U.S. Bankruptcy Court Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) Bankruptcy Petition #: 13-53846-swr

Date filed: 07/18/2013

Assigned to: Judge Steven W. Rhodes Chapter 9 Voluntary No asset

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Filing Date	#		Docket Text	
08/09/2013		316	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 08/02/13 RE: Status Conference. THIS TRANSCRIPT WILL BE MADE ELECTRONICALLY AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 91 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF FILING, TRANSCRIPT RELEASE DATE IS 11/8/2013. Until that time, the transcript may be viewed at the Clerk's Office by parties who do not receive electronic notice and participated in the proceeding. A copy of the transcript may be purchased from the official court transcriber Lois Garrett at 517.676.5092. (RE: related document(s) 282 Transcript Request, 284 Transcript Request, 285 Transcript Request, 289 Transcript Request, 291 Transcript Request, 315 Transcript Request). Redaction Request Due By 08/30/2013. Redacted Transcript Submission Due By 09/6/2013. Transcript access will be restricted through 11/8/2013. (Garrett, Lois) (Entered: 08/09/2013)	
08/29/2013		685	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 08/21/13 RE: HEARING RE. EMERGENCY MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE JULY 25, 2013, STAY ORDER; EXPEDITED HEARING RE. NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF DEFENDANT SYNCORA GUARANTEE, INC.'S, EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND CONDUCT EXPEDITED DISCOVERY; STATUS HEARING RE. CORRECTED MOTION TO ASSUME LEASE OR EXECUTORY CONTRACT; ADVERSARY PROCEEDING 13–04942 – STATUS CONFERENCE RE. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEBTOR'S EX PARTE MOTION FOR AN ORDER SHORTENING NOTICE, STAYING FURTHER BRIEFING AND SCHEDULING AN EXPEDITED HEARING WITH RESPECT TO MOTION OF DEBTOR CITY OF DETROIT TO SCHEDULE STATUS CONFERENCE, SET BRIEFING SCHEDULES AND MAINTAIN STATUS QUO. THIS TRANSCRIPT WILL BE MADE ELECTRONICALLY AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 91 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF FILING, TRANSCRIPT RELEASE DATE IS 11/29/2013. Until that time, the transcript may be viewed at the Clerk's Office by parties who do not receive electronic notice and participated in the proceeding. A copy of the transcript may be purchased from the official court transcriber Lois Garrett at 517.676.5092. (RE: related document(s) 570 Transcript Request, 620 Transcript Request, 634 Transcript Request, 661 Transcript Request, 1 Redacted Transcript Request, 649 Transcript Request, 661 Transcript Request, 1 Redacted Transcript Submission Due By 09/26/2013. Transcript access will be restricted through 11/29/2013. (Garrett, Lois) (Entered: 08/29/2013)	
08/30/2013		<u>693</u>	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 08/28/13 RE: Opinion re. Stay Issue; Status Hearing re. Corrected Motion to Assume Lease or Executory Contract; Motion for Protective Order, Adversary Proceeding 13–04942 – Status Conference. THIS TRANSCRIPT WILL BE MADE ELECTRONICALLY AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 91 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF FILING, TRANSCRIPT RELEASE DATE IS 11/29/2013. Until that time,	

		the transcript may be viewed at the Clerk's Office by parties who do not receive electronic notice and participated in the proceeding. A copy of the transcript may be purchased from the official court transcriber Lois Garrett at 517.676.5092. (RE: related document(s) 673 Transcript Request, 679 Transcript Request, 681 Transcript Request, 687 Transcript Request, 690 Transcript Request). Redaction Request Due By 09/20/2013. Redacted Transcript Submission Due By 09/27/2013. Transcript access will be restricted through 11/29/2013. (Garrett, Lois) (Entered: 08/30/2013)
11/19/2013	<u>1770</u>	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 11/14/13 RE: 2:36 p.m. Motion of the Objectors for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery in Connection with Motion of the Debtor for a Final Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 105, 362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(e), 364(f), 503, 507(a)(2), 904, 921 and 922 (I) Approving Post–Petition Financing, (II) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Claim Status and (III) Modifying Automatic Stay. THIS TRANSCRIPT WILL BE MADE ELECTRONICALLY AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 91 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF FILING, TRANSCRIPT RELEASE DATE IS 02/18/2014. Until that time, the transcript may be viewed at the Clerk's Office by parties who do not receive electronic notice and participated in the proceeding. A copy of the transcript may be purchased from the official court transcriber Lois Garrett at 517.676.5092. (RE: related document(s) 1732 Transcript Request, 1737 Transcript Request, 1738 Transcript Request, 1748 Transcript Request, 1752 Transcript Request, 1754 Transcript Request). Redaction Request Due By 12/10/2013. Redacted Transcript Submission Due By 12/17/2013. Transcript access will be restricted through 02/18/2014. (Garrett, Lois) (Entered: 11/19/2013)
11/28/2013	<u>1875</u>	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 11/27/13 RE: 11:19 a.m. – City of Detroit's Motion for Entry of an Order Establishing Pre–Trial and Trial Procedures and Setting Additional Hearings (Docket #1788). THIS TRANSCRIPT WILL BE MADE ELECTRONICALLY AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 91 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF FILING, TRANSCRIPT RELEASE DATE IS 02/27/2014. Until that time, the transcript may be viewed at the Clerk's Office by parties who do not receive electronic notice and participated in the proceeding. A copy of the transcript may be purchased from the official court transcriber Lois Garrett at 517.676.5092. (RE: related document(s) 1839 Transcript Request, 1841 Transcript Request, 1843 Transcript Request, 1848 Transcript Request). Redaction Request Due By 12/19/2013. Redacted Transcript Submission Due By 12/26/2013. Transcript access will be restricted through 02/27/2014. (Garrett, Lois) (Entered: 11/28/2013)
12/15/2013	2132	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 12/13/13 RE: Motion to Adjourn, Motion to Compel the Production of Privilege Log; Pretrial Conference. THIS TRANSCRIPT WILL BE MADE ELECTRONICALLY AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 91 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF FILING, TRANSCRIPT RELEASE DATE IS 03/17/2014. Until that time, the transcript may be viewed at the Clerk's Office by parties who do not receive electronic notice and participated in the proceeding. A copy of the transcript may be purchased from the official court transcriber Lois Garrett at 517.676.5092. (RE: related document(s) 2100 Transcript Request, 2106 Transcript Request, 2107 Transcript Request, 2114 Transcript Request, 2117 Transcript Request, 2125

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			Transcript Request, <u>2127</u> Transcript Request). Redaction Request Due By 01/6/2014. Redacted Transcript Submission Due By 01/13/2014. Transcript access will be restricted through 03/17/2014. (Garrett, Lois) (Entered: 12/15/2013)
		2280	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 12/18/13 RE: IN RE: MOTION OF THE DEBTOR FOR A FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO 11 USC SECTIONS 105, 362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(e), 364(f), 503, 507(a)(2), 904, 921, AND 922(I) APPROVING POST-PETITION FINANCING, (II) GRANTING LIENS AND PROVIDING SUPERPRIORITY CLAIMS STATUS AND (III) MODIFYING AUTOMATIC STAY (DKT #1520) MOTION OF THE DEBTOR FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER (1) AUTHORIZING THE ASSUMPTION OF THAT CERTAIN FORBEARANCE AND OPTIONAL TERMINATION AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 365(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, (II) APPROVING SUCH AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 9019, AND (III) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF (DKT #17) CORRECTED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER (I) AUTHORIZING THE ASSUMPTION OF THAT CERTAIN FORBEARANCE AND OPTIONAL TERMINATION AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 365(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (II) APPROVING SUCH AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 365(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (II) APPROVING SUCH AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 9019, and (III) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF (Dkt #157). THIS TRANSCRIPT WILL BE MADE ELECTRONICALLY AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC 91 DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF FILING, TRANSCRIPT RELEASE DATE IS 03/21/2014. Until that time, the transcript may be viewed at the Clerk's Office by parties who do not receive electronic notice and participated in the proceeding. A copy of the transcript may be purchased from the official court transcriber Deborah Kremlick at 810.635.7084. (RE: related document(s) 2215 Transcript Request). Redaction Request Due By 01/10/2014. Redacted Transcript Submission Due By 01/17/2014. Transcript access will be restricted through 03/21/2014. (Kremlick,
12/20/2013			Deborah) (Entered: 12/20/2013)

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE: CITY OF DETROIT,

Docket No. 13-53846

MICHIGAN,

Detroit, Michigan

August 2, 2013

Debtor. . 10:01 a.m.

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HEARING RE. STATUS CONFERENCE

MOTION OF DEBTOR FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER (I) AUTHORIZING THE ASSUMPTION OF THE CERTAIN FORBEARANCE AND OPTIONAL TERMINATION AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 365(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, (II) APPROVING SUCH AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 9019 AND (III) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF (DOCKET #17); MOTION OF THE DEBTOR FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER (A) DIRECTING AND APPROVING FORM OF NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT OF CASE AND MANNER OF SERVICE AND PUBLICATION OF NOTICE AND (B) ESTABLISHING A DEADLINE FOR OBJECTIONS TO ELIGIBILITY AND A SCHEDULE FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION (DOCKET #18); MOTION OF DEBTOR FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER APPOINTMENT KURTZMAN CARSON CONSULTANTS, LLC, AS CLAIMS AND NOTICING AGENT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C., SECTION 156(c), SECTION 105(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND BANKRUPTCY RULE 2002 (DOCKET #19); AND MOTION OF DEBTOR, PURSUANT TO SECTION 1102(a)(2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER DIRECTING THE APPOINTMENT OF A

COMMITTEE OF RETIRED EMPLOYEES
BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEVEN W. RHODES
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please 1 be seated. Case Number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan. 2 3 THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. 4 ATTORNEYS: Good morning, your Honor (collectively). THE COURT: We are going to begin as we did the last 5 time with the admission of an attorney to the Bar of the 6 7 Who would like to be admitted? Step forward, please. Court. 8 MR. ROSSMAN: Good morning, your Honor. 9 Rossman. THE COURT: Mr. Rossman, are you prepared to take 10 11 the oath of admission to the Bar of the Court? 12 MR. ROSSMAN: Yes, I am. 1.3 THE COURT: Please raise your right hand --14 MR. ROSSMAN: Sorry. 15 THE COURT: -- carefully. Do you affirm that you 16 will conduct yourself as an attorney and counselor of this 17 Court with integrity and respect for the law, that you have read and will abide by the civility principles approved by 18 19 the Court, and that you will support and defend the 20 Constitution and laws of the United States? 2.1 MR. ROSSMAN: I do. 22 THE COURT: Welcome, sir. 23 Thank you, your Honor. MR. ROSSMAN: 24 THE COURT: Before we begin our status conference 25 today, I need to remind everyone of the rules for the use of

cellular phones in the courthouse and the rules for those listening to these proceedings through CourtCall. District Court Local Rule 83.31(f) governs the use of cellular phones and other communication devices. An attorney appearing in connection with any judicial proceeding may bring a phone into our federal court facility. However, the phone cannot be used at all while in a courtroom. In other words, texting, talking on the phone, recording, or taking pictures of the proceedings is not permitted in the courtroom. Attorneys may use cellphones in the approved attorney conference room on the second floor of this building.

Now let me address the use of CourtCall to listen in on these proceedings. Its use is restricted to attorneys and their clients who are parties in this case. CourtCall is not to be used or accessed by the media or the public. The law prohibits the simultaneous public broadcast of court proceedings. The Court expects that, as officers of the court, attorneys will respect this restriction. The Court understands that this is an important and valuable service, but it can only continue to make this service available if this restriction is observed. The audio recording of all court hearings will be posted on the court's website very shortly after the hearings are concluded and will in that way be available to the media and the public without charge.

Okay. So now turning to our status conference, I'm

going to shuffle the order of the agenda just a little bit.

I've decided to do the review by me of the Court's limited role in Chapter 9 cases first, and then we'll do the items -- the rest of the items on the status conference agenda pretty much in the order stated, and then, of course, we will consider the motions that are on the calendar for today.

It is important for the parties and the public to understand the very limited role that a Bankruptcy Court and a bankruptcy judge play in a municipal bankruptcy case under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. Let me first try to describe what that role is and then discuss what that role is not. Primarily, the Court's role in this case is to resolve the legal issues that the parties raise as the city moves through this Chapter 9 process. In general, there are two main challenges that we can readily expect the city to face in this case. The first is to establish that it is eligible for Chapter 9 relief. If it meets that challenge, then its next challenge is to establish that its plan to adjust its debts meets the requirements for confirmation under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Beyond those two major issues, the parties may present other issues to the Court during the case. These may involve whether to approve the city's assumption or rejection of its contracts, including its union contracts; whether to grant creditors relief from the stay against litigation that

the Court and the law have imposed; whether to approve of certain settlements; whether to approve of certain kinds of proposed borrowings; and, finally, what dates and deadlines to set as we move the case to its conclusion, whatever that conclusion might be.

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In addition, the Court sees three other roles for The first is to facilitate, to the greatest extent possible, the consensual resolution of disputes. end, I have proposed a process of mediation, which I will discuss with counsel later. The second is to apply procedures of judicial management in this case that will meet the requirement to -- of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination The circumstances of this case make that of this case. requirement imperative and one that the Court intends to fulfill with the highest degree of commitment, but the Court, of course, cannot do this alone. In fulfilling this commitment, the Court requests input from the attorneys as well as their full cooperation and, indeed, their partnership. In a few minutes, the attorneys and I will discuss what dates and deadlines should be set in this case so that we can meet the requirement for the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of this case.

The third additional role for the Court is to recognize and appreciate the enormous public interest in this

case and to facilitate, to the greatest extent possible, public access to the Court's proceedings. However, there are certain restrictions that the Court must ask the public and the media to accept. Some of these restrictions are imposed by law. For example, as I said before, the law prohibits the simultaneous broadcast of federal court proceedings. Other restrictions result from security concerns, and we request your patience in our security screening process as this helps to protect all of us. Other restrictions will have to be imposed just to allow the process to function properly. For example, when and if disputes are submitted to mediation, that process must be both closed to the public and completely confidential in order for it to have any chance of success. Finally, there are simple practical limitations, so, for example, we only have so much space available in this courtroom and for overflow courtroom viewing.

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Now let me address what the Court's role is not and what the Court will not do. In this Chapter 9 case, as in all others, the city's elected and appointed officials and officers remain in full control of the city and its operations. Whatever their responsibilities for running the city before the case was filed, they still are. As a result, the Court has no role to play in managing or running the city or any of the services it provides. Any compliments, complaints, suggestions, or requests regarding city services

should continue to be directed to the city. There is nothing the Court can do about any of those matters. The Court does not displace city government in any respect, and nothing in Chapter 9 gives the Court any authority to hire, fire, or supervise anyone in city government. The city's officials are not accountable to this Court for how they run the city.

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There is a second way in which it is important to understand the limited role of the Court in this case.

Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code states that it is the city's responsibility to propose and file a plan. The Court's role is only to determine whether the plan that the city proposes meets the requirements of Chapter 9. It is not the Court's role to dictate to the city what its plan should state or even to suggest anything about it. That is entirely for the city to decide after, of course, discussing and attempting to negotiate the plan with its creditors.

Any questions about what the Court's role is or is not? Okay. So let's now then move on to the next item on our status conference agenda. I'll ask the representatives of the city to address the Court regarding the status of the filing of the list of creditors under Section 924 and any potential amendments. Sir.

MR. HEIMAN: Good morning, your Honor. David Heiman from Jones Day on behalf of the city. I hope the microphone is working properly after the attack on it, but what -- and

thank you for those comments. They're very helpful, indeed, especially about the plan process and understanding that you have proposed a plan deadline -- a plan filing deadline, which I will address in a few minutes. As you have suggested, I will take these one at a time. I assume that you will want to hear from others, to the extent they wish to be heard.

THE COURT: Yeah. At this point I just need the record to state the city's compliance with the filing of the list of creditors and if you intend or foresee any amendments to it.

MR. HEIMAN: Well, we did, I'm happy to say, file the list of creditors last night, so that's the easy part. I cannot speak really -- it's 3,500 pages, so I cannot speak to whether there are amendments. Actually, this list itself was an amendment for changing of addresses and the like --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. HEIMAN: -- and so I hope it's complete, but we may find during the course of the case that we will supplement it, so I don't --

THE COURT: Okay. My only encouragement to you would be that if you determine a need to amend that list, you do so promptly.

MR. HEIMAN: Thank you, your Honor. We will do that.

THE COURT: So the next item is the disclosure by the city of the status of its negotiations with creditors.

MR. HEIMAN: Yes, your Honor. That might take a few more minutes than the last item.

THE COURT: Um-hmm, yes.

MR. HEIMAN: I'd first like to say we all know that we are in a very serious situation here, so rather than drag everybody through the blow-by-blow of how we got to our proposal and so forth, I'd like to just refer the Court and others to the Orr declaration that --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. HEIMAN: -- I think does that in great detail at pages 52 to 73. I would like to say that there was a significant effort that went into preparing that, and that was followed up by meetings, many meetings with creditors, informational and issue-oriented meetings. The proposal we made, as your Honor knows, was 128 pages. It was made public on the city website for all to see, and from our standpoint we feel we've done our best to basically lay open the relevant aspects of the city's finances to everyone, most particularly to our creditors. In that presentation, we --

THE COURT: I have to interrupt you. I don't intend this to be your opening statement on the issue of whether your client has negotiated in good faith because that's an eligibility issue. What I really want to hear is what the

current status is and what negotiations, if any, have taken place since the case was filed.

MR. HEIMAN: Yes, your Honor. We have had discussions in the last week and have discussions even scheduled today --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. HEIMAN: -- and next week, so discussions are continuing. However, in terms of the status of discussions, it's clear that there are significant differences between the city and its unsecured creditors distinguished from its secured creditors.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. HEIMAN: Those differences are not surprising based on the limited resources that the city has available, so in our book -- and that's what I was getting to -- there was a proposal made, so our proposal is out on the table. I don't mean this in terms of eligibility, and I certainly don't want to characterize any creditor positions here. That's not my objective. What I'd like to say is of course we are continuing to talk. We will hopefully continue to talk virtually every day as we get through this case or attempt to get through this case, but there are significant differences that we feel are going to be difficult to bridge. We believe those differences, again, are based on our limited resources to pay our creditors and their perspective on their

own positions and rights with respect to their claims, and so --

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THE COURT: How would you -- how would you characterize your client's willingness to continue to try, however, to bridge those differences?

MR. HEIMAN: I would say more than a willingness, your Honor, there is a commitment not only by Kevyn Orr and other people in the city but by his team of professionals to make itself available and, in fact, pursue discussions, as I say, every day of the week that we can with every constituency. And I would also like to add I don't want to mislead anybody. I believe that we've had constructive discussions and -- civil and friendly, and yet when it comes to the point of saying, "How do you view our proposal?" no one likes it, and that's not surprising. It requires significant -- our proposal requires significant across-theboard debt relief from our unsecured creditor body. So that is where we are, and if I may, I know this is another agenda item, but we welcome the idea of mediation because there are very serious issues here. We have, as I say, limitations, and, again, we would like to talk to creditors consistently, constantly. We have meetings scheduled even today and several meetings scheduled next week, and we will continue to schedule meetings, but the --

THE COURT: All right. Well, you know, I'll

certainly submit -- request your more specific comments regarding mediation as well as those of others when we get to that item on the agenda.

MR. HEIMAN: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's turn our attention to the proposed dates and deadlines item on the agenda, and I want to focus first on the schedule for resolution of the issue of eligibility. Before we set dates and deadlines and the extent of discovery, however, it would be helpful for me to get whatever sense I can from the attorneys involved as to what the eligibility issues will be, and so from the papers that have been filed so far, I think we can safely assume that there will be at least these two: one, did the city negotiate in good faith; and, two, did the governor properly authorize the Chapter 9 filing in light of what is argued to be the constitutional protection of pension rights. Do you or does anyone here see any other eligibility issues?

MR. HEIMAN: I think, your Honor, first of all, let me say that Mr. Bennett is going to address the motion that requests the eligibility schedule as well as your proposed --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HEIMAN: -- deadlines, so he may have more to say about this, but we believe that the statutory requirements for filing are going to be at issue, and, of course, we have our position on that. And also we understand

the governor's authority issue, especially after the last couple of weeks, so we are aware of that, but Mr. Bennett may have more to say about that at the time we get to the motion. Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me ask any other counsel, can any of you foresee any other eligibility issues?

MR. LAROSE: Good morning, your Honor. Lawrence
Larose representing Assured Municipal Finance Guaranty
Corporation, insurer of approximately \$2.5 billion of various
series of the city's indebtedness.

Your Honor, with respect to authorization -- we have made no decision as to objecting to eligibility, but with respect to authorization, your Honor, I respectfully suggest that it goes beyond the issue of pensions.

THE COURT: In what sense, sir?

MR. LAROSE: Compliance with the underlying Act in connection with the authorization of the Chapter 9.

THE COURT: Can you be more specific?

MR. LAROSE: No. As I said, your Honor, I'm not prepared to make an objection today on that issue. I just need to preserve it for the record.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LAROSE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, I don't want anyone to think that they need to address me at the microphone to preserve

anything for the record. You will be given an opportunity to object. That will be your deadline to state your eligibility objections.

MR. LAROSE: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: So we don't need that parade.

MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, I rose before, so I don't -- Sharon Levine, Lowenstein Sandler. We really were concerned that there might be a limitation on some of the reservations. We gave the Court a preview in the brief in support of 105, and we don't need to burden the record today.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Gordon.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor. Robert Gordon on behalf of the Detroit Retirement Systems. At the risk of not answering the question that you just asked, I just want to make sure from a procedural standpoint whether we're going to be able to go back to other questions that you've asked of Mr. Heiman that we might want to respond to, such as the status of negotiations. I didn't know if you wanted to hear from parties after you've gone through the list or whether we can weigh in on those issues for the Court at this time.

THE COURT: I don't really feel the need to have everyone respond to that. What I wanted from that was what I got, which was the city is willing to negotiate.

MR. GORDON: And I'm certainly not here to get into a polemic about it, but I wanted to make sure the Court was

aware of the status in a little more detail at the right time because obviously one of the things that the Court is considering is mediation, and I would like to have the opportunity to at least apprise the Court of why the discussions are where they are at this point with parties and why perhaps mediation may not be appropriate just yet, so --

THE COURT: Okay. Let's save that for --

MR. GORDON: Okay.

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THE COURT: -- that agenda item then.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I will want to hear from you then regarding that.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Any other thoughts -- go ahead, sir -- on what issues may arise in the context of eligibility?

MR. BENNETT: I'm Bruce Bennett from Jones Day, your Honor, and I have responsibility for the eligibility side of this today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BENNETT: My reading of the situation in terms of where the expected objections are is the same as yours from the pleadings that have been filed. We certainly expect the objection relating to the constitutionality of the statute, and we certainly expect the objection relating to good faith. I'm not aware of the objection Mr. Larose is

foreshadowing. One of the reasons for an early deadline for exclusivity objections, which will hopefully be -- I think we expect them to be genuine substantive objections -- is that it will help every subsequent step in the process if we have a clear and complete statement of what the objections are as rapidly as possible.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BENNETT: On the schedule in particular, the schedule is fine with us. I can report -- I want to report two things. There were really two objections to the whole scheduling process that were actually filed. One was did we really need to receive e-mail service of objections or would we just take them off ECF.

THE COURT: Hold on that one. We'll get to that later.

MR. BENNETT: Okay.

THE COURT: Right now I just want to talk about dates and deadlines.

MR. BENNETT: Okay. The only comment I'll talk about dates and deadlines is that we -- in private discussions, there is one party that has what I think are genuine special circumstances affecting their ability to comply with the August 19th and 23rd dates, and under the assumption that these dates stay the way they are, we've reached a separate accommodation that would work for the

debtor and for that party, and I guess I just wanted to make clear that -- or ask, your Honor, that when you did set deadlines, was it possible to make those kinds of informal adjustments where two sides thought they were appropriate without offending the overall schedule?

THE COURT: Well, the answer is most likely yes so long as it doesn't result in the delay of the hearing itself.

MR. BENNETT: And this one doesn't, and I think that's an appropriate guideline, and we will govern ourselves by that.

THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough. If those are the two primary issues -- and I recognize that there may be others that parties may assert in the meantime -- I have to ask with all sincerity, because you all know this case better than I do, what is the need for discovery, and what is the scope of the discovery that is needed? Now, let me, before you all answer that question, give you my uninformed analysis, admittedly uninformed analysis.

On the issue of whether the governor's authorization was proper, it strikes me that that is entirely a legal issue, and if anyone believes otherwise, I'd obviously be interested in hearing that, but I think we can all agree that the governor's authorization did not include a restriction on the city's ability to seek an impairment of pension rights, which is the fact that raises the issue.

Turning to the good faith negotiation issue, I have a sense -- and I could be wrong -- that anyone who might object on that ground has already firsthand knowledge of what the negotiations were or weren't, so, again, I would ask from a totally uninformed perspective what the need for discovery is. I ask this question because if there's not a need for discovery, we're going to have to think about even advancing eligibility from where I have tentatively suggested it.

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, since we would concur with your assessment, I'll cede the podium to others for now.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. CECCOTTI: Your Honor, I didn't mean to send Mr. Bennett away prematurely, but I wasn't clear exactly when you wanted us --

THE COURT: Now.

MS. CECCOTTI: -- to rise.

THE COURT: Please.

MS. CECCOTTI: Okay. Well, speaking for the UAW, I think what we have in the record certainly on the bankruptcy -- from the city's filings we have some, you know, documents that were filed in terms of their qualification statement, in terms of a memorandum of law, various declarations. I don't know that -- certainly for the UAW I don't think -- I wouldn't want the Court to think that we've scratched the surface in trying to unpack those and determine

to what extent any discovery is needed, so I would caution against perhaps assuming more than the parties or at least certainly we have had an opportunity to do. We expected to discuss with the Court, as we're doing today, a schedule for eligibility but not in the context of -- or not informed by anything other than an initial look at the papers that have been filed, so while it may be true that some or more of us were present at certain meetings, looking at the totality of what the city has filed, I think we would really need to take a harder look at that before we could say with any certainty that no discovery is needed really on any of the qualifications. So I realize that that is a rather general statement, but I would not want the Court to be misled in thinking that we are prepared certainly today with a, you know, sort of fully indexed and annotated view of the papers that the city has filed and a sort of plan of how to get to -- from those papers to a position that we might take let alone to a litigation schedule position.

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MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, for the record, Sharon Levine, Lowenstein Sandler. We would concur that the extent of discovery that we would need has not yet fully availed itself to us, but, at a minimum, to the extent that the city intends to rely on declarations to offer evidence in support of eligibility, we would want to take a close look at that evidence and probably seek documents and depositions with

regard to those proposed witnesses.

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In addition to that, one of the things that's probably going to come to light as we move forward in this process, your Honor, is there may be a definitional issue and a dispute with regard to what exactly constitutes negotiations because our view is that the meetings that have taken place to date have been more presentations without an opportunity for give and take. And in addition to that, your Honor, in reviewing the information that's in the data room, there's information that we would need even to evaluate just those presentations that's not yet in the data room, so if a negotiation over this kind of an economic situation goes as we've seen others go, the first step of the negotiation process is the diligence, so, you know, we appreciate the fact that the city has populated a data room. There's always stuff that has to get added to it and/or created. seen the soft model, if you will, of the debtor's business plan. And after that then there is the dispute that you have to work through with regard to what the assumptions are that underlie that business plan before you can get to whether or not the asks and the gives are appropriate or not appropriate, and we would respectfully submit that in addition to just the litigation aspect of the trial on eligibility, there may be a second silo of discovery that has to do with legitimate diligence requests in connection with

facilitating better and more meaningful negotiations or exchanges of information perhaps facilitated by the mediator who may be helping us with process as well as substance in order to get through this process constructively. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. That is a very helpful comment to make. Everyone in this room who has been in more than one bankruptcy case knows that there's very little about a debtor that's irrelevant to the bankruptcy case and very few requests that creditors make for information that is burdensome, and I am sure the city and its counsel understand that and will act accordingly.

MR. BJORK: Good morning, your Honor. Jeff Bjork from Sidley Austin on behalf of National Public Finance Guarantee. National insures about 2.5 billion of the city's debt obligations. I just want to echo the comments of counsel. We have been exchanging information requests with the city. We've been in major discussions with them about information we need, some of which actually goes to issues that may be pertinent to eligibility, some of which goes to issues that are beyond the scope of eligibility. While those discussions are continuing, what we had talked with Mr. Bennett about was potentially allowing us to participate in the discovery with eligibility because we think on the schedule it's tight. We support the schedule. We also think it might be the most efficient way to get the information

that, from our perspective, will help us better understand where this restructuring is going and, to your Honor's point about appointing a mediator, I think better inform the parties quicker on -- sooner in terms of where that mediation may be going. So just on that, what we had proposed, just one change in the schedule would be that the pretrial brief that you've set forth in terms of timing actually be the substantive objection that would be tied to any evidence that was intended to be presented at trial based upon the discovery policies itself.

THE COURT: I'm not sure I followed you. What is your request?

MR. BJORK: My request, your Honor, would be that the August 19th deadline --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BJORK: -- they have proposed that it be objections tied to specific facts. Our proposal is that we could participate in the eligibility based -- eligibility discovery based upon a reservation of rights to the extent we think that there are issues with an objection to the extent necessary based upon the facts to be determined through discovery supplemented and filed as part of the pretrial brief, so rather than -- so essentially, your Honor, what you end up with is one objection tied to the record as opposed to objection, discovery, and then a supplemental objection.

THE COURT: That makes me nervous, uneasy, because if I hear you right, what you're saying is you want to do discovery first and then decide whether and to what extent to object to eligibility?

MR. BJORK: We want to make a fully informed decision based upon the discovery that we determined and received from the city as to whether there is any grounds to object to eligibility, yes.

THE COURT: That's -- sir.

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MR. BENNETT: We are uncomfortable as well. I think that there was a number of things said. There's a lot of information about the city that's already available, and we log each and every request, and we respond to requests as we can, and if there are disputes about that, we can deal with it, but given that there's so much information available, it kind of is hard for us to understand how it is that one would not know the grounds on which they are objecting to eligibility at this time. We fully understand that facts currently unknown could conceivably surface later, and we would certainly not object if a fact unknown today found its way into a subsequent brief, but we think the August 19th deadline should require and call for an objection -- all grounds stated and facts then known that support the objection. And that's the way to narrow disputes and to have an economical piece of litigation going forward. Short of

that, it could be a wide-ranging procedural disaster that would be ridiculously expensive and we think should be avoided.

THE COURT: I agree, counsel. There certainly are circumstances in which the law permits amendments to pleadings. They are limited. They apply here, but as a general matter, the Court wants to set a firm deadline for the filing of objections to eligibility.

MR. BENNETT: Understood. Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Gordon.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor. Again, Robert Gordon on behalf of the Detroit Retirement Systems. I will focus just on the 109(c)(2) issue for a moment because Ms. Levine already commented on the 109(c)(5) issue of good faith and what have you. As to the 109(c)(2) issue, I certainly, in all candor, agree with the Court that it could appear that it is strictly a legal issue. To that end and consistent with the comments I've just heard, it would seem to us -- and this is something that is consistent with what we filed yesterday afternoon -- that in addition to a deadline for the filing of an eligibility objection, there ought to be a deadline for the city to then file some kind of a response, and then we could see if there is any kind of a discovery issue that needs to be addressed.

THE COURT: Um-hmm, um-hmm, yeah.

MR. GORDON: So that's my suggestion --1 THE COURT: I saw that you submitted that, and that 2 3 was not in there, not by intent. It just didn't occur to me 4 to put that in there, so I would like to hear from the city 5 regarding that question. Thank you. 6 MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor. 7 THE COURT: So the question is should we have a 8 deadline for the city to file a written response or a series 9 of written responses to the eligibility objections that are 10 filed? 11 MR. BENNETT: I certainly don't have a problem 12 filing any pleading that the Court thinks would be helpful to it. 1.3 14 THE COURT: Um-hmm. MR. BENNETT: I do think it's important to note --15 16 and I hope people didn't miss it in the flurry of filings --17 that we had filed a statement of qualifications and a fairly 18 extensive --19 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 20 MR. BENNETT: -- brief on the subject of eligibility 21 already --22 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 23 MR. BENNETT: -- so it's not as if our position is a 24 mystery. 25 THE COURT: Um-hmm. All right. I want to give

serious consideration to this and see how it can be worked into the schedule. Okay. But to refocus us here, the question is what about discovery on the issue of eligibility?

MS. PATEK: Your Honor, Barbara Patek appearing on behalf of the public safety unions. I would echo Ms.

Levine's comments with respect to the definitional question on negotiation. We concur with the deadline. We think this is an aggressive and tight scheduling order as it stands now. We're prepared to abide by it subject to -- you know, for good cause shown, and it sounds like the debtor has already acknowledged and agreed to that with one other party, so with that caveat --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MS. PATEK: -- and the issue of the city's response being considered, we're prepared to go forward.

THE COURT: Um-hmm. Anyone else? Okay.

MR. BENNETT: On the subject of good faith, I agree with your Honor that it doesn't take a great deal of exploration to figure out whether the parties did or did not act in good faith, and I would, frankly, think that there's --

THE COURT: Well, whether the city negotiated in good faith.

MR. BENNETT: Well, that's true; however, if your Honor reads the cases, you'll find that the emphasis quickly

shifts to what both sides were doing because it takes -
THE COURT: Fair enough, but the eligibility
requirement --

MR. BENNETT: Okay. And so --

THE COURT: -- is the city.

MR. BENNETT: -- just to lay out very briefly, Mr. Heiman, I think quite properly -- I'm going to do the same thing. We're very reluctant to say what our negotiating partners said to us. We feel comfortable telling you everything about what we said, and, frankly, much of what we have said is public. It's the other side that your Honor does not know about and has to find out about on some basis to make an assessment.

THE COURT: Fair enough.

MR. BENNETT: And I am submitting that, in fact, if you had before you what the city proposed and what the responses were and were there responses in all circumstances in the negotiating period that we tried hard to make productive, I think you would, frankly, have all you need, so I do think that in the context of parties who are going to object to good faith of the city in the negotiating process, you need some form of an arrangement, I think, to benefit your decision-making to find out exactly what that party said in response to the city's very public proposal.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BENNETT: Thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Brimer. One second, sir. Mr. Morris, I do want to hear from you, so stand by.

MR. MORRIS: All right. I was told I need to get the --

MS. BRIMER: Good morning, your Honor. Lynn M. Brimer appearing on the Retired Detroit Police Members
Association. It is an association of approximately 240 retired Detroit Police Department personnel who either are currently or will in the future collect pursuant to the police and fire-fighters pension.

I raise one issue with respect to the Court's deadlines and the comments this morning, and that is up later this morning, your Honor, is an issue with respect to whether or not a committee will be appointed to represent the retirees. And there are many issues that we have with respect to that motion, but with respect to the Court's deadlines, the concern I raise right now and just want to be sure the Court is cognizant of this is that if there is -- if the Court does determine that --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MS. BRIMER: -- it is appropriate and within the authority of the Code for the trustee to appoint a committee, these deadlines may be extremely aggressive because it's very possible that a committee would not be constituted, and

counsel and what other -- whatever other professionals would be required would not even be in place by this deadline, so I just --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

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MS. BRIMER: -- would like to ensure that the Court keep that in mind when evaluating the deadlines.

THE COURT: Right. I do want to be very sensitive to that issue and build into our process an adequate opportunity for everyone to be heard, of course.

MS. BRIMER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Sir. And then I'll hear Mr. Morris next.

MR. GOLDBERG: Okay. I just have a brief question, your Honor. My name is Jerome Goldberg, and I'm on --

THE COURT: Mr. Morris, there's a seat for you here. Go ahead, sir.

MR. GOLDBERG: And I represent party of interest
David Sole. I just had a brief question, and I excuse the
Court for my own ignorance in the procedures in this matter,
but the deadline to serve written discovery requests for
August 23rd, just for my own clarification, that specifically
is discovery requests relative to the eligibility question;
is that correct?

THE COURT: Yes. All of this discovery is the discovery needed for the eligibility issues that are raised

in the objections.

MR. GOLDBERG: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Morris.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, Ms. Brimer made my point.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. Then you're all set. Would anyone else like to be heard on this issue of the necessary discovery? All right. I will take your comments under advisement and issue an appropriate scheduling order. There are other deadlines. We've been talking about deadlines regarding eligibility. I suggested that we might want to have a deadline for the city to file motions to assume or reject executory contracts, including collective bargaining agreements. Sir.

MR. HEIMAN: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. I think I can address that pretty quickly. Most of our collective bargaining agreements have expired, the large majority. We have six or seven still remaining in connection with the work at Detroit Water and Sewer District. It is our view at this point that we will not seek -- we will not need to seek court relief on those --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. HEIMAN: -- and we will advise you at our earliest opportunity if that should change.

THE COURT: Okay. What about other kinds of executory contracts, leases, et cetera, et cetera?

MR. HEIMAN: We have nothing on tap today for that in terms of deadlines. As your Honor may know, we have a list of noncore assets that we're dealing with. They include water and sewer and the Coleman Young Airport, et cetera, et cetera, the Institute of Art. There is a list in our book and our -- and a description about them, and we hope on some of them, at least, to be able to bring something to your Honor that will be beneficial to the estate. We are not anywhere near prepared to do that today, so I don't think we have anything today specifically in that area.

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There is one that comes to my mind. There is one issue right now, and I'm reluctant to raise it slightly, but I feel I have to so that there's no question of the city somehow waiving a right to object, but, as your Honor may know, the attorney general has filed a notice of appearance which was preceded and followed by public statements. Without going into a lot of detail, that confuses us a bit about the role the attorney general expects to take in this case. We want to try to unravel that and not come to your Honor unless we have to, but that is something that we have to look at, and, you know, we won't need any special hearings. I know that you have a schedule on omnibus and so forth that, by the way, is perfectly fine with us, so with that -- and, you know, we're talking about some post-petition financing that we'd probably like to pursue, and that

requires --

2 THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. HEIMAN: -- a long explanation as well, and we would hope that sometime in the near term we will know when we would like to --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. HEIMAN: -- seek your Honor's views of that, but, again, we're not ready today to suggest any deadlines.

THE COURT: All right. In other kinds of reorganization cases, as you well know, courts do commonly set a deadline for the assumption or rejection of executory contracts so that the plan confirmation process doesn't get delayed when such issues are raised just before confirmation, so I guess I'm willing to grant you some latitude here, but I don't want to get to plan confirmation and then run into issues of what contracts are going to be assumed or rejected.

MR. HEIMAN: Your Honor, you raise a very good point, and we have been looking at executory contracts. Without belaboring the issue, it's a huge job in this city to look at --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HEIMAN: -- those, and at this point we have nothing specific that we know of that we need to bring to you, but there are -- in what I call the asset columns there are some leases and arrangements and whatever that at some

point -- I am not talking about, you know, like next year -- at some point hopefully this year we will bring to your attention if --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HEIMAN: -- we think we need to.

THE COURT: Well, I think you understand my concern here.

MR. HEIMAN: Yeah. And I appreciate it, and we will make a special effort to accelerate our evaluation of those executory contracts. Shall I go on with your agenda, your Honor?

THE COURT: Well, let me just ask the question of really everyone in the room point blank. I have suggested these discovery deadlines, the date for a final pretrial conference, and a date to begin the trial on eligibility.

Assuming I agree that discovery is required, and I'm inclined to at this point, based on the record we have so far, does anyone object to any of those dates on lines 8, 9, 10, and 11 of my Notice of Proposed Dates and Deadlines?

MR. HEIMAN: Sorry.

MS. CECCOTTI: Your Honor, once again Babette

Ceccotti, Cohen, Weiss & Simon, LLP, for the UAW. I'm not so

sure I'm rising specifically to object to those particular

items, but I guess with the open-endedness of -- despite the

efforts here today to try to outline for your Honor some

discovery issues -- and I should also point out that from our perspective, some of the discovery may extend, you know, beyond the city, so I'm wondering whether it would be helpful if the Court were to perhaps think about the discovery schedule and then perhaps build on that because there may not be enough time. And, again, I don't think anyone here is looking to delay any of this unduly, but there's a lot here, and one of the things that I'm sure is not in anyone's interest is to have some of these issues rushed. One doesn't know what one is going to find in discovery, so I --

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THE COURT: Well, let me just ask you. Are any of the other discovery deadlines that I proposed here, in your view, too aggressive?

MS. CECCOTTI: Yes. I think they might be too aggressive. They might be too aggressive.

THE COURT: Which one or all of them?

MS. CECCOTTI: Well, again, if we're looking at the whole schedule as a package, the whole schedule is fairly aggressive in and of itself. In addition -- and we've already had the reference made to the retiree motion -- we don't know exactly how your Honor is going to view that motion in the context of the schedule, and there have been some suggestions that it would be worth considering this schedule in the context of where your Honor ends up on the retiree motion, so I wonder if it might be possible to

perhaps revisit the totality of the schedule, at least the block of time, after your Honor has had a chance to hear the parties on the retiree motion. It might actually inform the Court rather than to try to set something now and then try to shoehorn the retiree motion — the retiree committee process, assuming your Honor authorizes the motion, into a schedule that your Honor is saying now it's just a scheduling suggestion.

THE COURT: All right. Does anyone else want to be heard on the specific dates and deadlines that I have set forth here?

MS. PATEK: Your Honor, I apologize. Not specific dates and deadlines, but I want -- if I may go back for a moment to the 365 issue just --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PATEK: -- for the matter of preserving something. I represent the public safety unions. Barbara Patek. One of those, the Detroit Police Officers

Association, to my knowledge and understanding -- and I'm not up to the minute because I'm not their labor lawyer -- does have a contract in place, at least as of a couple of days ago, so I don't know if that perhaps with everything they have on their plate was simply off the city's radar screen, but we were looking -- I don't have a particular deadline to propose, and I just want that noted for the record.

THE COURT: Mr. Heiman.

MR. HEIMAN: Your Honor, that is inconsistent with our understanding. There may be a CET, what's -- you know, was something unilaterally opposed by the city, but we don't view that as an executory contract, so we don't think that that is correct that there is a CBA on police, fire, or otherwise that is extant right now.

THE COURT: I'm hearing buzzing in the loudspeaker system, which most commonly means someone has their telephone on. Please check your telephones and be sure they're off for me.

MR. HEIMAN: I think I might have changed -- do you still hear it?

THE COURT: Oh, you moved the microphone, and maybe that solved the problem. Well, okay. If that's what it took, great.

MR. HEIMAN: I have -- I am now on 3(b) of your agenda. Is that correct, your Honor, the plan filing date?

THE COURT: Well, before we get to that, I want to ask whether there are any other potential motions or adversary proceedings that you or anyone else foresees that we should address before we get to the issue of setting a plan deadline. Any other motions --

MR. HEIMAN: Not other than what I --

THE COURT: -- or adversary proceedings?

MR. HEIMAN: No, your Honor, not --1 THE COURT: Anyone else foresee any other kinds of 2 3 motions or adversary proceedings that it would be helpful to 4 know about now and perhaps set a time schedule for? Sir. 5 MR. HACKNEY: Good morning, your Honor. Stephen 6 Hackney on behalf of Syncora. I wanted to rise briefly to 7 say that it is possible that there will be additional 8 adversary proceedings arising out of the COPs and swap structure that I think the Court has read --9 10 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 11 MR. HACKNEY: -- probably more than it wants to 12 about, but there is already --13 THE COURT: Probably. MR. HACKNEY: Probably. Already litigation has been 14 15 initiated by the city against Syncora. Syncora has also 16 initiated litigation against the swap counterparties in New 17 York. 18 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 19 MR. HACKNEY: I think the Court has been made aware 20 of that. 2.1 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. HACKNEY: And I cannot be more specific other 23 than to say that --24 THE COURT: Right. 25 MR. HACKNEY: -- it's entirely possible as you're

resolving -- as the various courts are resolving where this can proceed, there may be additional adversaries that arise out of that structure.

THE COURT: Right. Good. Thank you for reminding me of that.

MR. HACKNEY: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. HEIMAN: I'm sorry, your Honor. I actually appreciate that supplement because there may be some motion or adversary arising out of that debt that's not with respect to what's already being litigated, so --

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. HEIMAN: -- we don't know today.

THE COURT: Well, if so, that would happen fairly soon and not likely to impact the plan confirmation schedule.

MR. HEIMAN: Right.

THE COURT: All right. Anyone else with any other possible motions or adversary proceedings? I have one I'd like to suggest to you, although we'll address that when we get to the issue of committees. All right.

Let's talk about the deadline to file a plan. I suggested March 1st.

MR. HEIMAN: Your Honor, we enthusiastically accept that deadline. I would only supplement that acceptance with a statement of desire on the part of the city, if I may.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. HEIMAN: And that is that we hope -- and our view is that time is our enemy and that the facts are not going to change no matter how long we wait, whether it's on eligibility or filing of a plan, so we intend or hope to run our process on parallel paths so that we can move as swiftly as possible through this case, and, therefore, it is our hope and desire that we will file a plan by year end, which is well in advance of the deadline you have set. Now, there are a lot of issues surrounding that, but that is our own target, so --

THE COURT: Um-hmm. All right. Well, it would be the Court's intention when a plan is filed to reconvene a conference like this to set a schedule for litigating whatever the issues are regarding that plan.

MR. HEIMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Would anyone else like to be heard regarding the deadline that the Court proposed? All right. Thank you.

MR. HEIMAN: Next is item four, the mediation proposal, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. Let's turn our attention to that.

Before you commence, I have a little introduction to give.

The Court does solicit the comments regarding its proposed mediation order. The reason that the Court provided notice of its proposed mediation order is because it would like

comments from you on whether this is a good idea in this case or not. First, the Court would like to hear from counsel regarding the concept of mediation in this case. Then we can discuss the particulars of the order itself. The Court does strongly encourage mediation in this case in order to facilitate the consensual resolution of disputes to the greatest extent possible. Bankruptcy certainly does offer litigation as a means to resolve disputes, and the Court is, of course, fully prepared to conduct the litigation of any issue that the parties decide requires it. However, the goal of bankruptcy is almost always better served through the consensual litigation of disputes.

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What is the goal of bankruptcy? The purpose and goal of bankruptcy is to give the city a fresh start in its financial life and to do so in the most expeditious and efficient way possible. That's the goal of this bankruptcy and really all bankruptcies. Everyone who practices in the field of bankruptcy law understands that consensual resolution will meet the goals of promoting the city's fresh start better -- much better than litigation. There are two reasons for this. The first reason is that after this bankruptcy case is over, however it is resolved, many of the city's creditors will continue to have long-term relationships with the city. You know who you are, the unions, the bondholders, the employees, the trade creditors.

Settlements can stabilize and even strengthen those long-term relationships. On the other hand, litigation is not designed for that purpose, and experience strongly suggests that it will not have that effect. It may even be counterproductive.

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Why is stabilizing and enhancing those long-term relationships important to the city's fresh start? For the simple reason that if these relationships are stronger and more cooperative, it will help the city's recovery and facilitate the city's ability to become the city that it wants to be. Strong relationships between the city and its creditors should also be important to the creditors because it will place the city in a better position to do more business with its creditors.

Finally and perhaps most important of all is that consensual resolution of the city's disputes with its creditors is in the best interest of the citizens of the City of Detroit. Without addressing their legal rights as such, the city that they deserve, a city that is strong, vibrant, and responsive, is more readily achieved after a settlement between the city and its creditors than after long, expensive, and potentially bitter litigation. As a result, the citizens of Detroit also have an important interest in the outcome of this case that is as prompt and efficient as possible. Sir.

MR. HEIMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Hold on one second, please. Okay. All right. After all, I do need to ask you to turn that microphone so that its head is facing directly at you.

MR. HEIMAN: Is this better?

THE COURT: Turn it like 90 degrees so it's right -- pointed right at you. There you go.

MR. HEIMAN: Okay.

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THE COURT: That's it.

MR. HEIMAN: Sorry.

THE COURT: Okay. But, again, I'm hearing noise in the loudspeakers, so please check your phones to be sure they're all off. Go ahead.

MR. HEIMAN: First, the concept of mediation.

Obviously you articulated better than I could possibly why we support mediation. We want resolution. We don't want protracted litigation. We want to move swiftly. Time is our enemy, as I said. We are hopeful that a mediation process on all important issues that relate to the plan or otherwise, individual creditors' rights will be better served by mediation, so, again, we welcome that and appreciate your comments in that regard.

With respect to the order, which is your second question, we have no desire to change any of the language presented in the order as you've stated it.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And I want to

solicit the comments of others regarding the concept of mediation and the particulars of the order. It's probably not, however, appropriate to seek your comments in this forum regarding the proposed mediator, and so I am going to ask you if you have any comments, either -- on either side of the question about the proposed mediator, I'm going to give you a seven-day opportunity to submit to my chambers sealed and confidentially any such comments, and so the actual entry of the mediation order will be held up for that purpose, but at this point I would like to hear from others on the concept of mediation and the terms of the order.

MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, Sharon Levine, Lowenstein Sandler, and I'm not sure because of the informal sort of nature if I actually entered for whom I'm appearing, so with the Court's permission, the Michigan Council 25 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFLCIO, and Subchapter 98, the City of Detroit Retirees, which is the union's retirement group here in Detroit.

First, we support mediation. We support protecting our constituents in every way we possibly can within the core proceedings. We had some discussion in the retiree motion response about reservation of rights, and we've had some conversations with the city's attorneys with regard to that as well. We don't want the fact that we do recognize the

city has some serious woes here that it needs to address to in any way detract from our --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

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MS. LEVINE: -- ability to go down dual or three tracks.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MS. LEVINE: Two, with regard to the specific language of the order, we would just ask for a clarification with regard to decretal paragraph four, which I alluded to when I approached the podium earlier. In addition to mediating the difficult substantive issues that need to get done, we do seem to be having some issues which we're hoping that we're working through with regard to actually getting access to information and the ability to have more of a give and take in the process. And we're hoping that, to the extent that there is a mediator, it's a full-service mediator that can help us with process issues as well as substance issues. Thank you.

THE COURT: Good point. Thank you.

MR. GORDON: Your Honor, Robert Gordon again on behalf of the Detroit Retirement Systems. Your Honor, without waiver of our position that accrued pension benefits can't be diminished or impaired under the Michigan constitution, the systems are not simply standing pat on that position but are pursuing parallel -- the parallel path of

exploring ways in which the systems can be a part of the solution. Having said that, in the context of discussing mediation, it's important that -- again, harkening back to my comments from earlier, that the Court understand a little bit about where the negotiations actually stand. And this is not with respect to any comments about whether those negotiations meet the standard for good bid negotiations at all.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. GORDON: This is about whether there's been negotiations in general. To date there have been, as has been indicated, several presentational meetings with the city and the emergency manager and his financial and legal There were presentations made at the airport on There was a presentation made on June 20th regarding modifications possibly to pension and healthcare There was a financial due diligence session conducted in New York on -- I believe it was June 25th. There were further financial due diligence sessions conducted just on July 9th and 10th, roughly one week before this bankruptcy was filed. These were due diligence sessions. These were sessions to gather information. There were legal and financial advisors from all the major creditor constituents in a room asking questions about the cash flow forecast, for example, and that really is the basis for the proposal that was made by the emergency manager on June 14th.

Your Honor, those discussions made clear that there are a number of not immaterial but very material financial analyses that still need to be undertaken, and I want to make it very clear. I am not by saying this casting any criticism or aspersion on anyone. The emergency manager's team, as far as I know, is working very hard, but there is information that is not available at this time in the data room or otherwise, and some of that I can even give you an example because it's public. The emergency manager's proposal on —that was disseminated on June 14th has those cash flows available, a ten-year cash flow forecast there.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. GORDON: The emergency manager's proposal also references, for example -- and this is just one example -- that there may be an initiative to create a water authority. And in the root cause document that was issued a couple months back by the city, there was some indication that such an authority may free up tens of millions of dollars in revenues for the city. Those numbers are not in the cash flow forecast at this time.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. GORDON: And it's been readily accepted they haven't, and the analysis is still ongoing as to what that number should be. That is very important because if you look at the cash flow forecasts, the premise of the proposal by

the emergency manager begins by -- with the fact that, according to those cash flow forecasts, there is on average over the ten years about \$80 million a year available for payments to what are designated under his proposal as unsecured creditors. The root cause analysis talks about tens of millions. I believe it puts a range of maybe 30 to \$70 million on that, so you can imagine just that item alone, 30 to \$70 million versus \$80 million, these are huge numbers, and it makes it difficult to sit down and have fulsome negotiations when there are things that are still in flux like that. Again, it's part of the process. This is not a mom and pop convenience store situation. There are a lot of complexities, and I fully expect that the parties will engage to resolve those informational issues, but they haven't happened yet.

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The Retirement Systems have also -- I feel like I'm free to report to the Court -- have had discussions with their actuaries to discuss different issues relative to this matter. They are very complex issues, very complex issues with respect to the actuarial calculations, and we have kept the city --

THE COURT: This is the underfunding issue?

MR. GORDON: The underfunding issues or how cash

flows might be permitted as they -- whatever the cash flows

may be, how those could permit supporting the existing

benefits over time. We have kept the city, their legal and financial advisors apprised of our progress on that front with a view to being able to sit down with them, and it is, indeed, anticipated that later this month we will hopefully be able to sit down with our financial team and our actuaries in the same room with the emergency manager's team and his actuaries and start to have conceptual discussions about actuarial issues, but that is just at the beginning stage at this point, so I wanted to be clear about that. As a result, it is our feeling that while mediation -- we have absolutely no objection to the concept of mediation, we would respectfully submit it's premature at this point. We are going to make formal information requests of the city in the near future. It's been all informal up to now because of the out-of-court situation that we were in.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

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MR. GORDON: But we will be making formal requests, and, of course, the city will need time to respond to those requests. And then we would expect that the parties would engage in negotiations to narrow the issues, and we think that process needs to play out to some extent before we end up in mediation. We need better information, and we need to have had those discussions between the parties. So it would be our suggestion in that regard, respectfully, the Court consider something along the lines of perhaps having a status

conference every 30 days to see where we are in this negotiation process to gauge when mediation may be appropriate.

Rule 1001, as the Court has referenced, talks about both a just and speedy administration of the case. Just is as important as speedy is. We want to caution against expediency merely for the sake of expediency. We all have a sense of urgency. How could we not? But there is proceeding with all due dispatch, and then there's proceeding in haste and endangering parties' due process rights.

The sound bite that we hear that the city is broke is a catchy sound bite, but -- we all understand the urgency, but it is a bit of a sound bite. The city is not paying its unsecured bond debt at this time. The city is not paying its employer contributions at this time. The city is meeting its payroll obligations. So while everything needs to move with due speed -- we understand that -- again, it should not be used as an excuse to move through this process faster than is reasonable.

Your Honor, the stakes are high, and the men and women of this city, current employees and retirees, deserve to have their rights addressed in a careful and delicate manner and not in a more --

THE COURT: All right. You make really -MR. GORDON: -- blunt fashion all in the name of

expediency.

I thank you for them. As I see the issue that you raise, it is this. Who is in a better position to determine when the actual mediation discussions should begin, either a mediator or the Court? A mediator could meet with the parties on a regular basis informally, supervise the expedited exchange of information, and have potentially a better sense of when to begin negotiations, or the Court, whose processes are much more formal, much more public, more constrained. I'm inclined to think that the mediator is in a better position to say, okay, now it's time to actually begin discussions.

MR. GORDON: Your Honor, I will step back and say this. What you've just described is a much more three-dimensional mediation process than perhaps I was envisioning and has often been the case.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. GORDON: What you're describing I think could be constructive. I would not dispute that.

THE COURT: Well, please understand what I'm referring to here and what I envision here is entirely facilitative mediation. There's nothing that this mediator will have the authority to do in terms of compelling any particular outcome, so it's up to the parties to work with the mediator on setting the agenda, setting the schedule, and

working through the issues. The ultimate deliverable is a plan, assuming we get past eligibility, which I don't want to assume, but for purposes of this we want to assume it, a plan that has the support of enough creditors to be confirmed; right? And in that regard, there may be other disputes that should better be referred to a mediation panel than to the mediator who is working on debt adjustment, and I think we want to keep that option open also.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor, for those thoughts and comments.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GORDON: Yeah. Without revisiting my comments, it is consistent also with our concerns that are expressed with respect to the retiree committee that, again, the process not be used in a way that --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GORDON: -- allows someone in a perfunctory way to move --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GORDON: -- through this process and say we've met the obligations, let's just go to a plan confirmation hearing when the parties really haven't had a real meaningful opportunity to discuss the issues.

THE COURT: Right. You've already heard me speak on the subject of why a consensual resolution is better than a

cramdown.

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MR. GORDON: To that end, your Honor, the only other comment I would make is that as to the proposed mediation order itself --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GORDON: -- it is a little bit, I guess -- you know, your Honor, I'll strike that comment.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GORDON: Based upon your comments, I'm fine. Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, let me just offer this opportunity to you, Mr. Gordon, and really anyone. In the seven-day period that I'm going to allow for additional comments to be submitted to the Court, you should also take that as an opportunity to suggest any changes to the language or really anything about the order that you'd like.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Would anyone else like to be heard regarding the proposed mediation order concept or terms? No? Sir.

MR. HEIMAN: Your Honor, just two quick comments to what Mr. Gordon said. The first is that I don't intend to respond today to some of his characterizations. I don't think that would advance the ball on the subject we're talking about. And the second is your Honor asked me awhile

ago whether the city is willing to continue to negotiate with its creditors. I think I responded that we're committed to doing so, and I want to make that clear again in this context. We do not view mediation as a reason to not continue our discussions. Quite the contrary. If mediation is going to be successful at all, it's our obligation — and the burden falls on us — we recognize this — to move the ball here with information, discussions, or what have you, so we, again, endorse the mediation concept as well as the language of the order.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Let's move on then and talk about the proposed order appointing a fee examiner. Again, I have a bit of an introduction that I'd like to give you and everyone. In considering and addressing the issue of whether to appoint a fee examiner in this case, the Court wants to assure everyone who might be affected by such an order that it fully recognizes and accepts that neither Section 330 nor Section 1104 of the Bankruptcy Code applies in this Chapter 9 case. Those are the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that judges commonly rely upon in appointing fee examiners in Chapter 11 cases.

Likewise, the Court states on the record here that it has no reason to believe that the city's professional fees in this case either have been or will be either excessive or otherwise improper, no reason. Still, the Court has

concluded that it at least should suggest and discuss with counsel the merits of appointing an independent fee examiner. It is easy to predict in this case that there will be intense media and public scrutiny of the city's professional fees. Now, this is entirely natural and proper, and, frankly, the Court encourages the public to remain fully informed about all aspects of the case, including the professional fees that the city is asked to pay. There is, however, a blunt truth that motivates the Court to make this suggestion. this. If the city's professional fees and professional fee expenses have been processed through an independent fee examiner, then two things are more likely. First, the city's professionals will be in a much better position to justify those fees to the city, and, second, the city will -- the city itself will be in a much better position to justify those fees to the public and to the citizens of the city. Therefore, the Court sincerely hopes that the city and its professionals will recognize and accept this blunt truth and agree to some kind of a process for the independent review of the city's professional fee expenses. The parties and counsel should understand that the Court is willing to be quite flexible on the design of the process and is fully prepared to collaborate with counsel on the process of fee examination if we agree to it.

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There are, of course, many possible ways to

accomplish the goal. The process set forth in the Court's proposed order is only one way. Likewise, the Court is willing to be flexible regarding the process of selecting the independent fee examiner. If we can agree in principle to the concept, then I am confident we can work out the details and identify a qualified individual. Having said that, however, in order for the fee examiner to be truly independent, probably the selection should ultimately reside with the Court rather than with the city and its professionals.

So, again, I'd like to solicit first comments on the concept of an independent fee examiner and then regarding an appropriate process. Sir.

MR. HEIMAN: Your Honor, the city accepts and appreciates the concept, and we and the city and its professionals are committed to working with a fee examiner, whoever that may be.

As to the order, I had one I think very minor comment, but it's consistent with your comments about flexibility, which, as I understand your approach, would be -- this hearing or the entry of an order would be followed by a discussion between the fee examiner who you appoint and us, the city and its counsel.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HEIMAN: And so if you look at the first

sentence of paragraph 6 and less so to the first sentence of paragraph 5, there are issues in there, including rate per hour and so forth -- and that is, in my mind, going to be whatever it is, but it seems to us that that's somewhat covered by 4(c) or could be covered by 4(c) at least and that it might be better to move that to the proposed order that the fee examiner presents to your Honor.

THE COURT: Um-hmm, um-hmm, um-hmm. Okay.

MR. HEIMAN: With that minor suggestion -- and I must say it's not a big deal to us -- it's just a matter of how the process is going to work -- I think I've responded to your questions.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Any other comments on either the concept of a fee examiner or the terms of the proposed order or any other order?

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: Good morning, your Honor. Excuse me. Maria Giannirakis on behalf of Daniel McDermott, United States Trustee. Your Honor, I'm here on Mr. McDermott's behalf to comment on the Court's suggestion that a fee examiner might be appropriate in this case, and although we're not asking for the relief, we are offering the Court information on our experience in Chapter 11 cases, and if the Court finds this useful, I'd be happy to share it with you.

THE COURT: Please.

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: Thank you. We've certainly -- we

certainly see the utility of a fee examiner in this case. As the Court has stated, the fee examiner could advance the public interest and the public confidence by promoting transparency in this highly publicized case. Trustee has supported the use of fee examiners in complex Chapter 11 cases, and this endorsement is reflected in the new fee quidelines for larger Chapter 11 cases that the U.S. Trustee program has recently issued. The guidelines set forth several models for the use of fee examiners and fee committees and have proven effective. Most recently they have been effected in the GM and American Airlines cases. The fee examiner has not only proven to be effective and efficient in identifying problems such as over-staffing, but they've also raised other important legal issues for the Court's consideration. Just an example, in the GM case the fee examiner raised the issue of whether professionals should give notice of different rate increases. These guidelines and the information and quidance that's included in them might be helpful to the Court, the proposed fee examiner, and the parties. And just an example of some of the guideline provisions that we think could be useful is the adoption of professional budgets and benchmarking invoices to the budgets, the submission by professionals of electronic billing data, specific disclosure of comparable compensation through the use of blended rates, the disclosure of whether

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rate increase -- of whether rates increased post-filing, the disclosure and calculation during the case of rate increases and the effect of those increases on compensation, and the consideration of standards for using co-counsel as efficiency counsel. We agree with the Court, as the Court commented, about Chapter 9 different from Chapter 11 but believe that some of these comments could be useful and thank the Court for allowing us to share that with you.

THE COURT: You're welcome, and thank you as well.

Any other comments?

MR. HEIMAN: Your Honor, I'd just like to add one thing to note that there was a quite voluminous filing by Godfrey & Kahn, and I have no comment about that except that, for what it's worth, we don't think General Motors and Lehman are in any way comparable to our situation. Hopefully we'll have far fewer retained professionals and the like, and the process will not be so complicated, but having said that — and they said they would be in the courtroom. I don't know if they are and may want to speak, but having said that, again, we appreciate your Honor's approach and accept it.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question. To what extent do you think your office or your client or other parties should be invited to participate in the selection of an examiner, or do you just want me to do it?

MR. HEIMAN: That's an interesting question.

THE COURT: Again, there's a range of creative ways 1 in which we could handle this. We could do what --2 3 MR. HEIMAN: I personally --4 THE COURT: We could do here what we are doing in the mediation context, which is just to allow you a seven-day 5 6 period to submit confidential sealed suggestions or comments 7 on this question. MR. HEIMAN: I must say, your Honor, I'm just going 8 9 to let my hair down on this one. For me to suggest who I 10 would like to have examine my fees seems unseemly to me, 11 so --12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. HEIMAN: -- that's my gut reaction. I don't --14 you know, my colleagues may beat me up after this hearing for 15 saying that, but that's my honest reaction. Your Honor has 16 expressed --17 THE COURT: I understand and accept that. 18 MR. HEIMAN: Okay. So with that we have -- I think 19 I've addressed this already, your Honor. Number 6 on your 20 amended list is future conferences and hearings, and we 2.1 are --22 THE COURT: Stand by one second. We do have --23 MS. LEVINE: Sorry. Before we leave the --24 THE COURT: -- Ms. Levine who'd like to be heard.

MS. LEVINE: Before we leave the fee examiner

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issue --

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2 THE COURT: Step forward, please.

MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, one of the issues and one of the themes you've been hearing throughout this is trying to maintain the credibility of a process that's a very difficult process for people to have to go through.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. LEVINE: So to the extent your Honor would welcome it, I believe that we would like to have a voice at least in having your Honor consider some thoughts with regard to the fee examiner.

THE COURT: With regard to the identity of the fee examiner?

MS. LEVINE: The identity, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Will it suit your purposes sufficiently if I give you seven days to submit to the Court confidentially and under seal whatever your comments are?

MS. LEVINE: Yes. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. And this is an opportunity open to everyone. Don't file anything, please. Just submit them to my chambers directly --

MR. HEIMAN: And, your Honor, Mr. Bennett points out --

THE COURT: -- by mail or hand-delivery, whatever you want to do.

MR. HEIMAN: Mr. Bennett points out, as he so often does, that I spoke for myself and not for the city, my client, so I don't know what the city's reaction will be to your invitation, and I just need to --

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. HEIMAN: -- make that clear.

THE COURT: Fair enough.

MR. HEIMAN: Thank you. Status conferences and omnibus, I think I have already said we appreciate the advance notice on those, and they look good to us, and nothing further to add to that unless your Honor has a question about it.

THE COURT: Just for notice purposes, the District Court has requested that we not conduct hearings on the morning of September 4th because there's another high-profile matter that morning, so if we do have any hearings of any kind on September 4th, they would be in the afternoon, and I'll have to get back to you all on what time in the afternoon.

MR. GORDON: Your Honor, I believe that's actually Rosh Hashanah that night, so just to be careful --

THE COURT: Ah, we will have to be very careful about that, too, yes. Thank you.

MR. HEIMAN: Your Honor, I --

THE COURT: On the issue of omnibus hearings, I

suggested a motion procedure that was very different from the one that your office submitted in its motion. You want to take that up now?

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$ HEIMAN: I would like to call on Ms. Lennox for that purpose.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HEIMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

MS. LENNOX: Thank you, your Honor. For the record, Heather Lennox of Jones Day. What we had proposed in our motion -- we tried to be fairly faithful to Local Rule 9014-1, so I'm pleased to say that we just have a couple of questions and clarifications on --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LENNOX: -- what your Honor might propose, and some of them may be a little parochial or a little minor. The first one that I view as perhaps a little parochial is Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(e) imposes a five-page limit on replies for certain matters, and then the Eastern District of Michigan rule has a similar blanket seven-page limit on replies. It is more than likely that as the debtor in this case, the city, will be doing omnibus replies to many objections, and we would ask for your Honor's consideration in waiving that at least as to the city.

THE COURT: Well, I'd rather deal with the issue now than get a motion to waive it on a case-by-case basis. Is

there a limit that we can set within reason?

MS. LENNOX: I do think it depends on the issue, your Honor. I mean if we're going to do a general limit, I would propose a little higher, so it might be up to 20 pages. For example, replies on eligibility could be quite lengthy. Replies on minor matters could be much shorter. But I do expect that there will be several objections that your Honor would prefer to have one pleading from the debtor rather than many.

THE COURT: All right. Well, then how about if I put in the order that that is extended to 30 pages and, of course, without prejudice to your right to request even more in the context of a specific reply?

MS. LENNOX: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: What else?

MS. LENNOX: There was also a question on clarification that we had with respect to your Honor's statement on 4(a) about not conducting an evidentiary hearing on a motion unless the order and notice setting the hearing states otherwise, and that is simply a procedural question about how your Honor would like to proceed about whether we should notice that ourselves, whether we should put a request for that in the motion. How would your Honor like to address that issue so the parties know how to handle it in advance?

THE COURT: The more information you can provide to

me about what it will take to resolve any given motion the better, so, for example, if your motion foresees that there will be factual issues, it would be helpful to identify those factual issues and request an evidentiary hearing.

MS. LENNOX: In the motion. Thank you.

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THE COURT: Right. At that point, I can decide whether it's appropriate to conduct the evidentiary hearing on one of these omnibus days or not, but I have to tell you that in general I don't foresee conducting evidentiary hearings at all on omnibus hearing days; that instead when there are issues of fact, we will identify them and set a schedule for whatever discovery might be needed, whatever additional briefing on any legal issues might be needed, and sometimes even a final pretrial conference and then an evidentiary hearing, so I like the idea of your telling me when you think an evidentiary hearing will be required and if it's possible that it might be an extremely brief one to do it on an evidentiary hearing day -- on an omnibus hearing day, but more often than not -- much more often than not, I foresee it playing out in a more traditional way. Does that answer your question, or is it too vague?

MS. LENNOX: That does in large main, your Honor.

Part of the question -- and perhaps this is a follow-up

question -- is related to your admonition in -- your

perfectly appropriate admonition in Section 1 reminding

counsel that when you assert facts in a motion, you should have an affidavit to support them, so I would expect that there may be motions filed with affidavits that support facts in the motion but maybe we don't need a whole full-blown evidentiary trial on, things like that, so that --

THE COURT: Among the things we discuss at the initial hearing is whether there are genuine issues of material fact.

MS. LENNOX: Um-hmm.

THE COURT: And my suggestion or request, which maybe I should actually incorporate in the order, that parties advise the Court about whether they believe an evidentiary hearing will be required applies also to responses.

MS. LENNOX: Thank you, your Honor. Two other things, your Honor. You mentioned in paragraph 2(c) that the Court will let parties know at least two days in advance of the hearing what matters you would actually like to take up on the hearing. I am assuming for notice purposes in advance of that two days that the parties should submit a notice of hearing so that people will be -- people will be on notice of the hearing date that is proposed for that motion.

THE COURT: My concern with that process is that it has the potential for creating confusion.

MS. LENNOX: Um-hmm.

THE COURT: I would rather that the Court maintain complete control over the process of issuing dates. If you're concerned about two days not being enough time --

MS. LENNOX: That's the concern, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- we can talk about how to enlarge that.

MS. LENNOX: That is the concern, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. What would you -- what would you prefer then?

MS. LENNOX: I would propose, if it please the Court, at least five days, particularly if we're going to have many matters on for one hearing.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. LENNOX: And then the last point that we had was one of the requests that we had suggested in our motion, and that is related to motions for relief from the automatic stay under Section 362. We had suggested a procedure, and we would ask the Court to consider it, that provides that if the Court is not able to hold a hearing or is scheduling — unwilling to hold a hearing within that 30-day period referenced in Section 362(e)(1) that the stay not automatically terminate until your Honor can hold a hearing.

THE COURT: I saw that in there. My problem with it is I just don't think it's consistent with the requirements of Section 362 itself. I can state for the record pretty

categorically that it would be my intent to set every motion for relief from stay -- from the stay within the 30-day time period because that's what I think the law requires, and I think our history with motions for relief from stay certainly suggests that we have been able to do that. I think setting two motion -- or omnibus hearing days a month will permit that to happen. In the odd event that it can't happen, we can select a date that isn't an omnibus hearing date. We can ask the creditor to stipulate to extend it to an omnibus hearing date or, if necessary in odd circumstances, conduct a hearing by telephone, so we have lots of options to comply with that 30-day time period, and I'd rather do that than just have an open door.

MS. LENNOX: Thank you, your Honor. That definitely helps with clarification.

THE COURT: Okay.

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 $\mbox{\sc MS.}$ LENNOX: And that was all the clarifications that I had. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anyone else have any comments or questions or suggestions regarding the proposed motion procedure? Okay. One more second, please. Okay. Are there any other procedural or administrative questions, comments, concerns that anyone would like to raise before we go on to the motions that are set for hearing today? No? Okay.

Let's first address the motion for the order -- for the entry

of an order appointing Kurtzman Carson Consultants as claims and noticing agent.

MS. LENNOX: Thank you, your Honor. The city has filed a motion, as your Honor indicated, seeking to appoint Kurtzman Carson Consultants or KCC as claims and noticing agent in the city's Chapter 9 case to, among other things, serve as the Court's agent to mail notices to creditors, provide claims processing service, and provide computerized claims database services, and we seek this relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C., Section 156(c). The city has identified more than a hundred potential creditors, including, among others --

THE COURT: Has identified what?

MS. LENNOX: More than a hundred potential creditors -- oh, I'm sorry -- a hundred thousand potential creditors in this case. We've got employees, retirees --

THE COURT: Just three orders of magnitude up.

MS. LENNOX: Yes. Perhaps I should have added another three zeros to that. In any event, there are quite a few people that are going to require notices in this case, and we think it might be burdensome on the clerk's office to send those notices to all those folks. Before selecting KCC, the city did solicit bids from third-party vendors to serve as the claims and noticing agent, and we selected one with relevant expertise in this district and relevant expertise in a Chapter 9 case since they served as the claims and noticing

agent in the Jefferson County case, and they were the most economical proposal at the end of the day. Again, we found it important that KCC had experience working with this clerk's office and this court, and they have assured us that they will continue to follow the court's procedures and any orders that might be entered by this Court. There was a declaration of Evan Gershbein that was attached to the motion. If your Honor has any questions of Mr. Gershbein, he is in the courtroom today. So with respect to the motion, we would ask for its approval. I don't believe, your Honor, there have been any objections to it.

THE COURT: Okay. Yes. Would you ask him to step forward, please?

MS. LENNOX: Yes. Mr. Gershbein, would you approach? Would you like him to take the stand, your Honor?

THE COURT: No, no, no. Just to stand there is just fine.

MR. GERSHBEIN: Your Honor, Evan Gershbein.

THE COURT: What is your name, sir?

MR. GERSHBEIN: Sorry. Evan Gershbein with Kurtzman Carson Consultants.

THE COURT: Thank you. One second, please. One more second, please. My clerk welcomes your participation. She does, however, have a couple of details that she would like to work out with you and to work them out in the context

of the order itself that the city has proposed.

MR. GERSHBEIN: Okay.

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and just ask you to consult with her, and then the city can resubmit the proposed order to the Court. So there are two. The one is simply creating a link for the court to use to the claims register that you will keep, and the other is that you should work with the clerk when it actually comes time to file the notice of commencement because there's a very specific ECF event code that's important to use.

MR. GERSHBEIN: Right.

THE COURT: So these are not details I need to be involved in and don't want to be involved in, and so I'll just ask you to work them out with her.

MR. GERSHBEIN: Absolutely, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. That was it. Thank you.

Not too tough, huh?

MR. GERSHBEIN: Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So when that's worked out, Ms. Lennox, would you just submit your proposed order through the order processing program?

MS. LENNOX: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let's talk next about the motion for an order directing and approving the form of the notice of commencement and the manner of service and

publication. I think that the deadline part of it we have already figured out or at least are on the road to figuring out.

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MR. BENNETT: Okay. I think that's right, your Honor. On the notice part, as you know, notice is required in accordance with the statute notwithstanding the rather large notoriety the case has already attracted. We propose publishing the required notice at the required times in the Detroit Free Press and the Bond Buyer. We've received no objections, no comments at all to the proposed form of notice, and so if it's acceptable to your Honor, we'll get started on the process using the appropriate ECF code.

THE COURT: Um-hmm. Anyone have any comments or questions regarding this motion? Two. Okay. Go ahead.

MS. PATEK: Your Honor, just for clarification on the additional paper notice -- and that is part, I believe, of the notice of commencement telling people what they have to serve on the city. We did have a comment on that, and we think -- we're totally comfortable with e-mail notice, but given electronic filing and everything, we would --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MS. PATEK: -- prefer that from a cost and time standpoint that there not be paper.

THE COURT: This is a -- this is a concern I share. What is the need of the city and Jones Day to be mailed paper

copies of responses to -- or objections to eligibility in this electronic age?

MR. BENNETT: We have no need, your Honor, and I think I tried to mention that before. We are prepared to dispense with it.

THE COURT: Excellent. Mr. Gordon.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor. Just one nit. There is an identification of parties that are already presumed to be on the special service list, which includes creditors listed on a list of the 20 largest unsecured creditors. That would include the two retirement systems. However, there is no provision for counsel for those retirement systems to be on the special service list unless you file a motion, and I'd really like to dispense with having to file a motion. Hopefully Mr. Bennett would agree that counsel for those creditors should also be on the special service list.

THE COURT: Sir.

MR. BENNETT: That's perfectly fine, and for anyone else who wants to get on that list, if they want to contact us informally, that's okay as well.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. BENNETT: Your Honor, are you going to make the changes to the proposed form of order, or would you like us to --

THE COURT: No. I'm going to ask you to do it and, again, submit it through our order processing program. Any other comments or questions regarding this matter? All right. Please let's give counsel till the close of business on Tuesday to request to be included, and then you can submit your order or actually let me ask this. Was your order constructed such that it can be entered now, or do you need to wait to find out the names of attorneys who want to be on the special service list?

MR. BENNETT: Well, I think the order encompasses both the notice part, which I think can -- we can do that separately. I don't think it requires work on the order at all.

THE COURT: Right. Okay.

MR. BENNETT: The deadlines, though, are there.

THE COURT: Right. All right. So I need to get that order entered so that you can pick them up in the notice. All right. Let's follow that sequence then.

MR. BENNETT: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Let's turn our attention to the motion regarding the appointment of a committee of retired employees.

MS. LENNOX: Thank you, your Honor. The city has decided to seek relief under Section 1102(a)(2), which is made applicable to Chapter 9 by Section 901. We seek this

relief to assure the adequate representation of our retiree creditors during this case. As we set forth in the motion, retiree claims encompass pension benefits, which the city estimates to be underfunded by about \$3-1/2 billion dollars, and retiree healthcare benefits, which are pay as you go and actuarially amount to about \$6 billion. We have approximately 23,500 former employees with vested pension benefits. We have almost 20,000 of them receiving retiree healthcare. It is a very diffuse group of individuals.

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Many of the city's legacy obligations but not all stem from old collective bargaining agreements. The city has 47 bargaining units with 28 different unions, and there are also four formal retiree associations which have voluntary membership of which the city is aware. There may be more.

As we noted in the motion prior to this case, the city solicited the unions to see if they were interested in representing their current retirees. The overwhelming majority said no. I do understand from reading their pleadings filed yesterday that two of the unions, AFSCME and the UAW, have reversed course on this issue, but, regardless, we still have many orphan retirees. We also have nonrepresented retirees, which comprise about 15 percent of our retiree population.

Given the pressing financial crisis that the city faces, the city filed this because it wants to have a clear

authorized representative who can speak for the city's retirees and engage in negotiations and discussions with the city over the issues of resolving legacy obligations in this case. We don't have the clean guidelines, of course, that Section 1114 provides, that the unions will represent their members, and, again, we would have to seek a committee in any event for the nonunion represented members. So we have sought relief under Section 1102(a)(2) to provide this important group of creditors with adequate representation in this case and to provide a body with which the city can hold restructuring negotiations.

There are a couple of things I want to make clear. In the papers we commented on who the city thought the committee should represent, and we defined retirees as a committee of former employees because we had assumed that the unions would represent their active employees with respect to this and other issues. However, the city does recognize that active employees do have an interest in retiree benefits, particularly those who have pension rights, so the city is not opposed to the committee having representation for active employees that have an interest in retiree benefits as part of this committee as the U.S. Trustee sees fit, which brings me to a further point, your Honor.

The U.S. Trustee had contacted the city after the motion was filed to discuss the motion and the procedures

proposed. Now, I want to be clear here. The city did not propose procedures to try to control the process. The city understands that should your Honor grant the motion, the formation of the membership and the selection of the members of this committee are wholly within the purview of the U.S. Trustee. It was simply suggested -- the city was simply suggesting some procedures to form a logical process that might be useful for people to consider. However, understanding that the appointment of the committee, should your Honor grant the motion, is within the purview of the U.S. Trustee, we had discussions with the U.S. Trustee, and we have agreed to remove the suggested procedures from the order, and I think a lot of folks had commentary about that in their objections. So the process to be used, should the motion be granted, to select a fair and representative committee will be the U.S. Trustee's own. Yesterday, your Honor, we did file on the docket a revised form of proposed order with these revisions reflected that is agreed to by the United States Trustee. If your Honor needs a copy, I have one with me that I can hand up.

THE COURT: Please.

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MS. LENNOX: May I approach?

THE COURT: Please.

MS. LENNOX: That form of filing, your Honor, on Exhibit A is a proposed new form of clean order to which the

U.S. Trustee has agreed, and Exhibit B shows the blackline from the original order proposed with the motion.

THE COURT: All right. Stand by one moment while I look at this. Thank you. Go ahead.

MS. LENNOX: As a final comment, your Honor, because this also appeared, and there may have been some confusion — and I think Mr. Heiman echoed this earlier today — notwithstanding the appointment of the committee, the city also plans to continue discussions with all of its creditor groups with whom it's been having discussions. This is not an attempt to freeze out any party. This is simply an attempt to provide an authorized representative for folks that may not have adequate representation in this case as it stands today.

I do have responses to a lot of the objections that were filed, but perhaps your Honor wants to hear the objections beforehand.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And who would like to be heard regarding this motion, please?

MS. LEVINE: Good morning, your Honor, for another minute. Sharon Levine, Lowenstein Sandler, for Michigan Council 25 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFLCIO, and Subchapter 98(c) of Detroit Retirees. Your Honor, we represent the interests of between 40 and 50 percent of the city's retirees at about 11,943. We

represent about 70 percent of the non-uniform union represented employees. We have 18 units of the locals that counsel was referring to. We have units in every single department in the city, including the police and fire departments.

Your Honor, I'd like to address a couple of issues raised. First and foremost, when we first started drafting this response, we drafted it like we were answering a law school exam, and we were originally going to take the position before your Honor that you can't do this kind of thing before there's an order for relief, and we have serious eligibility issues and concerns along those lines. We've had conversations with the city and are hoping that today they will affirm that all of this action, mediation, retiree committee, et cetera, is going to be taken without any prejudice to any of those rights, constitutional, substantive, technical, whatever else they are.

THE COURT: I agree.

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MS. LEVINE: But regardless, the goal of our union is to work as hard as we can for all of our retiree and active members in every avenue that's available to us to work through this process. And in addition to that, we appreciate the city's comments that they recognize that a lot of the active employees have interests in their pension benefits and in their medical benefits as well, which brings me to another

point, which is there's some -- there's been some concern raised with regard to whether a union can actually represent its retirees.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MS. LEVINE: I'd like to respond two ways. First, legally we believe that the answer -- again, looking at the law school exam, that the answer is yes, that we have historically under our internal workings represented our retirees. In fact, at the International level, we have a designated person and a group that works with that person who just deals with retiree issues, so in that regard, we would fully expect to represent the retirees along with the actives, especially since a lot of the issues here overlap. And we've submitted the certification of -- from the union specifically talking about the fact that we do provide these services with regard to the retirees on a regular basis.

That said, your Honor, as a practical matter, in handling the situation in other cases -- and while they've been Chapter 11 cases under 1114 and not the unique situation we find ourselves in here, we have seen the United States Trustee's Office deal with this issue three separate ways:

(a) actually appointing the union to the retiree committee;

(b) appointing the retiree group affiliated with the union, which we represent here, to the retiree committee; or appointing individuals who are either members of the union or

members of the retiree committee. And in either of those three circumstances, we're committed to bringing the full support of the union to the process and hopefully constructively interfacing with the retiree committee's professionals and working through some of these difficult issues. With that said, your Honor, we start with the premise that we don't believe that there's a conflict, and we don't think that your Honor needs to rule on that issue.

Your Honor, the other issue that we did want to touch on just briefly is with regard to the timing, but we do think that your Honor addressed it adequately before, but we just want to state for the record that to the extent that your Honor enters scheduling orders in this case, we hope that they're without prejudice to come back to your Honor --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

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MS. LEVINE: -- in case circumstances change, including after the retiree committee gets up and running and its professionals get engaged. And with that, your Honor, we would just close by suggesting that we represent a large number of people here. We're very concerned about this process. It's a nice day today, but it's going to be cold this winter, and they're very concerned about their pension benefits, their health benefits, and moving forward constructively to resolve the issues here because regardless there's going to be something that has to happen in order to

resolve these issues. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else on this motion?

Ms. Brimer. Oh, Mr. Gordon.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor. Robert Gordon again on behalf of the Detroit Retirement Systems. Since we did file papers, if I could at least acknowledge the fact that we did file papers on this, and there have been other papers filed subsequently by a number of parties that cover the same issues, so, from our perspective, the concerns have been addressed, I believe, by Ms. Lennox as far as not marginalizing anybody in the process and in the selection process with the U.S. Trustee's Office and giving the U.S. Trustee plenty of space to make their own decision.

The only other thing that hasn't been raised yet is we suggested in our papers that there's -- if there is going to be a retiree committee, it ought to be able to function properly, and so there should be some provision made for compensation for reasonable professional fees. Obviously that's not necessarily imbedded in the Chapter 9 context, so it seems like if that is something that's desirable to the city, there ought to be some provision made for that because, again, Chapter 9 doesn't quite cover it very well. Thank you.

THE COURT: Now Ms. Brimer.

MS. BRIMER: Well, good afternoon, your Honor. Lynn

M. Brimer appearing again on behalf of the Retired Detroit
Police Members Association. Your Honor, we filed a response
and very limited objections to the city's motion.

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Fundamentally we understand perhaps in the long term the need for committees in order to effectively negotiate a resolution of whatever disputes may arise with respect to fully funding the pension rights of the city's retirees. However, we have several concerns with the motion and the proposed order as it's presented.

First -- and I addressed this earlier, your Honor -there is a concern with whether or not at this stage in this proceeding there is authority for the U.S. Trustee's Office to, in fact, appoint -- to go to the complete step of appointing a committee. While we believe it may be appropriate, without waiving any rights to our objection to eligibility for this Chapter 9 to proceed, for the U.S. Trustee's Office to begin the process of attempting to select and appoint the committees that should this Court determine eligibility should be appropriately appointed, however, appointment at this point may chill some of the existing retiree associations from actively pursuing their rights with respect to eligibility and may ultimately be that the committees are not properly authorized under Section 1102(a), which, in fact, does authorize appointment of committees after an order for relief. And if you look at at least some

of the more recent cases that have been filed, they are instructive to the extent that in the matter of <u>In re. The</u> <u>City of Vallejo</u> the Court, in fact, found that the appointment was premature prior to the order of relief. In the matter of <u>In re. The City of Stockton</u>, <u>California</u>, the orders were entered, you know. Immediately after the order for relief was entered, the Court then appointed the committee, which would tend to indicate the procedures were in place, and the Court acknowledged what the restrictions in Section 1102(a) are.

With that in mind, your Honor, we still have, should the Court determine that it is appropriate to appoint a committee at this point and assuming -- without waiving our rights to object to eligibility, assuming this case proceeds, we, nonetheless, still have some concerns with some of the issues raised in the motion. The procedures issues may have, in fact, been addressed by the city. We think it is completely inappropriate for the city not to control. The issue is influence. They should not even influence the selection process for appointing committees.

We do not believe it's appropriate for any of the unions or any representatives of current employees to have representation on committees that represent retirees.

Continuing wages and continuing current benefits may impact their willingness or their participation in negotiating with

respect to pension distributions.

That raises the concern we have also with respect to whether or not one committee for retirees would be appropriate. As this Court may be aware, police and fire-fighters do not participate in the Social Security Administration; therefore, to the extent any of their pension benefits are reduced in this process, they will not have the same opportunity to pursue Social Security as perhaps the retirees of the general retirement system would have. They may have, therefore, very different interests in pursuing negotiations and may have to negotiate a different resolution of their benefits than the retirees who participate in the general retirement system.

Then, finally, the issue that was raised by Mr.

Gordon is extremely important, and that is funding. If there are committees to be appointed, one or more committee, in order to properly be able to negotiate and address issues raised by the city, it must be funded. All of its professionals must be funded. Legal and any accounting or other actuarial type professionals that they would require should be funded. Even though I do understand that funding is not required, those provisions are not incorporated into Chapter 9, the fact that this Court recognizes the need for a fee examiner when, in fact, the fees are not subject to this Court's review under Chapter 9 is an acknowledgement that

this Court understands that funding and the protection of the public interest is of utmost importance in this case.

THE COURT: My question for you is really a process question. Does the Court have the authority to give direction and instruction to the U.S. Trustee in an order granting a motion like this, or is the process that the U.S. Trustee exercises its discretion, and then the Court, upon motion, reviews that after the fact?

MS. BRIMER: Well, I believe, your Honor, that, frankly, our U.S. Trustee's Office has the discretion and, in consultation with the various retirees and other interested parties, can evaluate what the appropriate procedures would be for selecting the committee. I can -- I recognize why the city filed this motion and brought it to the Court's attention that it would be very important in order to effectively advance negotiations that they are not negotiating with multiple retirees, individual retirees; however, I do believe that at this stage of the proceeding, it would be appropriate for the U.S. Trustees to exercise their discretion, move forward with the process for selection, and then present the Court with an order for the appointment of the committee.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Morris.

MR. MORRIS: May it please the Court, Thomas Morris of Silverman & Morris. I'm co-counsel with Lippitt O'Keefe,

PLLC, representing the Retired Detroit Police and Fire Fighters Association and the Detroit Retired City Employees Association. The first organization has been in existence for more than 30 years, and the General Retirees Association has been in existence for more than 50 years, and these two organizations represent -- have as their members approximately 70 percent of retirees.

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The reason we filed the response to the motion was we objected to the city's proposed involvement in the selection process and also the proposed involvement of the unions. The present employees of the city, most of whom are members of unions, have a very significant interest in seeing that their present wages are protected and their future benefits are protected, but they have a different interest than do the retirees. I take the -- we understand the proposal for a retiree committee to be just that, a committee of the retirees by the retirees and for the retirees, and it's not -- there's a lot of interests in this case to be served. This committee should not be everything to everyone. That's why we support the appointment of a committee, as I said, of retirees.

As to whether the Court -- whether it's appropriate for the Court to direct the U.S. Trustee in the details, that's -- the pared down proposed order is acceptable to us that leaves the details to the U.S. Trustee. I can

understand the Court ruling that way looking at the separation of powers. The reason for the U.S. Trustee's Office being separate from the court is to separate powers. We did submit a proposed order, which has some specific provisions that we would like to see in the order if the Court does prepare a more detailed order. I agree with the other comments that the scheduling order should allow the retiree committee, if and when it's formed, more time.

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Your Honor, the associations hope to work with the committee and with the unions to help to reorganize the city and reach a deal, but we do think the retirees have special interests; that that interest has been represented by the associations with their unique situation, having been in existence for years representing such a high percentage of the retirees, having gone through and prepared and adopted by-laws, elected officers and directors, and we think all those are important considerations for the U.S. Trustee. We have submitted and received from members of the associations proxies, not legal proxies, but written recommendation that the officers and directors of the associations be considered as — for membership in the committee.

THE COURT: One second, sir. Letrice, would you go adjust that mike stand to see if that takes care of the knocking that we're hearing through the loudspeaker? All right. Let's try that and see if that will solve our

problem, and you may continue, sir.

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MR. MORRIS: Yes, your Honor. We submitted to the membership documents for them to sign to recommend for the inclusion in the committee officers and directors of their associations. I think it'll be more appropriate for us to take that up with the U.S. Trustee, but we do have those available for the Court if the Court decides to get involved in the process to that detail. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Other comments? Your Honor, once again Barbara Patek MS. PATEK: appearing on behalf of the public safety unions, the three police unions, and the Detroit Fire Fighters Association. We did file a response and a limited objection to the city's motion. We are looking for four things, and I -understanding the limitations and the role of the U.S. Trustee's Office, we're looking for a seat at the table. We're looking for the U.S. Trustee to control the selection of the committee, and we are also looking for a mechanism for this committee to be adequately funded. Otherwise it will not make it an effective process, and the two things that we have suggested -- and we understand under Chapter 9 because of the limitations, it would require the city's consent -would be that the city consent to pay the reasonable professional fees of the committee and delegate the responsibility for determining the reasonableness of those

fees to the fee examiner to be appointed by the Court.

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We filed our response without prejudice to our right to object to eligibility, of course, and we are not conceding that the formation of such a committee would make it the sole negotiator on the issues before the Court.

I want to address the Court's question about 1102(a)(2) and (4) and the order in which things should happen, and it seems as though we have perhaps already leapt over the obstacle of having an order for relief. suggest, to the extent that the Court finds that it has authority, that given the -- that everyone in this courtroom agrees that time is not on its side, that from the standpoint of judicial economy and the efficiency of the process, that the Court in this case may be in a position -- ultimately the U.S. Trustee is going to select this committee, but to give some direction based upon the information that is being put before the Court this morning, and to that end I would like to speak briefly to the circumstances of my constituents. And appreciating that there -- if we were in a Chapter 11, there would be specific provisions that would govern both my clients' rights and the rights of the separate retirees under 1113 and 1114, we are in a very different circumstance in this case in terms of there's nothing usual about this case, but from the standpoint of collective bargaining -- and you heard the city's counsel say it earlier this morning -- from

their perspective, all the bargaining units, pursuant to the Emergency Manager Act, their position is -- and I'm not conceding this because I don't for sure know the answer to it -- are under imposed conditions of employment or imposed terms that have been imposed on them by the emergency To date, the position has been first under Public manager. Act 4 and then later after that was repealed under 436 -- the position of the city has been we have no obligation to bargain with you. We can pretty much do anything to you that we want except modify your pension. For that we need Bankruptcy Court, and now here we are. And we are a group that -- aside from the fact that our active employees do have vested benefits, this retiree group is obviously a rolling group, some by choice and some not by choice, may be moved very quickly even as this process is proceeding from active to retiree, and the issue of these pension benefits is the 400-pound gorilla in the room. And so for that reason, we think -- you know, we are advocating to have a seat at this table. We understand the Court can't tell the trustee who to put on the committee, but in terms of making it representative, there are a lot of different constituencies from the folks, as I think Ms. Brimer pointed out, who have no Social Security -- and some of them I understand don't even have Medicare to fall back on -- to some people who perhaps have more luxurious pensions and a second career.

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There's a lot of different constituencies, and the goal will be to get a representative constituency, and I'm going to return to, I think, from our perspective, we want not only representation, but it's critical that this committee, if the Court is going to appoint it, be adequately funded so that there can be a real and serious conversation about how this problem can be solved. Thank you, your Honor.

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MR. GOLDBERG: Good morning, your Honor. Jerome Goldberg. I represent party of interest David Sole, who is a retiree himself and was a former president of UAW SCATA, a chemist, and whose wife also is a retiree as a bus driver. Ι also filed an objection in this case, and we basically cited that our interpretation and our view of the plain language of the statute is that this motion is premature, that 11 --Section 1120 -- 1102(a) states that the trustee has the authority to appoint committees after a order for relief is entered, and 11 U.S.C. 921(c) provides that in a Chapter 9 case the Court shall order relief only after objections to the eligibility issues have been resolved and the determination on eligibility has been made. That's why we believe that the appointment of a retiree committee at this point would be in plain violation of the law.

Why we feel that's so important is that the -- as your Honor stated earlier, that one of the critical issues in eligibility is the applicability of the state limitation

on -- constitutional limitations on impairing pension to this That's a critical question that not only affects the thousands of retirees in this case, but it also will have national impact. There are 24 other states that have quarantees on pension. They're looking at what the decision is going to be on that issue. And our concern is in designating a retiree committee, especially the way it was initially proposed by the city, which would essentially be the only spokesperson for the retiree, it could have the effect of dampening the participation of all interested parties who choose to participate in this critical question, whether they be retiree associations, the unions, the retirement boards, all of whom already have done so and whose participation we fully respect, or individual retirees. There needs to be the fullest participation in this critical question that will have implications in Detroit and all over the country.

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THE COURT: Why would this committee do that, or how would it happen?

MR. GOLDBERG: Well, just listening to the debate here, we hear everyone vying for who will be on the committee, but what we say -- again, we say the plain language of the statute bars the formation of this committee.

THE COURT: No. I understand that, but you asserted that the formation and participation of this committee in the

eligibility question will discourage others from asserting their issues. Why would that happen? How would that happen?

MR. GOLDBERG: Well, let me just say that in the city's motion for this, the city provided that the retiree committee would provide a single party to negotiate with the city on behalf of retirees as a group.

THE COURT: They've moved past that; right?

MR. GOLDBERG: Well, it does sound like they've moved past that today, and I appreciate that they've moved past it today, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GOLDBERG: But, again, I really do feel that at this point it's improper. At this point the critical question is the eligibility question and the constitutionality, and, in fact, what would the committee even be negotiating on at this point? To spend time debating who should be on a committee when the scope of what the authority is on the issue of pensions and whether there's even authority in this question seems to me to be a diversion from the issue of eligibility that needs to be decided first under the law, and that is really the significant question in front of everybody right at this moment.

THE COURT: Of course, the statute says the Court has the authority to order this after an order for relief is entered; right?

MR. GOLDBERG: Yes, it does.

THE COURT: It doesn't say the Court doesn't have the authority to do it before that, does it?

MR. GOLDBERG: Well, I think by the language of the statute, it empowers -- it states when the Court has that authority, and 921 imputes that right into it, says the Court shall order relief only after objections to the eligibility questions have been heard. Thank you, your Honor.

I just want to make one other point, too, just for a point of correction to the city's motion that the city indicated that the city is the only authority that -- that the city has the authority to amend pensions, and just to clarify, I did attach Section 4744 of the Municipal Code 2 as an exhibit to our brief and which states very plainly that that authority does not apply to vested pensions. Thank you, your Honor.

MS. CECCOTTI: Good morning again, your Honor.

Babette Ceccotti, Cohen, Weiss & Simon, for the UAW. We did

file a short response to the motion, and I'll touch briefly

on essentially three items that we've covered.

First, the UAW is not taking a position specifically with respect to the 11 -- what I'll just call 1102 issue, whether the Court should grant the motion now. We are, however -- to the extent the Court does grant the motion, we want to emphasize three points, some of which have already

been touched on by counsel. First, the funding issue. We've stated in our motion that the UAW, if such a committee is formed, would be interested in declaring its interest in serving on the committee. Critical to the UAW's thinking in that regard and decision-making would be a sense that the committee is going to be able to have adequate resources to adequately perform the job that the committee is being formed to perform, and you've heard the other speakers. I won't belabor the point, but we do consider the funding to be very critical here, funding by the city, and we have suggested in our papers that the city should indicate its intention so that the Court has that information before it in terms of making a decision regarding granting the motion.

Second, on the -- we've indicated reservations of rights issues as well. Ms. Levine touched upon them. Others have as well. And we understood the Court to be cognizant and agreeing with us on that point, so I won't --

THE COURT: I am and I do.

MS. CECCOTTI: Thank you. So that leaves me with our third point, which is the point of adequate representation, and I regret that we have -- or being the U.S. Trustee thinks that we've initiated a disputed with them -- it was certainly not our intent to do so. We certainly have respect for the office -- their office, and we understand their role and respect the role that they play in

forming committees. However, that said, we do think that some quidance by the Court -- if the Court, again, were inclined to grant the motion, that some guidance just to deal with just some very practical considerations -- and I think you've heard some of them here today. When the city filed its motion, as Ms. Lennox indicated, they at first proposed a series of rather detailed procedures. The revised order that has been submitted to the Court has deleted those procedures with the expectation, and I think appropriately so, that the U.S. Trustee would be designing the solicitation procedures and the process by which it would form the committee. However, let's take a step back and let's assume that the city had not attached any suggested procedures. One would -we would have had a motion to appoint a retiree committee with a definition and, you know, perhaps some very general definition by the city and nothing more. And without any further guidance, the U.S. Trustee would have immediately, I'm assuming, just based on some of the questions that have been raised here today, have confronted a series of questions, some of which might be just considered procedural, but some of them would be quite basic, the scope of the committee's purview, whether the committee should include or can include individuals, associations, and labor unions, questions about -- the questions that you've already heard discussed before your Honor today about labor unions serving

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and in what capacity. These questions we could see, as a practical matter, might bog down the process to the point where either the parties would be back here before your Honor anyway or the U.S. Trustee, doing its best to take on those issues and try to solve them just themselves, would undoubtedly spur additional proceedings before your Honor anyway. So our thought was that -- and we understand normally how the sequencing goes. We've read the statement submitted by the office. We still think that 1102 does contemplate a role for the Court and that in terms of -- not with respect to detailing and wordsmithing procedures and not with respect to dictating or directing that specific entities or parties be appointed, but that, nonetheless, the framework, if you will, or the table that's being set for the office to perform its functions appropriately resides with the Court, particularly given the array of comments that the Court -- that have been filed both with respect to the legal issues but also with respect to issues of composition. state -- we have stated -- and, again, the UAW has a lot of experience on creditors' committees, on general creditors' committees and in the Chapter 11 context in the 1113 and 1114 process and outside of bankruptcy, and one of the things that labor organizations do is engage with employers on complex matters such as pension benefits, health benefits, retiree health benefits, other types of benefits as well. It makes

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the unions, in our view, who take on this role -- and the UAW is another union that historically does take on this role -- particularly well-suited to a project like this and a committee like this where their facility with being able to engage on these matters will aid in the effective functioning of the committee. So we made the suggestion that we did in our papers that the Court provide some direction on, again, the framework and scope and eligibility, if we can put it that way, in order to make sure that, first, the -- everyone's goal here, if your Honor grants the motion, is that the committee be effective and be able to function effectively with -- not only with funding but with members who can effectively undertake the task. This is an enormous task, and you've already heard about the human element here.

Second, in terms of participation and scope -- and we've made this point in our papers -- if there is a group that feels disenfranchised -- and we think this is -- I would put this in the heading of guidance that the Court could provide to the U.S. Trustee in fulfilling its role here. If there are groups that are left out for some reason or feel excluded, that will directly affect the credibility of the process, and it doesn't do the Court any good or any of us any good to have a committee like this formed, as I've said already, that cannot effectively complete its task. And if you have skepticism engendered by exclusions or if some folks

have -- some groups have been selected to serve and some haven't, undoubtedly that will have ramifications. So we think that, again, with all due respect to the Office of the U.S. Trustee and with no intention at all to interfere with their proper function in conducting the solicitation and the formation, we do think that some guidance along the lines that we've set forth in our papers in here would be appropriate and is also appropriate under the statute itself without crossing -- unduly crossing any lines or inappropriately crossing any lines in terms of the division of labor between the Court and the U.S. Trustee's Office.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question.

MS. CECCOTTI: Sure.

THE COURT: I heard today a concern that a union which represents by law present employees may have either an actual or a potential conflict of interest in representing retired employees. How do you address that concern?

MS. CECCOTTI: A couple of ways, your Honor. First, unions that -- like the UAW that are very familiar with the bankruptcy process and have served, as I said, in Chapter 11 cases for the most part undertaking those roles, are very skilled in -- not only very skilled in the substance of the subject matter but in making the internal institutional decisions to undertake representation of both actives and retirees. They do not see an inherent conflict in taking on

both -- in taking on that -- I was going to say both roles, but it really is a continuum. It's really viewed as a whole, and I'm speaking now really for the UAW. You heard Ms. Levine speak on behalf of AFSCME. These are decisions that individual labor organizations make based on their own institutional history and organization and their own institutional functioning. We do not think it would be appropriate for an outsider to simply make a blanket acrossthe-board station that -- statement -- excuse me -- that simply because we have a labor organization that is representing a unit of actives, that labor organization is, per se, disqualified. The first question to ask is what does that particular union think about that -- what is the position of that particular union? The UAW does not see an inherent conflict and hasn't throughout its history. been actively involved in retiree matters as -- with respect to retiree interests, not simply actives as future retirees but current retirees. They have -- and that is, again, part of their history, so I think that it is not possible really to make a blanket statement to that effect and that each labor organization answers that question for itself and should be permitted to do so given its own institutional operation and history.

THE COURT: Next question.

MS. CECCOTTI: Um-hmm.

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THE COURT: You have argued that the Court has the authority to give the U.S. Trustee's Office guidance.

MS. CECCOTTI: Yes.

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THE COURT: What guidance would you propose?

MS. CECCOTTI: Well, I would certainly propose guidance to the effect of a definition of the scope.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. CECCOTTI: Right. And I thought I heard Ms.

Lennox -- I couldn't quite hear her too clearly, but to the extent the scope or anything about the scope has changed from the time the motion was filed until today, whatever that is --

THE COURT: The scope is an easy one. It's actually inherent in the process.

MS. CECCOTTI: Understood, but I guess my point would be as long as we have a clear understanding -- as long as -- the United States Trustee should have a clear understanding of the scope of the committee.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CECCOTTI: It's also appropriate, I think, for the Court to provide guidance concerning the pool, the eligible pool. Is it okay to solicit, particularly in light of what you've heard today, retiree associations, individuals, and unions? And we think the answer to that should be yes, and we --

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. CECCOTTI: -- think that the guidance would ultimately help the U.S. Trustee devise its procedures and make the process work that much more efficiently. To the extent the Court --

THE COURT: So if I gave that guidance, that would effectively be an authorization to the U.S. Trustee to choose among those potential participants however it saw fit?

MS. CECCOTTI: With one more piece of quidance, your Honor, which is that -- and anything you'd like to say on funding, we'd be -- by the city we'd be happy to hear that, but that wasn't what I was going to say next. What I was going to say next is to the extent that -- well, not to the Adequate representation is something that we do think the Court should comment upon, and in this case, although it seems like a lot when you say there are 47 bargaining units, I would doubt that there will be 47 people clamoring to get on this committee, so the suggestion would be that for adequate representation purposes, any group that wants to participate should be permitted to participate because you can't, practically speaking, for example, ask -tell Unions A, B, and C, who show up ready and willing and able to serve -- you can't say to them as a practical matter there's too many of you; therefore, we're going to have Union A represent the retirees for Unions B and C. So we do think

that some adequate representation instruction along the lines of what we've suggested here is appropriate just to avoid the exclusion issue that we've suggested would be very detrimental to the process, not to mention just the practical implications of asking one -- with respect to the organized groups, those that are organized, one group to try and speak --

THE COURT: Well, but isn't it appropriate for the U.S. Trustee's Office to be concerned that in order for the committee to actually function, it has to have a limited number of people?

MS. CECCOTTI: Understood, and that is certainly part of their challenge. No question about it. We think, though, that there is a point to be emphasized that while there is — there could be — there could be a numerocity issue, there is also very definitely in 1102 an adequate representation issue so that in balancing those two, the fundamental concept there should be adequate representation and if there is an issue with respect to size, that that would be something that would be taken up in the context of determining adequacy of representation.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. CECCOTTI: Thank you.

THE COURT: Sir.

MR. KARWOSKI: Good afternoon, your Honor. Michael

Karwoski. I'm representing myself as an attorney who worked for the City of Detroit Law Department for about 15 years. I retired about a year ago. I draw a pension from the General Retirement System of the city. I can speak to -- I'd like to just address two points briefly because I know it's been a long morning, and we're into the afternoon.

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Attorneys for the city who are not in management are members of Public Attorneys Association 2211, which is affiliated with the UAW. For the 15 years that I was with the city and a member of that union, the union did not represent the interests of retirees. In fact, there were a number of issues where the union took positions that were adverse to the interests of retirees because it seemed that there's a limited amount of money available in the pension system, and sometimes the active -- the interests of active employees are different than those of retired employees, so I would suggest that in terms of the structure of the committee, that there should be a distinction between retirees who are drawing a pension and those who are -- and employees who are -- former employees or current employees who have vested interests in future retirement benefits, which may be different.

I have not seen the list of creditors that the city filed yesterday evening. I believe, as a retiree and someone drawing a pension, I'm probably on -- I'm somewhere in that

list of -- in that 3,500-page list.

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With respect to this motion, the city has given notice to -- on page 16, paragraph 29, it indicates the groups that it's given notice to, and I respectfully -- the last sentence is, "The city submits that no other or further notice need be provided." I respectfully suggest that this is essentially an ex parte motion at this point because the group that has not gotten notice is the group that has the most important interest in this motion, which are the retirees themselves. The groups -- not only have they not gotten notice, but the groups that did get notice have an interest adverse to the retirees. They include the largest creditors, the bondholders, the insurers, the large dollar interests who -- to the extent that pensioners are involved in the bankruptcy process and there's a limited amount of money available to satisfy creditors, the less money that is allocated to retirees through the committee process or otherwise, the more money there is for the larger -- for the other creditors. So the groups that have gotten notice are either the groups that are adverse to the interest of retirees or the unions and the associations, which the discussion that we've had so far, you know, is mixed at best as to whether they have legal authority to represent retirees and whether, in fact, they have interests that are contrary to the interests of retirees.

My request is that the Court order that notice of this motion be sent to all of the retirees of the City of Detroit, the 12,000 who are drawing pensions and the approximately 12,000 employees who have either a vested pension or a vested interest in health benefits. It's a large number obviously. It's about 24,000 people, but it's 24,000 out of a hundred thousand creditors of the city. And as the city has said, the alleged indebtedness of the retirement system, the \$3.5 billion, is one of the larger debts at issue in this case along with the \$6 billion of pay-as-you-go health benefits.

From the standpoint of each individual retiree whose average pension is \$19,000 a year or less, knowing about this process and having the basics of due process, notice and an opportunity to be heard, are as essential or more essential to those retirees as they are to the bondholders, the insurers, the credit swap counterparties, whoever they are —the notice is more important to the retirees because of their — the importance of their pension to them even though the dollar amount of the individual pensions is small.

Stockton, California, which had about 2,000 retirees, in the appendix or attachment to its petition listed the 2,000. They listed the individual names. They listed the addresses in care of the pension boards to avoid the privacy issue, which I understand caused the city to

withdraw the list that it originally filed. It's certainly doable to do that kind of a mailing, and, in fact, my understanding is that the city has proposed doing a mailing of that type somewhere down the road further in the process using Kurtzman Carson Consultants to do that mailing. It's a day late and a dollar short to do the mailing after the motion has been granted, after the committee has been appointed, after the process has run its course. It makes more sense, I believe, in terms of fundamental fairness, due process, and an opportunity to be heard for the Court to order the city to send the motion to the retirees through Kurtzman Carson, give them a short -- in the notice to the retirees give them a short turnaround time to respond to it. Some will, and some won't. The city somewhat condescendingly on page 13 refers to the retirees as basically a bunch of old fogies who don't know what's going on and wouldn't know what to do with the notice if they got it. I suggest that that's presumptuous on the part of the --

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THE COURT: All right, sir. Thank you. Who else would like to be heard?

MR. KARWOSKI: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. TAUBITZ: May it please the Court, Dennis
Taubitz appearing on behalf of myself. I'm a retiree of the
City of Detroit, and I'd like to make the following comments.
I concur with Mr. Karwoski. I believe that this committee,

as proposed, would be a denial of the due process rights of the 20,000 retirees. I also believe it's premature. I want to assert that the retirees are not a member of a labor union. They don't pay dues to the union. We don't have a voice in the union. The union, therefore, does not represent the retirees. Further submit that all 20,000 retirees deserve a place at the table. Thank you.

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MS. GIANNIRAKIS: Good afternoon, your Honor. Again, Maria Giannirakis on behalf of the United -- Daniel McDermott, United States Trustee. Sorry. Your Honor, the United States Trustee does not take a position on the motion here if an appointment of a committee is appropriate, but, frankly, we filed a response to the UAW's -- we filed a statement in response to the UAW's response that was filed yesterday because what they are asking is that if the Court does appoint a retiree committee, that it directs the U.S. Trustee to appoint all labor organizations to that committee or even some labor organizations, and I think other parties have mentioned the same thing in court this morning. relief is simply not available. 1102(a)(2) states if the Court directs an additional committee to be appointed, the U.S. Trustee will appoint a representative committee. There's nothing that mandates the appointment of a particular If parties, after a committee is selected, deem that it's inappropriate, 1104(a)(4) provides the relief that

they need, but that's not appropriate yet because at this time there's no committee appointed, although the UAW referenced that. Frankly, 1102(a)(4) says if the committee is appointed, after the appointment of the committee the Court directs the U.S. Trustee to appoint, if a party deems that it is not represented on the committee, then it has the right to come back to the Court at that time, and then the Court, if it finds that the committee is not adequately represented, will direct the U.S. Trustee to change the committee composition. The request that the UAW is making is not available at this time and is -- I'm sorry -- and is premature if they're asking the Court to -- they're assuming it's going to be a nonrepresentative committee, and that's not appropriate at this time.

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THE COURT: If the Court grants the motion, what would be the time frame for the U.S. Trustee to complete its responsibilities?

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: Your Honor, we have already started discussions with the city and other parties. We have been working on doing this as quickly as possible if the Court does grant the motion today. In cases where there are exigent circumstances, we have appointed committees almost immediately, in as little as three days. We don't anticipate that'll happen here because it's a complicated case, and we don't think we can quite proceed with that degree of speed,

but we will do everything in our power to appoint a committee as promptly as possible and with a view towards all the issues that are arising in this case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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Thank you, your Honor. I think there MS. LENNOX: are about half a dozen thematic objections that I'd like to The first is about the motion respond to in due course. being premature. This motion is not premature. We do not need to wait for an order for relief to be entered under Section 1102(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code under a plain reading of the statute's language. The limiter that suggests that the appointment of a committee should await the entry of an order for relief is only in Section (a)(1). If Congress had wanted that limiter to apply to both Sections (1) and (2), it could have placed the limiter in (a), and then it would have modified both subsections. It didn't do that, so the motion from a statutory basis is perfectly proper and perfectly timely. Moreover, from a practical perspective, your Honor, as many of the objectors themselves have noted, the legacy issues in this case are exceedingly important and complicated, and there's no reason to delay the discussions In fact, discussions of them have already In fact, it would be irresponsible to delay the appointment of a representative committee for those folks who are not currently at the table.

With respect to the <u>Vallejo</u> case that Ms. Brimer pointed out, in that case, to the extent it made any difference to the Court, that was not a case where the debtor moved for a committee. In fact, the debtor opposed the committee in that case. Here we are moving for the committee.

Secondly, your Honor, with respect to notice, we do state and we did in our motion and we did give notice to the four retiree associations that are voluntary memberships of currently retired persons that we were aware of. In fact, three of them have shown up today, and one of them claims to represent 70 percent of the folks that are retired, so we do think notice is appropriate. This is a procedural process in which we asked to appoint a committee to represent some folks. This is not s substantive process where we are asking to compromise any claims that retirees may have, so under the circumstances, we believe notice was perfectly appropriate.

Third -- and I've stated this before, so I'll just make it clear on the record again -- we are not -- the city is not participating in the selection of members of the committee nor does the city intend to be involved in who the committee selects as its professionals if it is appointed, so we don't believe, as has been alleged in a couple of pleadings, that there's any violation of Local Bankruptcy Rule 2014-2 here.

Fourth, with respect to the notations and reservation of rights -- and for this I would like to say that the city does appreciate the thoughtful response that was filed by AFSCME on this issue. It was very constructive. And we do confirm that by this motion the city is not seeking to preclude a creditor or the committee itself, should it be appointed, from weighing in on or objecting to any other substantive issue in this case, including eligibility. We are not asking parties to waive those rights.

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Fourth, one of the objectors has suggested there should be more than one committee, and we submit there should only be one committee. The retirees in the two pension systems have more in common than not. Each has an underfunded pension. Each gets similar retiree benefits from the city. The legal issues to be addressed are substantially similar, if not identical, but even if that were not the case, your Honor, the whole purpose of having a committee is to bring representatives of differing types of interests but claims of the same legal priority together in one body to try to work out a consensual plan. You know, it's one thing for a committee to negotiate with a debtor, but there are differing interests on a committee. That's the whole purpose of it, and part of being on a committee is so that the creditors can start working out their intercreditor issues as well. We think it's, therefore -- I mean on a normal regular

official unsecured creditors' committee, you have bondholders and unions and trade vendors and, you know, a host of people with differing interests. That's the whole purpose of having a committee. So we think it's perfectly appropriate and intended for members with different types of views and interests to sit on one committee, and we think that applies here as well.

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And then finally, your Honor, this is the punch line that everybody seems to have been waiting for. As many of the objections concede, a Chapter 9 debtor is not required to pay for professionals of the committee. Nevertheless, in light of the special nature of this committee that the city itself has sought, it is the city's current intent to pay for the reasonable fees and expenses of the retiree committee professionals, one committee's professionals. If the committee is formed, the city will have to certainly discuss with the committee itself what's reasonable and rational under the circumstances, and like it's done with its own professionals, the city is going to look to maximize efficiencies and economies among the committee's professionals as well as all professionals in the case. So, accordingly and as most of the objectors have noted, it wouldn't be inappropriate to put that in an order. However, the city did wish to make its intentions known on the record.

THE COURT: Thank you. In a few moments, the Court

will take under advisement the issue raised by this motion. There is another committee that I think we should think about here. It would be a committee of tort claimants, tort claimants, accident claims, civil rights claims, people who have litigation pending or contemplated to be filed. The merit of this seems to me to be as much procedural as substantive. I think the last thing any of us wants is a flood of motions for relief from stay filed by people with lawsuits against the city to be permitted to pursue those claims, and it seems to me there may be merit in the appointment of a committee for the purpose of working out how those will be handled. They are quite complex because the options of where those cases get resolved is guite wide; Under 28 U.S.C. 157(b), you know, personal injury claims can be filed -- or can be tried in the District Court or in the court that they were pending in, and it seems to me that we ought to try to think of some way to manage that potential chaos.

MS. LENNOX: May I respond, your Honor?

THE COURT: No. Please think about that. I don't

need a response right now, but at some point I think we need

22 | to think about that issue.

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MS. LENNOX: Yeah. We have thought about that on many, many fronts about how to handle that. In fact, we have inquiries that have been made of us, and we do have what we

believe is a perfectly appropriate process at the right time to resolve those kinds of claims that would not necessitate the appointment of a committee.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anybody else have anything for today?

MS. LEVINE: Your Honor, before you deliberate, can we make one or two comments on the proposed form of order?

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MS. LEVINE: The order that was filed last night seemed -- Sharon Levine, Lowenstein Sandler. The order that was filed last night seems to have resolved a lot of the issues between the city and the U.S. Trustee, and we appreciate those efforts. Decretal paragraph one, though, says the motion is granted, and we would respectfully submit, as we've seen in a lot of orders in a lot of other cases, it should just say the motion is granted as set forth herein because then it would avoid the conflict with regard to things that haven't been resolved.

In addition, at decretal paragraph five there's a retention of jurisdiction which isn't limited with regard to the reservation of rights that we've been discussing on the record, so I just want clarification even if that -- unlike decretal paragraph one, even if decretal paragraph five stays the same, there's an understanding on the record --

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, let me just --

MS. LEVINE: -- that the reservation of jurisdiction --

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THE COURT: Let me just say broadly I do not favor provisions in any order that say the Court retains jurisdiction to do A, B, or C. They are unnecessary and confusing. The law sets forth what the Court's jurisdiction is, and that's what applies.

MS. LEVINE: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. It's now one -- something else, sir?

MR. HACKNEY: Sorry, your Honor. I just -- Stephen Hackney on behalf of Syncora. I wasn't sure if you were going to adjourn for the day or just for a lunch recess, but there was a status conference on the motion pursuant --

THE COURT: Yes. I want to -- I want to contemplate this committee issue and then come back and hear yours. I don't really want to take a lunch break, per se, because that'll take altogether too long.

MR. HACKNEY: Understood.

THE COURT: So just give me 15 minutes to think about this committee issue, come back, give a decision on that, and then we'll get to the Syncora matter.

MR. HACKNEY: Absolutely, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: And we'll be in recess for 15 minutes, please.

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess.

(Recess at 1:00 p.m., until 1:14 p.m.)

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please be seated. Case Number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan.

THE COURT: The Court concludes that it is appropriate to grant the motion of the city for the appointment of a committee of retired persons. The Court concludes that the objection that this motion is statutorily premature should be overruled.

As counsel for the city has pointed out, Section 1102(a)(2), which is the section on which the present motion is based, does not require the Court to wait until after the order for relief to appoint a committee. Accordingly, by its plain language, the Court does have the authority to grant this relief, and so that objection is overruled.

It has also been argued here that this motion is on inadequate notice because most, if not all, of the individual retirees were not given notice of this motion. The Court concludes that that objection as well should be overruled. This is simply a procedural motion that does not affect the substantive rights of retirees or any other party, for that matter, and, accordingly, the Court concludes that notice was adequate, and that objection is overruled.

The Court commends and accepts the city's offer to pay the reasonable expenses of the committee and proposes

that all such professional expenses be processed through the fee examiner process.

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Regarding the issue of scope, it is an important part of the process to define the scope of the committee, and, as noted a moment ago, the Court concludes that the scope of the committee should be to represent the retirees of the City of Detroit. If the Court has any discretion on the issue of whether to give quidance to the U.S. Trustee as to the issue of adequate representation, the Court concludes in this case that it would not be appropriate to exercise that discretion. The Court, rather, concludes that the issue of who should serve on this committee should be left first to the discretion of the U.S. Trustee, and if there are issues or objections to the composition of the committee, there are procedures in place under the Bankruptcy Code to address that, and those issues will be addressed to the extent raised in due course, so the Court will not make any statement on the record at this time on this issue.

On the issue of adjusting the dates and deadlines that we discussed earlier on in the status conference to reflect the interest of the committee in participating fully in the process, the Court concludes that that interest can be accommodated by granting the committee a period of time after it selects its attorneys to file objections to eligibility and participate in the discovery as set forth in the proposed

dates and deadlines, so the Court will build that extra leeway in for this one participant, so with that on the record, the Court will grant the motion.

I do, however, want to address the representative of the United States Trustee's office one more time. Ma'am, would you take the lectern for me? I feel the need to take one more try at pinning you down regarding how long this is going to take because we have a very aggressive and tight set of dates and deadlines here, and so I think it's important to the process that I give your office a deadline as well.

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: Your Honor, I appreciate that, and I appreciate --

THE COURT: How much time do you need?

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: I don't have a specific answer. All I can say is we will --

THE COURT: If you don't give me a number, I'll make one up. And honestly, if I do it, it's going to be like arbitrary and capricious and clearly erroneous.

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: May I have a moment to consult -THE COURT: And none of us want that, so -- and I
don't know whether you're talking about three days, seven
days, fourteen days, twenty-one days. I don't know what
you're thinking about.

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: Your Honor, I don't think -- I don't think it's possible to have a committee up and running

in three days, to be honest with you. I mean we will --1 THE COURT: I wasn't asking you to. What I'm 2 3 telling you is I don't know what the right answer is. Do you 4 want time to consult with your colleagues? 5 MS. GIANNIRAKIS: I do want time to consult with my 6 colleagues. I do know --7 THE COURT: All right. MS. GIANNIRAKIS: I do know that we are concerned 8 9 with giving parties enough time to respond --10 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 11 MS. GIANNIRAKIS: -- because we are --12 THE COURT: Right. 13 MS. GIANNIRAKIS: -- we do have retirees here who --14 THE COURT: Right. MS. GIANNIRAKIS: -- may not have all the electronic 15 16 methods that we all have to get information. 17 THE COURT: Right. Okay. Fair enough. So I will 18 do the status conference on the Syncora motion while you 19 consult with your colleagues, and then we'll pick this back 20 up again. 2.1 Thank you, your Honor. MS. GIANNIRAKIS: 22 THE COURT: Okay. Let's do that. MR. HACKNEY: Good afternoon, your Honor. 23 24 Hackney on behalf of Syncora. 25 THE COURT: Here's my question for you.

MR. HACKNEY: Yes.

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THE COURT: Given the very restricted role that a court plays in either reviewing the decision of a debtor to assume or reject a contract or the decision of a debtor to settle a dispute, why do you need discovery at all?

MR. HACKNEY: So you've anticipated the first part of our argument, your Honor, which was why we filed the statement yesterday to express concerns that we had when you take the proposed order that they have submitted to you and the forbearance agreement and you lay them next to the Orion agreement from the Second Circuit. We have concerns that that order would entail the Court making judicial findings, judicial declarations that could foreclose the rights of third parties, and you see --

THE COURT: Okay. If that's your concern, I will assure you at the outset that my decision will be nothing more than to approve the decision of the city to assume this contract and enter into the settlement or disapprove of it.

MR. HACKNEY: And that assurance is very helpful I would say at the outset. I would still say, though, your Honor, that this is a sizeable transaction that the city is proposing to potentially assume and perform under. Whether they can perform under it is obviously a subject of dispute that I'll bracket, but whether or not this is within the business judgment of both the city and potentially the

service corporation that's also a party to this contract, what claims exactly are being compromised, why they're being compromised now, the likelihood of success, so on and so forth, where the city will get the money to potentially perform under this agreement if it is entitled to perform, bracketing our dispute about that, these are all important questions that are -- unfortunately, they are fact-intensive. And while it is true that the Court must defer to the city's business judgment, to the extent it applies, with a serious question around whether it applies when two of the three parties to the transaction appear to be city officers with duties to the city, the indemnification of the service corporation directors, a number of factual issues, your Honor, that's why we need discovery.

THE COURT: Let's assume for a minute -- let's assume for a minute that for any or all or some of the reasons you have identified the city cannot demonstrate that it has exercised appropriate business judgment. Isn't the answer to deny the motion --

MR. HACKNEY: I believe --

THE COURT: -- rather than grant all this discovery?

MR. HACKNEY: I believe it would be, but I need the discovery in order to inquire into that because remember, your Honor, at Syncora we have been excluded from these negotiations, so we do not know what's happened, what

meetings were involved, who discussed what with whom. And we also have serious questions about the interaction of the forbearance agreement with the COPs and swap structure that I discussed -- that I mentioned earlier, and so there are ambiguities in the way the forbearance agreement works. There are questions about the necessity of the casino revenues.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah.

THE COURT: Let's focus on ambiguities. If the ambiguities are such that it's not in the best interest of the city to assume this contract or if the ambiguities are such that the Court cannot say that the city exercised proper business judgment in proposing to assume the contract, why doesn't it suit your purposes just to argue the motion should be denied?

MR. HACKNEY: I think that's a fair point, your Honor, but it's also very possible that parol evidence may inform the resolution of the ambiguity in a way that leads to informing the Court's decision about whether it should -- whether it should deny the motion or not, whether it's within the business judgment or not. I mean, your Honor, we are talking about the city is purporting to use this --

THE COURT: What I'm having a hard time doing is reconciling your position on the one hand that the Court in

its very limited role here should not make any holdings or findings about what this contract means or does or how it impacts third parties with your interest in discovery on those very questions --

MR. HACKNEY: Well, I think that --

THE COURT: -- unless you have some ulterior motive because of your other litigation.

MR. HACKNEY: And we do not, your Honor. We do not, but we are concerned that the city is going to attempt to wrap itself up in the cloak of the order and say, "Now we're entitled to act consistent with this forbearance agreement," and so we do have serious --

THE COURT: Well, if the motion to assume is granted, it's granted with all of the words and questions about the contract. There's nothing about the assumption process that improves a debtor's position vis-a-vis other parties; right? We all understand that.

MR. HACKNEY: I agree, and, your Honor, you are speaking to the large majority of my concerns here, and so I'm trying to react on my feet. I do appreciate it. I also appreciate that you have considered our statement already given the avalanche of information that's filed every week. I guess what I would say, your Honor, is that we have not had very much insight into what led to the forbearance agreement. There are standards under 365 and 9019 that are applicable,

and to the extent we do have remaining objections
notwithstanding the Court's emphasis of its limited role, we
don't believe that we can meaningfully prepare for the
hearing without at least some discovery into what happened.

THE COURT: All right. I don't see it, so I'm going

to ask you to file a response to the motion within 14 days.

You can argue that the information that the debtor has placed on the record is not adequate information for the Court to make the judgments that the city is asking the Court to make, and the Court will, of course, take that very seriously, but -- so what I'm proposing is a response by you within 14 days and a hearing on the motion at our first omnibus hearing date on August 21st. Any objection to that?

MR. HACKNEY: I guess subject to our objection to the fact that our request --

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. HACKNEY: -- for discovery is overruled.

THE COURT: Yeah. Apart from that. Sir, did you want to be heard on this matter as well?

MR. MARRIOTT: If I might, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead, sir.

MR. MARRIOTT: Your Honor, Vince Marriott, Ballard Spahr. I'm embarrassed to tell you I cannot pronounce the name of my client. It's also about a paragraph --

THE COURT: I'm assuming that's because it's not

English.

MR. MARRIOTT: That's correct. It's also about a paragraph long. The first two words look like Erste Europaische.

THE COURT: Okay. That should be enough for our purposes. Thank you.

MR. MARRIOTT: I like to refer to it as EEPK because that's just easier.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MARRIOTT: We filed a preliminary objection to the debtor's motion at Docket Number 246.

THE COURT: I saw that.

MR. MARRIOTT: And at Docket Number 246 you can see the whole name. Just a couple of additions to what Mr. Hackney said. First, the forbearance agreement, as I think all of the papers indicate, isn't simply about -- or the motion isn't simply about assumption of an agreement. It's also about settlement of certain potentially significant claims that the estate might have against the swap parties either as to the validity of the swaps, the amount that's due under them, the perfection or priority of the --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. MARRIOTT: -- collateral interest in the casino revenues, and, you know, the city in its motion basically deals with those issues by saying, you know, they're

complicated. They're hard. It would take a lot of time to litigate them, and we don't want to. Nevertheless, one of the justifications for the settlement is that it's \$300 million in secured debt and, therefore, to the extent the city can get out from under \$300 million of secured debt so that the collateralization and the amount of the claim -- all of that is significantly relevant to consideration of the motion.

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When it comes to considering whether a settlement agreement is fair and equitable, I think the Court's role is a little more significant than passing on the business judgment of the debtor in assuming or not a contract. other words, I think the Court's involvement is a little bit more, and the showing that the debtor has to make is a little bit more substantial to approve a settlement than assumption or rejection of a contract. And at least in our view, your Honor, the forbearance agreement is much more a settlement than it is your -- what you normally would see as a contract that a debtor is seeking to assume or reject. And the fact that the debtor is seeking to assume a settlement agreement, although it's called a forbearance agreement, and the basis upon which it is entering into that agreement impacts what may be significant claims and impacts what may be significant issues for unsecured creditors insofar as either the debt or the swap obligations themselves --

THE COURT: Okay. But what I'm hearing from you is the opening paragraph of your argument on August 21st.

MR. MARRIOTT: Yes, but I could make that argument better if I had the opportunity to do some discovery and see the documents that relate to the swap agreement, see the documents that relate to the 2009 collateralization and amendment to the service contract.

THE COURT: Is there any reason to believe that these documents aren't in this data room?

MR. MARRIOTT: They may be in the data room, your Honor, but to get into the data room -- the problem with the data room is it has a lot of things in there that at least at the moment my client is not interested in seeing because the data room may very well contain material nonpublic information that would put my client in a position of perhaps impacting its ability to trade. We don't think any of the documents that we would seek in connection with this motion would be considered material nonpublic information. I think they're public record or could be available through public means, so we would prefer not to have to sign an NDA to get into the data room for a bunch of stuff we don't want. We'd rather make a document request for the limited things we do want that wouldn't create the same issue.

THE COURT: Well, all right. I have to say I still don't see it. Whether the debtor can establish the grounds

for its motion it doesn't seem to me to depend on anything other than what they assert in their motion and what they offer in court. Now, having said that, as a creditor in the case you're entitled to see any document you like that's related to the financial condition of the city. I said that earlier, and I hope the city will cooperate with you in that regard, but let's hold a hearing on this on October -- I'm sorry -- August 21st. Ms. Lennox or whomever, I should ask you if that date is acceptable to you as well.

MR. SHUMAKER: It is, your Honor. Gregory Shumaker, Jones Day.

THE COURT: All right. Is 21 -- excuse me. Is 14 days enough time to file a response?

MR. PEREZ: My name is Alfredo Perez, and I represent FGIC, which is another monoline insurer that's involved in this transaction. Fourteen days is fine if it applies to everybody. Obviously that wouldn't preclude us from arguing that this matter shouldn't be heard at this time, but we can --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. PEREZ: -- respond in 14 days.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. That will conclude that status conference. The Court will enter a scheduling order accordingly. We don't have our U.S. Trustee representatives back here yet. Was there something you

wanted to say, sir?

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MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, sir, your Honor. Again, Gregory Shumaker, Jones Day, for the city. Just one thing that I'm -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Go ahead, sir.

MR. SHUMAKER: I'm sorry. I'd just note that one of my colleagues asked that we ask that the hearing on the 21st be an evidentiary hearing as opposed to just a preliminary hearing. I know it's a formality, but I thought I should raise it.

THE COURT: An evidentiary hearing at which what evidence would be presented?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, the evidence in support of the motion.

THE COURT: You mean like a witness evidence or --

MR. SHUMAKER: Right, exactly.

THE COURT: -- or documentary evidence?

MR. SHUMAKER: That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT: Who would the witnesses be?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, we're not certain of that, but we're sure there will probably be witnesses, including potentially the emergency manager.

THE COURT: If I grant that request, does that open the door to discovery by those witnesses or of those witnesses?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, I believe part of our -- the presentation of our evidence is going to involve oral testimony from a witness, so we believe there's probably adequate opportunity for cross-examination, but that is what we were planning, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you for that information. In light of that -- sir.

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, my name is Bill Smith. I'm counsel -- I've learned to be precise about this -- to U.S. Bank in its role as custodian of the casino revenues and as trustee for the certificates of participation. That makes us a party in interest. It's unclear whether we are a creditor.

The dialogue you just concluded underscores, I think, a relevant factor. This is, as has been suggested to you by other parties, a complex series of transactions. If the debtor proposes --

THE COURT: I remain to be convinced of that.

MR. SMITH: I apologize, your Honor. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: I remain to be convinced of that.

MR. SMITH: We'd be -- well, I'm not certain we oppose the transaction, so I'm not sure I'm the right person to convince you. There are able and capable people who I believe are going to take a yeoman's shot at trying to do that. We believe, in the event that the debtor proposes to present live testimony, it is worthwhile making available to

interested parties at least the documents that surround this transaction, some of which are in the data room, some of which are not. And so our suggestion is, to the degree that you are disposed not to grant discovery, that you at least make -- suggest to the city that it make available to any person interested in opposing the transaction the transaction documents themselves. Past that we have no view on discovery, your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Well, the city's suggestion that they are proposing evidence at this hearing does cause me to change my mind about discovery and to allow some limited discovery, so by the same August 21st deadline, the Court will ask the city to file a list of witnesses and a list of documents that it intends to offer at the hearing and to provide those documents to the city. In the two weeks following, the Court will order the city to make available for deposition those witnesses who it intends to call. As a result, we won't have our hearing on August 21st. We'll have it on August 28th. Anything further on this matter?

MR. GOLDBERG: What does that do to the response time for the motion?

THE COURT: I want responses within 21 days -MR. GOLDBERG: Twenty-one --

THE COURT: I'm sorry -- 14 days. Fourteen days. Sorry. Okay. Let's get back to the issue of appointing a

1 | committee of retired persons.

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: Thank you, your Honor. Thank you for allowing us the opportunity.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: I was able to consult with my client during that break, and our concern -- and I'll just voice it briefly -- is --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: -- unlike when we have a list of unsecured creditors, we don't have the body of people that we have to -- well, I guess we do now with 3,500 pages of people to solicit. And although there are parties here that we know are interested and we're going to ask them for information, we don't control how quickly we get those names and that information. We are going to post the questionnaire on the website as soon as it's completed, and that will be done very early, and it'll be available.

THE COURT: What website?

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: On the U.S. Trustee's Detroit website. I don't have that address, but it's the U.S. Trustee's --

THE COURT: U.S. Trustee's website?

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: Right. And it'll be very --

THE COURT: Do you have any objection to posting it on the city's website and the court's website as well?

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have any objection to posting it on the city's website and the court's website as well?

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: Do not, your Honor. As much as it could be out there, we are not opposed to that.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MS. GIANNIRAKIS: And we also know that in addition to that, we're going to be doing mailings, and we're going to have -- we have a body of constituents here that are probably not all technologically savvy, so we want to be mindful of that.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: So with that said, your Honor, we are going to endeavor to do this as quickly as possible, but we believe we need at least the outline of 21 days.

THE COURT: Um-hmm. All right.

MS. GIANNIRAKIS: And if we can do it sooner, we will do it sooner.

THE COURT: All right. I will set that deadline for you. If there's cause to extend that, you can file a motion, and the Court will, of course, give that every consideration. Anything further for today, or are we done? I just -- I want to make one more statement. Was there something you wanted to say, sir? I didn't mean to cut you off. Okay. Give me one second.

This is quite out of the ordinary, but before we conclude I do want to take a moment to thank the United States District Court and its judges for very generously offering us the use of their space and for adjusting their schedules to allow this and future hearings. I also want to thank the clerk of the District Court, Dave Weaver, and the clerk of the Bankruptcy Court, Katherine Gullo, as well as their staffs for their monumental efforts in arranging and setting up all of this. It was an extraordinary challenge with very short notice, and they met that challenge with grace and with expertise and in the very best spirit of public service. And I'd like to break our decorum and ask you to give them a round of applause. And we are adjourned.

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is adjourned.

(Proceedings concluded at 1:43 p.m.)

INDEX

WITNESSES:

None

EXHIBITS:

None

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Lois Garrett

August 9, 2013

Lois Garrett

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE: CITY OF DETROIT, . Docket No. 13-53846

MICHIGAN,

Detroit, Michigan August 21, 2013

Debtor. . 10:02 a.m.

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HEARING RE. EMERGENCY MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE JULY 25, 2013, STAY ORDER

EXPEDITED HEARING RE. NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF DEFENDANT SYNCORA GUARANTEE, INC.'S, EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND CONDUCT EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

STATUS HEARING RE. CORRECTED MOTION TO ASSUME LEASE OR EXECUTORY CONTRACT

ADVERSARY PROCEEDING 13-04942 - STATUS CONFERENCE RE. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEBTOR'S EX PARTE MOTION FOR AN ORDER SHORTENING NOTICE, STAYING FURTHER BRIEFING AND SCHEDULING AN EXPEDITED HEARING WITH RESPECT TO MOTION OF DEBTOR CITY OF DETROIT TO SCHEDULE STATUS CONFERENCE, SET BRIEFING SCHEDULES AND MAINTAIN STATUS QUO

BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEVEN W. RHODES UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

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THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please 1 2 be seated. Case Number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan, 3 and Case Number 13-04942, City of Detroit versus Syncora 4 Guarantee, et al. 5 THE COURT: One second, please. Chris. All right. Did someone want to be sworn in? 6 7 ATTORNEY: Yes. THE COURT: Someone would like to be admitted to the 8 9 bar of the Court. Step forward, please. 10 MR. COCO: Good morning, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Good morning. What are your names, 12 please? 13 MR. COCO: Nathan Coco from McDermott, Will & Emery. 14 THE COURT: Mr. Coco. MR. PRICE: Good morning, your Honor. William Price 15 from Clark Hill. 16 17 THE COURT: Mr. Price. 18 MR. GUADAGNINO: Frank Guadagnino, Clark Hill. 19 THE COURT: What's your last name, sir? 20 MR. GUADAGNINO: Guadagnino. 2.1 Welcome. Okay. Are the three of you THE COURT: 22 prepared to take the oath of admission to the Bar of the 23 Court? Please raise your right hands. Do you affirm that 24 you will conduct yourself as an attorney and counselor of 25 this Court with integrity and respect for the law, that you

have read and will abide by the civility principles approved by the Court, and that you will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States?

ATTORNEYS: I will (collectively).

THE COURT: All right. Welcome. We'll take care of your paperwork for you. You are all set.

ATTORNEY: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: You're welcome. One second, please. My password is not working here, Chris. All right. Well, let's start. I want to start with the Davis matter, please.

MR. PATERSON: Thank you, your Honor. Andrew Paterson on behalf of Robert Davis.

THE COURT: And you may proceed, sir.

MR. PATERSON: Sir, this is our motion for clarification of your stay order that was entered in July and addressed, as we saw it, three state lawsuits that were included in the stay, although the debtor was not a party to those suits, but they did involve the first or second biggest liability of the debtor, the pension plans. And the definition or the identification of those cases was set forth in the motion, and your order did adopt that.

THE COURT: Excuse me one second, sir. Chris, it's working. Go ahead, sir.

MR. PATERSON: Since that time, your order has been interposed in our state case up in Ingham County on an open

meetings case. It's also been interposed in other matters that I've been involved in, and I'd like to have some clarification as to the extent of that order. I feel that the state proceeding in Ingham County is an open meetings case that has no impact whatsoever directly or practically on the debtor's Chapter 9 protections.

THE COURT: Well, let's talk about that. What does your client seek to accomplish by that lawsuit?

MR. PATERSON: A declaration from the Court that the Loan Board violated the Open Meetings Act in connection with the appointment of Mr. Orr under Public Act 72 as the emergency financial manager for the City of Detroit.

THE COURT: And what does he intend to do with that declaration if he obtains it?

MR. PATERSON: The declaration is used in the state court to guide conduct of public bodies, and I will also seek an injunction that they not violate the OMA again, although it's somewhat moot at this point since Public Act 72 has now been repealed by the enactment of Public Act 436 of 2012 under which Mr. Orr currently serves and is appointed.

THE COURT: Is it your representation to the Court that it is not the intent of your client to use such a declaration to remove Mr. Orr from office?

MR. PATERSON: It is, and he did in our reply brief so stipulate that we would not be appealing any such

decision. I also indicated to the Court and have brought with me a copy of the transcript from our July 24 hearing before Judge Collette wherein he indicated that he was not going to invalidate any actions taken by the Loan Board in connection with the appointment.

THE COURT: Well, I appreciate that, but I want to be sure you understand the very specific question I'm asking you. I get that it is not the intent of your client or of the state court to invalidate any of the actions of the Loan Board or any of the actions that Mr. Orr has taken from the time of his appointment until whenever that judgment might be entered. I've got that.

MR. PATERSON: Nor could I seek that relief, nor could the Court grant that under Michigan law.

THE COURT: But that's not the question I'm asking.

I'm asking is -- the question I'm asking is is it your

representation to the Court that your client will not seek to

use that judgment to remove Mr. Orr from office in the

future?

MR. PATERSON: That is, in fact, our stipulation.

THE COURT: So if I heard you correctly, what you plan to do with this judgment is to use it to enjoin the Loan Board or others from violating the Open Meetings Act in the future?

MR. PATERSON: That is correct.

THE COURT: And anything else?

MR. PATERSON: No. I mean the relief that I seek is the declaration. I am compelled to ask for an injunction against further violations. It's within the discretion of the state court to issue or not issue that, and then I will, of course, be seeking reimbursement of the attorneys' fees and costs.

THE COURT: All right. So the question remaining to be addressed is why shouldn't the order that the Court previously entered be read to stay your suit or the suit where you represent Mr. Davis?

MR. PATERSON: Because none of the debtor's assets or property is affected whatsoever by my suit. My suit is against state actors, not against the city. The city is not a party. None of its departments are parties. None of its assets or property is subject to any action by the Circuit Court in my OMA suit. My OMA suit is exclusively against the governor, the state treasurer, and the state Emergency Financial Loan Board.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further, sir?

MR. PATERSON: No. I would just emphasize that the de facto doctrine does validate all of the acts that have occurred to date, in any event, and there's been no response to that. I mean that is clearly the state law.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. PATERSON: Thank you.

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THE COURT: Who will be addressing this? Oh, I'm sorry.

MS. BRYA: Good morning, your Honor. Michelle Brya and Joshua Booth. We represent the governor, the state treasurer, and the Local Emergency Financial Assistance Loan Board in the state case.

Extending the bankruptcy stay should include the Davis case. In the debtor's motion they specifically requested that it apply to actions against the governor, the treasurer, and the Loan Board that directly or indirectly seek to enforce claims against the city or interfere with the city's actions or activities in the Chapter 9 case. Although the order that was signed by this Court specifically acknowledged the three pre-petition cases, we believe that by the language of that order it said that that language was included for the avoidance of doubt, and it didn't in any way limit the scope of your order to those three cases.

The defendants in the state case, the <u>Davis</u> versus <u>Loan Board</u> case, are the exact same defendants that this Court acknowledged in its order, the state treasurer, the governor, and the Local Financial Emergency Loan Board, and Davis seeks to invalidate the emergency manager, and that would clearly interfere with the state's activities in the

Chapter 9 bankruptcy case. Until Mr. Paterson filed his reply brief, we weren't aware of his position with respect to the invalidation, but clearly in his prayer for relief in the state case in his second amended complaint he requests a declaration that all decisions of the defendants, including its votes taken at the March 14th Loan Board meeting, are invalidated, and one of the decisions that they made that day was the appointment of Mr. Orr, so we believe that by seeking such relief, Mr. Paterson and Mr. Davis have not withdrawn those claims for the invalidation of the emergency manager, and, therefore, Judge Collette in the state case could still order that invalidation occur and that Mr. Orr's appointment be invalidated. And we believe that that could have a significant impact on the Chapter 9 proceedings, and we're asking that you extend the scope of stay.

THE COURT: Suppose the motion were granted with the condition that prohibited that?

MS. BRYA: That prohibited the ability for the state court to invalidate the emergency manager?

THE COURT: Precisely.

MS. BRYA: That would be something that we would be probably comfortable with, your Honor. I mean certainly that's the concern that we have is that if his position is invalidated, then it could significantly impact the City of Detroit and the state in general.

THE COURT: It sounds like all Mr. Davis and his counsel want here is a declaration that the Open Meetings Act was violated and attorney fees.

MS. BRYA: To some extent I think that that's correct, your Honor, although they still have those claims in their complaint, and so that relief, again, can still be granted.

THE COURT: But if my order of clarification limited Mr. Davis to those two forms of relief, you would be comfortable with that?

MS. BRYA: Yes, your Honor, I believe we would.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. BRYA: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. HEIMAN: Good morning, your Honor. David
Heiman, Jones Day, on behalf of the city. As a technical
matter, this seems more like a request for relief from stay
than clarification, but I'll leave that to your Honor, and I
don't -- it matters not to me whether we try to go through a
proper process or not in that respect, but I would like to
say that we're obviously very concerned about anything that
would in any way question the role or authority of the
executive decision-maker of the city, and I cannot imagine
anything that would be more disruptive to a Chapter 9 case
than that. So to just respond to your proposal, if I can
call it that, I also have no problem with the suggestion as

it relates to Mr. Davis and his counsel, Mr. Paterson. concerned, however, about the impact of a ruling that potentially invalidates the -- for the record, invalidates the appointment of Mr. Orr not so much for the party that is making the commitment to your Honor but for the rest of the world and what they do with that, so I think we have to address that. I have no problem with your Honor getting comfortable with whatever works here, but I just want to make sure that we have covered the waterfront in terms of not being exposed to some third party coming in and saying, "Look at that order, " so with that --

THE COURT: Is it possible -- one second, sir. Is it legally possible to give Mr. Orr and the city that kind of protection?

MR. HEIMAN: I would assume -- I'm not a constitutional scholar, your Honor, but I would assume if your Honor issues an order that makes it clear -- and what I think I heard you say is your order would say that, without, again, being technical, the stay will not apply to the Davis lawsuit -- the pending Davis lawsuit so long as the Bankruptcy Court does not move to invalidate the appointment of Mr. Orr.

THE COURT: Well, you said "Bankruptcy Court," but, of course, you mean the Circuit Court.

MR. HEIMAN: Yes. I'm sorry. Excuse me. I'm

sorry. And so --

THE COURT: Well, actually my question was a little more specific than that. It was the stay would be clarified to permit Mr. Davis to seek a judgment -- a declaratory judgment under the Open -- that the Open Meetings Act was violated, obviously not finding that. That's not our role here, but a declaratory judgment that the -- seeking a declaratory judgment that the Open Meetings Act was violated and attorney fees, period.

MR. HEIMAN: Okay. And if I may suggest that we add to that and that no other party may use any such ruling should it come to pass in any way regarding -- with respect to Mr. Orr's appointment without coming back to the Bankruptcy Court, I think we would be satisfied, so it's -- it would, in fact, be a clarification of the stay as relates to Mr. Davis' lawsuit, so I would think we could do that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sir.

MR. PATERSON: Yes. I think the Court should be aware that the Open Meetings Act itself I think addresses Mr. Heiman's concern. Section MCL 15.273 reads, "The circuit court shall not have jurisdiction to invalidate a decision of a public body for a violation of this act unless an action is commenced pursuant to this section within the following specified period of time," and then "(a) Within 60 days after

the approved minutes are made available to the public by the public body." His appointment was on March 14th. Sixty days have come and gone. No one else can seek to invalidate the appointment of Mr. Orr under Public Act 72 because the Circuit Court would not have jurisdiction.

THE COURT: So I take it by that that you wouldn't object to the additional suggestion that Mr. Heiman made here.

MR. PATERSON: I would not. It simply restates the law, I think, of the state.

THE COURT: Sir.

MR. HEIMAN: No. I was good.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HEIMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, in the circumstances, it appears to the Court that we have an agreement as to how this motion should be resolved, so, Mr. Peterson, I'm going to ask you to prepare an order with the three agreed upon conditions here and have it approved as to form by the Attorney General's Office and counsel for the city and then submit it to the Court.

MR. PATERSON: Will do. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: You're all set, sir. All right. Let's turn our attention to the Syncora matters. I'd like actually

25 first to address the adversary proceeding if that's okay with

everyone. Who will be addressing the adversary proceeding 1 2 for the city? MR. SHUMAKER: I will, your Honor. Gregory Shumaker 3 of Jones Day. 4 5 THE COURT: Mr. Shumaker. MR. SHUMAKER: Yes. 6 THE COURT: All right. So let's review where we are 8 in the adversary proceeding and where we think we might be 9 going. Okay? 10 MR. SHUMAKER: Certainly. 11 THE COURT: As best I can figure it, Syncora has a 12 motion to dismiss that's pending and fully briefed and needs 13 a hearing date. Yes? 14 MR. SHUMAKER: It's almost fully briefed, your 15 There's a reply brief from --16 THE COURT: Reply brief, yes. 17 MR. SHUMAKER: -- the city due I think on the 26th. THE COURT: Okay. There is the city's motion for a 18 19 protective order. What's the briefing status on that? 20 The reply brief was filed by the city MR. SHUMAKER: 2.1 recently, and that was in response, if you recall, your 22 Honor, to their emergency motion to dissolve the TRO and for 23 discovery, so we responded by responding to the motion to 24 dissolve and then with a motion for protective order with

respect to the discovery they sought.

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THE COURT: Right. And so then the other motion is the motion to dissolve the TRO.

MR. SHUMAKER: That's right, your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Well, my questions for you are what is the city's position on dissolving the TRO, and I ask that with the vague notion that perhaps the TRO has already expired by its own terms, if not by operation of law or rule, and what further relief does the city seek in this adversary proceeding, in any event?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, your Honor, excellent questions. The TRO, of course, by Michigan law typically expires as of 14 days. Judge Berry indicated that the TRO should remain in full force and effect until the Court specifies otherwise. After that happened, the case then got removed, and then it got transferred to your Honor, referred to your Honor, so the TRO has been out there. If you will, we believe that one option for the Court would be under Section 108(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows -- when an order is enforced in a nonbankruptcy proceeding and fixes a period which is -- say it's 14 days -- the city filed on the 13th day. The TRO was entered on July 5th, and the city filed on July 18th. Section 108(b) provides a 60-day, if you will, extension, but I can't tell you, your Honor, that I've got a case on that one, but it is something. But in the end, the TRO has been out there. We know that it is still needed,

which has kind of hung up the communications between the parties because we know that Syncora is going to try to capture or try to trap the \$15 million that goes into the lockbox arrangement every month, and so we have been unwilling, without them agreeing to not go after the cash, to agree to a dissolution.

THE COURT: But it's your position that the automatic stay --

MR. SHUMAKER: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- would prohibit that regardless.

MR. SHUMAKER: I don't mean to say what I just said was not relevant because I think it is, but in the end we think since the city has filed that the casino revenues, if you will, your Honor, the tax -- the wagering taxes, are subject to the automatic stay, so the TRO may have run its useful life, but we do believe that the automatic stay would prohibit Syncora from taking the actions that it intends to take.

THE COURT: Well, is it -- just procedurally is it your and your client's intent to try to keep this temporary restraining order in effect, if it is in effect, pending this Court's ruling on whether the stay is in effect as to this property?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, your Honor, what we have asked for is that the Court maintain the status quo through the

hearing on the assumption motion because the purported consent rights that Syncora is asserting are also -- are going to be ruled upon, if you will, in that proceeding, and, therefore, we see them as very closely connected. And what we would prefer, your Honor, is either an extension of the TRO or -- you know, that's why I raised the 108(b) vehicle -- or simply -- I don't think we're asking for the stay. We just noted the stay applies to this property or we believe the stay applies to this property, and Syncora has not moved to -- moved for relief from the stay. And as a result, we would --

THE COURT: It contends the stay doesn't apply.

MR. SHUMAKER: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: It contends the stay does not apply.

MR. SHUMAKER: That's correct, your Honor. That's correct, which we disagree with, and I'm more than happy to address those points, your Honor, if you'd like me to, but we -- and they filed a statement yesterday that went into the different reasons why they believe the automatic stay does not apply.

THE COURT: Right. I saw that.

MR. SHUMAKER: Yeah. Oh, your Honor, one other thing I should raise is not only is the 362 stay out there, but we also believe that there's a stay under Chapter 9 that applies which is 922(a)(2), which would also prevent Syncora

from taking post-petition action against the casino revenues 1 2 which are taxes, and so that would be another vehicle for 3 maintaining the status quo as we believe is necessary. 4 THE COURT: Well, if you got a court order clarifying that the stay does prohibit Syncora notifying U.S. 5 Bank to trap these funds, would that obviate the need for 6 7 this adversary proceeding altogether? MR. SHUMAKER: I don't -- the remaining aspects of 8 9 the adversary proceeding would be the tort claims that the 10 city advanced in that initial complaint on July 5th, which 11 were the intentional interference with a contract, 12 intentional interference with an advantageous relationship, 13 so those torts presumably would move forward, but in terms of, you know, the declaration that we sought, at least --14 15 THE COURT: Well, but has the city really suffered 16 any damages, assuming those wrongs were committed? 17 MR. SHUMAKER: Well, I think that's something that we would need to flesh out in discovery, but I think that the 18 19 declaratory --20 THE COURT: Excuse me, but really? 21 MR. SHUMAKER: Well, your Honor, it's -- those 22 claims are still out there. 23

THE COURT: How long -- how long --

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MR. SHUMAKER: We would -- we would --

25 THE COURT: How long was the city without the funds

because of the trap? 1 2 MR. SHUMAKER: At least a couple of weeks, your 3 Honor, since June. It's complicated because the --4 THE COURT: So there may be a bit of damages from 5 that maybe. 6 MR. SHUMAKER: There might be some damages from 7 that, correct, your Honor. THE COURT: Maybe. All right. So what you seek by 8 9 your request to maintain the status quo pending the 10 resolution of the assumption motion is the explicit or 11 implicit -- I'm not sure which -- order that the TRO 12 previously granted is still in effect. 13 MR. SHUMAKER: That would be fine with us, your 14 Honor. 15 THE COURT: Well, I'm asking what you're requesting. 16 MR. SHUMAKER: Well, I --17 THE COURT: I'm not offering anything. I just want 18 to know what you want here. MR. SHUMAKER: Well, what I think is -- the fact 19 20 that the automatic stay applies I believe would prevent 2.1 Syncora from doing what we believe they want to do. 22 THE COURT: Well, if that's your position, it seems 23 to me you ought to think seriously about consenting to the 24 dismissal of the case. Let me hear from Syncora's counsel. 25 MR. HACKNEY: Good morning, your Honor. Stephen

Hackney. It's nice to see you again.

THE COURT: Mr. Hackney.

MR. HACKNEY: So I think you've gone to the nub of some of the issues, your Honor, because I think what is really trying to happen -- what the city is really trying to have happen here is I think they're uncertain as to whether the stay applies, and they're hoping that they can prop up the TRO as an interim measure where they sort out whether -- THE COURT: I sort of asked that, and the answer was

THE COURT: I sort of asked that, and the answer was no.

MR. HACKNEY: And I think that to the point that if they believe the stay applies, then there is certainly no need for the TRO. There will be no irreparable harm going forward because the stay will prevent against that. We have been cards on the table with the Court in terms of expressing our views about the stay because we didn't want to come in here and get the TRO dissolved and then pop up later, so that was part of the reason for the lengthy filings.

THE COURT: I read what you wrote about that.

MR. HACKNEY: I know you've had a lot of filings, but -- we're not trying to weigh you down unnecessarily, but we wanted to be transparent with you. But I guess from my standpoint, your Honor --

THE COURT: Well, let's just ask the question -MR. HACKNEY: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- since you are willing to be so transparent.

MR. HACKNEY: Yes.

THE COURT: If, with the city's consent or without it, the Court dissolves the TRO --

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- do you intend to notify U.S. Bank to trap casino funds?

MR. HACKNEY: So I think that there are two answers to that question, your Honor.

THE COURT: Are they both either yes or no?

MR. HACKNEY: Ironically, the first one is that it's important to understand about our position on the legal documents that -- and this is actually very important to the way the collateral agreement works is that it doesn't matter whether we notice U.S. Bank to trap or not. This is very important. So under Section 5.4(a)(3) of the collateral agreement, when there is an event of default of which the custodian is aware -- that's U.S. Bank -- it shall not remit money to the city. And the custodian is aware that there are events of default separate and apart from Syncora's letters, which were merely describing its view of the state of the world, because Mr. Orr himself in his proposal to creditors in his presentation on June 14th said there was, so he created that state of mind in U.S. Bank. That is what led to

the conversation that we believe happened, which led to our confirmatory letter that under the normal automatic operation of the collateral agreement cash trapping would occur, so that's why I'm prefacing my question of what will Syncora do because our view continues to be that it doesn't matter whether we take action or not. It's something that happens automatically. So I think the -- as to what will we do, you know, I think the answer is that we've expressed our view to you that we do not believe that the stay applies. We've also attempted to describe to you this machinery embodied in the COP's and the swap and the different types of rights we have, so we believe that we have not only enforcement rights directly under the collateral agreement and the swap agreement but also direction rights to the swap counterparties themselves vis-a-vis their rights under the collateral agreement. And while I can't say definitively today what we will do, I do want to represent to the Court that we believe that we would continue to have those rights notwithstanding the stay, so, in an effort to be responsive to your question, I think it's something we could do, but, more importantly, I think it's something that we do not have to do.

THE COURT: So that's a definite maybe.

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MR. HACKNEY: Yeah. But, your Honor, if I could add something, I mean I'm trying not to argue the merits of the

dissolution motion, but I think, as you saw, we have very strong feelings about that TRO. I mean that TRO was granted ex parte, and I won't argue the merits, but I think it's already been in place for -- since July 5th, so I think that's something on the order of 45 days. And now the city is saying we think it should be extended another 60 days, and we don't see the merits of it under the classic test, and we also don't believe that it --

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THE COURT: Well, 60 days from filing, not from now. MR. HACKNEY: Fair point. Fair point, but -- so I really think that what -- I think that we have to just be candid about what's happening here, and I think this is really about the auto stay. I think it's does the automatic stay apply, and you know what, Syncora, if it does, act at your peril because you could be subject to sanctions if you violate the automatic stay, and, city, you know, if there's a question that the automatic stay doesn't apply -- for example, when the city touted the assumption motion, they were talking about the access to the liquidity they would get. I took that by negative implication to suggest if we didn't do the forbearance agreement, there would be cash So, city, if there's questions about whether you think the automatic stay applies, it's incumbent upon you to file a motion to extend it, but I wanted to add one last thing, your Honor. I'll try not to go on at length, but when

I did the conversation with Mr. Shumaker about our motion to dissolve and asked them whether they would consent, this is what I understood them to say. I understood them to say we will stipulate to dissolution. We're not putting the money back, so we had a disagreement there. But what will happen then is U.S. Bank will go back to trapping cash in the interim, and then I take from their papers that they anticipated that they would have then filed, and so if that had happened, as we believe it should have, given the stipulation, then it would have been clearly on the points of the automatic stay. It would have been does the automatic stay apply or does it not. I don't think that there's anything about the passage of time and the fact that the TRO actually didn't get formally dissolved by Judge Zatkoff that should change the essential nature of that legal question. think that's the appropriate place to leave the parties rather than having this TRO involved, which then leads to a preliminary injunction hearing which requires discovery and, to my mind, is not the real debate between the parties. One last note, your Honor. The motion to dismiss is not fully briefed because not only do we have to get their response, but I think we also are able to reply.

THE COURT: Right. Thank you.

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MR. HACKNEY: Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, before you sit down, let me just

ask you procedurally whether you are willing to take on in a formal context in this Court and on an expedited basis the extent to which the stay applies to any of the rights you think your client has in the circumstances.

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah. So if the TRO were dissolved and we shifted the focus to where we think it was -- where it should be, I would absolutely work with counsel and with the Court to move through an expedited process of resolving the status of the stay, and so if I'm right and cash is trapped in the interim, it would only be the amount of cash that's trapped while that issue is resolved, and we would absolutely work with the Court to meet any schedule you set. You can see we've done work on it already, so --

THE COURT: Yes. You've briefed it extensively already.

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah.

THE COURT: Ms. Calton, did you want to be heard?

MS. CALTON: We're representing Defendants Detroit

Entertainment, LLC, which is the Motor City Casino, and

Greektown Casino, LLC, and I think with respect to what

you're discussing today, our desire is pretty easy. We want

whatever order is entered to be very clear where we're

supposed to pay the money so that we're at no risk of ever

THE COURT: Right.

having to pay it a second time.

1 MS. CALTON: Okay.

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THE COURT: I don't think anyone could object to that. One more, sir.

MR. COCO: Yes, your Honor. Good morning again. Nathan Coco on behalf of -- on behalf of U.S. Bank in its capacity as custodian under the collateral agreement. Your Honor, as we noted in our response brief that was filed some time ago, U.S. Bank in this capacity is simply a custodian. It is not U.S. Bank's role or discretion under the agreement to decide whether or not there's an event of default, and, you know, there's obviously a live dispute about whether or not the stay applies, whether or not the cash should be trapped or must be trapped. U.S. Bank in this dispute is simply seeking clarification one way or the other. trying to avoid a situation much like the casinos where we're subject to conflicting instructions from the city and from Syncora and, you know, are forced to separately seek the Court's decision-making authority on those issues, so --THE COURT: That's a bit inconsistent from what I

heard Mr. Hackney say. He said you have obligations once you are aware of a default.

MR. COCO: And there is a dispute about whether or not there is an event of default --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. COCO: -- as I understand it because --

THE COURT: That's a different question.

MR. COCO: -- because the swap counterparties haven't officially declared a default, but I just want to make sure the record is clear. U.S. Bank is not taking a position that there is or is not. It's an issue that's been presented to the Court by the parties who have an economic interest in this dispute. We just seek clarification to make sure that we're not put in an untenable situation where we're forced to reconcile two conflicting directions.

THE COURT: Fair enough, sir. Thank you.

MR. COCO: Thank you.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, if I may, briefly. Mr. Hackney was talking about how the collateral agreement works. Of course, your Honor realizes that Syncora, the swap insurer, is not a party to the collateral agreement and not a third-party beneficiary. There's no clause in that agreement nor has there been any default on the swaps payments by the city. And we fundamentally disagree on this position as to whether there is automatic cash trapping of the casino revenues. Mr. Hackney referred to a conversation between Mr. Orr and U.S. Bank. U.S. Bank has filed a paper disavowing Syncora's version of those events, and we strongly believe that the only parties that can — the only entities that can declare an event of default are the actual parties to the collateral agreement. That would be the swap counterparties

and not Syncora.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you the same question that I asked of Mr. Hackney. Are you and your client prepared to address the issue of whether the automatic stay in this case acts to prohibit Syncora from enforcing any of the rights that it thinks it has under whatever the agreements are here?

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, I think we would be more than happy to do that. We believe that it would be —— the burden of proof would be incumbent upon Syncora to show that they were entitled to that relief, but the only other thing I would share, your Honor, is that we would still ask that the Court prohibit the —— Syncora from taking steps to get at the city's property, the casino revenues, which are so vital to the city. I mean we're talking if they take actions vis—avis U.S. Bank ——

THE COURT: Well, all right. Fair enough. Let me just put the schedule question to the two of you. I'm available today or we have a hearing -- a regularly scheduled hearing for next Wednesday. We could do it then or some other time. What suits you? Do you want a moment to consult with your --

MR. SHUMAKER: If I might.

THE COURT: -- staff there? Sir.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, we would be willing to do

it on an expedited basis over the next week for the August 28th hearing if we were able to have the status quo maintained in some fashion.

THE COURT: Sir.

MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, I think that in late June when we thought that we were negotiating an NDA with the city in order to make a proposal if the --

THE COURT: Negotiating what?

MR. HACKNEY: Negotiating an NDA with the city. That's what we thought we were doing on July 3rd.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Negotiating what?

MR. HACKNEY: A nondisclosure agreement. I'm sorry, your Honor. Don't mean to be overly familiar. If they had asked us back then, "Hey, will you stand still while we negotiate this nondisclosure agreement, see if we can work it out, make a proposal?" there might have been a different willingness on behalf of my client to voluntarily stand still, but I think -- I'm not authorized to say that we will voluntarily stand still, your Honor. I certainly will say that we're happy to show up and argue this on August 27th, August 28th if that works with the Court's schedule. My personal view is this TRO, there's not a lawful basis to maintain it for a variety of reasons, and I just don't think that we can just use it as this interim measure. I don't think a week's worth of cash trapping is going to cripple the

city, and so -- and by the way, if the TRO stays in place, 1 2 then you have the preliminary injunction, and we have to schedule the discovery. It's just -- I don't think it's an 3 4 efficient way to proceed, but we certainly will show up and argue this next week if you'd like us to. I'm not even 5 sure -- I will have to say I'm not even sure when the city 6 7 gets the next payment discharged from the general receipt subaccount, so I don't know if they're going to --8 9 THE COURT: Anybody have an answer to that question? 10 MR. SHUMAKER: I'm sorry, your Honor. I'm sorry. 11 missed the question. MR. HACKNEY: He wants to know when the next release 12 13 is to the city. 14 THE COURT: When is the next release from the 15 subaccount? 16 MR. SHUMAKER: It should be on or about the 26th, 17 your Honor. 18 THE COURT: 26th of this month? 19 MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, your Honor. 20 MR. HACKNEY: I was hoping it was. 2.1 THE COURT: So it's before next Wednesday. 22 MR. HACKNEY: I didn't know if U.S. Bank might know 23 the precise answer to that because it builds up, and then it 24 discharges to them, and so if it wasn't even going to 25 discharge, there is more time, so --

THE COURT: Right. Well, I wonder, Mr. Shumaker, if it isn't in the best interest of all concerned to reconvene later this afternoon and have argument on this question.

It's certainly been briefed in various filings that the two of you have made. I'm prepared.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, we got their papers setting forth their arguments yesterday, and --

THE COURT: Of course you did, but none of it was any surprise to you.

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, in terms of their positions on the automatic stay, I believe there were some things in there that were brand new, and we've --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHUMAKER: You know, I believe that if your Honor believes that's the only way to do it, that's what we'll -- that's what we'll do. We would hope that there would be -- because the automatic stay is in place, we believe, presumptively, that we could do this on --

THE COURT: My concern with your relying on the TRO is twofold. I'm not confident, as a matter of law, that it is still in place. I don't know. Second, I'm not comfortable imposing one without all of the process that Rule -- I think it's 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires, which we have not -- or you have not invoked, so I think it's in the city's best interest to get

this matter resolved very promptly, and I think it's also in 1 Syncora's best interest, too, because, you know, there's 2 3 money coming in, and there's money going out. 4 MR. SHUMAKER: And we will do it today then, your 5 Honor. THE COURT: I suppose we could reconvene tomorrow if 6 7 you think 24 hours will be necessary to help you prepare for it, but, in the meantime, there are risks, right --8 9 MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor --10 THE COURT: -- and to consult with your people and 11 let me know what you want to do. 12 MR. SHUMAKER: This afternoon is fine, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: This afternoon is fine. Okay. Is that all right with you, sir? 14 15 MR. HACKNEY: Absolutely. 16 THE COURT: What time would either of you suggest? 17 May I suggest three? 18 MR. SHUMAKER: Three o'clock? 19 MR. HACKNEY: You bet. 20 That's great. MR. SHUMAKER: 21 THE COURT: All right. At three o'clock we will 22 have an oral argument on the issue of whether the automatic 23 stay of either 922 or 362 stays Syncora's enforcement of any 24 of its rights under any of the applicable agreements. 25 MR. HACKNEY: And, your Honor, did you have a view

on the dissolution motion and whether we should argue its merits, or is the TRO going to be dissolved?

THE COURT: Well, my thought there was to wait and see what the outcome of the stay motion was.

MR. HACKNEY: Okay.

THE COURT: If the answer to that is there is no stay or it's a limited stay or whatever, then the city may or may not decide to pursue a TRO, and we'll have to figure out how to do that. If the answer is, yes, the stay applies, then I think the city would agree to dissolve the TRO and maybe even dismiss the lawsuit. So is that okay to hold off on that?

MR. HACKNEY: Absolutely. The only reason I'm asking is we do technically have a status conference today on the adversary that would normally involve scheduling of things like the preliminary --

THE COURT: Right. So let's hold off on that.

MR. HACKNEY: Understood. Your Honor, I just want to make one more technical note on the adversary -- on the adversary proceeding just before we leave the podium, which is it's not precisely before you, but I think one thing that we'll have to do is clarify the precise nature of the Court's jurisdiction. There were competing theories of jurisdiction offered to Judge Zatkoff, and Judge Zatkoff merely held that he did have jurisdiction. And I wanted to flag this with you

as a potentially important issue to things like mandatory abstention and so forth under Section 1334. It's not before you. I'm merely raising it with you in the means of a status to let you know that we think that may be an issue that has to be resolved.

THE COURT: Can you be a little more specific for me?

MR. HACKNEY: I sure can. When we removed the case, we asserted that the casino defendants had been fraudulently joined, and in doing so we represented that diversity jurisdiction existed that supported removal. By the time Judge Zatkoff asked for clarification of this, the bankruptcy had intervened, and they filed a motion that said it doesn't matter anymore whether there was removal, and maybe there was diversity jurisdiction. They hedged a bit, but they said now there's related-to jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKNEY: So that's good enough for him, but I think for you it will be important for you to decide whether you have either or both and so on and so forth. I'm just making that point now.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HACKNEY: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sir.

MR. GOLDBERG: Very briefly --

1 THE COURT: Sir.

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MR. GOLDBERG: What I'm hearing is that the hearing -- the expedited hearing you're talking about is a hearing on whether the automatic stay applies to postpetition release of the casino tax dollars. Is that correct?

THE COURT: Yes, among other things.

MR. GOLDBERG: I mean I just want to call attention that in -- I represent party of interest David Sole. We filed an objection to the approval of the forbearance agreement. One of the central arguments in our objection, which we did brief, was --

THE COURT: Excuse me, sir. Could you just state your appearance on the record?

MR. GOLDBERG: I apologize. Jerome Goldberg, and I'm appearing on behalf of interested party David Sole. We did file an objection to the city's motion for approval of the forbearance --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOLDBERG: -- agreement, and one of the things that we did brief in the objection -- and it goes to the core of our objection -- is whether or not the automatic stay does apply to the -- based on Section 922 and Section 928. And we would appreciate at least consideration going to the arguments we raised in the brief, which we took some time to raise, and --

THE COURT: Okay. We will look at that, and if you'd like to be heard this afternoon at three o'clock, that's fine with me as well.

MR. GOLDBERG: My problem this afternoon is my wife has cancer surgery next Wednesday, and she does have an important appointment with the doctor. I'm available tomorrow morning to be heard, but I could not be available today.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. GOLDBERG: But I would appreciate this because we feel it is a very -- we feel this whole issue is a major issue because it deals with interest rate swaps, which we briefed, and that's a -- we're talking about tons of money going to these banks and for what we believe is very little socially useful, but I'm not going to argue our argument there, but obviously the question of whether or not the city is going to have to pay the money goes to whether it's a secured loan. It goes to the status within bankruptcy, and it goes to whether -- it goes to the efficacy and the necessity for this forbearance agreement and any benefit to the city and to the -- against the interest of other creditors like my clients, who are pensioners, who will see less funds available for their pensions because the money is going to the banks when the money does not even have to go to the banks, so I would like to be heard on this question, but

I know I'm not available at three o'clock. If there's no other way to reschedule, I appreciate the -- I would at least appreciate that my brief be considered, be looked at. We took time doing it. We feel there are very valid arguments on why the automatic stay does not apply -- I mean does apply -- my apology -- does apply, and, you know, if there's going to be post-briefing on it, we'd like to be involved in that as well.

THE COURT: All right, sir. You have my commitment to review that part of your briefs for this afternoon's hearing. Thank you.

MR. GOLDBERG: I appreciate it. And it's Docket 361.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. Thank you. All right. The other item that's on the agenda is a status hearing on the motion to assume the executory contract, the forbearance agreement. Is there anything that anyone would like to bring up in that regard?

MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, your Honor. Gregory Shumaker again for the record. Your Honor, last time we met on August 2nd, you'll recall that Syncora had asked for a significant amount of discovery relating to the assumption motion. At the end of the hearing, I had informed the Court that the city planned on putting on one or two witnesses for -- at the hearing, and your Honor then ordered that there be -- that

depositions of the debtor's witnesses and any exhibits that it proposed to proffer take place. The city did do that on Friday, I believe, and designated three witnesses and put forth its exhibit list and has, in fact, given copies of all of those exhibits pursuant to your order.

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Syncora has put forth a witness list of ten witnesses, one of whom overlaps, and that's the emergency manager. We've got -- your Honor has set the end of next week for the end of those depositions. We were wondering, your Honor, if that was what you had envisioned for the hearing, that there would be multiple other witnesses. As your Honor knows, it's not supposed to be a mini trial. want your Honor to be -- you know, have everything it needs to be informed -- fully informed, but that puts into some sort of question the length of the hearing perhaps. know if, you know, September 9th -- if 13 witnesses can be put on that day, but, in any event, we wanted to raise that as a status conference and get your guidance on that and then also sort of the length of the depositions. We have 13 objectors on the assumption motion. We'd ask for clarification from your Honor that whatever depositions go forward be limited in length and perhaps that the objectors be asked to coordinate in terms of their timing so there's no duplication of effort for the parties.

THE COURT: What limit would you suggest?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, your Honor, you know, a lot of -- I don't know exactly with regard to the Syncora witnesses how long those would take. I was hoping with regard to the three witnesses that the city had put forth, including the emergency manager, given all that's going on, that those be depositions of a half day in length.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. HACKNEY: Stephen Hackney on behalf of Syncora, your Honor. So the first thing I want to say is that the order didn't require us to identify witnesses or disclose documents, but we thought it would be safer to identify any potential rebuttal witnesses now.

THE COURT: Well, the reason for that was because you didn't tell me at the last hearing that you intended to call any witnesses.

MR. HACKNEY: And I don't have a present intention. It's not a will call list. I mean I don't know what the city's witnesses are going to say in their depositions. I have their affidavits. I have a sense of what they're going to say, but there is water under the bridge yet. We just did it earlier rather than later rather than doing a rebuttal witness list after we take the depositions. That's all we did. I don't have a present intention to call witnesses. I will say I don't fully know enough about the city's case-in-chief on the assumption motion to make that decision. That's

a nuance decision. I don't anticipate putting on hours of testimony from Syncora or its financial advisors. I will tell you that four of the names on the list are the service corporation directors who are -- is a party to the forbearance agreement, so those were names that we put on the list as well as potential percipient witnesses. And then we identified a bunch of documents as well, so I'm not -- it's not my intention to hijack your assumption hearing. I agree with the statement that a Court can't resolve third-party rights in the context of assumption or 9019, so it's within the context of that guidance that the Court gave that we were -- that we submitted this list.

THE COURT: Are the depositions of the three city witnesses scheduled?

MR. HACKNEY: They aren't scheduled, your Honor. Well, that's in part because I didn't want to just fire out a notice and then claim all the seven hours to myself. I've been trying to coordinate and have already had communications with the other objectors, some of them. Our intention is to coordinate a call tomorrow so that the depositions can be as orderly as possible in terms of not having a merry-go-round of attorneys asking questions. And if we can do that, we will, but the one thing I'll say, your Honor, is we won't be able to get the depositions done, I doubt, with all of the objectors in a half day. I think all of the objectors means

that we'll need the full seven hours for sure.

One last point on the matter of status, your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't quite get that given the relatively narrow scope of the issues and the hearing.

MR. HACKNEY: I guess, you know, I won't reargue our last interaction with each other on this subject. I guess I will just say that this is a very complicated structure, and the implications of the forbearance --

THE COURT: Of course that's true, but nobody argues about the structure. The structure is what it is. It's in the documents.

MR. HACKNEY: Agreed; agreed. But I also think the implications, the analysis of the structure, of the city's need for cash, of the validity of various things, is a factual question that I know different objectors are going to want to inquire --

THE COURT: All right. But that's a different question than the question of the structure.

MR. HACKNEY: That's a fair point. It's just that the complexity of the structure bleeds over somewhat into the factual inquiry we do need to make in terms of have they run their traps properly in order to try and get this deal approved because they are contending that this will lead to performance, so -- and, your Honor --

THE COURT: You're talking about 21 hours of

depositions just on the city's side in a hearing that I was thinking of allocating each side three hours to try.

MR. HACKNEY: With the objectors grouped as a class? Well, remember, your Honor, I think that I will say part of the value of the depositions happening outside of the courtroom is that it streamlines the presentation before the Court. I mean cross-examination gets a lot crisper when you have the time to clarify and there's not as much fumbling around in the courtroom, so I'm not sure that the deposition will run contrary to your desire to run a tight hearing. I think it may accentuate it.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Does anyone else want to be heard on these issues?

MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, if I could raise --

THE COURT: Oh, is there more?

MR. HACKNEY: I'm sorry.

17 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I'm sorry.

MR. HACKNEY: No. That's okay. I try not to go on at length. I wanted to clarify one thing. There's been these repeated references to the data room as being something that they've provided to us, and I just want to confirm that it is being deemed discoverable and responsive to our requests. The reason for this is important. Everyone had to sign an NDA to go into the data room meaning --

THE COURT: Nondisclosure agreement. Got it.

MR. HACKNEY: Nondisclosure agreement. I'm going to 1 2 write that on my forehead this evening so --3 THE COURT: No, no, no. 4 MR. HACKNEY: -- I see it every time I look in --THE COURT: You can use the letters from now on. 5 MR. HACKNEY: Yeah. No. 6 THE COURT: I got it now. I will try to be less euphemistic. MR. HACKNEY: 9 I'm sorry. Under the nondisclosure agreement, you can't 10 disclose the information from the data room in court, to 11 witnesses, et cetera, unless the city agrees with you that it 12 is discoverable by other means, in which case now it can be 13 used in court proceedings. I think that that's happened, and 14 I just want to clarify that that's happened because that's going to facilitate depositions, filing of briefs before the 15 16 Court, and the execution of this hearing and a bunch of other 17 ones before you. I don't think they put any privileged information in that room, so there's -- it's financial 18 19 information of the city, so I think it should be 20 discoverable.

THE COURT: All right. I will get around to putting that question to the city.

MR. HACKNEY: Thank you.

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MS. ENGLISH: Good morning, your Honor. Caroline English from Arent Fox. We represent Ambac, and we filed an

objection. We, like Syncora, also at this point do not anticipate the need to put forth rebuttal witnesses and exhibits at the September 9th hearing, but based on what we hear from the city's witnesses during depositions, it's possible, and so we would like to request that a schedule be entered allowing us after the conclusion of those depositions to disclose any rebuttal witnesses and exhibits we might like to offer during the evidentiary hearing and then allow the city, if necessary, to depose our witnesses as well. I'll also --

THE COURT: That would require that the depositions take place like tomorrow, all three at the same time.

MS. ENGLISH: Well, I think we have an extra week built in. The depositions of the city witnesses are supposed to conclude by August 30th, I believe, and I think the trial -- or the hearing is the 9th, so we do have the week of Labor Day. We could squeeze in some extra depositions if necessary. Again, we don't anticipate that it'll be necessary, but we couldn't say for sure, and we need to reserve the right to call any witnesses as we see fit after we depose the city's witnesses.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. ENGLISH: Thank you.

THE COURT: Sir.

MR. PEREZ: Good morning, your Honor. Alfredo

Perez. I represent FGIC. Your Honor, in connection with our limited objection, we did file two declarations. One was my declaration just attaching the documents that we relied on, so I don't think that's an issue, but we did file a very short declaration for Stephen Spencer on kind of two issues, and that would be our direct testimony of him to the extent the hearing goes forward. So I don't know if anybody wants to question him about that, but that -- you know, those two-or three-page declaration would be our direct testimony of him.

THE COURT: If you haven't already, perhaps you could work with the city on seeing if they would be willing to have that declaration be admitted in lieu of testimony.

MR. PEREZ: Okay. I will do that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Would anyone else like to be heard?

MR. GORDON: Good morning, your Honor. Robert

Gordon of Clark Hill on behalf of the Detroit Retirement

Systems. I just thought this might be the right time to echo
the sentiment of Mr. Goldberg. I don't know what's going to
get argued in oral argument regarding the stay this
afternoon, but we did in our papers raise the issue of
whether the lien asserted by the swap participants actually
extends to the post-petition casino revenue, so there could
be an issue there relative to whether there would be a basis

for even arguing whether the stay applies or doesn't apply,

so we just want to make sure that the Court is aware of that.

2 THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GORDON: Thank you very much, your Honor. And other than that, I echo Mr. Hackney's suggestion that all objectors would somehow in a very efficient way hopefully be able to participate in the same discovery so no one is duplicating each other. Thank you.

MS. BRIMER: Good morning, your Honor. Lynn M. Brimer appearing on behalf of the Retired Detroit Police Members Association. Your Honor, we filed a limited objection chiefly concerned that, as the Court is aware, there was a retiree committee formation meeting yesterday. The committee was -- will be appointed at the request of the city, and to just request that the Court ensure whatever scheduling order the Court puts in place takes into consideration the opportunity for committee and committee counsel to address these what are going to be ultimately very significant issues to the ability of the city to honor its pension obligations.

THE COURT: Thank you for reminding me of that.

MR. MARRIOTT: Good morning, your Honor. Vince
Marriott, Ballard Spahr, on behalf of EEPK. If you remember,
they're the unpronounceable --

THE COURT: I do.

MR. MARRIOTT: I rise only to address the notion

that it would be half-day depositions as opposed to full-day. Not all of the objections raise the same issues. I mean there is some overlap, but there's also some independent, depending upon who's objecting --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MARRIOTT: -- so that it is not as though a single lawyer could be designated to handle all of the questioning, so I think that given the lack of overlap among the objections, I think a full day would be appropriate, not half. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. GOLDBERG: Your Honor, Jerome Goldberg appearing again on behalf of Mr. Sole. We also did file a declaration with our objections of the declaration of David Sole based on a thorough review of the swap documents based on a previous FOIA we had done, and if -- we are very amenable to that declaration being entered in lieu of any testimony and will check with -- as you instructed the other attorneys, we could check with the others. If they want to talk to -- depose Mr. Sole, we would clearly make him available.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GOLDBERG: If I could maybe visit one issue, and I apologize for -- I sat thinking about this. I am available tomorrow morning to be part of this argument on the automatic stay, which I think is a very important argument, and if

there was any way to reschedule -- I just am absolutely not available this afternoon. I'm pledged to -- family comes first obviously, but I could make myself available tomorrow morning or Friday for the argument on the stay if that's possible. Thank you.

THE COURT: Well, I certainly appreciate your interest in this issue and your client's, of course, and your personal circumstances, but I think it is in the best interest of all concerned to proceed this afternoon, so that's what we're going to do.

MR. GOLDBERG: If I could have a representative who works with me appear, that would be okay.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

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MR. GOLDBERG: Okay. I appreciate it. Thank you.

THE COURT: Absolutely. Anyone else?

MS. CALTON: For clarification, your Honor, will the status conference in the adversary proceeding be resumed this afternoon or set for some other day?

THE COURT: What more did you think we needed to accomplish?

MS. CALTON: Well, I don't know that we need to accomplish, but if there's going to discuss discovery and scheduling and briefing or is it really just going to be the stay argument?

THE COURT: Well, you raise a good point. It is

possible that if the Court holds that the stay does not apply and the city wants to go ahead with the adversary and including the TRO, there may be some scheduling issues discussed at that time.

MS. CALTON: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay? Okay. Mr. Shumaker.

MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: What's your answer to Mr. Hackney's question?

MR. SHUMAKER: His question is -- there were several, your Honor. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Well, his question about the data room being discoverable and, therefore, not subject to your NDA.

MR. SHUMAKER: Right. The reason that the NDA's were necessary, your Honor, is because there's a number of sensitive financial documents, projections that are in the data room that the city strongly believes should not be disseminated unless there's an NDA in place. We have provided the parties with all of the documents that we've --

THE COURT: I have to ask you to pause there with this very general question, which is in bankruptcy why isn't every piece of paper not privileged discoverable by any creditor?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, your Honor, I think the answer is if it's -- it might be discoverable, but it would -- it's

possible it would be provided to the Court under seal if 1 2 there was competitively sensitive information in there 3 that --4 THE COURT: Competitively sensitive? MR. SHUMAKER: Well, I mean sensitive financial 5 information. 6 THE COURT: These days. I'm sorry, your Honor. 8 MR. SHUMAKER: 9 THE COURT: What do you mean? What do you mean? 10 Give me an example. MR. SHUMAKER: Well, there are --11 12 THE COURT: Give me an example of a document that 13 parties can see but you don't want disseminated, whatever that means. 14 15 MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, there are cash 16 projections relating to the city's financial future. 17 are expert reports. 18 THE COURT: Okay. Stop there. Financial 19 projections. Why are they sensitive? 20 They have --MR. SHUMAKER: 2.1 THE COURT: Doesn't the city want every one of its 22 citizens to see what the city's financial future is projected 23 to look like? 24 MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, your Honor, but --25 THE COURT: What's the problem?

MR. SHUMAKER: There are a lot of different 1 2 scenarios that are played out in those projections which, 3 again, the city has believed is it would not be in its best 4 interest to be disseminated in public. THE COURT: Okay, but why not? 5 MR. SHUMAKER: Because we believe that the --6 7 THE COURT: What would be the harm to the city's 8 interest if that happened? 9 MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: What would the harm be? 11 MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, you know, it's hard to 12 imagine the different scenarios that might develop with some 13 of the information that would suggest certain things. That's why we proceeded in this fashion. 14 THE COURT: Well, generally speaking, speculation 15 16 and conjecture are not the basis for confidentiality, are 17 they? 18 That's true, your Honor. MR. SHUMAKER: 19 THE COURT: Now, you moved on to expert reports. 20 Those are discoverable, in any event, aren't they? 2.1 MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, I mean I guess there's 22 also a relevancy concern. I mean a lot of this 23 information --24 THE COURT: This is bankruptcy. What's not 25 relevant? All right. I'm going to -- I'm going to just

pause this inquiry now because I sense the need for it.

We're going to reconvene this question also at three o'clock

because I want you to seriously consider with your colleagues

and your client the extent to which confidentiality is

necessary and appropriate for what's in your data room, and

at that point you can give me a more specific answer.

MR. SHUMAKER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: And that'll work for you, too, Mr. Hackney.

MR. HACKNEY: It will.

Okay. So I guess I need to make a decision about the length of depositions. I am persuaded that the depositions of the three city witnesses should be permitted for six hours, and the Court will allow that. It is the Court's hope and expectation that these depositions can be scheduled as promptly as possible so that parties opposing the motion can determine the extent to which they will put on rebuttal testimony. In the circumstances, the Court will order the disclosure of rebuttal witnesses 24 hours after the conclusion of the last of the three depositions, and then the city will have an opportunity to depose them if it sees fit. Having said that, it is still the Court's strong intent to proceed with the hearing on the date it set. Anything else we can do between now and three o'clock? Sir.

MR. NICHOLSON: Michael Nicholson appearing for International Union, UAW. I won't be able to be here at three o'clock, your Honor, because of a prior commitment, but I did want to report to the Court that with respect to the NDA, the nondisclosure agreement, in meetings leading up to the filing, we raised the very same questions the Court raised and really didn't get a satisfactory answer. We said why shouldn't retirees, our members, citizens, be allowed to know what's going on, and we were told we wouldn't get certain information unless we signed the NDA. We refused to do that. We still have not signed the NDA. I think the Court's concern is very appropriate. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. I do have one more thing to put on the agenda for three o'clock, which is the issue that I raised about how much time each side should be allowed to present evidence at the hearing. I'd like for you to suggest some answer to that question to me at that time. Anything else anyone have at this time? All right. We'll be in recess until three o'clock.

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess. (Recess at 11:16 a.m., until 3:01 p.m.)

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please be seated. Recalling Case Number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan, and Case Number 13-04942, City of Detroit versus Syncora Guarantee, Incorporated, et al.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's address the automatic stay issue.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, could I interrupt with two preliminary matters if it's okay?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SHUMAKER: My colleague, Ms. Ball, is going to argue the stay motion, but two things I wanted to get back to your Honor on. One of them was, in light of your Honor's willingness to have this hearing so quickly this afternoon, I wanted to indicate that the city is willing to dissolve the TRO, so prior to the automatic stay motion being heard we thought we should tell you that.

The second thing is with regard to the data room. I wanted to be very clear that the city very much agrees with your Honor that this is -- we should be as transparent as we possibly can be with regard to documents affecting the city and its citizens, and what we would propose, though, as much as we agree with that, there are some documents -- we talked about the 70,000 or so pages that are in that data room over the break, and there are certain documents that we have concerns about. There's really kind of two categories. One is documents that involve individual privacy issues. There are some documents relating to different employee salaries, compensation, benefits, Social Security numbers and whatnot that we would be very reluctant to have disseminated publicly

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And then, secondly, in connection with sort of some of the pension assessments, the city agreed to an agreement with Milliman, which is a pension actuary, and as part of the city's agreement we agreed to an NDA with Milliman, so anyone who has come into the data room since then can get access to the Milliman documents but also has been required to sign an We're happy to talk to Milliman about that, but that was the other category that we were concerned about that was -- obviously had some sensitivity as well. What we would propose is that if -- if it was all right with your Honor, that we go through, cull out any of those documents that we have those concerns about, and approach your Honor with a motion for a protective order very, very quickly. We don't think any of this stuff has any relevance to the ongoing assumption motion, but if we determine that the protective order motion has to be filed, to get it filed in the next day or two and then come back perhaps next Wednesday, if your Honor was amenable to that, to argue that if there were certain documents that we thought really should remain under seal and require further protection.

MR. HACKNEY: That makes sense to me, your Honor. I think it switches the burden a bit. Instead of saying it's all confidential until it's not, it says it's all not confidential unless it should be.

THE COURT: All right. So this will solve the issue you raised initially about discoverable material. Yes?

MS. CALTON: Judy Calton for Detroit Entertainment and Greektown Casino. We've been told that my clients aren't eligible for the data room; that they won't tell the criteria for who is eligible for the data room, which this may be great for these two parties, but it doesn't help for the rest of us. I don't know what the criteria is for who can have access.

MR. NEAL: If I could -- good afternoon, your Honor. Guy Neal, Sidley Austin, for National Public Finance
Guarantee Corp. I rise to address the Milliman issue. The city has taken the position that in order for parties in interest and creditors to have access to these actuarial reports and valuations of their post-employment benefits,
OPEB's, that you need to release Milliman. You have to execute a third-party release. We have not executed that release. We don't believe it's appropriate that we need to enter into a release in order to obtain these materials. If
Mr. Shumaker's opinion --

THE COURT: Of what?

MR. NEAL: Excuse me. Release of any and all claims that one may have against Milliman. I'm not saying we have claims, but I'm not sure why one needs to release a party in order to get access to information that may become public.

If it's the city's position that they're going to arrive at a -- they're going to evaluate what needs to be public and what needs not to be public by the next hearing, we're happy to work with the city on that. If they have a stated position that they're going to hold firm to this third-party release and the parties need to sign it, I'd like to have that addressed today.

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MR. GORDON: Good afternoon, your Honor. Robert Gordon on behalf of the Detroit Retirement Systems. I would echo the comments of Mr. Neal on that point. There already have been also, just for the Court's edification, releases or information provided by the city about some of those Milliman, quote, unquote, reports, and I use that term loosely because I don't believe they are reports. letters, they are analyses, but they're not actuarial reports. But, for example, there was a June 4 letter from Milliman that was in that data room that was subject to these confidentiality agreements, but then there's been information released by the city about those reports, so there's additional issues about whether things that are in that data room and that might have been arguably at one time subject to confidentiality are still subject to it, so I welcome having that discussion at next week's hearing. I don't think anyone will be prejudiced in the interim. Thank you.

MR. SHUMAKER: And, your Honor, that is what I was

talking about is that the city was required to enter into this contract with Milliman, and that's who we would like to talk to about addressing the concerns that were just raised about those documents. As to the initial --

THE COURT: Well, before we move on from that, please ask the people with this firm that if they're not willing to excuse what is apparently your contractual requirement to get a release from the people who see their work product, they need to come to court next week and talk with me about it.

MR. SHUMAKER: Be happy to do that, your Honor. And then as to access to the -- to I think it was Detroit Entertainment, again, considering that this is the approach that we think should be taken, they would get access like any other objector or party.

THE COURT: All right. So we'll look forward to your motion in the next day or so. Ms. Ball.

MS. BALL: Thank you, your Honor. Good afternoon. Corinne Ball on behalf of the City of Detroit. Your Honor, I rise to do a number of things, but I thought it might be helpful, with the Court's indulgence, if I provided the context in terms of the nature of the asset that we're talking about this afternoon. The casino tax revenues are probably the highest quality revenue stream the city has. It certainly is one of the largest and we believe the most

stable tax stream that the city has generating in excess of 175 million a year and forecast to generate roughly that much in at least each of the next ten years. Being able to use this valuable revenue stream is pivotal to the overall resolution of this case and the rehabilitation of the city.

Another point that's been bouncing -- perhaps we could assist the Court -- are the numbers that have been discussed in connection with the swap, and your Honor may wonder why. With these particular swaps, which are between the counterparties and the service corporations, the termination value, your Honor, floats inversely with interest rates, so as interest rates rise, the termination value is reduced so that as of now I am told the discounted price to free up this revenue stream is less than 200 million and, in fact, estimated at 190 million. To date I think there has been no debate in any of the three litigations involving the casino revenues that if the swap obligation is discharged, the lien on these revenues is released. I also think there is no debate that Syncora has not paid anything on the swaps and that there are no amounts due.

Moreover, your Honor, absent the forbearance agreement, were the swap counterparties to exercise their alleged rights under Section 560 to terminate the swap, by our calculation, as is reflected in Mr. Orr's affidavit, Syncora's exposure is capped at \$27 million.

Your Honor, as is obvious to me but sometimes not as obvious to others given the pendency still of litigation and the fact that the city has no assurance that the settlement with the counterparties will be approved, it may, in fact, flounder or fail. As is obvious from the 13 objections filed to date, there are key issues as to which the city is not prepared to concede any of these points today, since it doesn't know where the settlement will end up, but certain issues, your Honor, we think may be raised this afternoon, and I wanted to share with you our view that we'd like to make certain assumptions during our argument this afternoon.

Key among those issues which are being settled, should the settlement and assumption motion be approved and succeed, is are the casino wagering tax revenues special revenues within the meaning of 9022. There is dicta in the Jefferson case cited by Syncora, and, your Honor, I know there are three JeffCo decisions that have been cited frequently with you. I'm referring to the decision on the receivership, which is reported at 474 B.R. 28, suggesting that a revenue picture like ours it may or may not be special revenues, so we are reserving that issue.

Obviously, your Honor, we're also not prepared to concede that the swap is valid or that the pledge of the revenues are valid, but having from the outset reserved on those issues, we think we can still address the stay's

applicability to the wagering tax revenues.

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I was impressed by Syncora's statement of yesterday where for the first time they asserted that the casino tax revenues, the wagering tax revenues payable by casino owners to the city, are not property of the city, and for that proposition -- and your Honor will have to excuse me because we'll be referring to New York cases a lot this afternoon as many of these documents are governed by New York law -- they point to cases which there's only one common theme among the escrow cases cited by Syncora in support of that proposition, and the common theme is you have to go to the underlying agreement, and you have to look at it and see what it says. So if we go to the key agreement, which is the collateral agreement, which, as your Honor knows, Syncora is not a party to, the agreement has a definition of pledged property in Section 1.2, which keys into the definition of revenues that are pledged and ultimately to the city's tax -- wagering tax revenues. So I think that the agreement is fairly clear that these revenues are property of the city, and the remedy section -- and, in particular, Section 11(c) of that collateral agreement -- confirms that the revenues remain property of the city in these accounts and cannot be accessed except with an appropriation by the city of its revenues to that purpose. So I think this agreement, were one to read it, is fairly clear that these revenues are remaining

property of the city. But I think we would then turn, your Honor, beyond the agreement to the decision again by Judge Bennett in ruling on the receivership motion. You may recall that the monolines and other warrant holders in that case sought to restore the receivership in the context of Jefferson County's Chapter 9. Judge Bennett spent a very thoughtful opinion, and in that he concluded that the pledged revenues, even though in possession of a receiver appointed by a state court, remained property of the Chapter 9 debtor and, as your Honor knows, ultimately did not restore the receivership and did say that these properties are protected by the stays of 362(a) and 922. So I think we have the general proposition look to the agreement as well as a very specific one in Chapter 9, and that was an exceptionally well-reasoned opinion.

I also think, your Honor, that there should be no doubt that the casino tax revenues, technically wagering tax revenues, are taxes within the meaning of Section 922(a)(2), which has a very specific reference to taxes being protected. While we're not prepared to concede, as I indicated already, your Honor, that casino revenues are special revenues, assuming arguendo for this afternoon that they are special revenues within the meaning of Section 9022, there's still two problems. It's not clear to us that Syncora has standing -- since it's not a secured party and it cannot

apply these revenues, that it has standing to raise or to be within the protection of 922 at all. It's not a party. These properties were not pledged to them. But more importantly, if one actually looks to the words of 922, literally it says that the stay does not apply to the application of special revenues to the payment of indebtedness. As I think I've already shared with your Honor, there are no amounts owing under the swap, and there is no indebtedness remaining to be paid currently due on the swaps, so we think reliance on 922(d) is misplaced for two

And, your Honor, if I -- I thought it might be most helpful if I went to 922(a)(2) first -- it's a very narrow argument -- and then if your Honor would still like us to argue the applicability of 362(b)(17), we're prepared to do that. I don't think there's any debate that wagering taxes are taxes.

I also think, your Honor, that the 11th Circuit in a case called <u>In re. Patterson</u> -- and perhaps at this point, your Honor -- I have assembled a listing of the authorities that I'd be using. Would it be helpful to the Court so that I don't have to keep reporting them -- I also have some for Syncora. May I approach, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

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reasons.

MS. BALL: Your Honor, the 11th Circuit case named

In re. Patterson, the 11th Circuit has told us that a credit 1 2 union's action to freeze revenues constitutes a violation of the stay as an act to enforce a lien. That particular 3 4 passage appears at 967 Fed. 2d at 512. We also have one of your colleagues from the Southern District of Ohio in a case 5 6 called In re. Figgers. In that case, the Court was 7 confronted with a refusal to release funds, which the Court 8 similarly found a violation of the stay as a prohibited 9 enforcement and collection action. So, your Honor, I think 10 we now have freezing or refusing to release is enforcing a 11 lien, and we have taxes, so plain meaning for this 12 afternoon's purposes, the casino wagering tax revenues --13 there should be a stay protecting them from enforcement of a 14 lien. Now, what else do we know about a stay under Chapter 15 16 9? Again, thanks to Judge Klein in Stockton --17

THE COURT: Well, the question that Syncora raises is how is U.S. Bank's act in allowing the funds in the sub account to accumulate rather than to turn it over to the city a violation of the stay, an exercise of control --

MS. BALL: Your Honor, I think --

THE COURT: -- assuming it is property of the

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MS. BALL: I think, your Honor, that's the Southern District of Ohio. That's enforcement of lien, refusing to

release revenues. Similarly, your Honor, I think that Syncora has somewhat overstated the Supreme Court's ruling in Strumpf. Your Honor may recall that the Supreme Court did find in Strumpf that freezing revenues for a short duration was not a violation of the stay, but it was really a stopgap measure, if one looks at that case at 516 U.S. 19 and 20, to get to the Bankruptcy Court to seek relief from the stay.

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Your Honor, U.S. Bank has been releasing revenues without a hitch until June 17th when communication started There were -- all of the events that were from Syncora. alleged in Syncora's papers had all -- many had occurred before then, but a custodian has a view. I wouldn't be surprised at all. The documents only protect them if they rely on the directions of the swap counterparties as the secured party. As part of the forbearance agreement, your Honor may recall those swap counterparties consented to the continuing release of those funds to the city. Query, would U.S. Bank ever had changed releasing revenues which it had been doing since the emergency financial manager was appointed in March, it had been doing for over a year when there was an intervening credit rating downgrade? doing what the secured parties wanted it to do until a communication from Syncora, and the nature of those communications, your Honor, are probably beyond this afternoon, but they were peppered with words like "demand

that you hold." It was not "look to your agreement." And if, in fact, 922(a)(2) applies, if this matter of law does, and we would submit to your Honor on these facts it does, then there are no exception -- the 362(b) exceptions that are being argued by Syncora, they don't apply in Chapter 9. There has to be another basis to come to your Honor and seek relief from the stay. 362(c), (d), and (e) apply, but (b) doesn't. So if we're in Chapter 9 stay world, I think U.S. Bank has to think about it. I think Judge Klein and Judge Bennett, both in <u>Stockton</u> and all three <u>JeffCo</u> cases, have underscored that the exceptions to the automatic stay that one would classically rely on, police power, 362(b), do not apply, so in construing that agreement, I think -- which no one has done and the custodian has zero obligation to do, a fact -- that's the position it has espoused in filings in the adversary proceeding now pending before your Honor, so we know, your Honor, that if a Chapter 9 stay applies, 362(b)(17) doesn't.

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Now, if I were to take a detour with your Honor's indulgence -- bear with me because there is a critical difference between 362(b) and Section 560. The way the exceptions work in the safe harbor world it appears to us -- it appears to me first from Judge Shannon's decision in SemCrude where he actually took the lead -- he took the general proposition that the automatic stay is very broad

relying on Timbers and Midatlantic and said that exceptions really have to be construed extremely narrowly. know that from him, but he looked at the safe harbors, and I want to get back to 560. It is relevant to the Chapter 9 stay. He looked at the safe harbors as saying it kind of works as a package, but fundamentally it's about offset netting and the termination of qualifying financial contracts. In Judge Shannon's <u>SemCrude</u> case, your Honor may not be aware of the facts, but it involved what the Wall Street types call a triangular setoff, which means that if one of the nondebtor parties' affiliates owes an obligation, they can set off -- I mean one of the debtor's affiliates owes the counterparty an obligation, they can set off the debtor's property. The contract said that was totally permissible. They look to 362(b)(17), contract right, we're exercising this. Judge Shannon, who was affirmed in his decision, said, no, very narrow exception. You still have to fundamentally be entitled to set off or exercise the rights that you're seeking to exercise.

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So why do I want to get back to 560? 560, 561, 559 are the part of the safe harbors. If your Honor looks to the language of 560, unlike the language of anything in 362, including 362(o), 560, were the swap counterparties to actually be terminating the swap, says right in it -- and I quote, your Honor -- that they have a right to do so

notwithstanding any provision in this title, meaning including, I would argue, 922(a)(2) if it were the swap counterparties who were, in fact, terminating the swap. They have something they can point to. 362(b) has no such reference to notwithstanding anything else in this title.

362, including 362(o), operate subject to Chapter 9. So I think that when we think of the decisions, your Honor, that have really looked at this issue and they are, when one thinks about the qualifying financial contract decisions, outside of Chapter 9, you have to start, as I said, with Judge Shannon's decision in SemCrude on the triangular merger.

Shortly after that, Judge Peck would follow again. He, too, encountered very creative arguments that banks and financial parties raised to say that they were arguing — they were asserting a contractual right that enabled them to squirt through this very narrow exception of 362(b)(17). So even if we were only operating under the automatic stay, I think we have to look to Judge Peck's ruling against Swedbank, and, your Honor, that's reported on the list that I have given you at 433 B.R. 101, and that was affirmed. And Judge Buchwald in affirming that decision went at length through the legislative history of the safe harbors, and, in fact, relied on Dewsnup, the Supreme Court decision, to say we have to pay attention to the fundamental principles. If

this was designed for a setoff and a termination, that's the only time it can be used. So Swedbank that got the bright idea that it could have had a contractual right to do more than that was found to have violated the stay and directed to release to Lehman the monies it was holding.

Shortly after that a name familiar to this Court,
Bank of America, would try something very similar against
Lehman. They said, "Gee, we also have a contract right to
take your monies wherever we're holding it and apply it to
your debt. And since we're involved in a swap, we should be
able to do that." And, your Honor, that case was cited in
our statement to you of earlier this week. And Judge Peck
said, "Wait a minute. No. You are not within the safe
harbor, and you shouldn't have done that. You should have
come to me first and demonstrated your entitlement to relief
from the stay." Failing that, he found that they had, in
fact, violated the stay.

You would then have the opportunity -- and Lehman gave Judge Peck many opportunities to deal with the safe harbors, your Honor. Forgive me for reverting to New York decisions so often, but he would then have to deal with another triangular setoff case with <u>UBS</u>. In the list of authorities I've given you, your Honor, that's the <u>Lehman</u> case that is followed with the initials UBS. Again, following Judge Shannon's lead, no, your contract may say --

or you can argue till you're blue in the face your contract says you can do that, but that is not permitted. That is not a right that should be recognized. It's beyond the termination of a swap and going against collateral.

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The case that probably gets the most press -- and it was not reported, your Honor, so I don't know your rules regarding an unreported decision. It was a decision in the transcript of Judge Peck. In that case, a financial party known as Metavante had relied on a provision in the ISDA master swap. It's very interesting. Metavante was, in swap vernacular, out of the money, which meant that Metavante should have been paying monies periodically into the debtor. Metavante said, "Wait a minute. Safe harbor. I have the right -- I have the right to terminate the swap, and I haven't decided whether I want to or not, but I also have a contract provision which I'm exercising under 362(b)(17) that says I don't have to perform if the debtor is not performing." Judge Peck had little patience -- had little patience with that provision and said, "You waived your right to terminate on account of the bankruptcy. You haven't done it, and you can't exercise other remedies." That's not the scope of this exception known as 362(b)(17). It's far narrower.

Another bank would come along shortly thereafter, the Bank of New York. And your Honor may be familiar -- and

I know that it did come up, I think, in <u>Collins & Aikman</u> where there are special provision entities where there are management rights, and if one were to become bankrupt, the management rights would flip to the nondebtor. Someone sought to enforce such provision against Lehman. They had a swap and a financial contract, and they also had this flip right. And they literally read 362(b)(17), any contract right. Judge Peck said absolutely not.

It's not confined to Wall Street cases, your Honor. In <u>Calpine</u> there was a forward contract in the energy field between <u>Calpine</u> and Reliant Energy, and Judge Lifland was confronted with Reliant Energy as a nondebtor trying to exercise a right, a remedy, under its contract under 362(b). Judge said, "Wait a minute. You're not terminating this forward. That's all that's protected in the safe harbor. It's not a roving commission to do what you want to a debtor and withhold."

Your Honor, Judge Gonzales had a similar experience in <u>Enron</u> when someone commenced a DEC action in state court in reliance on a remedy in their contract, and he found that that, too, was a violation of the stay.

But what I'm kind of concerned about -- and I certainly did not mean to concede -- we're not sure since we've heard conflicting statements and we certainly are not conceding that Syncora has any contract rights with respect

to the casino revenues and the collateral agreement. In fact, we've heard them say they're not doing anything. To your Honor's point earlier, they're passive. So, your Honor, we think they can't be on all sides of this issue. We think that the automatic stay of 362(a) has to rise to protect property of the city of this magnitude. Your Honor, this property has substantial value. It can support substantial leverage to resolve this case. It should be protected by the automatic stay as a critical resource of the city, but its characteristic as a tax can't be ignored either, which would bring in the separate protection of Section 922(a)(2). And, your Honor, there's only one exception for that, and that's in the safe harbors themselves, not the exceptions from the stay, and I don't think that anyone, in light of the forbearance agreement, certainly the swap counterparties, are not terminating the swap.

Your Honor, I'd like to reserve the right to respond as this was somewhat unscheduled, and we've tried to anticipate the arguments that Syncora might raise.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MR. HACKNEY: Good afternoon, your Honor. Stephen Hackney on behalf of Syncora. So there were a lot of cases that were referenced there. I would propose to start with each of the three arguments I think that were made as to why the stay should not apply, and I'd propose to start with the

fact that we contend that the property of the casino revenues is not property of the estate. And I thought it would be helpful if I could walk the Court through where exactly this property goes and how it gets to where it goes under the collateral agreement, so there -- I don't think -- I heard Ms. Ball say that I quess maybe they're reserving on the question of whether it's a special revenue, but these are excise taxes that we believe constitute special revenues that are imposed on the activity of gaming and gaming related activities. They come into the hands of the casino, and then instead of being paid to the city, as they normally would be, the city gave irrevocable instructions to the casinos directing them to pay the money to U.S. Bank. And the irrevocable instructions are interesting because they also come with a release that says if you pay the money to U.S. Bank, you have no further obligation. You are released. U.S. Bank then under the collateral agreement sets up a number of accounts. There's an account called the holdback account, there's an account called the developer account, and there's an account called the general receipt subaccount. Put the holdback account over to this side for a moment conceptually. The developer account and the general receipt subaccount are accounts that U.S. Bank itself sets up under the collateral agreement. They are housed at -- in New York City, so the accounts themselves are physically outside the

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State of Michigan. The funds then go into the developer account, and U.S. Bank at certain times then itself transfers the funds from the developer account to the general receipt subaccount. They are only paid -- and the collateral account uses the word "the custodian shall make payment of the funds to the city upon the" -- either the city fulfilling certain specific events or the nonoccurrence of other events as we contend under Section 5.4, a termination event, an event of default. If those things are happening, then the custodian shall not pay to the city the funds in the general receipt subaccount.

The reason I'm going through this in such detail is because the question is whether or not the casino revenues are property of the estate. I don't think it's a question as to whether the debtor has an interest in them. It certainly has an interest in them, but that is not tantamount to saying that it is property of the estate. Here the --

THE COURT: What's the nature of that interest that you concede?

MR. HACKNEY: I would -- what we have analogized it to, your Honor, is a residual interest like one in an escrow account. And, in fact, I think we have made an argument in our papers that the collateral agreement does create an escrow account under New York law. It has the hallmarks of an escrow --

THE COURT: Would you agree it's a contingent interest?

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah. I think -- I would think of it as residual, but I think contingent maybe is also accurate in the sense that it is contingent upon a number of things either coming to pass or not coming to pass before the city has a right to receive the property, but we have cited the cases to you that we cited --

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you to pause one more time --

MR. HACKNEY: Oh, you bet.

THE COURT: -- for what, you know, will seem like a silly question, but I'm going to put it to you anyway. If it's not the debtor's property, whose is it?

MR. HACKNEY: I think that the answer to that is that it is property of the custodian. The custodian has title to the property. It has control and possession over the property. There are other people that have interests in the property. The service corporations have an interest in the property by operation of the city pledged to them.

 $\,$ THE COURT: The custodian has no beneficial interest in the property.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ HACKNEY: I would have to think about that some more. The custodian is entitled to --

THE COURT: There are no circumstances under which

the money would ever go to the custodian for the custodian's own use and benefit; right?

MR. HACKNEY: I will have to duck that one, your Honor, and say I'm not sure just because there are circumstances where in its role as contract administrator the contract administrator is allowed to pay itself some of its fees. I don't know if the custodian has similar provisions that say, "Oh, by the way, before I kick the money out, I get to hold back the X, Y, and Z." I'm not saying it does. I'm just saying I'm not certain. I can't concede it from the podium, but -- so does the service corporation have an interest in this property that is the property of the custodian? Yes. Does the swap counterparty --

THE COURT: All right. Let's stop there.

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah.

THE COURT: Assuming for the moment that the city has even a contingent interest in the money on deposit in this account, isn't any attempt to exercise control over that contingent interest stayed by Section 362(a)(3)?

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah. I guess I would say we don't believe so, your Honor, because of the cases that we have cited that say where in the context of an escrow all the debtor has is a contingent interest that isn't sufficient to establish that the property is property of the estate, and so the stay does not apply in the first instance. And I would

note that we have also cited cases to this effect.

THE COURT: But what's the logic behind that? I ask that because in every other circumstance I can think of where a debtor has a contingent interest in property, that contingent interest is considered to be property of the estate protected by the automatic stay. Why would an escrow agreement be any different?

MR. HACKNEY: Well, I can only say that I guess reason number one would be certainly we've cited cases suggesting that it is, but in terms of the policies behind those cases --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKNEY: -- I think the policies are that there is value to having certainty with respect to security that's been granted by a debtor that is no longer under its possession or control, and so you can see a situation where if the debtor -- I can see where the debtor has -- is driving its car around, but, yes, it's pledged the title to a bank there. The debtor still retains the primary possession and ownership of the property. The creditor there's interest is a security interest that they're not allowed to foreclose upon without violating the automatic stay. I understand that as an example where there are contingencies to the debtor's interest, but it's got the hallmarks of possession and control, and it's actually using the car. Where I think

things change from the standpoint of the Bankruptcy Code, they certainly change from the standpoint of the cases that we've cited is where the debtor now gives the car as well to the bank that's also holding the title and saying, "Now this is property that can be held pursuant to this agreement. I can only get it back in these certain circumstances."

THE COURT: So if under state law a creditor has a possessory security interest in property, your position would be that that creditor is not required to seek relief from the stay because the stay doesn't apply? That's an extraordinary position to take.

MR. HACKNEY: Where the creditor has a possessory interest in --

THE COURT: Possessory, yeah. It holds possession of the property as a secured creditor under state law like a pawn shop or a bank that holds a CD, for example, as a security interest.

MR. HACKNEY: What I would say is that the escrow cases we have cited I think read onto that circumstance that you've identified, which is that, yes, where the maintenance of the escrow, the continued operation of the escrow subsequent to the bankruptcy filing does not constitute a violation of the automatic stay.

THE COURT: Well, but that would only be because the stay doesn't apply; right?

MR. HACKNEY: That is correct. I mean I'm not trying to assume the conclusion, but I'm saying the cases that we have cited were considering the question of whether or not the maintenance of the escrow violated the automatic stay because of the fact that the debtor had -- did have potentially a residual interest in the property that was in the escrow account, and what those cases said is the debtor's residual interest does not rise to the level of making the property property of the estate. Part of the reason we're analogizing to them is we do think at some point the rubber has to meet the road in terms of looking at --

THE COURT: Well, but there are a gazillion cases that say a secured creditor who's in possession of collateral must turn that over to the debtor and -- to the debtor, and the creditors' relief is to ask for adequate protection, right --

MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, I have to --

THE COURT: -- outside of Chapter 9?

MR. HACKNEY: I have to say I -- I will say, your Honor, I'm not familiar with those cases as I stand here today. I prepared on the cases that were cited in the city's papers. It does seem to me, though, that to the extent those cases hold that way, that the creditor has to pay the money over to the debtor, they may be distinguishable from the escrow context wherein the escrow is specifically designed to

capture the money while different parties' potential rights are assessed, so I can only say that the cases we have cited are ones in which there's -- it's agreed that the debtor has a contingent and residual interest to the property potentially someday, but it doesn't have either possession or control of the property. We have cited cases saying that the operation of the escrow is not outside the automatic stay.

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Your Honor, I would like to speak briefly, if I could, to the question of the pledged special revenues. don't think that there's a real debate that -- as to whether these are pledged special revenues. I understand counsel's, I guess, reserved on that, but they are excise taxes. There's an opinion from Orrick Herrington that was issued in connection with the 2009 collateral agreements formation identifying the wagering taxes as excise taxes, and Mr. Orr himself in his proposal identified them as such, so I think what I'd like to turn to, though, is the city's argument that there's not going to be any application to indebtedness because -- the fact that they're staying current on the swap. And I want to address this because I think this misapprehends the precise nature of the structure because the obligations to make the periodic swap payments are the obligations of the service corporation. The city's obligations that are secured by the city's pledge of these revenues are obligations under the service contracts. All of the city's obligations under

the service contracts have accelerated as a result of the city's bankruptcy filing, so we disagree with the fact that the city is current with respect to its obligations under the service contract that the city pledged secures. So I think that argument by the city misses the mark.

THE COURT: Is that acceleration legal?

MR. HACKNEY: To the best of my knowledge, it is, your Honor. It's provided for in the service contracts that the city signed that contain numerous opinions that were rendered with them regarding the legality of those contracts.

THE COURT: Is there any other indebtedness you rely on?

MR. HACKNEY: Well, I guess what I would say is that the ultimate application of the wagering revenues to the obligations of the service corporations under the swap in the future would also be potential indebtedness that would require the trapping now. For example, if Mr. Orr decides I'm going to stop paying the swap in light of the fact that the trap is valid, then the payments will be made out of the trapped funds via the -- from the city -- from the custodian to the --

THE COURT: Let's assume your argument is accurate as far as it goes. That is to say, the party holding the lien can proceed. How does that help you? Why does that suggest that there's no stay against Syncora because Syncora

does not have a lien?

MR. HACKNEY: Well, first of all, the language of Section 922(d) is not versed in the language of who possesses the right in question, which distinguishes it from something like 362(b)(17), which we'll get to in a moment, which talks about swap participants, but let me answer your question head-on, your Honor, and say that remember that this is an integrated transaction, and so the collateral agreement not only takes pains to integrate itself into the swaps agreement, the services agreement, and the contract administration agreement, the swaps agreement also makes clear that the services contract, the collateral agreement, and the contract administration agreement are all credit support documents underneath the swap agreement.

Now, the significance of this, your Honor, is that the way this structure works is that because Syncora possesses the -- along with FGIC, but because the insurers possess the ultimate economic exposure here to the structure, the system -- the structure gives them the power to enforce the various agreements and the right to direct the actions of other people. So if you look at the swaps agreement, for example, Syncora is an explicit third-party beneficiary with the rights to enforce the obligations underneath the swap agreement, which, as I've noted, is integrated with these other agreements. Under the services contract, it's also an

explicit third-party beneficiary with the rights of enforcement, and what is also unique is that under the contract administration agreement, it has the rights to direct the actions of the service corporation, the custodian, and the swap counterparties. The reason for that, your Honor, is in order to remain in control of a structure that it's ultimately going to be paying people on, if you default on your insurance, you lose these control and direction rights, so you have to be staying current, which Syncora has done, but the -- I'm trying to be responsive to your point, which is to say they keep saying -- you know, it's like a drum they're beating to say that -- what they're really saying, your Honor, is Syncora is not a signatory to the collateral agreement. And you know what? They're right. Syncora is not a signatory to the collateral agreement, but you should know that its consent was required to enter into the collateral agreement. It is a noticed party under the collateral agreement. There are provisions in the collateral agreement that say that in order to exercise its rights under the collateral agreement, it must not be in default of its credit insurance that hearken back to the other provisions in the services agreement and the swap and the contract administration agreement that talk about not being in default of your credit insurance, and so Syncora is absolutely a party in interest and a third-party beneficiary with rights

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of enforcement, and that would entail the right to direct the conduct of the swap counterparties, so even if the Court decided under 922(d) it is important to me, the Court, that the party asserting 922(d)'s exemption of special revenues being applied to indebtedness have some connection to that, what I'm telling you, your Honor, is we absolutely do because that's the way these agreements are designed to work in terms of the control, the consent, and the direction rights.

Your Honor, I was going to speak briefly to the question of Section 362(b)(17) of the Bankruptcy Code, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HACKNEY: So the key argument here, there is not a suggestion, I don't believe, that the swap is not a swap, that the collateral agreement isn't a security agreement within the meaning of a swap agreement, which, by the way, extends to agreements beyond just the swap agreement. I think the sole argument that the city is making here is that Syncora is not a swap participant, and so I think I would not belabor or repeat the arguments that I all just made about the way Syncora is intimately connected to and has the powers of different aspects of the agreements to both enforce them directly and to direct other parties to do things including the swap counterparties. So from my standpoint at a functional level, if you look at the language as to whether

Syncora is a participant in the swap, it fits within the plain language not only because it has potential economic exposure to it, but also because it has rights of enforcement, and it has rights to direct the swap counterparties underneath the swap. To me that makes it a swap participant under the plain language.

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There is admittedly -- there is a dearth of authority on this question. We've researched it to say can we find a case one way or the other, and while I'll start as an advocate by telling you that we found no case saying that a swap insurer is not a swap participant, I'll also be candid and tell you that we haven't found a case that says that a swap insurer is a swap participant, so we're somewhat in a case of first impression, but I wanted to offer you two The first is that that Lehman case that they did cite in their briefs, which is a -- I would describe as a highly distinguishable case -- there was a -- Lehman involved, I believe, Bank of America as attempting to use its role as a custodian in one context, to grab the money and use it to set off against an unrelated agreement that it believed it had with Lehman, and not only was it held not to have the setoff rights, which were the premise for what it was doing, it was also -- certainly shouldn't be using the amounts it was holding as custodian in order to try and set off its other obligations, so <u>Lehman</u> is inapposite. Obviously we take the

admonitions to be cautious with respect to the stay seriously, and I'm not diminishing them, but here is what is interesting about Lehman, I think, which is when Bank of America invoked Section 362(b)(17) in Lehman, it was just a custodian, you know. I mean, yeah, they're a signatory to a swap, but are they really a participant in the swap? They're not somebody that's going to benefit from the swap one way or the other. And the Court in that case never said, "You're not a swap participant." It said, "I will address your argument on the merits as to whether Section 362(b)(17) applies," and then concluded that it did not. And I think that's significant because Syncora is absolutely a market participant in connection with the swaps. Swap insurance is a common aspect of the market, and so to ignore the practical realities I think would ignore some of the purposes of the safe harbor.

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I would also note that we were able to find language from Collier's, and this is 5 Collier on Bankruptcy 560.031, and what it said was the special protections for swap agreements provided by Section 560 and other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are available to all parties to swap agreements with the debtor because the swap -- the term "swap participant" is broadly defined in Section 101(53C) to mean a entity that, at any time before the filing of the petition, has an outstanding swap agreement with the debtor, thus the

swap protections are generally available to all parties who 1 2 could benefit therefrom. That's obviously --3 THE COURT: Collier cite any cases in support of 4 that? MR. HACKNEY: It does not in the provision I'm 5 reading, so take it for what it's worth, your Honor. I 6 7 understand it's not the same as a Supreme Court opinion, I know, but in short I think that if you take a functional look 8 9 at the purposes of the Safe Harbor Act, it was designed to 10 provide certainty with respect to swap participants with 11 respect to things like collateral agreements. 12 THE COURT: How do you deal with Ms. Ball's argument 13 that under 922(b), Section 362(b) does not apply? 14 MR. HACKNEY: Yeah. So under 922 -- and I'm 15 sorry -- was that --16 THE COURT: (B). 17 MR. HACKNEY: I want to make sure. There was an argument made under 922(a)(2) that these are the collection 18 of taxes. Am I mis --19 20 THE COURT: Well, 922(a)(2), yes. 21 MR. HACKNEY: And then --22 THE COURT: It's a stay applicable to all entities 23 of the enforcement of a lien on or arising out of taxes or assessments owed to the debtor. There's that stay. 24 25 MR. HACKNEY: Yeah.

THE COURT: But there's nothing that suggests that (b) -- the exceptions in (b) -- 362(b) apply to that stay.

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MR. HACKNEY: Okay. So at the first level, our argument, your Honor, is that under Section 922(d) what 922(d) says, "Notwithstanding section 362 of this title and subsection (a) of this section," so even if Ms. Ball were correct -- and I will tell you why we don't concede that she is -- they still have to run the rapids of 922(d) because it specifically excepts 922(a).

The second thing I will tell you, your Honor, is that I would say we have conducted research on this, and we were, if I'm not mistaken, only able to find one case that related to this provision, and it's in my iPhone, so I don't have it for you because you have to turn your iPhone off in the courtroom, so -- which is a good -- which is a good rule because we're all too connected, but, anyway, I was reading the case over lunchtime, and what my associate told me was he was only able to find one case where this was invoked, and the case there involved confusion or attempts to collect taxes by an entity that was distinct from the debtor. I don't believe that this is currently the enforcement of a lien against -- arising out of the taxes or assessments owed to the debtor. This is the natural operation of the collateral agreement, the irrevocable instructions that were entered into long ago, so there is no action that's being

taken by someone. That's what's frustrating to the city is the inaction, the refusal to transmit the monies that the city has set by this -- by the dead hand of the collateral agreement and the irrevocable instructions to flow directly to the custodian.

THE COURT: You keep tripping over that. There's lots of case law that says that Section 362 doesn't distinguish much between action and inaction, and I assume that case law would apply to 922 because it's the same language, if not the same policy. How do I deal with that here?

MR. HACKNEY: Well, I guess the -- I think the -you would deal with it first by saying that it only applies
to property of the debtor ab initio, so you do have to get to
that stage. And then second, even if the -- even if we are
on the subject of action versus inaction being irrelevant,
you also do have to find that 92 --

THE COURT: What the cases say is that there are many circumstances in which the inaction of a creditor constitutes the exercise of control over the debtor's property.

MR. HACKNEY: But in those cases I'm going to surmise there is a finding that it is property of the debtor, and there's also --

THE COURT: Right.

1 MR. HACKNEY: So --

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2 THE COURT: Right. It is.

MR. HACKNEY: I also don't want to assume the conclusion the other way against me, which is we have a threshold question that says it's not property of the debtor.

THE COURT: Okay. So there's two different issues. The first is is what is at stake property of the debtor. The second issue is is what the debtor is doing in relation to that property an exercise of control over it.

MR. HACKNEY: That's right, and that the 9 --

THE COURT: What the cases say is that on the second issue, the issue of exercise of control, inaction can be an exercise of control.

MR. HACKNEY: And I think the -- so and not to forget that 922(d) is also an exception to 922 --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HACKNEY: -- (a)(2), but I think -- Mr. Bennett has handed me a helpful note, and hopefully I'm doing him justice, but what he points out is we are not seeking to interfere with the contingent interest that the city does have. It is merely that the property which is not the city's property is the cash itself continue to be trapped, so that is the distinction there which, again, folds back into our argument that it's not property of the estate.

Your Honor, I have said my piece. I think we --

1 THE COURT: All right.

2 MR. HACKNEY: -- may have exhausted my knowledge

3 of --

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. HACKNEY: -- bankruptcy law as well, so thank you very much, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anyone else briefly without duplicating what's already been said?

MR. NEAL: Yes, your Honor. Good afternoon again. Guy Neal, Sidley Austin, counsel for National Public Finance Guarantee Corp. I rise to echo or to -- to echo and to underscore what Ms. Ball said about her reservations as it relates to the special revenue determination, and without treating this as a complete reservation of rights, which I know is not something I need to do, I would encourage your Honor to expressly reserve or avoid ruling on the issue of whether or not these are special revenues such that they are excepted from the automatic stay.

NPFG, among others -- I think about 12 or 13 others -- have filed an objection to the swap forbearance motion, will be an active participant in discovery, will litigate this issue on the 9th, and those threshold issues that are raised -- and there are just three of them, so I will be brief -- that were raised in NPFG's objection or technically NPFG's joinder to Ambac's objection is that the

swap obligations are unauthorized under state law and, therefore, void. State law does not authorize the city to pledge casino revenue to secure swap obligations, and, third, the casino revenue does not constitute special revenue, and, accordingly, the swap counterparties do not have a lien on post-petition casino revenue. I think these were the same three issues that Ms. Ball appropriately reserved on. Those are issues to be -- that have been extensively briefed and will be extensively argued and litigated on the 9th, so I would ask your Honor in your ruling today not to foreclose any argument -- or foreclose us -- excuse me -- and others who, frankly, are not here in the courtroom today, including Assured and Ambac this afternoon, to make these arguments on the 9th.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. NEAL: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Mr. Gordon, you rose.

MR. GORDON: I did, your Honor, and the vagaries of going second -- Mr. Neal said everything I wanted to say.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GORDON: But just for the record, we support the same position. It was our understanding that the arguments today were simply as to whether the stay had any effect on Syncora as a third party not standing in the shoes of a swap participant. Those issues are really to be dealt with on the

9th. Thank you, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Anybody else before we get back to Ms. Ball? One more, yes.

MS. FLUKER: Good afternoon, your Honor. May it please the Court, Vanessa Fluker standing in for the attorney of record, Jerome Goldberg, on behalf of interested party David Sole. I do concur with Ms. Ball's arguments. I would just like to highlight a couple points that I think add something to that, and that is, number one, that the gravamen of this whole issue is whether we have a special revenue here, and I think that is significant. Counsel for Syncora made an argument about the escrow and was very eloquent, but the bottom line is the escrow was created based on the alleged lien that was on the revenue that came into the city via the wagering taxes. Therefore, it's incumbent to be able to ascertain whether, in fact, this is a special revenue which, pursuant to statute, it obviously is. If you look not only at the definition under 902, but also if you look at the Michigan statute that allocates the revenue, it specifically articulates purposes that the revenue could be used for, including hiring, training of street patrol officers, neighborhood, downtown economic developments. It's just a laundry list of things that it could be used for, so to say that it was specifically earmarked for the payment of Syncora as a custodian, I think that is a far stretch, particularly

when you have statutes incorporating this.

THE COURT: Not on the list?

MS. FLUKER: That is correct. They're not on the list, exactly. Therefore, we believe that obviously the stay is applicable and just based on pure statutory construction in addition to the collateral agreement itself that does not specifically isolate all of these funds that would make it constitute a special revenue as defined by Section 902. I do concur, as I indicated, with Attorney Ball.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, ma'am. Ms. Ball.

MS. BALL: Thank you, your Honor. If I may, I rise for, I think, a very short list of points, but two of them are critical. I have a picture which I think lays out what Mr. Hackney tried to describe to you. I have one for Mr. Hackney as well. May I approach, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BALL: I think your Honor has appropriately cautioned Syncora regarding the fact that secured creditors remain subject to the automatic stay even if they're the IRS. Your Honor may recall Whiting Pools where the IRS had seized property and similarly claimed it's no longer property of the debtor. The Supreme Court has told us that's clearly not true, and, in fact, as I mentioned to you earlier, Judge Bennett in his assessment in Jefferson County as to whether or not possession by the receiver removed revenues from the

estate of Jefferson County similarly concluded no.

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But I want to get back to three things that Mr. Hackney said. On this -- this picture, your Honor, has nothing to do with any agreement other than the collateral agreement, and all the payments that are required to be made are not made under the service contract as alleged by Mr. Hackney. As a matter of fact, there are payments that casinos every day are directed to pay revenues into that general receipt subaccount. Monthly under the collateral agreement the payments are made by the city under the collateral agreement into the holdback account. Once there is a -- once the city makes that payment into the holdback account, every day, not remote in the future, not at the end of the year, every day casino revenues are released in that monthly cycle, so payments -- monthly payments are made by the city under the collateral agreement, never goes near the service corp., the service contract. It's a contractual obligation under the collateral agreement. Similarly, under the collateral agreement, the city has the right to obtain a release of its funds from the holdback from the general receipts account every day until the next monthly cycle begins, so the city has a contract right under the collateral agreement to have monies released to it from -- its monies released to it from the general receipts subaccount on a daily basis every day in the month after it has made the

payment.

THE COURT: What paragraph of the agreement are you referring to?

MS. BALL: Pardon?

THE COURT: I'm sorry. What paragraph of the agreement are you ${\hbox{\scriptsize --}}$

MS. BALL: Paragraph 5.2 of the collateral agreement, your Honor. And then the payments to the city from the holdback account are in Section 5.5, so everything works here in a closed circle under this agreement that Syncora is not a party to.

The other point which I think goes to the application of special revenues to indebtedness, again, assuming arguendo that the special -- that the casino revenues are special revenues, the only obligation for which the casino revenues stand as collateral is the hedge payable, payments under the swap, very clear in the grant of the security interest under the collateral agreement that that is the scope of the city pledge, and that is in Section 4.1. While I know it has been -- well, I don't know. It just seems that it's been fundamental to the approach that my colleagues representing Syncora have taken that this really is a complex, interrelated, multiple, multi-party, everybody is in the game situation, your Honor, that world changed, and it changed radically in 2009. And what changed in 2009? And

I want to get to the Syncora consent.

What happened in 2009 was, your Honor may be aware from all the papers, there was a downgrade of the city, but the city wasn't the only one on its heels. The insurers had been downgraded, and there had been an insurer event under the swap as well, so here everyone was facing the prospect in 2009 of a massive default by the city and a massive amount of money due. The city did the responsible thing. The banks kind of had everybody. We were all on our heels, the city, Syncora, FGIC. Nobody was in tremendous shape in 2009. I'm sure it's a time that your Honor recalls well, particularly in this part of the country.

So what happened in 2009? We've heard a lot about the banks got collateral. Well, that's true, and I want to come back to that. Two major things happened in 2009. We focused on one. One was the city gave the swap counterparties collateral in this closed circuit agreement under a document which was not only — the insurers weren't a party to it, but, your Honor, also the city was very careful. Kudos to them. In the section that my colleagues are so wont to quote to your Honor, which the rest of us might refer to as a merger clause, you know, Section 14, 14(a), that all these other documents constitute the entire agreement of the parties, it's very interesting because only three places — and I would dare our colleagues to find more — where the

word "insurer" is even mentioned in the collateral agreement, and it's mentioned in the merger section. You know what it says? This section does not apply to any rights and obligations of the insurers. The insurers had nothing to do with the collateral agreement. Why? Because a second change happened in 2009. And, your Honor, it was very obvious because the ordinance of the city in that summer of 2009 had a term sheet, and the term sheet kind of highlighted it very nicely. It laid out in gory detail the fact that the city was now going to pay a higher rate of interest to the banks. It was going to put up collateral. But it also provided for the end of the hedge. It severed the tie between the COP's, which are the certificates of participation, insure the other insurance obligation by Syncora that has nothing to do with the swaps, and Syncora disagrees with that construction, but it, in essence, said to the banks you get a free -- get out of jail free card. You can walk away from these swaps anytime you want, and, you know, your Honor, when do you think a rational financial player is going to walk away from those swaps? When they're going to be out of the money for the banks. So rather than ever have to pay a nickel, the banks got the right to just wash their hands and say, "We walk." Well, that's a radical change, your Honor. meant that the hedge could never really be a value to the city. It was never going -- to the service corps. Excuse

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me. It was never going to be in the money. That was kind of a radical change, but it was consistent with the city's view that we are pledging this incredible revenue stream, the last big one we have, to the banks, and we want to be able to get it back. So if those swaps are terminated, we only have to deal with you, and we'll get our -- we'll get our revenue stream back. But that is an immense change, your Honor, and what's very interesting -- and I have copies with me should your Honor want to walk through this with me. Mr. Hertzberg, perhaps you can help me. Mr. Hackney is a hundred percent correct that Syncora was asked to consent to everything that happened in 2009, and I have with me, your Honor, a copy of their waiver and consent. May I approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BALL: Your Honor, in the third paragraph on the first page of that waiver and consent --

THE COURT: All right. I'll let you describe this to me briefly, but I'm going to --

MS. BALL: Your Honor, suffice it to say all the agreements that they consented to were appended to their consent, and, in fact, Syncora did consent not once but four different times because they had four different policies on four different swaps to this amendment that broke the hedge, that broke the --

THE COURT: Okay. So what does this have to do with

whether the stay is applicable --

MS. BALL: Your Honor, it goes to the --

3 THE COURT: -- in the circumstances that we're

talking about here?

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Sorry. It goes to any debt unpaid on the MS. BALL: COP's or the service are so far afield from this pledge and should not be countenance in the context of suggesting that 922(d) is applicable here. It is only payments under the swap, and they have all been timely made. And all the payments in our contract rights to get the release of revenues are under the collateral agreement, and that's a right that we believe the automatic stay and the stay of Chapter 9 protect. It is not a very complicated series of many other things. The city pays every month. every day they get their revenues, their tax revenues. Your Honor, I think there should be no doubt that it remains property of the city throughout, and I think, as I said earlier, the remedy section of the collateral agreement, which is the only way to get remedies should they trap, also provides that you have to go through all the hoops to get to that property because it's city property, and you only get there by appropriation. So to suggest that it ever ceases being property of the city is totally contrary to this agreement, which is the agreement by which these revenues are delivered to the custodian. I can see I've worn out my

welcome. I'm sorry. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. BALL: Do you have any questions?

MR. HACKNEY: Just a brief rebuttal.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. HACKNEY: I will resist the temptation. I'm not always good at resisting temptations, but I'm not going to argue the way the structure works and our interpretation because it's super technical, and I don't believe it's germane here, so I'm going to just respectfully disagree with Ms. Ball.

But I want to address the diagram because you'll remember that in my argument I said that the payments under the service contract which the city pledged definitely secures had all accelerated so that there is a disagreement with us with their contention that the city is current. They're holding this diagram up to say, no, look, the amounts go directly to the counterparties from the holdback account. I only want to tell you that this is a very technical point, but under Section 5.7(a)(1) of the collateral agreement, it says "payments to the counterparties and the custodian from the holdback account," and it says, "The custodian shall pay to the counterparties from the holdback account at the end of each quarterly period" -- so these are the three months that have now stacked up -- an amount equal to all hedge periodic

payables, capital HPP. Hedge periodic payables are defined in the service contract as a periodic amount owing by the corporation under a stated hedge, so the only reason I'm making this hypertechnical point is to say that to the extent these payments are made to the counterparties, they are made for the ultimate benefit of the service corporation, which is, of course, the party to the swap.

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The only other limited point I wanted to make, your Honor, is that in Section 14.14 where Ms. Ball said there's this sort of curious reference to Syncora, it says words to the effect of Syncora's rights and obligations shall be unaffected by -- this section does not apply to any rights or obligations of the capital line insurers. This is the integration provision of the collateral agreement. Obviously, a quick reminder that the swap itself references the collateral agreement, the services contracts, and the contract administration agreements as credit support documents, so there's integration on that end as well, but more importantly, I think all this is doing is noting that Syncora's insurance obligation contracts are not referenced in the various documents that are part of the integration, and we are not claiming that we're coming through one of our insurance documents and exercising direct rights. claiming that we have enforcement and consent and direction rights as third-party beneficiaries explicitly in the

agreements. That's all I think that provision is designed to do. Thank you for your patience today, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The Court will take this under advisement and either written -- either issue a written opinion before next Wednesday or give it to you on the record at that time when we reconvene on the discovery and disclosure issue.

MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, if I could say --

THE COURT: One thing -- sir.

MR. HACKNEY: I'm sorry. Just to the extent there was any failing in my presentation today to respond to some of your questions, I wanted you to know that we would be happy to submit additional pleadings. I know that you get a lot of pleadings every day, but --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKNEY: -- there were some questions you posed that if you'd like more, we'd be happy to prepare --

THE COURT: In the meantime, the Court will maintain the status quo, whatever that is. At some point, in light of the city's agreement to dissolve the TRO perhaps after the court rules on the stay motion, the two of you can prepare an order and submit it to the Court that accomplishes that.

There is one more matter that I want to discuss with certain parties, and I'm looking at the -- what?

MS. CALTON: I'm sorry. On the order dissolving the

injunction, could they circulate it to the casino so we can make sure the language protects us for making payments in the interim and not be at risk to have to pay them a second time?

THE COURT: Any objection to that?

MR. SHUMAKER: No, your Honor.

MR. HACKNEY: No.

MS. CALTON: Thank you.

THE COURT: You're welcome. Okay. So I want to have a conversation with certain attorneys but not with everyone, so I need a show of hands. Who here represents parties who are signatories to any of the agreements that have been discussed here today? Okay. If your hand is not raised, I'm going to ask you to leave the courtroom at this time. That includes members of the press and the public. I'm going to ask you to leave the courtroom at this time if you do not represent a party to one of these agreements. Turn it off. Turn it off. We're going to turn off CourtCall and the overflow courtroom communication as well.

(Proceedings concluded at 4:25 p.m.)

INDEX

WITNESSES	•
MITIMESOFIS	•

None

EXHIBITS:

None

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Lois Garrett

August 29, 2013

Lois Garrett

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE: CITY OF DETROIT, . Docket No. 13-53846

MICHIGAN,

Detroit, Michigan August 28, 2013

Debtor. . 10:00 a.m.

.

HEARING RE. OPINION RE. STAY ISSUE

STATUS HEARING RE. CORRECTED MOTION TO ASSUME LEASE OR EXECUTORY CONTRACT

MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

ADVERSARY PROCEEDING 13-04942 - STATUS CONFERENCE

BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEVEN W. RHODES UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please be seated. Case Number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan, and Case Number 13-04942, City of Detroit versus Syncora Guarantee, Incorporated, et al.

THE COURT: Okay. I'd like to begin with administering the oath of admission to attorneys who seek admission to the Bar of the Court. I think we have one today, Ms. Newbury.

MS. NEWBURY: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning. And you are Ms. Newbury?

MS. NEWBURY: Yes, I am. Karen Newbury.

THE COURT: And are you prepared to take the oath of admission to the Bar of the Court?

MS. NEWBURY: Yes, I am, your Honor.

THE COURT: Please raise your right hand. Do you affirm that you will conduct yourself as an attorney and counselor of this Court with integrity and respect for the law, that you have read and will abide by the civility principles approved by the Court, and that you will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States?

MS. NEWBURY: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Welcome.

MS. NEWBURY: Thank you.

THE COURT: We'll take care of your paperwork for you.

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MS. NEWBURY: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Okay. One moment, please. Okay. So in terms of our order of proceeding today, I thought we would start with the Court's opinion regarding the stay issue and Syncora, and then we would do the status conference on the Syncora adversary proceeding, and then the status conference on the motion to assume and then the city's motion for a protective order regarding the data room and then if there's anything else anyone would like to bring up. Is that order okay with everybody? Okay. Perhaps so the record is clear, we should just take appearances in regard to this stay issue for the record.

MS. BALL: Good morning, your Honor. Corinne Ball for the City of Detroit.

MR. HACKNEY: Good morning, your Honor. Nice to see you again. It's Steve Hackney on behalf of Syncora.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. The issue before the Court is whether the casino revenues in the subaccount held by U.S. Bank are property of the city protected by the automatic stay. It is the position of Syncora that these casino revenues in this account held by U.S. Bank are not property of the city. In the alternative, Syncora contends that either Section 362(b)(17) or Section 922(d) of the Bankruptcy Code apply to provide an exception to the automatic stay. The city contends that these funds are

property of the city.

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Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code stays any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate. Section 902(1) makes the references in 362(a)(3) to property of the estate to mean property of the debtor. So the application of the stay depends on whether the property is property of the city.

Syncora argues that the subaccount in which the casino revenues are held is similar to an escrow account, and, therefore, the funds in the account are not property of the city. Under New York law, apparently applicable here, an escrow is defined as, quote, "a written instrument which by its terms imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the grantor, promisor, or obligor and -- or against thereof, with a stranger or third party to be kept by the depository until the performance of a condition or the happening of a certain event. The escrow relationship is of a fiduciary nature and has some characteristics of a trust," close quote. This is from -- excuse me -- 55 New York Jurisprudence 2d Escrows Section 1. With an escrow account, the, quote, "incidents of ownership remain in the person depositing the property into escrow until the conditions of the escrow are fulfilled," close quote, 55 New York Jurisprudence 2d Escrows Section 9. See also 99 Commercial

Street, Inc. v. Goldberg, 811 F. Supp. 900 at 906, Southern District of New York, 1993.

Pursuant to the collateral agreement, the casino deposit -- the casino deposits -- sorry -- the casinos deposit the funds owed to the city into the subaccount. For the subaccount to be an escrow account, as Syncora argues, the arrangement would have to be such that the casinos would retain ownership of the funds; however, there is simply no basis in the collateral agreement for such a finding.

Likewise, there is no support for Syncora's alternative argument that U.S. Bank, as the custodian, owns the funds. The fact that the city is not in possession of the casino revenues is of no consequence in determining whether they are the city's property. See, for example, United States versus Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 103 Supreme Court Reporter 2309, 1983. The Court must conclude that the casino revenues are, under applicable state law, property of the city.

Section 362(b)(17) of the Bankruptcy Code exempts from the automatic stay, quote, "the exercise by a swap participant or a financial participant of any contractual right (as defined in section 560) under any security agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement forming a part of or related to any swap agreement, or of any contractual right (as defined in section 560) to offset or

net out any termination value, payment amount, or other transfer obligation arising under or in connection with 1 or more such agreements, including any master agreement for such agreements."

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Section 101(53C) of the Bankruptcy Code defines swap participant as, quote, "an entity that, at any time before the filing of the petition, has an outstanding swap agreement with the debtor," close quote.

It is Syncora's position that the swap counterparties are swap participants and that Syncora has the right to direct the actions of the swap counterparties under the collateral agreement and that, therefore, any action taken by the swap counterparties at the direction of Syncora is not subject to the automatic stay. Syncora also contends that because it is a third-party beneficiary of the collateral agreement, it is a swap participant. The Court concludes, however, that there is no legal support for either of Syncora's arguments. Syncora is not a swap participant as that term is defined by the Bankruptcy Code, and the Court concludes, therefore, that it cannot rely on Section 362(b)(17). If Congress had intended to include a party like Syncora within the definition of a swap participant on the grounds that Syncora now asserts, Congress could readily have done that with more expansive language, but it did not. Instead, it limited the definition to those who have swap

agreements with the debtor, which Syncora does not.

Lastly, Syncora argues that Section 922(d) of the Bankruptcy Code is applicable. That section provides, quote, "Notwithstanding section 362 of this title and subsection (a) of this section, a petition filed under this chapter does not operate as a stay of application of pledged special revenues in a manner consistent with section 927 of this title to payment of indebtedness secured by such revenues." Assuming, without deciding, that the funds on deposit with U.S. Bank are special revenues, this section is inapplicable. Syncora does not have a lien on the revenues. Further, the accumulation of the funds in the subaccount is not the, quote, "application of special pledged revenues to the payment of indebtedness," close quote. It is merely an administrative act. Therefore, there is no indebtedness to Syncora here.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the casino revenues are protected by the automatic stay. The Court will prepare and enter an order to that effect. This order will, of course, be without prejudice to the right of any party to seek relief from the stay under Section 362(d).

So let's turn then to the adversary proceeding. In light of this order, is the city prepared to dismiss the adversary proceeding against Syncora and others?

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, Gregory Shumaker of Jones

Day, for the record. It's a pleasure to be here. Your Honor, the answer to your question is -- well, first is --I'm not -- we obviously just heard your ruling, so a final determination as to whether we might be able to dismiss the case -- we would appreciate the opportunity to do that. We're not sure if your Honor's ruling, however, covers all of the factual findings that we would need and the declaratory judgment that the city is seeking with regard to Syncora's rights vis-a-vis the collateral agreement and the casino revenues, and so I think that that determination remains outstanding as does Syncora's lawsuit against the swap counterparties in New York where they will be seeking a similar -- and currently seek a similar -- not a similar declaration, but a declaration of their rights -- a declaratory judgment as to their rights. We also -- so I believe we still have the need to get those rights adjudicated finally, all of the rights that are asserted by, for example, Syncora in its motion -- its pending motion to dismiss. The New York action, too, remains out there. subject to a motion to transfer it to this Court. When -- if and when that action were to come here, perhaps a consolidation would be appropriate, but, in any event, I'm not -- I can't tell you right now, your Honor, that the city is amenable to a dismissal because we --THE COURT: So if the motion to assume is denied,

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that would moot out those claims as well; right?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, it would depend on why your Honor denied it, I presume. There are multiple objections to the assumption motion. If it had to do with Syncora's rights, I think there is some question as to whether you will be making findings in that regard. We believe that you should, but we -- based upon earlier comments from your Honor, that seems to still be a question as to the --

THE COURT: Can you be more specific about what you want declared in the adversary proceeding?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, in the adversary proceeding right now, it's a little bit complicated, your Honor, because, if you'll recall, the adversary proceeding was filed prior to the forbearance and optional termination agreement being executed. In fact, we pursued that so that the forbearance agreement could be executed -- or negotiated, finalized, and executed. So right now the TRO that we discussed last week relates to the city's allegations about the irreparable harm that it would suffer if the casino revenues were attached. Syncora has, in response to that complaint, filed a motion to dismiss, which asserts a broader set of rights to the casino revenues based not only on the collateral agreement but a number of other agreements, which your Honor is probably all too aware of at this point, but, you know, if the city would need to amend its complaint in

order to deal with those broader issues, I'm not sure, but the New York action that is still out there, your Honor, is a post-forbearance agreement suit, and it may or may not come here, so it's a bit complicated. And I'm not sure that your ruling is going to -- on the assumption motion is going to address that adjudication of rights.

THE COURT: Okay. So presently pending in the adversary are the two motions that we've been discussing, the motion to dismiss and the motion for a protective order; is that right?

MR. SHUMAKER: That's correct, your Honor. The motion to dismiss is not yet fully briefed. The city filed its reply brief earlier this week or late last week, and then the motion for protective order emanated from the discovery that Syncora sought back in the beginning of July, which we believe for a number of reasons was oppressive, and we should not be required to go through that.

THE COURT: Is it premature to set hearing dates on those two motions?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, your Honor, I believe that the motion to dismiss reply brief is due September 12th, and certainly at that time that would be --

THE COURT: Obviously --

MR. SHUMAKER: -- I would think a threshold issue.

THE COURT: Obviously after that.

MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, your Honor, because I presume you would want to adjudicate that prior to discovery proceeding, if you will.

THE COURT: All right. We'll have to work with my schedule and the district courtroom's availability to provide you with a date. Mr. Hackney, would you concur that after September 12 we can set hearings on these two motions?

MR. HACKNEY: Absolutely, your Honor. If I could -- I guess I have a couple quick observations --

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. HACKNEY: -- that might facilitate things. I guess it seems to me that the TRO is dissolved and that logically that the preliminary injunction motion would be withdrawn. Now, if I'm wrong about that, I'll --

THE COURT: Well, let's inquire.

MR. SHUMAKER: With the stay in place, your Honor, that would be fair, yes.

THE COURT: All right. There you go.

MR. HACKNEY: The protective order -- the discovery we sought was principally in connection with the anticipated preliminary injunction hearing that we might have. If there is no preliminary injunction hearing, I do not believe that there is a need for expedited interim discovery. I would instead propose that we proceed in the normal course under a Rule 26 discovery conference, so I view that as sort of

mooting the protective order issues. I had a --1 2 THE COURT: Would you concur with that, sir? 3 MR. SHUMAKER: I would, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right. So all we'll set for hearing is the motion to dismiss. 5 6 MR. HACKNEY: That hopefully streamlines things, 7 your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Good. Thank you. 9 MR. HACKNEY: I had a -- I did have a favor to ask, 10 which is we've been running relatively hard. We are able to 11 do two things at once, but I will tell you we've been 12 relatively busy. I was wondering if I could have an 13 extension of time of four days until September 16th to do our reply brief. The briefs in this --14 15 THE COURT: Any objections? 16 MR. SHUMAKER: No, your Honor. 17 MR. HACKNEY: And then we would, of course, be willing to argue before -- subsequent to that time. 18 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MR. HACKNEY: And those were all of the issues that 21 I had to discuss today. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. HACKNEY: Thank you. 24 THE COURT: Okay. All right. In regard to the 25 motion to assume, is there -- are there any issues or

comments or suggestions that anyone would like to make in regard to that?

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MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, there are a few scattered I should apprise your Honor of this. You may have noticed that deposition notices were filed. Mr. Buckfire's deposition is scheduled for 9:30 tomorrow morning, and Mr. Orr's deposition is set for Friday at 8:30. One issue that's arisen as the -- and I've been dealing with Mr. Hackney, who's been the liaison for the objectors -- is consistent with your Honor's quidelines or at least proposed guidelines for the September 9th hearing where we -- where the suggestion, I believe, your Honor, was three hours for the city to put on its case and then the objectors three hours to We were -- one of the things that we did was we withdrew one of the proposed witnesses, Gaurav Malhotra, who is with Ernst & Young, who submitted a declaration on the first day. We did that to -- because we wanted to consolidate. We know that this is not supposed to be a mini trial. Your Honor really was not looking for, I think, extensive discovery and had the debtor put forward its witnesses, and those depositions are the ones that are going to occur. We withdrew that. There seems to be a developing question as to whether the Court can take judicial notice of Mr. Malhotra's first day declaration, which is in the record. There are a few paragraphs that relate to the COP's and the

swaps and the assumption motion. I'm not -- we've had some discussions earlier today just before coming into court. If your Honor is able to do that, wants to take judicial notice of Mr. Malhotra's testimony, then we would continue to leave him off. If your Honor, however, believes that he needs to appear as a witness and in order for that declaration to get -- gain weight from the Court, which it would have if we had not had discovery presumably, then I think we would have to revisit the notion of Mr. Malhotra's presence on our witness list.

THE COURT: Well, I'm certainly willing to take judicial notice of the fact that there is an affidavit there, but that's not particularly pertinent. You want me to take judicial notice of the facts that he asserts in his affidavit?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, as you would have, your Honor, if there had not been discovery. If you had -- if you had -- if you had -- if you had proceeded on the papers for the assumption motion, you would have considered the declaration and given it whatever weight you believe necessary. And given the --

THE COURT: Well, but that's subject to the opportunity of the opposing parties to question the witness.

MR. SHUMAKER: I guess if you were then going -- if you were going to look at the city's motion to assume and then have discovery on it, but at least it was my

understanding, your Honor, that you were limiting that discovery to just the debtor's witnesses that were going to appear at the hearing so that the objectors would have some idea of what -- how they would cross-examine the witness as opposed to, you know, reopening the issue of what evidence had been submitted to your Honor in connection with the motion.

what he says in his affidavit is hearsay even though it's in a court-filed document, so unless the parties opposing -- all of them are willing to waive that hearsay objection, which I would doubt, I would have to sustain any effort on your -- sustain an objection to any effort on your part to offer it into evidence to prove the truth of any of the matters asserted in it.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, if that's your ruling, then I would ask if we could reserve the right to put Mr. Malhotra back on our witness list and schedule a deposition for him. Now, the deadline that you previously set was August 30th. I'm not certain of his availability at the moment. If that deposition moved a couple days into next week, would that be all right with your Honor?

THE COURT: It's fine with me so long as we can stand firm with our hearing date.

MR. SHUMAKER: Sure, sure. And I presume we could

do that. As your Honor knows, after Mr. Orr's deposition concludes on Friday, the rebuttal witnesses will be named within 24 hours, so those will be going on at the same time.

THE COURT: Mr. Hackney.

MR. HACKNEY: Well, I guess I'll just say that I think the city made a decision about what witnesses it was going to call, and it withdrew one of them, and now it's regretting the evidential implications for the hearing, and so I guess for me it's simple, which is when they decided to withdraw Mr. Malhotra, they took him off the case as someone that they could call at the hearing, and now they're asking you to amend the discovery schedule that they previously, I think, were agreeable to because of their decision to withdraw him, so I guess I don't follow the cause for it. That's all I'll say, your Honor. We'll be guided by your decision.

THE COURT: Well, the question the Court needs to address in these circumstances is how would the city's changing its mind again prejudice your presentation or the presentation of others at the hearing?

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah. And I guess the answer to that -- I mean I've been coordinating all these folks, and we've actually been working well in concert together. I want to share credit with the other objectors. It's been very constructive. It's not that easy.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HACKNEY: And so what we've been trying to do is be orderly in the way we depose these witnesses so it's not just this chaotic deposition, and so when Malhotra came off, a lot of prep for that deposition didn't happen. If he went back on, we would want it to be sometime after the Labor Day holiday so that whomever can get ready for it. That's, I guess -- I wouldn't want to try and jam it into this week. I would want it to be like on Thursday or Friday of that following week just so whomever -- in light of the holiday and et cetera.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKNEY: Sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: No. I appreciate it and understand it.

MR. PEREZ: Good morning, your Honor. Alfredo
Perez. I represent FGIC. Two things, your Honor. With
respect to how you want the evidence presented, one of the
things that we would like to do is to make a presentation
with respect to how the swaps work in connection with the
COP's. And we could certainly do that through a witness, but
I think, since it's a matter of, you know, reading the
documents, if the Court would indulge just a straightforward
presentation, that might expedite things. I don't think it's
particularly -- it would be particularly controversial, so
that's one thing.

THE COURT: Well, if you don't think it would be controversial, what I would encourage you to do is work with the city on a joint statement.

MR. PEREZ: We can certainly do that, your Honor. Then the other thing, your Honor, is I was tasked by the various objectors to file a statement yesterday requesting some additional time, and --

THE COURT: I saw that.

MR. PEREZ: And, your Honor, we would -- if the issue were just the objectors versus the city, I think that we could certainly comply -- fully comply and do a good job for our clients, but there are -- as between the objectors, there's really a lot of different issues, and, in fact, you know, we're much more aligned with Syncora than we are with anybody else since Syncora and FGIC are the only two people who actually insure the swaps, so I would request additional time with respect to that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Six hours?

MR. PEREZ: I think we could do it in six hours, your Honor.

THE COURT: You're dubious about even that?

MR. PEREZ: Well, it depends. Let me give you -- and that's why I asked the first question.

THE COURT: Fully understanding that the issue here is only whether to assume or reject this. It has -- the

issue is not who has what rights under this contract.

MR. PEREZ: I understand that, your Honor, but I think in order -- in order for us to do a good job of presenting whether we think -- you know, basically the facts so that we can argue them to the Court, I really -- we really kind of do think that the Court needs to understand the transaction, and it's a complicated transaction.

THE COURT: Well, but you're going to come up with a joint statement with the debtor on that point.

MR. PEREZ: Well, we're certainly going to try.

THE COURT: Let's negotiate. Five hours, and you come up with a joint statement.

MR. PEREZ: We'll do that, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else in regard to preparation for the hearing on the motion to assume? Sir.

MR. MARRIOTT: Briefly, your Honor. Vince Marriott, Ballard Spahr, on behalf of EEPK. I would just like to echo Mr. Hackney's observation that coordinating preparation for these depositions among the objectors has been a complicated process, and we've been designating who's going to prepare for what, and Ballard Spahr has been heavily involved in that process. When that one witness came off, it did affect the preparation. And if the witness is going back on, we really do need time to sort of reload in preparing for that witness.

THE COURT: Yes. Thank you. Let me just ask will

this witness be available Thursday or Friday of next week? 1 MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, I don't know, but I will 2 3 certainly attempt to make him available then. 4 THE COURT: Well, doesn't he pretty much have to be in order for our hearing date to proceed and to --5 MR. SHUMAKER: Yes. You know --6 7 THE COURT: -- give the objecting parties the time 8 they have requested? 9 MR. SHUMAKER: So the request, your Honor, just so I'm clear, is that it's on Thursday or Friday of next week. 10 11 THE COURT: That's what I heard. 12 MR. SHUMAKER: Okay. THE COURT: Okay. 13 14 I don't know of him being out of the MR. SHUMAKER: 15 country or anything like that, your Honor, but I'll do 16 everything within my power to make that happen. And I'm sure 17 the odds are extremely low that he would not be available. THE COURT: Well, I hope you understand that if he's 18 19 not available for deposition, it will be challenging to 20 establish that he should be called as a witness. 21 MR. SHUMAKER: Understood, your Honor. Understood. 22 THE COURT: Sir. 23 MR. FRIMMER: Good morning, your Honor. 24 Frimmer from Schiff Hardin representing FMS Wertmanagement, 25 which was incorrectly listed previously as DEPFA Bank, PLC.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FRIMMER: I almost hesitate to do this, but just to remind counsel that next Thursday and Friday are the Jewish holidays. Some of us won't be available. So whether or not the witness is available does cause of a bit of a monkeywrench for some of the other players, so --

THE COURT: That's a problem.

MR. FRIMMER: -- I just wanted the Court and the counsel to be sensitive to that.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask is Wednesday an acceptable day, and can you all prepare in time for the deposition on that date?

MR. FRIMMER: As Mr. Hackney correctly noted, we've been trying to work together to coordinate this. I'm sure someone will be available. I just wanted to alert the Court just to remind everybody that some portion of the populous here will not be available.

MS. ENGLISH: Good morning, your Honor. Caroline English from Arent Fox on behalf of Ambac. Just to point out another wrinkle, if Malhotra testifies, we need the right to call a potential rebuttal witness, which is going to put more time into the schedule, and right now our hearing is scheduled for Monday. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I was wondering when that issue was going to arise.

MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor --

2 THE COURT: Sir.

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MR. HACKNEY: I was wondering. I guess I'd like to stick my head in the lion's mouth, so to speak, because I think the Court has been clear that you want to have this hearing on September 9th, and I appreciate that. I understand what you're trying to do. I really do. I've been in situations before where it makes sense to hold the foot on the accelerator, but I did want to make an observation to the Court in light of two developments. One of them is that today you held that the city is going to have at least interim access to these casino revenues during its case, and, second, under the forbearance agreement, what's ostensibly driving the schedule and the hurry-up is the idea that if they don't get a final and unappealable order by September 16th, which is 60 days from the commencement of the case, the swap counterparties may terminate the forbearance agreement. It's a fact today that they will not have a final and unappealable order by September 16th. That is already established. If the Court's order is final, it will be appealable, and if it's not final and unappealable, then it won't be final. I just raise this to ask a practical question about whether or not we need to strictly adhere to the schedule in light of some of the challenges it's posing. And I also wanted to add one thing, your Honor, that may be

nearer and dearer to your heart, which is it impacts things like the mediation. You know, I'm part of the Syncora team. I'm not going to the mediation tomorrow because I have to be in the deposition. I know Mr. Marriott was originally planning to take the Buckfire deposition, but now he's going to the mediation. We can do two things at once. We can take depositions and mediate, but there is sometimes a desire to see whether a mediation can be fruitful before parties take up the time and expense of litigation, and it seems to me that even a two- to three-week adjournment of the hearing may solve many of the different issues that are coming up. Just a suggestion, your Honor.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, one -- excuse me -- two things. One, I've been asked to advise your Honor that a retirees' committee has been formed and is, I think, in the process of retaining counsel, who is here, Carole Neville of Dentons, and I believe she may wish to address the Court, but before she does, if I would, your Honor, if the objectors would have five hours and Mr. Malhotra is on the slate for the city, we'd ask this, that we be given an hour to make sure that we could get his testimony because we were -
THE COURT: So you want four instead of three?

MR. SHUMAKER: Exactly, your Honor. One of our considerations was how can we do three witnesses in three

1 hours. 2 THE COURT: Is he available next Wednesday? 3 MR. SHUMAKER: I can check on a break. I could 4 leave right now if your Honor would --THE COURT: All right. I'm going to give you that 5 6 opportunity and sit here while you do that. Wait. What? 7 The issue is use of the telephone? MR. HERTZBERG: He can't use it out in the hallway, 8 9 your Honor, under the rules of the District Court. He has to 10 go downstairs. 11 THE COURT: I will grant you relief from that --12 MR. SHUMAKER: Thank you, your Honor. Be right 13 back. 14 THE COURT: -- and instruct the security personnel 15 to allow you to use your phone in the hallway. 16 MR. SHUMAKER: Thank you, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hertzberg. (Pause at 10:37 a.m., until 10:41 a.m.) 18 19 MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, can I propose something to 20 the Court while we're waiting on this information? 21 THE COURT: Sure. 22 MR. HACKNEY: I understand the city's sensitivity on 23 the subject of the schedule because under the forbearance 24 agreement they have a best efforts obligation, best efforts 25 to try and get this final appealable order within 60 days, so

I respect the fact that they need to exercise best efforts, but I think the objectors in the court, we don't have that obligation, and what I would propose is that we continue the hearing one month and that the city vigorously oppose my motion for a continuance. And, your Honor, I think that may allow for a number of things to happen that are potentially conducive both to the use of your time, which is also occupied by other matters, and to the coherence of the presentation and to the mediation, and the city will comply with its best efforts obligation to attempt to get a final appealable order within 60 days, which, by the way, it already cannot get, but it has used its best efforts.

THE COURT: Ms. Ball.

MS. BALL: Thank you, your Honor, with vigor. Your Honor, Mr. Hackney has correctly calculated the dates, so I cannot contest his description of where we will find ourselves should your Honor approve the settlement and the assumption of the forbearance agreement. We do also have the obligation that Mr. Hackney has described as a best efforts obligation. Your Honor, we have all tried mightily, and my partner, Greg, is out trying to find out if we can do a deposition on Wednesday. I certainly question whether a month is necessary because, your Honor, there are other economic provisions in the agreement, which Mr. Hackney may not be as aware of at this point, but I'm sure by the time of

our hearing he will be, where some of the economic benefits that we must obtain are important. But in fairness to your Honor, our ability to obtain those economic benefits is in some respects tied to two other events, which are on a different schedule, and those two other events, your Honor, you scheduled with an order earlier this week, the eligibility hearing as well as, your Honor, any effort to obtain -- and we are working mightily -- post-petition financing. Actually funding it will likely require a resolution of the eligibility issue. So we have not just the parallel tracks of mediation and litigation. We actually have the track -- if the city is going to get the benefit of -- one of the reasons why it did this, clearly one, your Honor's ruling -- we thank you; it was very important -- was getting immediate access, continuing access to casino revenues, and I certainly am grateful for your ruling and don't want to under -- in any way understate the importance of that. So, your Honor, I really question whether or not 30 days is appropriate. I do think that if -- in fairness to the Court and in light of what you've already heard certainly from Mr. Perez on behalf of FGIC and from Ambac as well as Syncora, this is complicated, and a better presentation -the more we work out in advance of this hearing, the better off we will all be in terms of as much being stipulated facts and a very short succinct but accurate joint statement.

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with that, your Honor, we are -- we will go forward on 1 September 9th assuming Mr. Malhotra is available on 2 Wednesday, but at my -- discharging my obligations to this 3 4 Court, I have to just make those three points. condition is virtually impossible to meet through no fault. 5 Secondly, there are other -- two other deadlines out there 6 that we're mindful of for getting the economic benefit. Your 8 Honor, I'm talking about when the discount of 75 percent 9 increases to 77, so we think a month is too long if you're 10 even considering this motion. And, thirdly, your Honor, as 11 I've apprised you, we're going to be somewhat in a bind with 12 financing on the schedule, so a short adjournment would not 13 injure the city terribly, but obviously, your Honor, we will 14 be prepared to go forward on September 9th, if that's your 15 Honor's ruling, on the motion for continuance. Thank vou. 16 THE COURT: Ms. Ball or Mr. Hackney, what are your 17 appearance obligations in relation to mediation? 18 Thursday, your Honor, is the mediation MR. PEREZ: 19 with respect to the swaps, and then on the 17th is the 20 overall mediation. And I would imagine that there would be

MS. BALL: And, your Honor, the retirees' committee has asked to participate in the assumption, and they have to get up to speed.

THE COURT: Right.

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other dates set as soon as we have those dates.

MR. PLECHA: If I may, your Honor, Ryan Plecha on behalf of the Retiree Association Parties. It is my knowledge that counsel for the committee has been selected, but it has not yet been formally retained. But it does wish to participate relative to the motion on the lease, so I did just want to make that clear for the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PLECHA: Thank you.

THE COURT: What is your report, sir?

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, I'm sorry. As luck would have it, we called his office, his cell, and e-mailed him and haven't heard anything yet. Perhaps by the time we adjourn, I'll know if I can keep looking at my Blackberry. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: One more second, please. What would be the consequences to the city that would concern it if the matter were adjourned to Monday and Tuesday, the 23rd and 24th?

MR. SHUMAKER: I'm sorry, your Honor. I was reading the e-mail that says that the witness would be available on Wednesday if that's -- I'm sorry -- moving the assumption motion --

THE COURT: 23rd and 24th.

MS. BALL: Your Honor, noting our objection to any adjournment to be in compliance with our best efforts, we do not believe that it will adversely affect any other provision

of the agreement.

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THE COURT: Mr. Hackney.

MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, I think that that would be helpful, and I would have one additional suggestion, which is that I think that the way we should use this adjournment is to, in addition to creating order on the litigation side, to create a little bit of space to see what happens with the mediation. That would be the purpose, in my mind. I would recommend then that -- I would recommend allowing depositions to complete at a time that's closer to the hearing so that we all don't remain in the same litigation scrum that we're currently in and have to --

THE COURT: What would you suggest, sir?

MR. HACKNEY: And the 23rd, your Honor -- I'm sorry.

15 I don't have my --

THE COURT: 23rd is a Monday, Monday and Tuesday,

17 | the 23rd and 24th.

MR. HACKNEY: You know what? In bankruptcy litigation a lot of times the depositions will run up a little bit closer to the hearings, and I would say that I would do it -- I would cut it off on the Wednesday before.

THE COURT: That would be the 19th?

MR. HACKNEY: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. Shumaker?

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, we have the eligibility

track going on, and the nonexpert depositions are to be completed on the 23rd for that. The witnesses are also here and available tomorrow and Friday. We would propose --

THE COURT: Oh, I think you should go ahead with those regardless.

MR. SHUMAKER: And I think --

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THE COURT: They're scheduled.

MR. SHUMAKER: I think that's --

THE COURT: And with a third of the city's witnesses next Wednesday.

MR. SHUMAKER: Yes. I think subject to what Ms. Ball has already said, then that would be fine with the city.

THE COURT: I'm sorry if I misunderstood you, Mr. Hackney. I thought you were talking about extending the opportunity for rebuttal witnesses' depositions through the 19th.

MR. HACKNEY: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. Sorry. Let's stick with the schedule you have for the city's witnesses' depositions.

Okay. All right. Subject to the availability of a courtroom here in this building, we will reschedule the hearing on the assumption motion for the 23rd and the 24th. The Court will allow the city four hours and the objecting parties five hours, and I want you to work with your best efforts to come up with a joint statement on how the swaps and COP's work.

MR. SHUMAKER: We will do that, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Yes. Okay. Let's turn our attention then to the city's motion for a protective order regarding the data room.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, you recall our colloquy last week about the data room, and consistent with my representation to you, the city filed the motion for I don't believe that there are any protective order. objections to it. It has to do with the access to the data Two of the things that have occurred, as reflected in the motion, are we have removed any requirement that the objectors or others with discovery rights sign an NDA, and we have also gone back to the city's pension actuary, Milliman, and essentially renegotiated that contract such that they no longer will require an NDA to access their materials. only outstanding issue was, just for clarity purposes, that the city would still be able to redact personally identifiable information. There's very few documents -- I mean I think less than a handful -- that have Social Security numbers, home addresses, and even the city's own bank account number, but that's what the city seeks to do with this motion.

THE COURT: Anyone object to the city's redaction of personally -- of personal information? There was an objection or a request really, more appropriately stated,

that the city waive any NDA obligations of people who have 1 2 already signed them and waive any releases that people 3 entered into as a condition previously of entering into this 4 room. MR. SHUMAKER: We'll, of course, do that, your 5 6 Honor. THE COURT: You will. All right. One of the papers 8 actually had proposed language, I think, to be added to the 9 order that you seek. Did you see that language? 10 MR. SHUMAKER: I know that came in last night. 11 Thank you. 12 THE COURT: Well, we don't have to review it now. 13 Let me just ask you to work with --14 MR. SHUMAKER: Certainly. THE COURT: -- whoever filed that to see if you can 15 16 agree upon the language and to submit an amended order 17 through our order processing program. 18 MR. SHUMAKER: We will do that, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Ms. Calton, did you want to be heard? 20 MS. CALTON: Yes, your Honor. Judy Calton for Detroit Entertainment, LLC, which is Motor City Casino. 21 Αt 22 present the casino has to file financial information 23 regularly with the city under the Michigan Gaming Control 24 Act, and under the Act that information is confidential, and

it can't be subject of a Freedom of Information Act

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disclosure. As far as I can tell, that information today is not in the data room. My client is concerned that its right for that information to be confidential maintains confidential or at least if they're going to feel that they should make it public that we have an opportunity for advance knowledge and to seek a protective order. And I feel kind of -- it's not a today issue, but we need to be protected in case tomorrow they decide to put it in there.

THE COURT: Any thoughts on this?

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, we have no intention of putting the financial statements that Ms. Calton talks about in there. If for some reason that would change, we would endeavor to talk to counsel about that.

THE COURT: That representation sufficient for you?

MS. CALTON: Yes. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. The motion is granted with the condition that the city seeks and the additional condition that we've discussed here. Please submit an order. Would anyone else like to raise anything else here today? All right.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, if I may, one --

THE COURT: Sir.

MR. SHUMAKER: I'm sorry. One issue that has arisen with the depositions -- and I don't have any firsthand knowledge of this, and I tread lightly given our exchange

last week, but apparently there has been some media inquiries about attending the depositions of Mr. Buckfire and Mr. Orr. I raise that because we want to avoid tomorrow or Friday some sort of situation where people are trying to get into the deposition room, the witnesses are prejudiced by, you know, the commotion, and we're just -- we're seeking whether -- wondering if we could get some clarification from your Honor as to the fact that hopefully --

THE COURT: What's your position on whether it should be allowed or not?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, the witnesses will be present on September 9th for the hearing, so obviously they will be present then. If your Honor wants us to provide a transcript from the deposition to the press, we could do that if need be, but I really am worried about crowd control, if you will, tomorrow where the deposition is going to take place.

THE COURT: Mr. Hackney.

MR. HACKNEY: I do share Mr. Shumaker's concerns just on the subject of crowd control. I had a suggestion for your Honor, which is -- I'm not entirely certain, I'll confess, about whether parties in interest in the case generally that haven't objected to the motion are entitled to appear at a deposition and ask questions. I'll just tell you that I just don't know the answer to that. From an orderly process --

1 THE COURT: The answer is no.

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MR. HACKNEY: Okay. That's helpful because my suggestion was that the only people that be allowed to appear in person at the deposition would be parties that have objected and that perhaps could --

THE COURT: I agree with that.

MR. HACKNEY: -- communicate with me and Mr.

Shumaker who they will be maybe I'll just say.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. HACKNEY: That will allow us to exercise some crowd control over the physical room we're taking the deposition in.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. HACKNEY: We have a conference call line that we're going to set up for people that want to listen in, and so that was requested by certain people that couldn't be in Detroit, and separately --

THE COURT: Certain attorneys representing parties who have filed objections?

MR. HACKNEY: Yes, for sure. Like I said, I didn't know coming to the podium today how parties in interest were handled in terms of their ability to even attend. And the idea of giving a transcript after the deposition would seem to address some of the public interest concerns that the people of the city legitimately have --

1 THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. HACKNEY: -- you know, so that would be our suggestion.

THE COURT: Um-hmm. Would anyone else like to be heard regarding this specific issue?

MR. PLECHA: Good morning, your Honor. Ryan Plecha again on behalf of the Retiree Association Parties. Because of the new nature of the retiree committee, I would request that they be allowed to attend even though they've not had the opportunity to file a formal objection at this point.

THE COURT: Um-hmm. Interesting point. Anybody object to that?

MR. HACKNEY: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: The Court will permit that then. All right. I do think it is appropriate to order that only parties plus a representative of the retiree committee to attend these depositions. The Court will order the release of the transcript of the depositions to the press upon their request but that no other members -- no other parties in the case or no members of the press otherwise be permitted to attend these depositions. Anything further yet? Thank you for bringing that up. All right. We'll be in recess then.

THE CLERK: All rise.

MR. HACKNEY: Thank you, your Honor.

THE CLERK: Court is adjourned.

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(Proceedings concluded at 11:01 a.m.)

INDEX

WITNESSES:

None

EXHIBITS:

None

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the sound recording of the proceedings in the aboveentitled matter.

/s/ Lois Garrett

August 30, 2013

Lois Garrett

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE: CITY OF DETROIT, Docket No. 13-53846

MICHIGAN,

Detroit, Michigan November 14, 2013

Debtor. 2:36 p.m.

HEARING RE. MOTION OF THE OBJECTORS FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT LIMITED DISCOVERY IN CONNECTION WITH MOTION OF THE DEBTOR FOR A FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. SEC. 105, 362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(e), 364(f), 503, 507(a)(2), 904, 921 and 922 (I) APPROVING POST-PETITION FINANCING, (II) GRANTING LIENS AND PROVIDING SUPERPRIORITY CLAIM STATUS AND (III) MODIFYING

AUTOMATIC STAY BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEVEN W. RHODES UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

THE COURT: And let's move on and talk about discovery.

MR. HACKNEY: Good afternoon, your Honor. Stephen Hackney on behalf of Syncora.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

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MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, we're here on a motion that Syncora filed with several other parties joining that relates to discovery that we'd like to take in anticipation of the hearing on the motion for post-petition financing that you spent most of the morning and afternoon discussing.

Before I -- I know that we're running into your next call, and I will get right into the discovery itself, but I was wondering if I could --

THE COURT: Well, don't worry about that. Don't feel rushed. I want to --

MR. HACKNEY: Okay. I will try.

THE COURT: I want to take our time and do this properly.

MR. HACKNEY: I wanted to at the start, if I could, your Honor, frame the importance of the DIP motion itself to the case because I think its importance is significant not only to this case but to other Chapter 9's that may follow, and I think it's important to think about that in the context of why we believe discovery is important. As you've heard today, the proposed DIP loan in question is believed to be

the first of its kind. We actually -- our research indicates that it's not literally the first Chapter 9 DIP loan. Our research indicates that there have been a couple small DIP loans in other Chapter 9's, and there was a sizeable one that was done as part of a plan, but it is the first of its kind in terms of being the largest and also one I think that is unabashedly about revitalization of the city in part as opposed to immediate cash flow needs, so the DIP loan in this case that's being proposed is significant.

It is significant for a second reason, and that is because the proceeds of the DIP loan, the \$350 million, 230 million about will be used to pay certain creditors outside of the plan context, and the \$120 million that's going to be devoted to what are called quality of life initiatives, the idea of a revitalization of the City of Detroit, a renaissance on the street, so to speak, is also one that will be happening outside the plan context, so they're coming to you on an interim basis between eligibility and confirmation and saying that they would like to be able to do this today.

The reason this is of great sensitivity and concern to creditors is because if the city pledges away income streams or assigns them to different parties now, it has obviously an important impact on the city's ability to later fairly adjust the debts of creditors like Syncora or the pensioners or the others, so we perceive there to be

significant plan implications by some of these interim motions that are being brought to the Court, and that is why this is an area of great focus and concern for creditors, and that informs somewhat the discovery that we've sought.

I believe there is some agreement with the city that some discovery is appropriate, and I'd like to recite that for the record and try and narrow it. The city, as I understand it, is amenable to the idea that the objectors can obtain discovery into the DIP solicitation process, the DIP evaluation process, and the process by which the DIP was submitted to the City Council under PA 436. It's my understanding, at least, that we have general agreement that that's okay and also that the city is willing for its deponents, Mr. Doak and Mr. Moore, to be deposed.

Where there is disagreement with respect to the scope of potential document requests and inquiry is on the subject of the uses and the need for the quality of life proceeds, and this is where I will confess I was taken a little aback by our disagreement on this because the motion itself is replete with references to Mr. Moore's declaration but also to a discussion of all of the challenges that the City of Detroit faces, for example, with respect to blight remediation, the fire department, the police department, and IT infrastructure. These are some of the areas where the city has said it may -- it's not obligating itself to, but it

has said it may or that it intends to direct the quality of life proceeds at these subject matter areas. We believe that discovery into --

THE COURT: Excuse me. Why does Syncora care about what the city's priorities are in terms of quality of life spending?

MR. HACKNEY: The answer, your Honor, is because, as a creditor who, you know, expects to see a plan of adjustment at the end of the case that fairly allocates or fairly adjusts its debts along with the debts of the others in the case, the way the city spends its money and the impact or lack of impact that has on creditor recoveries Syncora believes is endemic to analyzing whether it is, for example, within the business judgment, as the city has contended it is and which is one of the elements under Section 364 or one of the factors you'll consider, whether it's in the best interest of creditors, as they have suggested that it is in their papers and as the order they proposed would find, and it also goes to whether --

THE COURT: Do you think the city is going to ask me to approve its allocation of how it's going to spend the proceeds of the loan?

MR. HACKNEY: I think that --

THE COURT: That makes me sound like a mayor or a city council.

MR. HACKNEY: Well, these -- your questions go right to the core, I think, of this matter, but also in some respects of the case, and I was -- let me respond in two respects, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, we don't have to have an answer now, but the issue is why have discovery on all of this?

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah. So I will answer your question,

which is I know that the city -- or I believe that the city is taking the position that you're not permitted to consider either the needs or the uses of the funds and that they have sovereignty to administer themselves sort of thematically under Section 904.

THE COURT: Is that a proposition you disagree with?

MR. HACKNEY: It is. It is because, your Honor, I

acknowledge that under Section 904 that the city has the

right to administer itself without the Bankruptcy Court

interfering. That's the language of Section 904. But where

things change substantially is when you come to this Court

and ask this Court to begin to work the controls of the

Bankruptcy Code to the benefit of the city when they invoke

concepts like obtaining superpriority liens or good faith

assurances to be given to parties so that they're protected

no matter the outcome of various appeals and so on and so

forth. When you come into that context, we believe you've

now entered -- first of all, you've put your dispute --

you've consented to the idea that the Bankruptcy Court must determine whether it's appropriate, and we believe that unlike a mayor or another political leader who thinks about the needs of his citizens or her citizens in administering the body politic, a bankruptcy judge, under Chapter 9 and the history behind Chapter 9, the legislative purpose, does think in terms of fairness to creditors, that that is an essential aspect of the purpose of Chapter 9, and that the bankruptcy judge is duty bound to consider --

THE COURT: The fairness of what, though?

MR. HACKNEY: What's that?

THE COURT: The fairness of what?

MR. HACKNEY: The fairness of the proposed action in terms of how it will impact creditors. For example, we believe, your Honor, if I could go back to answer your question about will you have to involve yourself in assessing how they propose to use the money and whether they're using it in the right way, we think that, at a minimum, we should be entitled to take discovery on the subject but also that you should consider evidence later that there are less burdensome ways, for example, for the city to improve the quality of life in Detroit that may not impair creditor recoveries or that may not require superpriority liens and the like, that there are different ways that the money can be spent so that creditors will obtain either a better return on

their -- a better return on their claims. And, for example, your Honor, this is particularly appropriate when you think about the concept of Section 364 and its incorporation into Chapter 9, which hasn't always been part of Chapter 9, but when it was incorporated, there's some of the legislative history that suggests that the reason it was a good idea to incorporate it into Chapter 9 was similar to the reason that it is a good idea in Chapter 11, which is that post-petition financing can be used to enhance the value of the estate and enhance the value to creditors. So we believe that the question of how the money is being spent is germane to the question of whether or not it's serving the purposes of Section 364 even in the Chapter 9 context.

And your Court is asking -- the Court is asking questions that I think are momentous ones. I think the -- formulating the appropriate legal standard by which the Court can determine that the interests of creditors are being safeguarded whenever a municipal debtor invokes the provisions of Chapter 9 that are outside Section 904 I think is going to be critical and precedent setting, not only in this case but also in the other cases, and I think that it is inconsistent for the city, I guess, in my mind, your Honor, to say that this evidence isn't relevant or that you're not permitted to consider it when it dominates their motion and where they are asserting that they have exercised good

business judgment and that what they're going to do is in the best interest of creditors and is necessary to enhance the value of the estate and so forth, the other elements that you'll consider under Section 364. That is why we want to obtain that discovery, and we want to test the proposition that the city is advancing that this is a good way to spend the money and, by the way, so important that it has to be done now outside of the plan context at a time where the city doesn't have some sort of cash flow emergency. It's my understanding that the city's cash coffers have actually increased substantially during the bankruptcy in part because it isn't -- it is not paying bond debt such as the debt held by my client in part, so this isn't a situation where the city is coming to you and saying we need \$5 million to get us through the case or to pay professionals or to literally pay the police officers. The city has more cash today than it did when it started the cases. It is about a novel and distinct concept, in our view, novel in the history of Chapter 9, which is that during the pendency of the case, you can use the Bankruptcy Code to revitalize the city and to allow for a renaissance, which is the word from the declaration and from the motion. And whether you can do that outside the plan context and whether you can actually subordinate creditor recoveries to the notion of revitalization is, we believe, a threshold issue of critical

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importance to the cases, and that's why we are urging the Court to allow us to take discovery, to allow for a fully developed record before you for whatever decision that you'll make on this subject when we try it.

THE COURT: What does this discovery entail specifically?

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MR. HACKNEY: What I would think it would entail is -- I understand that we haven't proffered requests yet, but I've already mentioned to counsel for the city that I understand we'll have to put some thought into formulating it because we don't want every piece of paper that relates to the fire department or the police department or to blight, and it's likely burdensome for the city to go collect all of that information. What I was thinking that we would want were two principal types of information. The first type of information would be information that relates to assessments of how the City of Detroit can improve itself. There have been consultants obviously in this case who have been doing this type of work. There have also been other consultants, it's my understanding, in the history of the City of Detroit who have looked at some of these questions, and the types of documents or reports, whether it's from a consultant or whether it's something internal at the Detroit Fire Department itself that says here are our needs, here are the most important things to us that would most allow us to

achieve our mission, here's the anticipated costs, those types of analytical documents I think would be of extreme importance to creditors so that they can make an assessment of whether or not the city is exercising its judgment in a way that's most appropriate or that is most efficient, and the second type of document that I could see would be documents that Mr. Orr himself considered as the decider behind the loan as he's looking out at the city he's administering and trying to decide how much money do I need and what pacing and where will I put it and why, documents that he considered that show how he selected the priorities that he selected and documents that show what perceived impact his decisions will have on the creditors in terms of their recoveries to the extent these documents exist. are the types of documents I was thinking of when we broadly described the concept of discovery into the uses and needs of the quality of life note.

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A third category of documents would be additional specificity around the deployment of the capital in terms of how it will be spent, the specific uses.

There are also some depositions that we had proposed in addition to the two affiants, and the city, I think, is of the view that it may object to some of those depositions.

There were four that we had put forward, a Barclays deposition that relates to the negotiation of the DIP itself;

depositions of City Council members that would be germane to discovery of the compliance with PA 436; discovery of an Ernst & Young representative, which is germane to the cash flow forecasts that have been assembled and what they say about the city's cash flow needs; and, last, depositions of the swap counterparties. And I want to make clear for the Court in proposing the concept that we would depose the swap counterparties, it wasn't my intention that we would revisit the forbearance agreement discovery that was done previously. It was my intention that we would examine them on the subject of whether they're going to close on the optional termination payment under a variety of circumstances because you wouldn't want the city to take down \$350 million in credit if it was not going to be able to deploy the money in the way that it was saying and pay the interest costs and so forth and not being able to close. The city has suggested that they oppose the swap counterparty depositions and that they, I think, needed additional information on the Ernst & Young purpose.

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But those were the categories, and those were the depositions that we propose to take, and I wanted to make sure that I contextualize that within what's at stake here in the motion itself. Thank you.

THE COURT: I'd like to hear from the city, please.

Good afternoon, your Honor.

Hamilton of Jones Day on behalf of the City of Detroit. When

MR. HAMILTON:

we received on October 23rd Syncora's motion for authority to take discovery under Rule 2004, while we thought the procedure was incorrect, we understood that discovery was inevitable and going to occur with respect to our at that time anticipated motion to obtain approval for the postpetition financing from Barclays, and we immediately began the process of collecting and reviewing documents for eventual production to Barclays -- I mean to Syncora and others who may decide to object to our motion for approval of the financing facility.

We have collected and reviewed documents with respect to how much financing -- external financing the city will need to fund the assumption of the forbearance agreement if this Court were to approve that assumption in a separate hearing as well as how much external financing would be needed to start the funding of the restructuring initiatives that were the subject of the July 14th proposal to creditors and that was the subject of extensive testimony during the eligibility trial that your Honor oversaw over the last few weeks.

We've also collected documents regarding the solicitation process for potential participants in the post-petition financing facilities as well as the myriad of proposals that we received from various potential lenders and their terms and documents regarding the exercise of the

city's business judgment in selecting the Barclays proposal as the best one for the city. As a result of that process, we have collected and are prepared to produce tomorrow or Monday over 5,000 pages of documents on each one of those topics to those parties who indicate that they want to take that discovery and, with respect to some of the documents, agree to a protective -- or a confidentiality agreement to maintain the confidentiality of some of the documents that we're submitting.

We have also offered to Syncora to make our witnesses, our two declarants, available for deposition, Mr. Doak, who you heard from today, on Friday, November 22nd, in New York, and on Monday, November 25th, Mr. Moore in Detroit. The city consents to the discovery that I've just outlined the production of all these documents on the need for external financing, the process for obtaining that financing, and the selection of Barclays. We consent to the deposition of those two declarants.

Syncora is asking for leave to take discovery on other subjects that go substantially beyond the scope of what we consented to, we believe on subjects that threaten to impose substantial economic and logistical burdens on the city on topics that we believe are not what this Court must adjudicate when it hears and determines our motion for approval of the post-petition financing motion. Those

categories where they're going beyond what we think is the legitimate scope fall under -- or there's two categories. The first is relatively simple to deal with, and that's the category with respect to our proposal -- or our request that the Court approve our motion to assume the forbearance agreement. With respect to the motion that Syncora filed for leave to take discovery, they did not list that as one of the topics on which they were seeking documents, but they did identify they wanted to take depositions of the swap counterparties. I did not follow entirely what counsel's explanation was for why the depositions of the swap counterparties is not a back door effort to take additional discovery on the forbearance agreement, but I would just suggest that if this Court at a separate hearing determines to approve the city's assumption of the forbearance agreement, the city, as -- pursuant to the terms of that forbearance agreement that are detailed in our motion and in the motion to assume the forbearance agreement, the city would have the option to then cause the termination events that would trigger our obligation to pay the \$230 million --\$230 million -- 210 -- \$210 million pursuant to that forbearance agreement, so there would be, as we can see it, no reason to depose in connection with the finance motion the swap counterparties because the finance motion only becomes material if you approve the forbearance agreement.

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you approve the -- if you approve the forbearance agreement, what the swap counterparties say about what their intentions are are immaterial and irrelevant because at that point the city controls what happens upon seven or ten days' notice under the forbearance agreement.

The bottom line is this Court has already heard and considered and decided what discovery should occur in connection with our motion to assume the forbearance agreement. That discovery has occurred, and the hearing is scheduled to occur, and it should — it will be decided based on the record that this Court already dictated should be developed for that hearing, and Syncora or others should not be allowed to pursue discovery on the finance motion as a way to get back door discovery and supplement the record on the motion to assume the forbearance agreement.

The more difficult argument and the more difficult category is what counsel spent most of his time in his argument on, and that is the request for discovery on our proposed use of the quality of life -- the proceeds of the quality of life bonds. The devil in this request is substantial. While he indicates that they want to take just limited document discovery, just assessments that the city may have developed both at the macro level and at individual department levels, the fire department, the police department, and how much money they think they need for what

particular improvements, documents that Mr. Orr may have considered in deciding what restructuring initiatives to approve and which ones to table, and how the money will be spent among various different departments, I can't think of what kind of evidentiary hearing counsel is contemplating that that discovery would go to other than sort of a supertribunal in which this Court second-guesses and sits in judgments of every single governmental decision that the City of Detroit is making on how to go forward with its revitalization and restructuring initiatives. There is no way that kind of hearing could be completed in one or two days.

Essentially, I think what counsel is suggesting is that Section 364 constitutes an effective repeal of Section 904 in a Chapter 9 case where the Bankruptcy Court does not have authority or jurisdiction to interfere with a municipality's governmental decisionmaking and its decisions on how to use its property and revenue unless the municipality decides they have to borrow some money, and if the municipality decides it has to borrow some money, then the Bankruptcy Court, notwithstanding 904, can sit in ultimate judgment and second-guess every single spending decision that the city makes on how much money to spend on fire, how much money to spend on police, how much money to spend on lighting, how much spending — money to spend on

roads, versus creditor recoveries. And, in essence, they would turn the 364 --

THE COURT: Don't forget pensions.

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MR. HAMILTON: Very important, pensions, maybe not sacrosanct, but very important. And the point would be that instead of the Chapter 9 plan of adjustment process working those things out, they want to turn the 364 hearing into some macro hearing that decides how all the money that the City of Detroit should spend for the next ten years, how it should be spent, what dollars should go to creditor recoveries, what dollars should go to fire improvement, what dollars should go to police improvement, all because we have to borrow some money in order to fund some of these initiatives. We do not think that is a proper construction of either 904 or 364. believe that when you hear the 364 motion, we have to demonstrate that we exercise sound business judgment in determining that we needed to borrow money in order to meet our cash needs. We will also have to demonstrate that we -in order to borrow that money under 364(c)(2), we had to give super administrative priority status and liens because general unsecured credit was not available. That does not mean that this Court will sit in review of the city's business judgment on the underlying money that is needed. You do sit in judgment on whether or not forbearance agreements should be approved, but that's on a separate

motion under 365 and a 9019 motion. And if you decide that that forbearance agreement should be approved, then we know we need \$210 million. Then, in connection with the 364 motion, you will hear and adjudicate our business judgment as to whether or not we needed to borrow the money to pay that \$210 million and whether or not the terms on which we want to borrow that money are reasonable and in everybody's best interest. That is your call.

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Similarly, by the same token, with respect to the restructuring initiatives, the city has exercised its governmental and political judgment as to how much money it should invest in its restructuring initiatives over the next ten years. You do not sit in judgment and review the city's exercise of its governmental and political decision-making in that regard. That's up to the city to figure out how to do with the mayor, with the emergency manager, and with all the constituents. We have already presented an extensive evidentiary record on how those calculations were made, what the restructuring initiatives are, and how much they will cost over the next ten years. And we lay that out in our motion just like we lay out all the details of the forbearance agreement, but in connection to whether or not you're going to approve the financing arrangement, what you sit in judgment on is not our decision to spend \$1.25 billion over the next ten years on those restructuring initiatives

because that's a governmental political decision that only the City of Detroit has the authority to make. What you sit in judgment on is our business judgment that we need to borrow some money to start paying for those initiatives and the terms on which we want to borrow that money are reasonable. That's what you sit in judgment on, and we are going to produce the documents that are relevant to that inquiry, but it is not appropriate to turn the 364(c) hearing into some mega trial that kind of makes moot the whole plan of adjustment in which the parties ask you to decide what's an appropriate use of loan proceeds and what's not. we use the loan proceeds to pay creditor recoveries, or should we use it to pay pensions, should we pay it to use -to pay for OPEB, or should we use it to pay for lighting? That's not what this hearing is about, and I think it's improper for them to try and seek discovery on that.

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We are willing to make Mr. Moore and E&Y available for deposition on the fact that we need to borrow money to start paying -- to start funding the initiatives, the restructuring initiatives, but we think it is improper for them to take discovery on the underlying decision-making, the political and governmental decision-making that the City of Detroit has undertaken in deciding what restructuring initiatives they're going to undertake and when over the next ten years and how much they're going to cost. That's not

appropriate for this motion. 1 2 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 3 MS. CONNOR COHEN: Your Honor, may I also be heard 4 in support of the motion? THE COURT: Yes, ma'am. 5 MS. CONNOR COHEN: Carol Connor Cohen, your Honor, 6 7 on behalf of Ambac Assurance Corporation. Your Honor --8 THE COURT: But not to repeat anything. 9 MS. CONNOR COHEN: I'm sorry. 10 THE COURT: But not to repeat anything. 11 MS. CONNOR COHEN: I will not repeat anything. 12 want to start with, though, talking about what the test is 13 under 364 because quite clearly the city has moved to have your Honor make a ruling under 364(c) in this bond financing. 14 The Court will have to look at whether the debtors exercise 15 16 reasonable business judgment, whether --17 THE COURT: On what? MS. CONNOR COHEN: On -- I'm going to -- would you 18 19 just let me finish, and I'll get back to that? I want to 20 come back to that. 21 THE COURT: You're asking me not to ask you any 22 questions? 23 MS. CONNOR COHEN: No. 24 THE COURT: I didn't think so. 25 MS. CONNOR COHEN: No, but actually there's a point

I want to make --

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2 THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CONNOR COHEN: -- here that --

THE COURT: I'll let you work into it. That's fine.

MS. CONNOR COHEN: -- the Court has to exercise reasonable business judgment, has to evaluate whether it's in the best interest of creditors and the estate, has to look at alternative financing that might have been available, whether there are any better bids and all that kind of stuff -- we've talked about that -- whether it's necessary, essential, and appropriate to preserve the estate and continue operations, whether the terms are fair, reasonable, and adequate, whether it was negotiated in good faith and at arm's length. Now, some of those criteria are the same as in a Chapter 11, and some of those criteria the debtor has said they're happy to give us discovery on. But there's two or three of these that really have never been applied before on a Chapter 9, and that's exactly my point, the reasonable business judgment and the best interest of creditors and the estate and whether it's necessary, essential, and appropriate to preserve the estate and continue operations. Those have never been applied before in a Chapter 9, and part of what the Court will have to do in deciding the motion before the Court will be to decide what the proper criteria is, in fact. believe that's what we're here for today because there is

going to be extensive briefing, I'm sure, on those questions, and, you know, we will --

THE COURT: Well, but some judgment about that is necessary to control or decide the dispute about discovery.

MS. CONNOR COHEN: Of course it is, and what we will point to in discussing that issue, for example, is the legislative history that was -- when 364 was first incorporated into what was then the version of Chapter 9, and at that time Congress said the reason they were doing it, the reason they were adding this ability in for a municipality was so that the municipality could maintain essential city services directed to public safety and public health during the reorganization proceeding, kind of a narrow purpose because it was very controversial to add this provision into Chapter 9.

Now, the question is going to become -- and we don't -- this isn't a question for today again, but the question is going to become at what level is the city permitted to spend at the creditors' expense and still be able to confirm a plan because it is pretty well settled -- there's tons of cases out there that when it comes time to confirming a plan of adjustment, that the best interest of creditors test does limit the city's ability to spend lots of money on improving and glossing the current situation as opposed to paying off creditors, that there's a limit to how

much money the city can expend at the expense of creditors.

We believe that same criteria should apply on the best

interest of creditors position here.

THE COURT: Fixing the lights in the city is glossing the city?

MS. CONNOR COHEN: No. And we're not talking about the Lighting Authority motion right now anyway, but you're right.

THE COURT: All right. Fair enough. I'll change the question.

MS. CONNOR COHEN: To ask --

THE COURT: Getting adequate police and fire is glossing the city?

MS. CONNOR COHEN: Having adequate police and fire is not putting a gloss, absolutely not. And the legislative history suggests that's exactly why this provision was added to Chapter 9, but how and whether you're doing it in the most efficient manner or at the expense of repayment of creditors is something that's in this Court's purview under this test.

Now, we keep hearing 904, 904, 904. 904 is not an absolute. 904 says quite clearly that the debtor can consent to the Court's involvement, interference, as the statute says. Here the debtor has come to the Court. They could have gone off and spent their money however they wanted. They could have borrowed money if -- and spent it how they

wanted, but they came to your Honor and asked for an order, and the reason they're coming to your Honor and asking for an order is because --

THE COURT: They came to the Court for an order but only to approve the necessity of the borrowing, the necessity of the priority and the senior liens, and to establish the reasonableness of the terms.

MS. CONNOR COHEN: But --

THE COURT: What suggests there's any consent beyond that?

MS. CONNOR COHEN: Well, once you do that, when they come to your Honor and asked to be able to give Barclays this superpriority treatment and the like, then that has to be considered consent to having the criteria under 364(c) apply, which includes looking at the best interest of creditors and whether they are not --

THE COURT: Okay. Can you walk me through the baby steps as to why that follows because I don't exactly see it?

MS. CONNOR COHEN: Well, simply coming to the Court in the first instance has in other situations effectively been treated as consent. All right. But they didn't have to come to your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm not sure the proponents of \underline{Stern} versus $\underline{Marshall}$ would a hundred percent agree with you on that.

MS. CONNOR COHEN: Well, I don't -- okay. I'm going to let that one pass, but --

THE COURT: Well, no. It's an important point, which is the mere fact that a party comes to court can mean consent to some things, but you have to be very careful in measuring what the consent is.

MS. CONNOR COHEN: All right. I'll take that as a given, but what the -- again, what the --

THE COURT: Why I'm asking --

MS. CONNOR COHEN: What the debtors --

THE COURT: Why does this motion constitute consent for this Court to approve, for example, how the city will spend \$350 million?

MS. CONNOR COHEN: Because they're asking your Honor to give them -- to give Barclays, this new lender who's going to come in and layer on \$350 million worth of new debt --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

 $\,$ MS. CONNOR COHEN: $\,$ -- over and above most of the other creditors in this case --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MS. CONNOR COHEN: -- they're asking them to have that superpriority status, to become a superpriority creditor of the city, and part of the criteria for deciding whether that's appropriate is to look at the best interest of creditors, a test we believe has to be interpreted the same

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way as the best interest of creditors test in confirming a
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    plan of adjustment, which, again, looks at a balance of the
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    extent to which the city can spend at the expense of the
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    creditors, so that does require -- now, the litany of
    horribles we got about the kind of trial, we don't think
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    that's what you were looking at.
              THE COURT: Is there a 943 case that says that?
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              MS. CONNOR COHEN: I'm not aware of a 943 case, no,
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    but when -- what we're talking --
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              THE COURT: You know what I'm asking. I'm asking in
     defining best interest of creditors in plan confirmation, is
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     there a case that gives the -- that says the Court has that
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    broad authority?
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                                 There actually was case law cited
              MS. CONNOR COHEN:
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     in Syncora's objection to the Public Lighting Authority
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    motion that we joined in that says it's --
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              THE COURT: I should look there?
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              MS. CONNOR COHEN:
                                 Those cases say exactly that.
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              THE COURT: All right. I'll look there. Thank you.
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     That's all right. If it's there, you don't need to pull it
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     out again.
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              MS. CONNOR COHEN:
                                 Sorry.
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              THE COURT:
                          That's all right.
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              MS. CONNOR COHEN: I don't retain case names.
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              THE COURT: Right.
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MS. CONNOR COHEN: And I lost what I was saying.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry.

MS. CONNOR COHEN: No. It's not your fault.

THE COURT: Okay. I won't take any then.

MS. CONNOR COHEN: Because that is a factor that has to be taken into account at plan time in that text -- in that context, then we think that's something that has to be taken into account also in applying 364 because it also incorporates a best interest of creditors component in the factors, at least according to the case law, and that -- by invoking the Court's jurisdiction to ask for that order, we believe they have consented to having the Court look at the things that have to be looked at.

Oh, I know what I was saying. I was saying that the hearing that we're looking for doesn't envision, you know, a lengthy exposition of all of the operational details of all of these various departments and so forth and so on but rather a testimony about what they're going to spend it on, why they need it, why they need those things, and why it has to cost what they think they're asking for, and once your Honor hears the testimony, then you decide does it meet this criteria or not. It's not saying this expenditure is okay and this expenditure isn't.

THE COURT: Where in this process do the citizens of Detroit get to be heard?

MS. CONNOR COHEN: Well, they will be heard through their various representatives, many of whom are here, the unions, the retiree representatives.

THE COURT: There's 680-some thousand citizens. A small percentage of them are represented by unions.

MS. CONNOR COHEN: Your Honor, I'm afraid I don't see that --

THE COURT: I guess my question is, you know, not to be flip about it, don't the citizens have a right to be heard on the question of how the city will spend the proceeds of this loan if it's approved, and if the answer to that question is yes, isn't the mechanism for providing for that right to be heard the political process, not the judicial process?

MS. CONNOR COHEN: Well, it is, and -- it is.

THE COURT: Isn't that the end of the discussion?

MS. CONNOR COHEN: And that's part of the 436 process. I mean the political process is represented in this situation in part by the 436 requirements, the City Council and the Emergency Loan Board, for example, and for the city officials who will be elected -- who have been elected and who will be taking over when Mr. Orr's term is completed, but with --

THE COURT: Right, so why -- but doesn't that mean it's a political process, not a judicial process?

MS. CONNOR COHEN: Well, it's a judicial process to 1 2 the extent that your Honor has to apply the standards that 3 are in the statute and in the case law interpreting the 4 statute for providing Barclays with the superpriority status. THE COURT: Suppose the creditors' interests are 5 different from the citizens' interests? What do I do then? 6 7 MS. CONNOR COHEN: Your Honor applies the statute, 8 the statutory --9 THE COURT: Creditors win over the --10 MS. CONNOR COHEN: -- standard, which says that you 11 have to balance -- obviously the -- we don't -- none of us 12 would disagree that the city is entitled to and should spend 13 those amounts necessary to provide essential service to provide public safety and health but doing so in a way and at 14 a cost that is reasonable and that doesn't do so at the 15 16 expense of the creditors. Thank you, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, can I reply to Mr. Hamilton? 19 20 THE COURT: You can, but let me see if there are any 2.1 other objecting parties --22 MR. HACKNEY: Absolutely. 23 THE COURT: -- who want to be heard, and then I'll 24 give you a chance. Did you want to be heard, Mr. Gordon?

MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor. Robert Gordon

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of Clark Hill on behalf of the Detroit Retirement Systems. 1 2 Thank you, your Honor. In some respects, your Honor, I feel like I'm still trying to catch up from last week's trial to 3 4 this issue, and I think it highlights what I'm seeing from over there as a chicken and egg and chicken again issue right 5 6 now, which is it sounds like we're arguing objections that -legal issues that may be implicated by the motion that was filed for the DIP financing, which is supposed to be heard 8 9 later, which hasn't been fully briefed yet, which may 10 determine what the total contours are of what's fair to ask 11 for in discovery. We're arguing today to figure out what we 12 can ask for in discovery, and I'm concerned about that 13 because we haven't had a chance to fully brief this. 14 There's significant legal issues that are being discussed 15 here, but I don't think all of us have a chance to brief that 16 just yet, so I'm concerned about that. So I'm not sure 17 whether --18 THE COURT: Well, I don't know what to do about 19 that. 20 MR. GORDON: Yes. 21 THE COURT: It is a concern, but the fact is that 22 Syncora filed this motion, and the choice was deal with it 23 now or deal with it later, and the reason why I chose now is 24 because the city says it's got to get going on this loan.

MR. GORDON: Well, there seem to be a couple of

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options here. One, I'm just trying to think this out -think this through with you before we're --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

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MR. GORDON: -- prejudiced in some way because I would like to be able to brief this if we're really going to go down this path today. The discovery could be held in abeyance while we file objections to the DIP financing and claim that there's all sorts of reasonable business judgment issues that the Court should be probing, and the Court could then rule upon whether those are fair game or not subject to discovery, but then we'll be into mid-December, and then we'll be starting discovery. The city says that's not fast enough for us. Everything has to be immediately because our hair is on fire and everything else, and, you know, everything has to be done like yesterday for reasons I'm not exactly sure since they're accumulating cash in the meantime and they're still paying payroll and so forth. That's one option. Doesn't seem real efficient, but that's one option. The other option --

THE COURT: Well, hold on.

MR. GORDON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I'm sure the city is as concerned as you are about the fact that the retirement contributions aren't being made.

MR. GORDON: I hope they're concerned about it. I'm

not sure, but I hope so. I'm sorry, your Honor. I'm not sure if I'm following --

THE COURT: You missed my point.

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MR. GORDON: I missed your point. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Well, your point was there's no urgency here.

MR. GORDON: Oh, I didn't say no urgency. I'm just trying to think of what's prudent.

THE COURT: Well, your point was that there was no urgency here, that we can wait till January.

MR. GORDON: Not necessarily, your Honor. The other option is that we allow this discovery because it's not as -certainly not as broad as what we just engaged in in the last 45 days in connection with eligibility, that we allow this discovery, and if some of it turns out to, in your mind, not be relevant, then I mean we've certainly incurred an expense. There's no doubt about that. But if the urgency is more important, then so be it, but I don't think we should be precluded from at least taking the discovery and being fully prepared to point out things. I think we all actually were surprised at some of the things that came out in discovery relative to the trial last week that -- anyway, I won't go into that, but I do -- no problem. Sorry. So that's another option is I mean, you know, if urgency is that important, then the discovery seems to be fairly narrowly tailored.

can discuss -- I haven't had a chance to really think about it. We can discuss whether the swap participants are necessary.

THE COURT: It's hard for me to see how discovery on the subject of how the city should spend \$350 million is anything but gigantic, enormous.

MR. GORDON: Yes. I totally agree, and I think that the suggestion that 364(c) --

THE COURT: I mean because that opens up the possibility that any objecting party -- and by that I mean objecting to the motion -- can call its own expert or experts to testify about how he or she from an urban planning perspective thinks this money ought to be spent.

MR. GORDON: Well --

THE COURT: Wow.

MR. GORDON: -- as your Honor knows, it's a reasonable business judgment standard. It's not reinventing the wheel. To suggest, as city council -- as city's counsel has, that 364(c) in the context of Chapter 9 doesn't even implicate reasonable business judgment -- at least that's what I was hearing --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. GORDON: That seems pretty big to me. That seems a bit odd. That kind of reads 364(c) out of Chapter 9, which is not the case.

THE COURT: Well, no.

MR. GORDON: I don't know how you -- I don't know -THE COURT: I think the argument is you reconcile
364(c) with 904.

MR. GORDON: And how do you do that? I mean I didn't hear anything here that could parse that and -- well enough to say that we shouldn't be talking about what is reasonable business judgment in terms of what you're going to use this for if you're going to incumber unincumbered assets that could otherwise be used in various ways and which are not being proposed -- these initiatives are not being proposed in the context of an overall Chapter 9 plan.

They're saying they need to commence these things, but they're not doing it in the context of a Chapter 9 plan.

They're doing it outside of a plan. I think there are serious implications there.

THE COURT: So you think, just to summarize, that the city should go with an understaffed police department, an understaffed fire department, 40 percent of lights lit, I'm not sure how many tens of thousands of abandoned properties, until a plan is confirmed?

MR. GORDON: No, your Honor, but I'm not -- I am not sure that the \$150 million portion of the DIP loan has been clearly identified as to what it will go for, so I think that there are fair questions to be asked about that, but if it is

going to provide essential services, that would be a different story. And as to the \$200 million portion of it, of course, all subject to the arguments we've made -- that all the parties have made regarding whether the swap participants are even entitled to it, there needs to be some analysis of whether if that part goes away, if the Court determines that the swap participants are not secured creditors, is the 150 million still there? How is that affected? I don't know that we've fully analyzed that yet.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Before I get back to you, I want to ask a question of the city because I want to give you the last word. Sir, at the lectern, please.

MR. HAMILTON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I didn't quite hear your response on the request for discovery regarding compliance with PA 436.

MR. HAMILTON: We have no -- we have no problem with that. They wanted to take a deposition of a City Council member. We took no position on that. We don't represent the City Council. We would appear at the deposition if it happens.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Sir.

MR. HACKNEY: Thank you, your Honor. I will be brief, but the stakes are very high, and I think that the

legal position that the city is taking is breathtaking here because you heard Mr. Hamilton say that when they come to you on a 364 motion and they ask you to work the controls of the Bankruptcy Code to their advantage, should you deign to ask -- to probe behind what they're using the money for, why they believe they need it and assess whether this borrowing is in the best interest of creditors, apply some of those different elements you heard both counsel and I talk about, that if you're to do that, now you're sitting as a super tribunal almost how dare you interfere with our administration. You are now acting as a super tribunal when there's no question that if they did these very plan-like steps, paying \$220 million to a creditor, investing in the city, revitalizing the city and pushing down on the creditor stack to do so, if they did that in the context of a plan, there is no question that the Court would be within its rights to make all of those assessments, whether it's fair and equitable, whether it's in the best interest of creditors, those precise elements that are designed to protect creditors and make sure that the plan is fair, that it does fairly adjust the debts. The thesis here is, well, why don't we just pull it forward because if we can pull it forward out of the plan context, we can engage in a number of these key set pieces with the Court where their position is that they will come in and say, "In my judgment, it's

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necessary, and you must defer to my judgment." You're given no opportunity to assess, and you could give away the city, so to speak, in the process of improving itself because you could -- Detroit's challenges are well-known, and I'm sympathetic to and sensitive to your questions. I don't mean to be callous. I understand that there are issues with the lights, with 911 response times, and I understand that there are real people out there today that are living with these challenges, and I'm not being callous, but I do want to say this. They've been living with these challenges for a very long time, and while it is important that --

THE COURT: This argument does not impress me, counsel. Don't go there.

MR. HACKNEY: But while it's important, it is something that must be fairly balanced with the other aspects of the city's --

THE COURT: That's a fair point, but the fact that they've been living with it for a long time --

MR. HACKNEY: Agree. Well, and --

THE COURT: -- is no justification for imposing it upon them for another day.

MR. HACKNEY: I'm not trying to say that we should make them wait for no reason at all. I am saying that there is a good reason to approach this with both the benefit of a fulsome record and with caution because, your Honor, even as

we talk about the business judgment rule in this context, I
think that your rulings on what the business judgment rule
means in Chapter 9 are going to be questions of first
impression in some respects, and I think they are going to be
momentous rulings. I know what it means in Chapter 11. I
deal with that a lot, and I know the Court does as well. But
when you talk about the way the business judgment rule works
in Chapter 11, it's not clear how it translates into Chapter
9. For example -- and don't -- this is not intended to be
flip or callous, but I'm trying to map these two things very
precisely. Are the citizens of the city, are they like the
equity in a Chapter 11? That would be -- that would be -
THE COURT: Those analogies are so imperfect that
it's not even worth trying.

MR. HACKNEY: There are challenges there, and so I actually think that when you say what the business judgment rule means under 364 in the context of Chapter 9, I think that ruling is going to grapple with these concepts of balance, necessity, rights of the citizens vis-a-vis rights of the creditors, and I -- and those are the types of issues that you would grapple with, I believe, in a plan. I don't believe that the city can say that you are not entitled to grapple with them in the context of 364.

I'd like to finish with one point. I want to thank you for your patience. There's one thing that doesn't make

any sense to me about the city's position here today, which is they are willing to allow us to take the deposition of Mr. Moore, so he's the Conway MacKenzie consultant whose deposition is a very colorful recitation of the challenges and how they need the money to address the challenges, so it's both about needs and uses. It doesn't square with me that they're saying, yeah, you can depose Mr. Moore because, of course, we're going to call him, and we are going to paint a picture of the City of Detroit that justifies this loan for Judge Rhodes, but we won't give you discovery that relates to the work and the assessments and the types of things that he engaged in and reviewed and considered in order to generate the declaration that we attached. I don't see how those two things fit with one another. If the needs and the uses are irrelevant, why does it dominate their motion? Moore's declaration devoted entirely to it? Why is he proposed as a witness? If those things make sense for the city because they admit that they are relevant to their motion, then the discovery on the uses and needs I believe also would be relevant. I agree that while we can try to minimize the burden, it will be substantial discovery because of what you said. I'm not going to disagree with that, but this is a big loan, and this is a big issue for the creditors. We're talking about \$120 million on top of the swap counterparty termination amount.

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THE COURT: It's a big number, but it pales in comparison to the numbers I heard the city needs for its revitalization program over -- I think it was ten years.

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MR. HACKNEY: I think that in some respects, your Honor, the whole case is about that word "need," and I think it's a hard question because I think that this is something that's --

THE COURT: Isn't "hard" just another word for political?

MR. HACKNEY: No. I think in this case it's emphatically going -- it is certainly also a political question that people wrestle with, that certainly the city wrestled with before bankruptcy under the constraints that it had to operate under. I think it is -- no matter how much we struggle with the difficulty, it is a legal question, though, for you because -- because necessity is something that municipalities struggle with everywhere outside of bankruptcy, when they come to bankruptcy and they now want to confirm a plan and get out, they have to prove to you that the steps that they propose to take, the recoveries that they propose to offer are fair and equitable and are in the best interest of creditors. In the case of the City of Detroit that has these well-documented challenges -- and I won't shirk from saying that they are significant challenges -- at some point doesn't Kevyn Orr just come in and say, "Why would I ever give creditors a dollar? I mean the needs here are substantial, and I intend to invest not a billion" --

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THE COURT: A lot of people think that's what he already said.

MR. HACKNEY: I guess I would say he's come relatively close to it, but I'll finish with one point, which is you can see there's a logical way to back into the fact that the Court must be as vigilant, we believe, in the interregnum period between eligibility and closing as it is in confirmation. And the logical point is that if you put the plan together that said we are going to revitalize the city, improve services, speed up police officer response time, protect our firemen, remediate blight, build parks, all sorts of different types of things, and give the creditors nothing or very little, pretend that the plan said that -some people feel that the plan does say that today, but pretend in this hypothetical the plan said that and it didn't marshal any creditor support, it wouldn't be a confirmable plan that would allow the city to exit, so you know that in the backdrop of all of this, the need to have at least some creditor support -- and the history of Chapter 9 indicates --

THE COURT: Well, it's way premature to come to the conclusion about what plan is confirmable and what isn't.

MR. HACKNEY: This motion --

THE COURT: There are provisions for cramdown --

1 MR. HACKNEY: There are.

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We've been --

THE COURT: -- in Chapter 9.

MR. HACKNEY: There are, but those provisions still --

THE COURT: A plan can be confirmed with no creditor support.

MR. HACKNEY: Well, at least an impaired assenting class I would expect even in cramdown, but understood. You could have a small minority, but it would still have to satisfy all those factors of what's fair and equitable, what's in the best interest of creditors.

THE COURT: True.

MR. HACKNEY: Those never go away, and I think that's the difference between when you come to a bankruptcy judge in a Bankruptcy Court and start asking for these unique aspects of the Code is that that is the perspective, and this is one of the things we intend to brief for you in our objection because I do want to -- it is absolutely complicated and I believe reasonably a first impression.

THE COURT: All right. I'm inventing a process here that I think will at least go some good measure of the way toward accommodating everyone's interest here because I think there -- I think there is merit in the concerns that you have raised and that Mr. Gordon have raised about process here, so

here's the best I can come up with to try to accommodate everyone's interest here. The first is between now and when we start the hearing to limit discovery in the ways that the city has proposed or, in the case of PA 436, not opposed, and then this will give you then an opportunity to brief more fully than we have in connection with today's hearing the issue of what is the appropriate scope of the Court's review of this motion under Section 364(c). And then in the context of that hearing, which the Court will take so much evidence as the city thinks is relevant to the motion, according to its view of the scope of the Court's review, the Court will then decide whether, based on its determination of the scope, that the record is complete or to provide for further discovery on a more expanded scope of review, so I know it's a little bit more cumbersome and complex, but I think there is merit in trying to make a determination of the scope of review in a more fulsome way than this discovery motion has allowed us to do, so that will be my order at this point in I will try to prepare an order that perhaps more articulately sets forth what I'm trying to do here than I have been able to on the record here.

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MS. CONNOR COHEN: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. NEAL: Your Honor, just -- good afternoon again. Guy Neal. Just a question on the objection deadline. I know there's been talk potentially of having that date moved. I

believe it's --1 2 THE COURT: What is the deadline now? 3 MR. NEAL: I believe it's on the 22nd, but I thought 4 that it might be moved to the 27th. I'm just not sure where 5 it stands today. MR. ERENS: Your Honor, the notice that the debtor 6 7 sent out had set the 21st as the objection deadline. 8 already talked to Syncora because of the need to accommodate 9 discovery that we would move that objection deadline to the 10 The debtor then would reply on the 4th consistent with 11 the order your Honor issued in connection with the 10th, the 12 hearing on the 10th, and then we'd have the hearing on the 13 10th. THE COURT: All right. So if that's your 14 15 stipulation, you may submit that, but you'll engage in 16 discovery in the meantime. Is that the idea? 17 MR. HACKNEY: It is. 18 THE COURT: All right. 19 MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, can I ask one clarifying 20 fact? 2.1 THE COURT: Sure. 22 MR. HACKNEY: I promise not to hector you to death 23 with questions, but the one --24 THE COURT: Thank you. 25 MR. HACKNEY: The one thing that I do want to

understand because I don't want to violate this order, which is Mr. Moore's deposition, because -- can I --

THE COURT: The city has offered it up. You take -- you ask him whatever questions you want to ask him.

MR. HACKNEY: Okay. That's the best way because then we don't have to do them twice or whatever. I just wanted to clarify that. Thank you.

MR. ERENS: Also, I should make clear, your Honor, we would try, if it was okay with your Honor, to have the objection deadline moved to the 27th only for parties who felt they needed to participate in discovery. If parties did not think they needed to participate in discovery, we'd like to get those objections so that we can start reviewing them. The city will not have a long period of reply.

THE COURT: Can you readily identify those parties or are we going to have a dispute about which parties and which category?

MR. ERENS: We will certainly try, so we'll do our best.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'll trust you to try to work it out. If there are issues, you can get me on the telephone.

MR. ERENS: Okay. Thank you.

(Hearing concluded at 3:40 p.m.)

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None

EXHIBITS:

None

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Lois Garrett

November 19, 2013

Lois Garrett

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

IN RE: CITY OF DETROIT,

Docket No. 13-53846

MICHIGAN,

Detroit, Michigan

November 27, 2013

Debtor. 11:19 a.m.

HEARING RE. CITY OF DETROIT'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER ESTABLISHING PRE-TRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES AND SETTING ADDITIONAL HEARINGS (DOCKET #1788) BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEVEN W. RHODES UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

MR. SHUMAKER: Good morning, your Honor. Greg Shumaker of Jones Day for the City of Detroit.

THE COURT: Before you proceed, did anyone ever show up on the Mobley matter?

MR. FUSCO: Your Honor, we reached Mr. Rose finally. He apologized. He said he just inadvertently did not see the notice for today and asked -- and we have no objection to moving this to the next hearing date.

THE COURT: Okay. You may submit a stipulation and order that accomplishes that.

MR. FUSCO: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, to resume, the city filed this motion in an effort to gain your guidance in the lead-up to the upcoming hearings on what we referred to as the assumption motion and the DIP or the post-petition financing motion. As your Honor knows, you set aside December 10th, 11th, and 12th for the hearings on those motions, and what we do in our motion is to lay out a proposed schedule to try to -- to order things in the lead-up. You know, I don't think there's anything surprising in what the city has proposed there. It's, if you will, in some ways a redo of what we did with the eligibility motion in terms of setting a date for will call and may call witnesses, exhibit lists. We would suggest simultaneously exchanging those on Friday.

That's not the most convenient day on -- in the calendar, but we are --

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THE COURT: It's more convenient than tomorrow.

MR. SHUMAKER: That it is, your Honor. It is certainly that. We thought so, so we suggested Friday. all of it is sort of back-engineered from the hearing dates, and, you know, we've got our will call and our may call witness list again, the exhibit list. We talked, your Honor, with regard to the assumption motion hearing that your Honor thought it would be helpful to have a joint statement of facts, so we've been working -- actually, back in September the city was working with the objectors on that effort, and that would resume, and we presume it would also be helpful to the Court to have one with regard to the DIP motion as well and also have a joint exhibit list which would specify obviously the exhibits that might be introduced at the hearing and give the parties an opportunity to object and for the Court to have something to look at and resolve matters as we proceed to the hearings.

We also indicated that we -- in our motion we set forth the witnesses that we believe will testify, and what we did there gets into one of the issues that we were really seeking the Court's guidance on, which is whether the Court would like the -- it to be one or two hearings. We believe that for the convenience of the parties, the convenience of

well as the fact that the initial assumption motion hearing was adjourned in part because a number of objectors had said, "Hey, we can't really assess the reasonableness without knowing what the financing situation is," so we see them as going hand in hand, and that's why we suggested the hearing would be one consolidated hearing. We could have arguments however the Court would want to set that up, but for purposes of putting the witnesses on the stand, we would offer that the witnesses would take the stand and testify with regard to both, whatever their testimony is on the assumption motion and then also with regard to the DIP motion as opposed to having them step down after being cross-examined and then bringing them back, so that's why we -- and we've -- the five witnesses that we believe we'll be putting forth, your Honor has already heard testimony from all of them, Mr. Orr, Mr. Malhotra, Mr. Buckfire, Mr. Moore, and Mr. Doak. Now, the declarants in support of the DIP motion were Mr. Doak and Mr. Moore. Your Honor heard a couple weeks ago their testimony in connection with the motion for discovery. We also believe -- we don't believe that there will be significant amounts of testimony from Mr. Orr, Mr. Buckfire, or Mr. Malhotra on the DIP motion, but they did

the witnesses, and certainly the convenience of the Court as

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play roles, and they may well get into that on the stand.

And we wanted to afford the objectors the -- we wanted to

advise them of that and then afford them the ability to have what we would hope would be short depositions because they've already been deposed in connection at least with the assumption motion, so all of those were set up.

We also would like -- and I think it's only fair that if the objectors are going to put forth rebuttal witnesses, as they did with regard to the eligibility motion, the city would like the opportunity to be able to depose them, hence including a request that on Friday, which is pretty close, but the -- because objections to the DIP motion are due today, that they declare who their rebuttal witnesses are because we need to depose them in advance of the hearing ten days hence starting at the beginning of next week. So that's kind of what we were doing.

Now, we also -- so in terms of the scheduling, we also -- one other matter that we were seeking your Honor's advice on was the length of the hearing because, as your Honor recalls, with regard to the assumption motion hearing, it was going to be four hours for the city to put on its case, five hours for the objectors. We suggested seven and eight, and, your Honor, we believe that's a doable and -- hopefully for both sides.

We've also suggested -- I think your Honor used this in the November 18th hearing, and I think it would be helpful if there was some way of having a lead cross-examiner of the

witnesses if there's -- we recognize there are different interests at play, but perhaps if they were to categorize them by groups, but when your Honor did that with the cross-examinations of Mr. Doak and Mr. Moore, it certainly went more smoothly. And because this is a summary proceeding, in general, we suggest that that might be advisable as well.

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Now, with regard to the schedule that we proposed, the objectors have kind of said, you know, we don't really object to what you're -- well, there are some things that they object to, but in general setting some dates and deadlines makes some sense, but it seems rather hurried to us because there's so much that's going to have to be done in the next couple of weeks, and there's an intervening holiday. And they've sort of suggested some proposals. I wanted to share with your Honor the concern that the city has about doing that, and not to be presumptuous, but it's actually somewhat of a concern for your Honor because the city is going to be asking -- as you know, we've been trying to proceed as expeditiously as possible with regard to these motions because we believe the forbearance agreement -- we want to -- we want to implement it, of course, and we obviously want to fund it as well through the DIP motion. need orders from your Honor to do that. As things currently stand, you heard some testimony about the Barclays commitment letter on the 14th and how it operates, and right now the

Barclays commitment expires -- to fund the DIP loan expires on January 7th, 2014. And given how the forbearance agreement operates and the obviously -- the obvious need to fund the forbearance agreement, we believe that it's necessary to have eight business days in advance. The forbearance agreement would require the city to give notice to the swap counterparties that it has the ability to pay, it has received an order, and it has the financing to do what it's doing, and that's a seven-day notice period -- seven-day business notice -- I'm sorry -- seven-business-day notice period. If you back out from January 7th, a day upon which Barclays, by the terms of the city's agreement with them, could walk away from its commitment, if you back up those seven business days plus one for logistics -- that's the addon -- you come to December 26th as the date that the city would be asking your Honor to provide an order, which may not be perhaps the most convenient -- another perhaps inconvenient date on the calendar especially if, as the objectors have proposed, how about we move the hearing back from the 10th, 11th, and 12th to the 17th, 18th, and 19th. By my count, that's a week at a tough time of year, and so obviously the city wants to be reasonable and accommodate, you know, all of the parties' interests as best it can, but it would put a -- we worry, a burden on the Court that's worrisome. We would prefer not to do that, and that's why we

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think that, you know, sticking to the December 10th, 11th, 12th is the better way to go because it gives your Honor more time to do what you need to do as opposed to issuing an order from the bench at the end of the hearing or doing something in those seven days. So that's, you know, our suggestion. I could run through those dates, your Honor, and go through, you know, the pros and cons, but I think your Honor gets all that. I actually have a calendar that prints it all out If your Honor would like it, I'm happy to give you that. But this -- I want to emphasize for the Court -- and I know it was discussed at the hearing on the 14th -- but that January 7th date is an important date because by then the complete commitment fee that the city has agreed to pay in order to get Barclays' commitment to fund -- to provide the \$350 million will have been paid. That's over \$4 million. And if we don't hit that date, Barclays is able to walk away, and that has obviously significant consequences, I mean, because if they walk away, we don't have our DIP loan, and we can't set forth -- take the steps that we think are so vital to not only taking out the swaps, if you will, by way of the forbearance agreement but also to get access to those quality of life proceeds and implement the kinds of steps, blight, addressing blight and whatnot, so that's the conundrum that we currently find ourselves on, and I wanted to raise that with your Honor.

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The other aspect of our motion, which I'll touch on, which is -- and I think I touched on most of the objectors' -- the joint objectors' -- or the objectors' joint response. Syncora also raises -- it has its own independent objection, and, your Honor, you know, that objection -- we think it's time to deal with the Syncora -- the consent right As your Honor knows, Syncora's basis for objecting to the assumption motion is bound up in its consent rights as a swaps insurer, and that issue has come up in other contexts. It has come up in connection with the lawsuit that the city was forced to file back on July 5th to gain a temporary restraining order in order to continue to receive the casino revenues. That obviously predates the forbearance agreement, which was a couple weeks later, but Syncora's defense to its actions, which -- of the city's complaint is bound up in these consent rates as well as the fact that after the bankruptcy was commenced, as your Honor knows, Syncora went to New York state court and filed an action against the swap counterparties, and that action was removed and transferred to the Eastern District of Michigan, and then -- I guess it was as of the beginning of last week Judge Goldsmith referred it to your Honor, so now all the bouncing Syncora consent right balls are in sort of one bin now in front of your Honor, which we think is the appropriate spot for those balls to be. And we believe that given the fact -- I'll be shocked

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if in Syncora's objection -- well, first of all, I'll be shocked if Syncora doesn't object today to the DIP motion, but I'll also be shocked if that's not bound up in the consent right issue. And because there is a pending motion to dismiss in the adversary proceeding that is -- the only thing that's necessary is a reply brief, which I think actually may have been filed yesterday, that's fully briefed, and the city has moved to intervene in that case for what we think are obvious reasons. We have put in our motion a suggestion to your Honor that you hear the motion to dismiss -- actually, hear our motion to intervene to allow the city to get into the action and then hear the consent right issue because that's going to be a way of resolving these consent rights, which, your Honor, I think we believe you must do in connection with Syncora's objection in any event. And so that's kind of bound up in this motion. don't know what your Honor would like to do about the timing obviously, and -- but that's why we raise it because it is -at least the Syncora consent right issue is what we view very much a threshold issue and could impact the progress of the Court's substantial -- of the -- I'm sorry -- the hearing substantially when it comes before your Honor. And I just would -- one additional -- just to

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And I just would -- one additional -- just to emphasize something that's obvious to your Honor, and I hate to say this, but we were -- the city very much believes that

your Honor should be deciding the consent right issue. I mean you are forced to get familiar with some fairly complicated documentation in connection with Syncora's objection. It obviously has a clear impact on the city's revenues and the city's access to an incredibly important revenue stream, and, again, all the balls now are in front of you, and that's why we would submit that your Honor should deal with it when you can.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. SHUMAKER: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. GORDON: Good morning, your Honor. Good morning, your Honor. Robert Gordon of Clark Hill on behalf of the Detroit Retirement Systems. Your Honor, I'm actually here today presenting the joint response of a large group of objecting parties, so I have the solemn task of speaking on behalf of, in some respects, my last count was at least 14 parties who all signed onto this joint response that we filed yesterday.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. GORDON: I think that the genesis of the joint response was, in part, due to the parties speaking amongst themselves and realizing that they had common concerns and recognizing also that if we could put it all into one document rather than 14 documents, it might help the Court. I hope it was helpful.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GORDON: And then I suspect it was also helpful to out-state counsel to task me with presenting today so they might avoid traveling on the day before the holiday. In any event, I guess, your Honor, I'm a little -- I don't know if the word is "dismayed," and maybe the Court is as well, that we're having a contested hearing on pretrial procedures and scheduling matters. Hopefully those could usually be worked out to some extent, but if I may, I'd like to describe how we've gotten here today. Your Honor, we were before this Court on November 14th discussing discovery in connection with the financing motion.

THE COURT: Well, I'll give you a brief opportunity to do this, but mostly what I'm interested in is what do I have to decide, what do you disagree on, what do you want to do.

MR. GORDON: Yes. I understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: But go ahead.

MR. GORDON: I'll be brief. We were here on the 14th, and at that time there was a discussion of the timing of taking the depositions of Mr. Doak and Mr. Moore and only Mr. Doak and Mr. Moore. The city did not indicate that it intended to call any other witnesses for the financing motion and, in fact, opposed Syncora's request to depose Mr. Orr. If the city was planning to call other witnesses, one would

have hoped that they would have mentioned it at that time. They did not. They also did not mention that they desired to take the depositions of the objecting parties' witnesses at that time. Apparently subsequently the city decided otherwise, had a change of heart, and in the intervening eight days they could have reached out to the objecting parties, but they did not. Instead, last Friday at about three o'clock in the afternoon they simply filed a motion and asked for an expedited hearing. The motion, your Honor, in short, asks for procedures and deadlines that are illogical and unworkable, and I'll get into that in one moment. Honor, the local rules, 9014-1, requires that a party filing such a motion must seek the concurrence of parties or otherwise assert that it was infeasible to do so, and the section of the motion filed by the city states -- and I will just quote directly from it at page 10 -- "The city sought concurrence in this motion from Syncora, but such concurrence was not obtained. Given the large number of objectors and potential objectors, paren, some of whom are not yet known to the city, end paren, comma, it is not feasible for the city to seek concurrence in this motion from all parties. Accordingly, the city respectfully requests that such requirement be waived as to those additional parties, period," end quote. In other words, the city didn't reach out to any of the parties that appeared at the November 14th

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hearing other than Syncora. It knew of all the parties that have objected to the swap motion, which is part of what this pretrial procedure is all about. That's a finite number of parties. It's probably less than ten. They didn't reach out to any of them either.

We filed our joint response as of noon yesterday, your Honor. It's pretty straightforward. In the interim, again, the city has not reached out to us to try to resolve these matters. We actually during the break here reached out to counsel to try to resolve it to no avail.

Your Honor, as we've mentioned in -- described in our response, the deadlines are just not workable. They are -- the city is suggesting that all witnesses, will call and rebuttal witnesses, should be identified by this Friday before we've done depositions, before we've been able to fully review 20,000 documents that were produced just last week. We submit that that's truly impossible and prejudicial to have to identify all witnesses, including rebuttal witnesses, by this Friday. The identification particularly of rebuttal witnesses clearly has to take place after depositions have been taken.

Mr. Shumaker says that this is the same procedure that was used in the eligibility hearings. I don't recall that to be the case. I believe that the designation of witnesses took place after some significant and fulsome

deposition discovery had already been taken, so the procedure here is very different and very prejudicial.

It also -- the city also suggests that the exhibit list and the joint statement of facts and the pretrial order would be submitted on December 6th, the day after the completion of the deposition of Mr. Moore and before depositions have been taken of Mr. Orr, Mr. Malhotra, or Mr. Buckfire, who are all now indicated to be taking the stand for the financing hearing. That's simply not workable, and depositions will not have been completed, so -- and that doesn't even include the taking of the depositions by the city of any of the objecting parties' witnesses. So apparently the city --

THE COURT: Who are you going to call?

MR. GORDON: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Who are you going to call?

MR. GORDON: Actually, myself, your Honor, I don't know that we are going to call anybody, and I haven't had a chance to talk with the other parties to see who they would call. And certainly obviously we'd have to identify them within a reasonable period of time and allow them to take them, but I don't know who that would be, your Honor. It may be a very limited number, and I would think it would be, but I don't know.

So, your Honor, it's simply putting the cart before

the horse. They're asking us to designate things before we've even had a chance to review fully 20,000 documents and take certain depositions at least and see what comes out of those depositions to determine what exhibits we might want, whether all the documents have been produced, whether there's other documents that need to be produced and so forth.

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Having said all that, we understand that everyone wants to move quickly, and we're suggesting a solution for that, and that solution is -- with respect to the financing motion is that the dates be moved modestly one week. let me say the trial dates moved one week. The deposition deadlines that -- the city is asking for the 9th. With the addition of Mr. Orr, Mr. Buckfire, and Mr. Malhotra, and the city's desire to depose anybody on the objecting parties' side, that's just not going to be possible, but we're only asking to move that date, we're suggesting, to December 11th, two days, from December 9th to December 11th for a deposition cutoff. By December 13th we could submit a joint statement of facts, designation of witnesses and exhibit lists, and, your Honor, I would actually suggest -- and I don't know if the Court would indulge us in this regard. I would suggest that perhaps there should actually be a pretrial conference on the 13th, that Friday, because I can't imagine with things moving this fast that we're going to not have some issues. One of those issues, in particular, is something that I think

is being asked for prematurely today by the city, which is to determine how much time is needed by both parties and who should be conducting the trial on behalf of the 14 or more objectors. I think that all has to be figured out with the parties, and they need time to do that. And I think if there was a pretrial conference, that would be an excellent opportunity to discuss those things before the trial, but today seems difficult and premature to do that. Honor, we're only asking to move the trial dates by a week and to allow time for depositions. We asked this -suggested this to Mr. Shumaker, and the response was what you heard, that the swap parties need an eight-day notice period and that if you back that up, that gives the Court not a lot of time to issue a ruling. I would suggest that the swap parties, first of all, have adjourned certain dates in the forbearance agreement to allow the trial to take place already and that the due process rights of the 14 objectors shouldn't be held hostage by the swap parties standing on ceremony needing eight days' notice of something that they don't need eight days' notice of. Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: I'd like your permission actually to take a pause --

MR. GORDON: Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: -- and suggest to you that I agree with you that the trial is too rushed at this point and that we

should go the week of the 16th. Now, Chris says we have 1 2 motions on the 16th. What are those? 3 MR. GORDON: You do. You have a number of motions. THE COURT: A number of motions, so we may have to go like the 17th, 18th, and 19th instead of 16th, 17th, and 5 18th. Okay? 6 MR. GORDON: And that's what we have suggested. 8 THE COURT: So what I want to do is suspend this 9 hearing and ask all of you to try to agree on what the 10 schedule will be between now and December 17th. Are you 11 willing to do that? 12 MR. GORDON: Absolutely, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Not willing to do that? Ms. Calton is not willing to do that. 14 15 MS. CALTON: Could I just make a statement, please? 16 THE COURT: Of course. Step forward. 17 MS. CALTON: Judy Calton for Greektown Casino and 18 Detroit Entertainment, which is Motor City Casino Hotel, and 19 we filed rather limited objections to the financing motion. 20 This is unique in my career. I'm representing collateral, 2.1 and --22 THE COURT: Right. 23 MS. CALTON: -- they're heavily regulated, and if

things aren't done pursuant to the regulations, they could be

sanctioned, fined, lose their license, which would interrupt

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this important income stream, and we believe that the proposed documents as drafted now put us at risk. We're talking with the city and Barclays on changes. I'm extremely optimistic that it will happen, but if for some reason it doesn't happen, the city has agreed we could get up and argue at the hearing without having to go through the discovery and being part of the pretrial. I just wanted to get that on the record. We don't care about the dates and that kind of thing.

THE COURT: All right. One more? Who wants to just comment?

MR. GADHARF: Hello, Judge. Joshua Gadharf on behalf on behalf of Syncora. The Court graciously allowed the Quinn Emanuel firm, who's representing Syncora in the -- on their objection, to appear telephonically --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. GADHARF: -- so Mr. Susheel Kirpalani and Jake Shields are both on the line, and I just wanted to make sure that they did not want to weigh in on the matter as well.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. KIRPALANI: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there anyone on the line who --

MR. KIRPALANI: This is Susheel Kirpalani from Quinn Emanuel, and I have my colleague, Jake Shields, with me. I do want to thank the Court for allowing us to appear

telephonically for this matter.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. KIRPALANI: In the future we would, of course, come and appear in person. The issue for Syncora and for the aspects of the Syncora matter that we handle for the client is different than the ones that your Honor is already dealing with. Let me try to narrow down what the issue actually is.

THE COURT: No. Sir, I'm going to -- I'm going to --

MR. KIRPALANI: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Sir, can you hear me?

MR. KIRPALANI: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to interrupt you because I'm going to ask you to participate with the attorneys here in trying to work this out. If you can't, then I'll deal with it, but I want to give you the lunch hour here to try to -- to try to encourage all of the attorneys to work together to narrow your issues hopefully to none, but whatever is left I will deal with, so let's take --

MR. KIRPALANI: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's take a lunch break now and reconvene at one o'clock.

MR. GORDON: Your Honor, if I may, there's the one issue that we haven't really discussed, and I don't know if you're folding that into our discussions or whether that's

something that is better left to your Honor, is the issue of whether they should be two hearings or one hearing. There is no doubt that there is a relationship between the swap motion, if you will, and the DIP financing motion, if you will. They're related, but the inquiries are different, and they're --

THE COURT: My preference is to try them together.

MR. GORDON: Is it also possible in that regard because you'll see in our papers we mention the fact that there are different attorneys from different -- each firm that are handling those two parts -- is it possible that we might have a hearing with -- on certain issues that are -- and then hearings on the other issues, keep them discrete, at least, so that the record is clear as to which -- we'll talk about it. I understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. And I'm willing to be very flexible on that, you know, recognizing the different interests that are involved, so, you know, I'll just ask you all to be creative on how to solve that problem. You can figure it out.

MR. GORDON: Very well.

THE COURT: All right. I'll see you at one.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess.

25 (Recess at 11:52 a.m. until 1:00 p.m.)

THE CLERK: Court is in session. Please be seated. Recalling Case Number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan.

THE COURT: Is everything okay with our technology, Chris?

THE CLERK: I believe --

MR. SHUMAKER: Good afternoon, your Honor. For the record, Greg Shumaker of Jones Day for the City of Detroit. That was an excellent idea your Honor had. During break I'm pleased to report that all of us gathered in the cozy conference room and developed a calendar between now and a -- hearing dates of December 17th, 18th, and 19th. I'm happy to run through that, your Honor, if you'd like me to.

THE COURT: Yes, please.

MR. SHUMAKER: The new revised calendar starts as follows, and I apologize in advance because some of this is my own scribbling, and I'm doing the best I can here to interpret that, but on Monday, December 2nd, the objectors are going to identify their direct witnesses. These would be the witnesses that they are aware of right now who would testify at the hearing or might testify at the hearing so that we can get their deposition set. There's nothing occurring on the 3rd, although I'm sure there will be a lot of things which are just not on my calendar.

On Wednesday, December 4th, the -- there will be the deposition of Charles Moore here in Detroit, and the city is

going to provide a draft of the joint statement of facts to the objectors on that date. On Thursday, December 5th, there will be a deposition of James Doak. I believe that will be in Detroit, although I'm not certain of that. On Friday there will be a deposition of Ken Buckfire. The parties are tabling for now the issue of the length of those depositions until we see the objections, and then we're going to see if we can come to some agreement there.

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On Monday, December 9th, then, your Honor --December 9th, tentatively we're going to set the Orr deposition on that date on the DIP motion issues. Also at that time the parties plan on submitting exhibit lists to the Court on that date, and the parties will reserve the right to supplement those because the depositions will not be finalized on that date. Then on Tuesday, December 10th, the continue -- well, no. I shouldn't say continued. deposition of Mr. Malhotra would take place. It's unclear right now in which location. On December 11th -- oh, I'm sorry. One other thing on Tuesday, the 10th. We are penciling in those days for the depositions of the direct witnesses that the objectors identify on December 2nd, both the 10th and on the 11th. We have penciled in those days. And then also on the 11th continuing would be the parties' deadline for submitting the joint statement of facts to your Honor.

Moving to the 12th, on that date at noon would be the deadline for the objectors to provide the city with the names of any rebuttal witnesses regarding things that might come up during the depositions that occur, and the deposition dates for those rebuttal witnesses have been tentatively set aside as Friday, the 13th, and Monday, the 16th. Friday, the 13th, we were going to ask your Honor if you might schedule a pretrial conference as Mr. Gordon had mentioned the possibility of. If you're able to, we were hoping to cover the following subjects with you then, the first being whether the city believes it necessary to put Mr. Orr, Mr. Malhotra, or Mr. Buckfire up as an expert, discussing that with your Honor as to whether -- what your Honor's expectations are in that regard. Also, we would address at that conference the issue of process for examination. Your Honor, we talked about if someone could take the lead. I think the parties will have a better idea then of whether that's possible. We would also propose the following if your Honor is amenable to it. It would be to hear the motions in limine that have already been filed, and in connection therewith I should have mentioned something I failed to do, that the parties would agree to file their responses to the motions in limine that are outstanding on Tuesday, December 10th, if your Honor would be able to hear those on the 13th.

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We would also propose that if your Honor wanted to do this -- I don't believe you did at the assumption -- I'm sorry -- at the eligibility hearing, but the exhibit objections -- it would be possible to deal with them then. It might expedite things the next week, so we would propose that and then also the issue of time limits on the parties' cases. That's where I suggested, your Honor, that seven hours for the city and eight hours for the objectors might be reasonable, but that was -- would be a possible subject for then.

And then moving to Monday, December 16th, I mentioned the rebuttal witness deposition date, if necessary. Oh, I'm sorry. One last thing. I keep forgetting about December 10th. The reply briefs — the city's reply brief in support of the assumption motion would be due on December 10th as well as the city's response to the objections that we will be receiving today on the DIP motion —

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHUMAKER: -- would also be on the December 10th. Sorry for going out of order there. And that would leave us, your Honor, with the hearing on the 17th, 18th, and 19th, a consolidated hearing of both the assumption and DIP motions.

THE COURT: That's certainly all fine with me. We can reconvene here for your final pretrial conference

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actually in this courtroom --
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              MR. SHUMAKER: Okay.
              THE COURT: -- on the 13th.
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              MR. SHUMAKER: Wonderful.
              THE COURT: We just need a time, Chris. Any idea?
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              THE CLERK:
                         10 a.m.
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              THE COURT: 10 a.m.?
              MR. SHUMAKER: Wonderful.
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              THE COURT: Would anyone like to -- I'm sorry.
     Something further, sir?
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              MR. SHUMAKER: One thing. I mentioned all that.
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     The one thing that was excluded in my rundown were issues
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    with Syncora, so these are the non-Syncora issues.
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              MR. MARRIOTT: Good afternoon, your Honor.
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    Marriott, EEPK. Just one quick clarification. As I
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    understand it, the designation of rebuttal witnesses on the
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     12th is both the debtor and the objector's, and there's a
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    deadline of noon.
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              THE COURT: Noon on the 12th?
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                             Yes, yeah.
              MR. MARRIOTT:
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              THE COURT: Yes. I think he said that.
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              MR. MARRIOTT: Yeah.
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              THE COURT: Yes.
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              MR. MARRIOTT: Yeah. Okay. That's it. Other than
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     that, I think it all got in.
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THE COURT: All right. So you'll submit an order.
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    Is that the plan?
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              MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So now what's left to resolve
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    with regard to Syncora or anything else?
              MR. KIRPALANI: Your Honor, may I be heard on the
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    phone?
              MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, the Syncora issue is --
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              MR. MARRIOTT: Sorry. Can I just make a quick
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     request?
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              THE COURT:
                          Sir.
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              MR. MARRIOTT: I have a plane to catch. Can I -- I
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    have no dog in this fight. May I be excused?
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              THE COURT: Yes, sir.
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              MR. MARRIOTT:
                             Thank you.
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              THE COURT: Yes.
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              MR. SHUMAKER: The remaining issue --
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              THE COURT: Let's just be clear. Who is on the
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     line, please?
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              MR. KIRPALANI: Again, your Honor, for the record,
     it's Susheel Kirpalani from Quinn Emanuel in New York
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     representing Syncora in the New York state lawsuit that's now
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     been removed and transferred to the Eastern District of
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    Michigan and that pursuant to the automatic reference is
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     currently sitting and waiting to be docketed for further
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proceedings or consideration before the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SHUMAKER: And, your Honor, on the -- the remaining issues relating to Syncora relate to what I was explaining before about the city's position on the motion to intervene with regard to the adversary proceeding and the almost briefed motion to dismiss. We have discussed it with Syncora's counsel at the break. We have not been able to come to agreement. What we would propose is in our papers, which would be perhaps a -- if your Honor believes a hearing is necessary -- frankly, on the city's motion to intervene, we're not sure that a hearing would be necessary, but if your Honor believes one is, sometime next week, when would be convenient to your Honor, the 4th or the 5th or --

THE COURT: When did you file this motion?

MR. SHUMAKER: The motion to intervene, I believe,
was filed November 18th.

THE COURT: Has there been a response to it?

MR. SHUMAKER: There has. It is fully briefed.

THE COURT: Well, it's hard for me to give you an answer to that without having actually looked at the papers, so let me promise to get back to you as promptly as possible on that and, if a hearing is necessary, to give you as prompt a hearing as possible.

MR. SHUMAKER: And then the one remaining issue on

behalf of the city, your Honor, was the motion -- the motion to dismiss, which right now is pending and awaits the swap counterparties' reply, and if the city were to be allowed to intervene, then the city would participate in that briefing. We were thinking that if your Honor wanted to, we could have a hearing that next week -- it would be the week of December 9th -- to argue that motion, which, again, we believe would pare down the issues that would be taken up on the assumption and DIP motion hearings the next week.

THE COURT: All right. Walk me through that in little baby steps because I'm not sure I quite followed it from your earlier presentation.

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, I'm sorry about that, your Honor. The issue is if the city is allowed to intervene -- I'll boil this down to its essence, which is the swap counterparties, which are currently the parties in that lawsuit, have filed a motion to dismiss saying that Syncora does not have the consent rights that it argues that it has, the same consent rights that are at issue with regard to Syncora's objection to the assumption motion. And what we believe is -- as the swap counterparties believe, too, is that that motion can be adjudicated by your Honor because it is a matter of contract construction, contract interpretation. It's the interplay of the different swap agreements and the collateral agreement and the forbearance

agreement, and if your Honor was to hear that -- if the city were to intervene but it was to hear that the week of the 9th, then that would take care of a lot of -- well, the Syncora objection we believe would fall to the side.

Now, in connection with that, we would also, I think, be proposing that your Honor issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law because that's a part of the adversary proceeding, but I don't know if that answers your question, your Honor.

MR. KIRPALANI: Your Honor, if I could try and clarify --

THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead, sir, please.

MR. KIRPALANI: Thank you so much, your Honor, and, again, I apologize for appearing telephonically.

THE COURT: That's okay.

MR. KIRPALANI: This is Susheel Kirpalani from Quinn Emanuel on behalf of Syncora. I just want to give your Honor a macro sense of the issue. In July after your Honor confirmed at the city's counsel's clarification that the automatic stay does not apply to the swap counterparties but only to the city, we filed a lawsuit in New York state court against our counterparties, the banks. Thereafter, since July, really nothing has happened other than procedural pingpong. The banks sought to remove the case to federal court in New York. It was there for awhile. Finally, Judge Kaplan

in the Southern District decided to transfer the venue to the District Court in Michigan without deciding whether the federal court had jurisdiction over the lawsuit, which is, as counsel just mentioned, a New York state contract dispute between two nondebtor parties.

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Before the District Court last week we appeared and tried to address the issue of where is the right place for this dispute to be heard. We made it clear to all the parties as well as to the District Court that, consistent with what Syncora's position has been before your Honor, certain issues, while they may be related to the bankruptcy, are noncore to the bankruptcy, and statutorily they are required to be ordered and ruled upon and adjudicated by either a state court or by an Article III federal District In the interest of nothing other than efficiency, what we've tried to do with the city and with the banks is come up with a solution where we stop the procedural pingpong, we try to do something that's efficient. We would waive our right to try to seek the matter to be heard back through mandatory abstention in New York state court, and we would just have the matter adjudicated once in the District That was opposed, and the determination was pushed back on us that Judge Rhodes needs to review the issues. Your Honor, I haven't appeared before you in this matter, but I've read your transcripts. I do believe that your Honor

previously thought of this issue and considered it to be one of the many warts that may exist that if the forbearance agreement were to be assumed, it would be a contract that's assumed warts and all, and whatever the rights of nondebtor parties are as between each other, they'll have to duke that out in the right place at the right time.

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Nevertheless, the city and the banks have tried, as your Honor just heard, to kind of railroad the process and push everything to be resolved before even the city has properly intervened, before even the briefing is done, before the plaintiff, Syncora, has an opportunity to file a motion for summary judgment, which we've been waiting to file until the matter would be docketed in some court. And we have proposed in the interest of efficiency to not seek to withdraw the reference, to ask your Honor to consider the motions for summary judgment along with the motion to dismiss so everything is done once and done properly on a proper record with appropriate briefing, and then your Honor could issue proposed findings and proposed conclusions of law for the District Court to consider adjudication and issuing an That was unacceptable to the city and to the banks, order. and we -- I want to tell your Honor that we are trying to be as efficient as possible. We've never even had a substantive day in court since July on the issues of what our rights are vis-a-vis the banks under a contract that was negotiated

seven years before this bankruptcy case, and we'll do whatever your Honor pleases in terms of timing, scheduling. The city has not even filed a proposed pleading in support of its intervention. Frankly, we're not sure what they could possibly say that our bank defendants have not already said, but I'm not trying to stand on ceremony about those issues either, but we do need due process. We do need an opportunity to respond if they want to take a position with a pleading, and we have the right, as we've said in other proceedings, to have this matter adjudicated in an Article III court or in a state court, but in the issue of -- in the interest of efficiency, we're happy to have your Honor issue proposed findings and conclusions of law and then have it adjudicated by the District Court, and that's where we stand. And in terms of the briefing, whatever works for your Honor and your Honor's staff, which I'm sure is overburdened by enough, we will live by.

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MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, we -- counsel's proposal -- Syncora's proposal is unacceptable to the city because we do not believe that the matter is noncore. We believe that it is core and that it goes to the extent of the lien of the property of the debtor. And because of that, we think that your Honor can, in fact, deal with this, and so that's why -- I mean if we're able to brief up the -- okay. We have no idea what additional facts Syncora is going to

allege because we believe this is purely an issue of contract construction, but if there's a -- you know, a summary judgment motion they're going to file in the next day or so, we could get that briefed up, and we could argue that at the first day of the hearing on the 17th because we think this issue needs to be resolved once and for all for the city's sake.

MR. KIRPALANI: Timingwise that's fine with us, your Honor. It's an issue, again, now only of proposed findings that your Honor could deliver at or, you know, after hearing argument on December 17th. We're fine with the schedule. The issue had to do with where it should be finally adjudicated and what our rights are under the Constitution, and that's what we tried to make clear to the city and to the banks.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, Syncora could always consent to your adjudicating this.

THE COURT: Well, we can't determine the issue of core versus noncore right now; right? I don't have the papers to try to figure that out, so we're going to have to leave that issue open as well, and you'll have to brief it in connection with some motion or another or maybe its own motion. I don't know. The timing of these things is always unfortunate, but I have to say that the process of trying to get an issue as important as this one finally resolved within

the time frame that we have set for ourselves on approving the DIP financing and the assumption motion feels very rushed. And I'm normally all for efficiency and getting things done, as you all know, but this one feels a little over the line, so I'm going to -- I'm going to turn you down and suggest that we process this in the normal course, so we'll look at the motion to intervene in the next few days, early next week, and decide whether we need a hearing on that, but in connection with a motion to dismiss or motions for summary judgment, we'll have to handle those in the normal course.

MR. SHUMAKER: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KIRPALANI: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: You're welcome, and, yes, sir, you may.

MR. GROW: Thank you, your Honor. Stephen Grow,

17 Warner, Norcross & Judd. I represent the swap

18 | counterparties, your Honor. I think there may be some

19 | additional context that may be appropriate here, your Honor.

20 There is, in fact, with the exception of the counterparties'

21 | reply, a fully briefed motion to dismiss that's been pending

22 | for some time at the District Court level. Our thought was

23 | that certainly --

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24 THE COURT: Well, it's fully briefed unless the city

25 | is permitted to intervene, in which case it's going to want

to brief it. Am I right about that?

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MR. GROW: That's probably true, but I would expect, your Honor, that our interests and arguments in that respect -- with respect to the legal arguments are fairly well-aligned with the city's on this point. You know, the alternative is -- and I hear counsel for Syncora making the point that they ought to be entitled to file a motion for summary disposition that they've had on the shelf. They can certainly do that. The Court, in the meantime, could consider the motion to dismiss, and if the Court believed that there was a basis to grant the motion to dismiss, it would moot out the motion for summary disposition. And I understand the due process issues. I understand that we're moving at a very -- at a lightning clip here, and -- but it seems to me that would be one way for -- to recognize Syncora's due process concerns and at the same time give the Court an opportunity to resolve this issue before the --THE COURT: Well, fair enough, but if it's noncore, which, like I say, I don't know, but if it is, nothing I do would be final until a District Court reviews it anyway; right? MR. GROW: Understood; understood. It's difficult because --

THE COURT: So there's that built-in inefficiency or at least the potential for that built-in inefficiency

regardless. 1 2 MR. GROW: There is. There is. Now, I think --3 THE COURT: So, you know, maybe the answer is for me 4 to try to get my arms around it enough to come to some preliminary conclusion on whether it's core or noncore. 5 6 Where are the papers? Have they been filed with the 7 District -- with the Bankruptcy Court yet -- or you said 8 they're in limbo. Where are they? 9 MR. GROW: I believe the District Court case has 10 been referred to your Honor, but it hasn't been docketed yet. 11 THE COURT: Hasn't been opened up yet? 12 MR. GROW: Right. So I don't know whether there's a 13 paper file in transit. I don't know what that process is, but it has not --14 THE COURT: I don't either. Chris, can we try to 15 16 track that down at some point today? 17 THE CLERK: We haven't received it yet. THE COURT: Oh, we haven't received it from District 18 19 Court yet. Which judge did you all say it was? 20 MR. GROW: Goldsmith. 2.1 THE COURT: All right. Maybe we'll contact their 22 chambers and see. 23 MR. GROW: My point, your Honor, was that this is 24 not something that has been sprung on Syncora. There have

been pending motions which --

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THE COURT: Well, and I don't think they're contending that it was, yeah. All right. Well, I think we may just have to leave it open and let me get my arms further around it and come up with a schedule that makes sense for everybody. I wish we could, you know, pin it down a little further today, but it's too far beyond my grasp at this point.

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MR. GROW: Understood, your Honor. Thank you.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, one suggestion. If your Honor was to allow the city to intervene and the issue of core versus noncore could be briefed in connection with the reply briefs that have to be filed in connection with that motion to dismiss by the swap counterparties and obviously Syncora and the city.

THE COURT: When would those be due?

MR. SHUMAKER: Whenever you say, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Let's leave that open, and then we'll figure it out.

MR. SHUMAKER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Are we done? All right. When can I expect the procedures order?

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, I was going to try to circulate the draft on Monday and get it to you as quickly as possible. Would that --

THE COURT: Okay. But in the meantime, you all are

going to operate as if it's in effect? Yes?

MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHUMAKER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. We're in recess.

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is adjourned.

(Proceedings concluded at 1:27 p.m.)

INDEX

WITNESSES:

None

EXHIBITS:

None

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Lois Garrett

November 28, 2013

Lois Garrett

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Docket No. 13-53846 IN RE: CITY OF DETROIT,

MICHIGAN,

Detroit, Michigan

December 13, 2013

Debtor. 10:01 a.m.

HEARING RE. MOTION TO ADJOURN HEARING; MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF PRIVILEGE LOG; PRETRIAL CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEVEN W. RHODES UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

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Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please
be seated. Case Number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan.

THE COURT: It appears we have an attorney swearing
in for this morning. Okay. Would you stand at the lectern,

5 | please? And what is your name?

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MS. DIBLASI: Kelly DiBlasi

THE COURT: Okay. Are you prepared to take the oath of admission to the Bar of the Court?

MS. DIBLASI: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: Please raise your right hand. Do you affirm that you will conduct yourself as an attorney and counselor of this Court with integrity and respect for the law, that you have read and will abide by the civility principles approved by this Court, and that you will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States?

MS. DIBLASI: I do.

THE COURT: Welcome.

MS. DIBLASI: Thank you.

THE COURT: We'll take care of your paperwork for you. Okay. I think we should begin with Syncora's motion to adjourn.

MR. HACKNEY: Good morning, your Honor. Stephen Hackney on behalf of Syncora. Your Honor, we brought the adjournment motion I would say for two broad reasons, and then there are a couple discrete issues that are also

included in the motion, but the first broad reason was that we previously had pretty significant colloquy with the Court on November 14th, I believe, with respect to the interplay between Section 364 and Section 904 as the Court is considering whether to approve the post-petition financing. And it came up in the context of our request for discovery into the needs of the city for the money, the uses of the quality of life proceeds, and how the anticipated uses will relate to the interest of the city and the interest of creditors in this case, and I think the Court may recall that we had -- you had relatively extensive colloquy both with me and with Ms. Connor and with Mr. Gordon. And at the conclusion of that, what the Court had said was I'm not going to grant the discovery today, but I invite you to return on this issue at the hearing, and we can revisit it. And part of the reason we tied that up for today, your Honor, was because we were having this -- we teed it up for today is because we were having this pretrial conference and we thought it was appropriately considered in anticipation of the hearing next week.

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Your Honor, I think, in our view, there is the issue of the standard and the issue of what you are entitled to consider when you're deciding whether to grant the postpetition financing is a bit of a predicate issue to how the hearing should flow, and it's a predicate issue to the types

and the nature of the discovery that's been granted because I think that the city has taken -- took in that hearing and has taken the position that the Court is not entitled under Section 904 to consider whether the city needs the money, how it wants to use the money, and how those uses will impact the interests of creditors as well as the interest of the city. It has taken a narrower position, which is that the Court may merely consider whether the city has sought to obtain unsecured credit and, if it's unavailable, whether the secured credit that it purports -- that it wants to borrow is on the best terms that are available.

Depending on how you resolve that question I think should have an impact on both whether you grant discovery to the creditors of the type that we had previously requested or, alteratively, whether you streamline that portion of the post-petition financing hearing and say given that the city has taken the position that I cannot consider these issues under Section 904, the city has to have the courage of its convictions and also not make a record detailing all of the different challenges that the city faces and why the money will be used to assuage those challenges because I think there's a bit of a swinging door here, which is the city wants to put on through Mr. Orr or Mr. Moore, the Conway MacKenzie restructuring expert, the story of the City of Detroit and the different challenges that it faces, and it

wants to introduce that evidence into the record in order to persuade the Court to grant it the post-petition financing, but it also at the same time is saying that you're actually not entitled to review their decisions on that subject and that you're not -- that you ought not to grant us discovery that allows us to check the work of the city and its consultants in reaching the conclusions and recommendations that they've reached. So I think that is appropriately addressed today, your Honor, and what I think that you had said at the last hearing that we had before you was -- you know, at that time I don't think we had even filed our objection, so my sense of the hearing was that you were saying, "My current view is that I'm not going to grant the discovery, but I won't finally decide this issue and I'll deny your request without prejudice to come back." appropriate to us for the Court to decide the issue now because if we go through the hearing and in the course of the hearing the Court decides, you know, I actually -- I've decided that under 364 I do need to decide if this postpetition financing is in the best interest of creditors, and I do need to make an assessment of how this money is going to be used, whether there are alternative noneconomic ways for the city to address certain short-term needs, whether there are other existing cash flows that it can use, and in order to -- and the potential impact on creditor recovery. I need

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to assess that. Well, I think then we will be in the middle of a hearing where we will not have been given discovery into those questions in a way that allows us to develop a sufficient record.

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Alternatively, if you decide today, no, I agree with the city, and I'm not entitled under 904 to probe behind how the city -- how the city intends to use the money that it wants to borrow, my review is much more limited, then I think, alteratively, that the Court should make that ruling but also that the city should have the courage of its convictions and that that portion of the post-petition financing hearing should be presented in a way that's consistent with its legal posture. This was the first -- and I will tell you, your Honor, that to the extent the Court wants to have argument on the standard under Section 364 versus 904, the individual who -- the individual attorney who is preparing on those arguments for the hearing next week is available and in the court today and will do a better job than I will of getting deep into the weeds on some of the different case law and so forth that we think informs the standard, but we did think it was an important issue that was worth bringing up today, and that is one of the first motivations for our adjournment motion.

The second one, your Honor, was specific to the forbearance agreement, and it flowed from the replies that

were filed both by the city and by the swap counterparties because in those replies, those two parties made clear that they aren't just seeking assumption of the motion -- of the forbearance agreement, warts and all, for what it is worth subject to the third-party claims. They are seeking the type of broad relief that they outlined in the proposed order that they submitted to you, and this is of concern to us because you'll remember that the first time you and I had the opportunity to meet one another was at a hearing back on August 2nd right at the outset of the case where we had sought discovery on the forbearance agreement, and the Court in that hearing -- and I went back and reviewed the transcript again last night -- I would say was relatively clear about saying, look, let me assure you that when I decide this, I decide it -- you know, it comes warts and all, comes subject to all of the third-party claims that are asserted by parties as a result of it, and that decision then heavily informed the colloquy that you and I had about the nature of discovery because you were saying, given the limited role that I perform, why do you need all this discovery, and you denied our initial request for --THE COURT: You're focusing on the consent issue. MR. HACKNEY: Well, I would say in terms of the third-party rights, there is not only the consent issue but

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also the argument that the swap counterparties cannot

transfer rights under the swap to third parties, that they cannot modify or amend the swap or the collateral agreement without consent, the fact that payments to the swap counterparties under the forbearance agreement violate the waterfall that's contained in the service contracts. forbearance agreement implicates all of those things or it certainly does ab initio, and then it also does when you perform under it in connection with the DIP. So I think that the fact that the swap counterparties and the city are now coming to the Court and saying, no, we want you to finally determine these legal issues and we want the proposed order that we submitted to you that says we can perform without liability, no one else's consent is required -- you know, when you and I were engaging in our dialogue back on August 2nd, the city did not at that point pop up and say, "Wait a second, like we have a different view of what you can do under Section 365 and Rule 9019. We don't agree that you have this limited role. We think that you're going to decide these issues." They didn't say that, and so they actually said, yes, limited discovery is appropriate, but now we've come to the end, and they stick the reply brief in that says, no, you should decide all of these issues. So that was cause for concern for us and was the second major motivating reason in bringing the adjournment motion. Now, I do want to be up front with the Court.

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THE COURT: What does that have to do with an adjournment?

MR. HACKNEY: Well, I guess what I would say is this, which is it's similar to the concerns under Section 364 versus 904, which is we will not change our argument regarding the nature of a 365 hearing or a 9019 hearing, but if we're going to go into battle where there's a risk that the Court may be deciding all of these issues, then our position is if we're at risk that the Court may decide all these issues, we need to depose, for example, the swap counterparties.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. HACKNEY: Because they're all parties to this transaction, and understanding --

THE COURT: But aren't those issues all to be determined, if at all, based on the documents?

MR. HACKNEY: No, I don't think so. I don't think so. I think that -- I don't think that you can say at this point, oh, these are just pure legal questions. I think that the way that they structure these documents, the substance of the transaction, their intentions in structuring the documents, not only are going to be relevant to your consideration, but to the extent there are ambiguities, when you have different parties going at it hammer and tong like this on what the documents mean, there is a real potential

for the need for parol evidence.

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THE COURT: Every time that the parties disagree about what a document means, there's an ambiguity that opens up discovery? Is that the --

MR. HACKNEY: Not necessarily.

THE COURT: Is that the law?

MR. HACKNEY: Well, I think the law is that where the parties have advanced reasonable interpretations of the documents, multiple reasonable interpretations --

THE COURT: Isn't it the Court's job to interpret contracts as a matter of law?

MR. HACKNEY: In the proper context informed by the proper procedures, and both <u>Orion</u> and <u>Sportstuff</u> are cases that say the limited either assumption or 9019 context is not a substitute for the trial on the merits. Those are quotes. And now the city is trying to say, no, it should be --

THE COURT: Okay. But that's a different question from opening up discovery to the extent you seek it. I don't know if I agree with you or not on the question of whether this is the right time to decide those issues, but it's a long way from that to if it is, you need more discovery.

MR. HACKNEY: I think that you're right that they're separate questions. I agree that you might --

THE COURT: I'm only asking about why you need discovery, and I haven't heard it yet.

MR. HACKNEY: Well, I think the circumstances 1 2 regarding the negotiation of the forbearance agreement and 3 what the provisions mean and why they were structured in the 4 way they were structured and whether that structuring was 5 designed, for example, to evade consent rights, those are 6 factual determinations that I think could be validly before 7 the Court. THE COURT: Suppose they were. So what? 8 9 That would be relevant evidence. MR. HACKNEY: Ιt 10 would be relevant --11 THE COURT: To what? To how to interpret the 12 contracts? 13 MR. HACKNEY: Absolutely. Absolutely, your Honor. I don't think that -- I think --14 15 THE COURT: You need to move on. MR. HACKNEY: Okay. Well, your Honor, the 16 17 additional issues that are contained in the adjournment 18 motion are two. One of them relates to the privilege log and 19 our request for a privilege log. 20 THE COURT: And what's the relevance of that? 2.1 MR. HACKNEY: The relevance of that is this is with 22 respect to discovery that the city did agree to produce in 23 connection with the DIP hearing. 24 THE COURT: What's the relevance of it? 25 MR. HACKNEY: The relevance of it is that if the

information has not been validly withheld by a privilege, it may be discoverable and, thus, relevant.

THE COURT: I'll just ask one more time. What's the relevance of the privilege log?

MR. HACKNEY: The privilege log allows --

THE COURT: Suppose you look at the privilege log and say, "Ah, that's not privileged. We want it," I would ask what's the relevance of whatever it is you want?

MR. HACKNEY: You can't know until you see it, but you know it's relevant because they agreed to produce documents on this subject matter. If it's not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, then it wouldn't be on the log.

THE COURT: What else?

MR. HACKNEY: The last issue, your Honor, is an issue that relates to the mediation, and it is an issue that has some importance, I think, to this hearing, but it's also just a generally more important hearing to the case that I wanted to raise with the Court. There have been presentations that were made by the city's consultants that existed prior to the mediation that were done under confidentiality agreements, nondisclosure agreements, that related to the way that you could use the information that was provided in those presentations, and they relate to the work that the consultants were doing. After the mediation

was ordered, the mediation I would say generally has taken 1 two forms where there are --2 3 THE COURT: I don't want to hear anything about the 4 mediation. MR. HACKNEY: I'm not going to get into the 5 substance of the mediation negotiations. I'm just 6 7 describing --8 THE COURT: Why are you telling me anything about 9 the mediation? 10 MR. HACKNEY: Because it impacts the evidential 11 admissibility of evidence that's produced by the consultants 12 in the mediation despite the fact that the presentations that 13 are being --Is the city asserting -- excuse me. 14 THE COURT: 15 the city -- is the city offering evidence from the mediation? 16 MR. HACKNEY: It is not, but it is also saying that 17 none of the presentations that are being made by the financial advisors can be used as evidence even under seal 18 19 and so on and so forth. 20 THE COURT: I agree with that. 2.1 MR. HACKNEY: We wanted to raise that issue now as a 22 point of concern. 23 THE COURT: You have a different position?

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah, because the presentations by the

financial advisors are -- I would describe them as in the way

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of 2004-type information. They're not being done pursuant to 2004, but they are, "Hey, creditors, here's what's going on with our efforts on the -- on blight or police or fire," and then, yeah, separately there are negotiations, but the presentations that are being made, as I understand it, are the same type of presentations that were being made before the mediation.

THE COURT: Oh, I see what you're saying.

MR. HACKNEY: So --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, all right. We'll have a discussion about that.

MR. HACKNEY: The only reason it's relevant, your Honor, is just because that is the basis for a lot of our information about what's going on with the city, and so it does interplay --

THE COURT: I'm inclined to agree with you that just because information was presented in a mediation doesn't mean that that information is not admissible --

MR. HACKNEY: And, look --

THE COURT: -- if it's otherwise admissible.

MR. HACKNEY: Right. And one thing I want to --

THE COURT: It doesn't get shielded from our court process just because it was presented in mediation.

MR. HACKNEY: Right. And -- I agree, and I want to tell you that I'm not trying to evade the other parts of the

mediation where you may want the broader protections of there 1 won't be any evidential admissibility because you want people 2 to be candid in back and forth. I'm just saying given the 3 4 way this has gone together, can't we have like a little bit of a switch that we flip where we say this is an FA 5 6 presentation about blight, this is a negotiation. Okay. And 7 let's flip the switch so that we can say, okay, well these 8 decks that they're putting forward that provide this level of 9 detail, that's subject to the NDA protections because that's 10 how it was -- the same presentation could have been made 11 before the mediation, and that's how it would have been 12 handled. The only reason I'm raising that, your Honor, is it 13 came up in one of the depositions when I was using two documents, and we ultimately got past that issue with respect 14 15 to those two documents, but the city then at that point 16 asserted, hey, these two documents --17 THE COURT: This may be -- this may be something we have to deal with in the context of specific witnesses and 18 19 specific documents, but --20 MR. HACKNEY: I think that's fine. I agree with 21 you, your Honor. I just want to --22 THE COURT: If the question is did you say in 23 mediation A, B, and C, I don't like that --

THE COURT: -- but if the question is are A, B, and

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah.

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C true, that's a different question. There's nothing objectionable about that assuming A, B, and C are otherwise relevant.

MR. HACKNEY: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further?

MR. HACKNEY: I don't think so. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anyone else want to speak in favor of an adjournment?

MR. MARRIOTT: Good morning, your Honor. At the risk of being a glutton for punishment, Vince Marriott, Ballard Spahr, EEPK and affiliates. We also support adjournment on the basis that Mr. Hackney has indicated. Syncora has asked for it. We believe that the production of documents and the witnesses presented by the city were based on the city's view of what we were entitled to based on the city's view of what this Court is entitled to make a decision on or not. As and to the extent -- it's our view that this Court is entitled to make a much broader inquiry and findings than the city has suggested, and the discovery that has proceeded to date is based on their narrow gatekeeping view of what this Court is entitled to. And if this Court does not agree with that narrow view, there's more discovery that we'll need.

As to the forbearance agreement piece, let me just

make two quick observations. One is that as and to the extent contracts are ambiguous, then I believe that parties are entitled to and the Court needs to hear parol evidence based upon intent, negotiations, and the like.

And, second, your Honor, as and to the extent that the city and the swap counterparties are taking the view that third-party rights under those contracts need to be determined in the context of assumption of the forbearance agreement and as and to the extent, therefore, that such assumption and settlement embodied in it will affect third-party rights via those findings by this Court, then I think third parties are entitled to discovery around those issues.

THE COURT: Around what?

MR. MARRIOTT: Around --

THE COURT: I ask that because every settlement in bankruptcy affects third parties.

MR. MARRIOTT: Yes, and that effect has to be -- if it affects third parties, your Honor, affects third-party rights, has to be fair, and I think fairness goes to an inquiry into, well, what do the documents actually say, what was intended by the parties at the time that these documents were entered into. They are ambiguous. There has been a great deal of dispute about what various provisions in very complicated documents mean.

THE COURT: So you agree with the city and the swap

counterparties that these issues should be determined now unlike Syncora?

MR. MARRIOTT: I'm not saying I agree that it should be. If this Court were to stick to its statement in August that third-party rights would flow through entirely unaffected, then that would be fine, and we wouldn't need any additional discovery.

THE COURT: Oh, all right.

MR. MARRIOTT: If, however, this Court adopts the city, swap counterparty view that these are issues that now are before it, that would require, in our view, additional discovery.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anyone else want to speak in favor of adjournment? Okay. Would the city like to be heard on this matter?

MR. HAMILTON: Yes, your Honor. Good morning, your Honor. Robert Hamilton of Jones Day on behalf of the City of Detroit. If I can take the matters that were raised by counsel for Syncora in reverse order, since the ones at the end are the easiest to resolve, on the mediation issue that Mr. Hackney raised, there is no dispute among the parties, and we were able to work out what arose during the deposition. Everybody agrees, as far as I can tell, with the rules and the protocol that your Honor articulated in the colloquy with Mr. Hackney. Our point at the deposition is if

you're going -- that we made at the deposition is if you're going to whip out a document that was shared only at a mediation, you ought to talk with us first to see if we have a problem about that because maybe it would reveal something that was confidential that we didn't want disclosed to the outside world, but with the particular document that counsel did whip out at the deposition, we determined that that was the type of document that, as your Honor described, is information that should be made public even though it was initially distributed in the mediation, and we did make it public and put it in the data room. So, as far as I can tell, we're engaged at this point in a purely hypothetical discussion about maybe there might be some other documents that were shared in the mediation that we might want to use at trial, but as we're going to get to the status conference later today, everybody is going to share their exhibits. We're all going to decide in advance what's relevant, what isn't, or if we have an objection, so we're not going to have this mediation issue arise at all. So I don't understand and I certainly don't think there is any basis to adjourn the hearing so that we can somehow decide in advance whether or not there's additional information that was shared in mediation that might be a problem at the hearing because that issue is never going to arise.

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On the privilege log, there was some ambiguity in

the request that we received 12 days ago from Syncora about what type of privilege log they wanted, whether they wanted a particular document-by-document description of every document we withheld on privilege grounds or whether instead they wanted some category basis of a privilege log. When counsel for Syncora contacted me about 13 days ago or 12 days ago about that issue, I indicated that we did not understand your Honor's ruling on November 14th to require us to prepare and produce a privilege log, but we were willing to discuss it, and I wanted to -- I invited him to call me to tell me whether or not a general category one would be sufficient given the ambiguity in his original request. Counsel chose not to take my invitation to call me and instead just filed the motion to compel.

We are willing to do whatever the Court wants us to do as regard to a privilege log. We've been working on it for the past 12 days. And if the Court wants us to produce a general category privilege log, we can do that by Monday. If you want us to produce a document-by-document description of every document withheld on privilege grounds, we can do that by Monday, but it's certainly no reason to adjourn the hearing. I don't think it is materially enough in this context of a summary proceeding that they even need the privilege log, but if your Honor believes it's sufficiently material to order it, we can get it done by Monday on

whatever basis the Court or Syncora requests.

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With respect to the forbearance agreement and the request for additional discovery with respect to the forbearance agreement and the assumption motion to assume it, the City of Detroit contests Syncora counsel's suggestion that our position has changed in any way from when this Court already ruled on these arguments back in August. extent there is some -- it is certainly the position of the City of Detroit consistent with how the Court articulated it that to the extent the Court needs to make rulings with respect to the construction of particular contract provisions, it can do so as a matter of law, to the extent it needs to do so, in ruling on the 9019 motion for a compromise of the parties' rights underneath those contracts. extent the Court determines that there might be some evidentiary issues involved if you were to have a full-blown trial on those contracts, as we articulated, I believe, back in August, in the context of a 9019 motion, you don't conduct a mini-trial or an evidentiary ruling on those legal issues. You consider those issues in deciding whether or not the compromise is fair and equitable or is appropriate under the standards for approving a 9019 compromise.

To the extent this Court were to determine, based on the evidentiary record and arguments that are made at the assumption hearing, that for whatever reason it cannot rule

on the merits of the 9019 motion unless it makes a factual finding on a particular ambiguity and a particular document and it is barred from making that finding because adequate discovery hasn't happened yet, then the Court can decide at that time whether it needs to allow that discovery to occur, but there is no reason to adjourn this hearing now because there's no reason to believe that such a necessary factual finding is going to arise.

The bottom line is this Court already dealt with this issue back in August, and nothing has changed, so there's no reason two days -- two business days before the hearing is about to start to adjourn it based on the issues that this Court already decided back in August.

Now, with respect to the DIP and the 364 versus 904 issue that Mr. Hackney described, the City of Detroit has gone to great lengths to provide discovery and an evidentiary record to accommodate whatever ruling this Court makes as to what the scope of -- the proper appropriate scope of review is with respect to a request for 364(c) relief in a Chapter 9 case. We have set forth in our reply -- in our motion and in our reply brief what our views are as to what the appropriate legal standards are for this Court's review of our request for relief under 364(c) to get the DIP by granting superpriority administrative status in certain liens. However, we have done whatever we can do to accommodate any

ruling this Court may make that says the scope of review is broader than what we've laid out in our brief, and counsel for Syncora is not correct to say that we have refused to provide discovery on any of the broader issues that we say in our reply brief are not within the appropriate scope of review under the law. We have given all the information we have on the need for borrowing this money, even though we believe that, given the legislative history of the 1976-77 amendments to Chapter 9 with respect to 364 and the fact that 364(b) doesn't apply and the idea that the city should have the same right to borrow unfettered by Bankruptcy Court involvement in bankruptcy that it has outside of bankruptcy, we believe that the need to borrow or the decision to borrow money to fund city services is a decision that is committed at the sole discretion of the City of Detroit and is not subject to Bankruptcy Court review under both 904 and the Supreme Court's decision in Bekins.

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THE COURT: How would you articulate in one sentence what the Court's role is on your 364 motion?

MR. HAMILTON: I would -- it is to the extent the City of Detroit wishes to use special powers that are given to it in bankruptcy that it doesn't have outside of bankruptcy to borrow money, the Bankruptcy Court reviews whether or not the use of those special powers is appropriate. The ability to borrow money is not a special

1 power.

THE COURT: Those powers are the superpriority and the administrative expense priority?

MR. HAMILTON: And the finding of good faith under 364(e). Those three things give --

THE COURT: Is appropriate?

MR. HAMILTON: Is appropriate for you to review whether or not it is appropriate to allow the City of Detroit to use those special powers to borrow money, and in that context --

THE COURT: Is appropriate?

MR. HAMILTON: Well, whether the -- for instance, if -- it would be -- you cannot -- we would have to convince your Honor at the hearing that the City of Detroit cannot go get the financing that we have determined we need without offering those -- without offering the superpriority status or the liens, which is typical in a 364(c) hearing anyway, and we would also have to establish that the terms on which we are offering those liens in super -- in a sort of super administrative priority status, the terms on which we are offering them are reasonable. That would be relevant both to the use of those powers and to a finding of good faith under 364(e), but the decision whether to borrow the money in order to fund quality of life's or any city services is a decision -- is a political decision that, as we've

articulated in the reply brief, is one we don't think is within your scope of review. However, we have provided full discovery on that. We've given them everything we have on how we decided how much we needed to borrow, why we needed to borrow it, and the time --

THE COURT: When you say "reasonable terms," you mean -- well, let me just ask. What do you mean?

MR. HAMILTON: Like whether the commitment fee, interest rates are within market -- are within market --

THE COURT: Market standards?

MR. HAMILTON: Yeah. We need to establish in order to get a finding under 364(e) that this was the result of arm's length bargaining, good faith, and the terms are reasonable.

THE COURT: I ask you what you mean by "reasonable" because certain of the objections can be read to suggest that the terms aren't reasonable given what you want to do with the money.

MR. HAMILTON: Right. And the problem with that is that goes into the political decision of whether you should be borrowing money to fund city services, and our position, as we lay out in the reply brief, is under 904 and <u>Bekins</u>, that's not an appropriate review for this Court to do, but the point I'm trying to make here is if you decide that -- notwithstanding our best effort to be eloquent, that you

don't agree with us, we have provided full discovery to the objectors on what information we have as to why we think we need to borrow this money and how much. That essentially comes down to brass tacks, the cash flow projections prepared by E&Y, which we've provided.

THE COURT: What's the standard of review on the assumption motion?

MR. HAMILTON: I believe that's pretty much straightforward 9019 standard, whether it falls below the lowest level of reasonableness, I believe. I don't think that's a --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAMILTON: -- novel area of law.

THE COURT: How close can you pin down how much of the DIP loan you're going to use to pay off the swaps?

MR. HAMILTON: That will be the subject of testimony at the hearing, and it is my understanding that that amount fluctuates -- I don't know -- I think perhaps even on a daily basis based on interest rates, so we'll give you the most current estimate at the time of --

THE COURT: But what is it?

MR. HAMILTON: -- the assumption hearing, and whatever is left over is then the quality of life proceeds.

THE COURT: What's the number?

MR. HAMILTON: I don't know what the current number

is, your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Approximately. 3 MR. HAMILTON: It was the subject of deposition 4 testimony. 5 THE COURT: Approximately. Are we talking 200 million or 300 million or what? 6 7 MR. HAMILTON: I think it's closer to 230. THE COURT: Within \$25 million, what's the number? 8 9 230 million. MR. HAMILTON: 10 THE COURT: Okay. Is it the Court's role to 11 determine whether 230 million or whatever the number is is a fair number? 12 13 MR. HAMILTON: I'm not sure what you mean by -- oh, in terms of the compromise? It is the Court's role --14 15 THE COURT: In terms of the buy-out of the swaps. It is the -- I believe it is the 16 MR. HAMILTON: 17 Court's role to determine whether or not the city's decision to make that payment falls within the reasonable range of 18 19 possible outcomes if --20 THE COURT: Okay. 2.1 MR. HAMILTON: -- the underlying legal issues were 22 litigated, and so fairness in that context is defined by as 23 long as it falls within the range of reasonable outcomes, 24 it's fair. If that's what you mean by "fair," then, yes, 25 that's within your role.

THE COURT: What impact would a negative decision by this Court on that question on the assumption motion have on the DIP motion?

MR. HAMILTON: It is a condition to closing on the DIP that the parties be able to -- be able to perform under the termination -- under the forbearance agreement. If you don't approve the forbearance agreement, there's no DIP. It won't close.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAMILTON: And that was confirmed in depositions last week.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAMILTON: The only thing the city has not agreed to provide in discovery is the vast multitude of underlying communications that undoubtedly occurred in connection with the elaborate work that Conway MacKenzie and others have done in determining which restructuring initiatives should be pursued, how much was needed for particular restructuring initiatives, and when the money should be spent and how. We have produced the end product of all that work in detail updated through the middle of November. We have allowed them to depose a full day Mr. Moore on how those determinations were made, what standards were used, but we haven't produced all the e-mails that may have occurred between the various people at Conway MacKenzie

or the other outside consultants with the people at the city, at the fire department, the police chief, the police people, that they've done for the past year in determining how many vests need to be bought, how many new cruisers they need, what needs to be done in order to get police response times down to a national average. All those e-mail communications we have not undertaken to collect and review and produce because, quite frankly, the burden would be astronomical, and to the extent this Court were to undertake a review of each of the individual decisions that the City of Detroit has undertaken over the past year to determine what restructuring initiatives they want to pursue at this point, that type of hearing would take weeks, if not months, and we think no matter how you decide what the appropriate scope of review is under 364(c), there is no scenario where you will find that it is appropriate for the Bankruptcy Court to sit in judgment on those individual decisions about how many cruisers the City of Detroit should buy or what -- or how the police -how the bulletproof vests -- how many needed to buy, those type of decisions, and you don't -- they don't need to see all the e-mail communications on those type of issues, but everything else we've provided discovery. We don't think it's relevant, but if you decide that you need to hear it and it is relevant, they've got discovery, and we've got witnesses available, and you can hear the -- you can hear the

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evidence. We'll accommodate whatever ruling you make as to what the scope is of the evidentiary record you need in order to consider our request for relief under 364(c). On that basis, we don't think there's any justification for adjourning a hearing that has been scheduled, that everybody's been working at breakneck speed to be able to be in a position to present to you starting Tuesday of next week.

THE COURT: Anyone else want to speak against an adjournment?

MR. CLARK: Your Honor, Jared Clark, Bingham

McCutchen, counsel to UBS. I'll speak very briefly just on
one issue that counsel for Syncora raised. Syncora has
argued since after the August 2nd hearing in its objection on
the assumption motion that an exercise of the city's option
under the forbearance agreement is void ab initio and of no
force and effect, and, therefore, your Honor need -- should
not approve the forbearance agreement, and this is based on
what I believe your Honor referred to as the consent right
issues. The swap counterparties believe that your Honor can
and needs to look at the consent right issues as a matter of
contract interpretation, as indicated; however, we do not
believe that that supports any need for an adjournment.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Anyone else have anything further? All right. The Court will take this under

advisement until 11 o'clock and give you a decision at that time.

3 THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess.

(Recess at 10:42 a.m. until 11:17 a.m.)

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please be seated. Recalling Case Number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan.

THE COURT: Counsel are present. I do have a question for the city before I give a ruling.

MR. HAMILTON: Robert Hamilton of Jones Day on behalf of the City of Detroit, your Honor.

THE COURT: Of course, I said "a question," but I exaggerated. It's more than one. Is it the city's position that the issue of whether Syncora -- Syncora's consent to the forbearance agreement is -- or was required is an issue that the Court must determine in connection with this approval motion under 9019?

MR. HAMILTON: May I have a moment, your Honor, to confer? Your Honor, as we have articulated in our reply brief, it is our position that the Court has to determine that the contract we are trying to assume is a valid contract. In order to make the finding that the contract we're asking to assume is a valid contract, you have to make a determination on that issue.

THE COURT: So you agree with Syncora on that?

MR. HAMILTON: I don't -- I think we took the position that Syncora said the same thing in one of their earlier pleadings. I'm not sure if they've been consistent in that regard, but to the extent that they take that position, we agree with them.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, then there was just the one question. Thank you. All right. The matter is before the Court on the motion of Syncora --

MS. GREEN: Your Honor, if I may, something came up at the break relating to discovery. We have a third-party witness on our may call list named Thomas Gavin, and we were planning to depose him Monday morning to make him available for the city if they had questions for him. The city has just stated it will object to third-party discovery because they had not previously agreed to third-party discovery. I just wanted to --

THE COURT: What does the phrase "third-party discovery" mean?

MS. GREEN: That he's not a party. He used to be a financial advisor for the City of Detroit. He no longer is a -- is not currently a financial advisor for the City of Detroit.

We wanted to depose him Monday and call him as a witness at the evidentiary hearing. I wanted to confirm with the Court that that was appropriate to deal with any

objections. I don't want to call him as a witness at the evidentiary hearing and have some sort of objection to him by the city.

THE COURT: Let me suggest this. I've been advised you didn't put your appearance on the record.

MS. GREEN: I'm sorry. Jennifer Green on behalf of the Retirement Systems for the City of Detroit.

THE COURT: Let me suggest this to you to resolve your question. In connection with the motion to adjourn, I'm going to articulate as best I can the issues as I see them, and then you can consult among yourselves and see if the testimony of this witness that you want to proffer would be relevant given that these are the issues.

MS. GREEN: Okay. And I believe he would be relevant --

THE COURT: So let me ask you to stand by on that one.

MS. GREEN: I think he would be relevant to the business judgment of the city in entering into the forbearance agreement. That's what we would be proffering the witness for. He has testimony that the swap counterparties themselves had concerns about the pledge of the casino revenue back in 2009. He was a financial advisor on behalf of the city, and he worked with the city during the collateral agreement execution.

THE COURT: Okay. But to that I would ask you what is the relevance of the fact that the swap parties had concerns?

MS. GREEN: To the extent that both the city and/or the swap counterparties had concerns about the pledge of the casino revenue and the collateral agreement itself and certain objecting parties are arguing that the collateral agreement is invalid or that the casino revenue pledged does not survive the bankruptcy petition, if the city and the swap counterparties also were aware of these potential issues, I think that informs the city's business judgment in entering into the forbearance agreement, your Honor.

THE COURT: How, though?

MS. GREEN: If there were issues that they should have litigated, that is one of the arguments by some of the objecting parties.

THE COURT: Okay. But we can look at that question without having a witness tell us that Syncora or the swap counterparties were concerned about it at the time; right?

MS. GREEN: Well, I assume, your Honor, if I expect an objection --

THE COURT: Look, an issue is an issue whether the parties knew about it at the time or not.

MS. GREEN: Well, if they knew about it then and they knew about it at the time that the forbearance agreement

was being negotiated, it seems to me as though it's questionable to enter into the forbearance agreement if you knew you had very strong legal arguments that could have been --

THE COURT: Ah, but the strength of the legal arguments doesn't depend on whether the parties were aware of those legal arguments at the time, does it, or does it?

MS. GREEN: I believe it does. If you --

THE COURT: Why?

MS. GREEN: -- enter into a forbearance agreement and the argument from some of the objecting parties is that you should have litigated it rather than settle it, then to me it seems as though the knowledge of the city and the swap counterparties as to the strength of their legal arguments or the existence of certain arguments are admissions as to the strength of those arguments.

THE COURT: Are what? Admissions?

MS. GREEN: Could be admissions as to the strength or the existence of certain arguments that could have been made or defenses that existed.

THE COURT: Well, but we would evaluate the strength based on the applicable law and if there's conflicts in the law, et cetera, et cetera. All right.

MS. GREEN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. First, on the motion to

adjourn, this motion suggests to the Court that it's in the best interest of all concerned and to facilitate resolution of the motion itself for the Court to identify, as best it can, what the issues are for next week's hearing, so I'm going to attempt that.

The motion to assume the forbearance agreement under Section 365, the city at least recognizes, and I believe other parties do as well, that it's as much a motion for approval of a settlement under Rule 9019 as it is a motion to assume an executory contract. I just do not believe that the fact that this agreement was reached a few days before the bankruptcy as opposed to a few days after the bankruptcy should make any substantive difference in either the outcome or the nature of the Court's consideration in determining the outcome.

As a general matter, I think the parties agree that when considering a motion to approve a settlement, the Court's role is to determine whether that settlement is fair and equitable and whether it's in the best interest of the estate as a whole. Accordingly, what is not relevant is whether the settlement prejudices creditors or any particular creditor because every settlement that's proposed to the Court arguably prejudices one or more or even all creditors. The question will remain whether the settlement is fair and equitable and in the best interest of the estate.

In determining that question, the Court concludes that the following factors in the context of this case are significant. The forbearance agreement is clearly an attempt by the parties to it to settle and resolve on a going forward basis the legal and economic issues that they faced at the time, so, accordingly, the probability of success that the city might have if it pursued any challenge to the rights of the other parties or to its own obligations as they existed at that time is a major consideration. More on this in a moment.

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A second major consideration is the issue of collection. Now, when the claim to be compromised is a claim that the debtor has against a third party, of course, it's that third party's collectibility that is an issue. other hand, when the claim to be compromised is a third party's claim against the city or the debtor more generally, of course, the collectibility of the debtor is an issue. in the context of this case, the Court concludes that that is an issue to be considered in determining this motion. At the same time, the Court recognizes that on this issue of collectibility it is asserted that the issue is a minimal issue because of the security interests that are claimed here, but if there are potential challenges to the validity of those security interests, those would obviously come into play in determining whether to grant this motion or not.

A third consideration is the complexity of the litigation, although more specifically considering the complexity of the litigation is only important because it bears upon the costs to the city of litigating it if there is no settlement or no settlement is approved and the delay to the process, which leads really to the fourth consideration, which is the interest of creditors. The issue here would be what impact would granting the motion or denying the motion have on the plan process, upon the city's and the public's interest in the city's reconstruction and revitalization.

Those are the factors that the Court considers important in determining whether this settlement is fair and equitable and in the best interest of the city and its creditors and its residents, but I want to -- I want to drop a significant asterisk or footnote here. In considering the probability of success on any of the issues that are compromised by this proposed settlement, it is clearly not the Court's role to resolve those issues, and the Court will not resolve any of those issues.

A motion to compromise puts its proponent in a very awkward position, and you can see that awkwardness in the city's papers here because at the same time it is acknowledging the strengths of the other parties' positions or the weaknesses of its own positions, it dare not be too articulate about either side of that lest the motion be

denied and it has to actually litigate those issues, so in the context of this motion, the Court is not interested in any evidence about what Jones Day or Mr. Orr or any of its employees or agents thought were the strengths or weaknesses of any challenges it might have to the other parties' positions in this matter or with regard to any of the positions that those other parties might take against the city. The parties' papers have identified what those challenges are on both sides, and it's for the Court, with the assistance of counsel, surely, to try to evaluate as best it can but in a summary way the strengths and weaknesses of those challenges.

So, for example, and acknowledging this violation of the general rule against giving an advisory opinion, it would be inappropriate to ask Mr. Orr what he thought the city's probability of success was in asserting issue "X" not only because that would plainly require him to disclose his communications with his counsel that are protected, but, more importantly, and with all due respect to him, the Court isn't actually that interested in what his assessment of the city's probability on issue "X" is.

Now, it appears to the Court that most of the underlying disputes between the parties that this agreement compromises are, frankly, issues of contract interpretation that would, in the ordinary course, be resolved by the Court

without evidence as a matter of law. It is certainly not the law that simply because parties disagree about contract interpretation, it's, therefore, ambiguous and under the parol evidence rule subject to the testimony of witnesses. And on this point, the Court will go one step further and conclude that after reading all of the parties' briefs, the Court does not identify a single issue of contract interpretation as to which there is such ambiguity as would permit a party to present parol evidence in support of its interpretation.

Now, this does not mean that there is not a genuine good faith dispute about the interpretation of the contract. It appears to the Court there is, but that does not mean that the contract is ambiguous. There are, however, certain defenses that the city might have that may turn on the establishment of certain facts, so, for example, I think one of the parties, perhaps Mr. Sole -- correct me if I'm wrong -- asserted that the city might have an equitable subordination argument here. It would be the purpose and function of this hearing not to try that case, not to call witnesses in support of a claim the city has that some claim or another of a given party should be equitably subordinated, but still there should be some testimony by someone or some evidence somewhere of what the factual predicate in a summary way of such a claim might be.

All right. I think that's as much as I want to say about the 9019, 365 motion.

On the debtor in possession financing motion under Section 364, the Court basically agrees with the city's position that Section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits any review of what the city proposes to do with the proceeds of the loan and actually prohibits any review beyond the narrow review that Section 364 itself requires to determine the reasonableness of the terms of the borrowing given the current market conditions for similar kinds of loans and the other technical requirements of Section 364, including the city's inability to obtain a loan on any better terms. And, of course, the Court welcomes any evidence on the issue of whether the debtor in possession financing was negotiated in good faith, but the city's proposed use of the proceeds is not a matter for this Court's consideration next week.

Having concluded all of that, the Court must conclude that the record fails to establish cause for any adjournment. Accordingly, it is denied.

Now, can we move to the final pretrial conference on this? Did you all prepare a joint pretrial statement?

MR. SHUMAKER: Good morning, your Honor. Greg
Shumaker of Jones Day for the City of Detroit. Yes, your
Honor, we did prepare a joint statement of facts in
connection with the -- what we've referred to as the

assumption motion. We were able to hash that out over the last week or so, and I believe we filed that on Wednesday night.

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. SHUMAKER: The joint statement of facts with regard to what we referred to as the PPF motion, the DIP motion, is still in progress. We're hopeful, your Honor, that the parties will be able to come up with something before the hearing next week. We've sent back some -- the city sent back a number of comments to the objectors, I think, last night, so we are very hopeful that we'll be able to achieve that, but it's still --

THE COURT: Hopeful you'll be able to achieve what?

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, a joint statement of facts with regard to the DIP motion.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SHUMAKER: We've submitted that to your Honor. The parties have agreed --

THE COURT: Okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SHUMAKER: -- with regard to the assumption, the forbearance agreement facts.

THE COURT: Okay. And that's all wonderful, and I appreciate that all very much. My question had more to do with the more standard, you know, joint pretrial statement where you state your claims, you state the defenses, you

state who the witnesses will be and what the exhibits will be.

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, along those lines, the short answer, I think, your Honor, is, no, we have not been operating under the standard joint pretrial order process because we thought that it was not appropriate, but we have been working on --

THE COURT: That's okay. We can still accomplish a lot here this morning. Have all of the exhibit lists been finalized --

MR. SHUMAKER: I believe they have, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- by all of the parties on both sides?

MR. SHUMAKER: All of the exhibit lists have been submitted to the Court. The only reservation is that there are continuing depositions. There's one or two depositions left. The parties reserve the right to supplement, but, yes, the exhibit lists have all been provided, have been filed, and what we are hoping to do along the lines of a pretrial order that we haven't been following, but is to come up with what we've talked about with regard to the eligibility hearing where we do what your Honor is I would suggest proposing, which is that there would be a joint list where there would be a list of the documents to which there is no objection, and your Honor could rule on the admissibility of those, and then a corollary with the list of exhibits to

which there have been objections.

Now, the city has provided its objections to the objectors. We're waiting and discussing with them waiting for their objections to the city's exhibits, but that's underway, and we also hope to have that filed hopefully Monday. Obviously there's not a lot of time, but we are working on that actively.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Does anyone see any obstacle to getting that to the Court by the close of business on Monday? All right. But just to be, you know, as technically accurate about this as we can, there was some overlap in exhibits at the eligibility trial --

MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- which created a little bit of confusion. I would encourage you to try to minimize that as much as possible, so if the city has offered an exhibit, I would discourage other parties from including that same exhibit on their lists.

MR. SHUMAKER: We'll do everything we can, your Honor.

THE COURT: If it's an exhibit, you know, in a different form or if it has, you know, attachments to it that the city's doesn't have, okay, but if it's the exact same pieces of paper, we don't need it twice.

MR. SHUMAKER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: In terms of numbering, I like the numbering system we used last time where, you know, each party takes a range of numbers in the hundreds.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, I believe that the city had zero through a hundred, although we have more than a hundred exhibits, so we may have to hog the --

THE COURT: Yeah.

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MR. SHUMAKER: -- zero to 200 range.

THE COURT: Fine.

MR. SHUMAKER: But we can figure --

THE COURT: Whatever you work out is fine. I just don't want parties to use the same numbers --

MR. SHUMAKER: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- because that's going to be confusing.

MR. SHUMAKER: One outstanding issue on that is, your Honor, the city has provided electronic copies of all of its exhibits to the objectors. We've asked for those in return, but I think we've -- I don't know how many objectors have responded. As of yesterday, it was one, but it facilitates the issue of figuring out what exhibit it is and so that we can give the objections back. I don't know if a deadline is necessary, but we have had some difficulty in that regard.

THE COURT: Well, let me just ask. Can you all get your exhibits to the city in the electronic format that they

provided to you by the close of business today? All right. 1 Hearing no objection, I'll assume that will be done. So 2 after the hearing today, I would encourage you all to 3 4 collaborate together on who gets what exhibit numbers, what exhibit ranges are assigned to which parties. Okay? 5 6 MR. SHUMAKER: Certainly, your Honor. THE COURT: Now, who are your witnesses? MR. SHUMAKER: The witnesses right now are the five 9 that I mentioned last time we met, your Honor, the day before 10 Thanksqiving --11 THE COURT: Remind me. 12 MR. SHUMAKER: -- which was Mr. Moore from Conway 13 MacKenzie, Mr. Doak from Miller Buckfire, Mr. Malhotra from Ernst & Young, Mr. Buckfire, and Mr. Orr. 14 Those are the five. And I think I have --15 16 THE COURT: All right. But I want to be sure that 17 you constrain your examination of those witnesses to the issues that I identified here. 18 19 MR. SHUMAKER: We will do that, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: All right. I'd like to hear the names 21 of the witnesses that the objecting parties intend to call, 22 so let's have that, please. Who'd like to go? 23 MR. HACKNEY: I'm sorry. I didn't hear. I'm sorry. 24 THE COURT: I'm sorry to you, sir. My question is

who's -- what witnesses are the objecting parties going to

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call?

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2 MR. HACKNEY: I'll let each speak for their --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. HACKNEY: My name is Stephen Hackney, your Honor, on behalf of Syncora. At this point, we only have a may call witness. We have not determined today that we will call him, and I would propose to monitor the course of the hearing and give counsel for the other side 24 hours' notice or 48 hours' notice if I refine that. I was -- refine that into the intention to call for certain. I was hoping that I might ask the city to provide us with the order of the witnesses by the close of business today. It helps us coordinate our preparation of cross-examination amongst objectors.

THE COURT: So who's your may call witness?

MR. HACKNEY: It is a potential expert witness by the name of Mr. Davido.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah.

THE COURT: Who else is going to call witnesses?

21 MR. GOLDBERG: Good morning, your Honor. Jerome

22 | Goldberg appearing on behalf of interested party David Sole.

23 Your Honor, I'd like -- I just had one question, if I may.

24 | was a little confused on the second point in your order on

25 | the issue of collectibility. I guess maybe I should just

listen to it again, but I was a little confused. There were two --

THE COURT: Well, it's not that complex. To the extent that whatever claims third parties have against the city, the issue of the collectibility of the city is an issue to be taken into account in determining the fairness of the settlement. Anyway --

MR. GOLDBERG: Okay. I understand it better now.

THE COURT: Okay. Who's your --

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MR. GOLDBERG: I was -- my own confusion.

THE COURT: Who's your witness?

MR. GOLDBERG: I intend to call, at least at this point, Wallace C. Turbeville as basically an expert on the first issue. That's my -- the one witness.

THE COURT: When you say "the first issue," you mean --

MR. GOLDBERG: The issue on the equitable questions concerning the forbearance agreement itself and the DIP in relation to the forbearance agreement. I also do have a recall witness that's a -- a rebuttal witness who is Sharon McPhail. It was one of the people involved in the -- on City Council at the time of the hearing itself -- I just actually ran into her two days ago -- as a potential rebuttal witness.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. GOLDBERG: Can I ask one other question, your

1 Honor? 2 THE COURT: Sure. 3 MR. GOLDBERG: I'm sorry for --4 THE COURT: That's all right. MR. GOLDBERG: -- my inexperience. The city did 5 6 file a number of objections to exhibits that, you know, I 7 proffered, and will there be a hearing? You don't intend to hear those objections today or -- I was just trying to get 8 9 some advice on that. 10 THE COURT: No, I don't. You know, during the 11 course of the hearing when it comes time for your case --12 MR. GOLDBERG: Okay. THE COURT: -- you will proffer those exhibits in 13 the ordinary course, and if the city still objects, I'll hear 14 15 those objections and your response. 16 MR. GOLDBERG: Thank you, your Honor. 17 MS. DIBLASI: Your Honor, Kelly DiBlasi on behalf of 18 Financial Guaranty Insurance Company. We intend to call 19 Stephen Spencer of Houlihan Lokey as a witness. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 21 MS. DIBLASI: Thank you. 22 MS. GREEN: Jennifer Green on behalf of the 23 Retirement Systems. We had intended as may call witnesses 24 Ann Langan and Irvin Corley of the City Council staff and 25 Thomas Gavin. However, based upon today's ruling, we'll be

reassessing our may call list.

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THE COURT: Okay. Any other witness names? I do want to discuss the issue of limiting time on each side for presentations.

MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, I had some collected thoughts I was going to offer at some point, and I just wanted to make you aware of that.

THE COURT: Regarding this issue or a different issue?

MR. HACKNEY: It relates very directly to this issue and to the organization of the hearing.

THE COURT: Go for it.

MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, I wanted to tell you that the objectors have been working together to try to organize the presentation of it for the Court so it's as coherent as possible. That's not always easy because --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HACKNEY: -- the objectors don't always object -- in addition to the fact that we're all different firms and entities, but --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HACKNEY: -- we don't always object for the same reasons, but we've had some success. We have eight hours that's been allocated to our side by your order, and what we have done is we had a proposal for you about how we hope to

strike the allocation of time, and I was hoping I could lay that out for you in the way of suggestion as to how it may be --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKNEY: -- most efficient. The first thing is we are going to endeavor to use a lead cross-examinationer as a way of trying to get someone to cover the main body of a witness' cross on behalf of all objectors subject to the important point that each individual objector will retain the right to do discrete amounts of cleanup if they have unique issues, but we hope to use a lead questioner style method of cross-examination. We hope to spend approximately -- we intend not to do opening statements unless the Court really wanted them. The briefs so --

THE COURT: Yeah. I leave it optional to you.

MR. HACKNEY: Our intention was not to spend our time on opening statement unless you just preferred

18 otherwise.

THE COURT: I don't.

MR. HACKNEY: We hoped to spend approximately four and three-quarters hours on our witness cross-examination and/or our directs. I will tell you that it is somewhat -- it's more art than science when you're trying to predict time on that. It relates to things like witness responsiveness and a host of factors.

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. HACKNEY: That is our going in strategy, and we would then retain three and a quarter hours for closing argument.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKNEY: We propose to have an -- what we call an issue-based closing argument as opposed to a party-based closing argument. The idea is to try to avoid repetition. And so I wanted to suggest to you what we had thought the different mainline issues would be, although it's been impacted somewhat by today, but I was going to offer them for your consideration.

THE COURT: I have to say in this regard, you know, that how you divide this up among yourselves or what issues you articulate is not something I need right now, so if you want to keep this to yourselves and/or reconsider it at some point, that's fine, but, you know, my main issue is in fixing this time and making sure we're all on the same page regarding it, and it sounds like we are.

MR. HACKNEY: Yeah. Thank you, your Honor. I just didn't want to be in a position where I was presuming to tell you what we would be spending our argument time on because the argument, of course, is supposed to aid you in your determination, so I wanted you to have an opportunity to tell me, no, I don't want argument on that, I want argument on

this, and so forth, but we can caucus in light of today.

THE COURT: You can rest assured that if anyone is arguing into a vicinity that I don't think is helpful, I will let you know.

MR. HACKNEY: I have personal experience with that, so thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: You do.

MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor --

THE COURT: You asked for that.

MR. HACKNEY: I did. I did, and I take it willingly. I have a follow-up question, if I could ask you, about witnesses because -- and I'll let Mr. Hamilton respond to this after I do, but with respect to the views you expressed on 904 versus 364, obviously notwithstanding our disagreement, it's heard and understood on our part, but I wanted to tell you that my interpretation of what you said to me when I look at Mr. Moore's declaration -- he's the Conway MacKenzie individual who he details here are the different problems, here's how we're going to use the money, and here's why it's going to fix them, and so on and so forth -- that that would not be relevant under the standard as you articulate it. Now, I don't want overstep, but --

MR. HACKNEY: -- do you agree? Okay. That's

25 helpful to me because we're in the process of preparing, so

That's right.

THE COURT:

I'll caucus with Mr. Hamilton about that, but that was a point of clarification.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HACKNEY: So I've hit all the issues that I hit, and I hope I addressed your question about how we intend to use our time and --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HACKNEY: -- who we intend to use it with. Thank you.

MR. HAMILTON: Robert Hamilton of Jones Day on behalf of the City of Detroit, your Honor. I did have just a brief moment to caucus with Mr. Hackney, and I'm not sure we've worked all of this out. With respect to witnesses that both sides are going to call on the motion to approve the post-petition financing, it seems, given the Court's ruling, that most, if not all, of the testimony that was previewed in Mr. Moore's declaration would not be necessary and, in fact, would be immaterial under the standard you've articulated.

THE COURT: Under the standard that you advocated.

MR. HAMILTON: Under the standard that we advocated. I've advocated things, and I don't always win what I advocate, your Honor, so we were trying to cover all our bases. The two experts that the objectors have identified, Mr. Davido and Mr. Spencer, the opinions that they proffered at their depositions relate to an issue that appears to fall

on the irrelevant side, but if it doesn't, then Mr. Moore would be relevant.

THE COURT: Okay. I have to -- I have to ask you to defer your argument on this until they actually testify.

MR. HAMILTON: Well, it goes to whether we're going to have three witnesses here or zero on the issue of do we need to borrow the money now. If the question of do we need to borrow the money now or do we have enough money without borrowing to do what we want to do, if that's not within your scope of review under your ruling today, then neither Mr. Moore nor Mr. Spencer nor Mr. Davido are relevant, and they don't need to come here next Tuesday.

THE COURT: If you want me to find that it is relevant that it is necessary to borrow this money now -- this is your motion, you know -- then that suggests all that is relevant.

MR. HAMILTON: Our position is you don't need to find that, and we don't need to ask you to find that. And if that's the case, we would not need to call Mr. Moore, but then neither would Mr. Spencer or Mr. Davido need to come. And the only reason I raise it now is because it's a pretrial, and we'd kind of like to know in advance whether these three witnesses are going to have to be here on Tuesday or not. Our position is it's not relevant given your ruling, and I have not had a full opportunity to confer with Mr.

Hackney other than we thought it might be appropriate to raise it today to get it resolved. That's all I had to say at the moment.

MR. MARRIOTT: Your Honor, Vince Marriott, EEPK. If I could just speak to the findings, I think that the city's proposed order that accompanied the motion does request findings on those issues. If the city is prepared to submit a revised proposed order that strips out asking for these things, then I think we are in a better position to decide whether we need that, but so long as the proposed order asks findings on that sort of thing, you know, we're sort of stuck.

THE COURT: And that's why I asked the question that I asked, so I think the answer is really in -- of the city's own making. If there's a finding you want me to make, you better submit evidence of it, but then you open the door to rebuttal evidence on it. Otherwise I don't see the relevance of the necessity of the borrowing for the 364 motion, but, you know, it's your motion, so if you want me to make a finding on it, it's up to you. If you say no, then the objecting parties will rely on that, and, you know, you can't argue that they didn't submit any evidence.

MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, I think we are going to take the position that it's irrelevant. I think what we should do is that I should just caucus with Mr. Marriott and

Mr. Hackney, and we should work this out by Tuesday.

one more thing in the interest of justice. I wouldn't normally say this, but with all due respect to Mr. Orr, I need to emphasize to him through his counsel here the necessity of him being responsive to the questions and with the caution that if he is not, as he was not during the eligibility trial, that may constitute grounds or cause to extend the objecting parties' time to present their case.

All right. I need to get back to the issue of the privilege log, but before I do that, I want to see if there's anything else we need to cover in the context of this final pretrial conference. We have several willing attorneys, so we'll just race to the lectern.

MR. GOLDBERG: Sorry, your Honor. Jerome Goldberg on behalf of interested party Sole. I know I'm asking the indulgence of the Court, and if I'm out of line, let me know, but I have a -- honestly speaking, I'm operating in this case on virtually no budget, and my expert is testifying on that basis. I was just wondering if it's possible for me to get a sense of when I would need to -- and I have to fly him in from New York --

THE COURT: Um-hmm.

MR. GOLDBERG: -- when he might be testifying. I mean I normally would not ask, but I'm not in a position to

even pay him as my client is not in a position to pay myself.

THE COURT: Remind me how much time we allocated for the city. Was it seven, seven hours?

MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So we may or may not quite get through the city's case on Tuesday, right, depending on recesses and whatnot, so it would either be sometime during the day on Wednesday or Thursday, so I would suggest that you collaborate with your fellow objecting parties' attorneys and see if you can agree upon the order in which witnesses are called, and that'll give you a much better sense of when your witness would come up.

MR. GOLDBERG: Thank you very much, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Fish, you wanted to be heard?

Yes. I didn't know if Mr. Shumaker was

16 finished with the city's presentation. Deborah Fish from the

17 | law firm of Allard & Fish on behalf of the ad hoc COP

18 | holders. Similar to Mr. Goldberg, your Honor, my client

| would only like to make a five-minute presentation at the

20 hearing. Wondering if, in fact, that could be made at the

beginning so that we wouldn't have to appear every day and

22 | could just listen by phone.

MS. FISH:

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23 THE COURT: Does anyone object to that?

MS. FISH: Thank you, your Honor.

25 THE COURT: All right. We will hear you first thing

Tuesday morning then. Would anyone else like to be heard in the context of any joint -- of any final pretrial order issues, questions?

MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, would you indulge me in just one more brief colloquy on part of your ruling because I think it will help us determine whether witnesses need to come?

THE COURT: Um-hmm. Go ahead.

MR. HACKNEY: Steve Hackney again on behalf of Syncora. You know, I'm loath always to question the Court extensively, and I'll try to avoid that.

THE COURT: I appreciate that.

MR. HACKNEY: Your job is to rule, and our job is to figure it out, but you talked about the word "need" in the context of the Section 364 versus 904 context, and Mr. Hamilton and you talked about that subject with respect to different witnesses, and I just wanted to articulate a possible distinction and make sure we understand it.

The first thing I could see the Court saying is if Mr. Orr decides that the city needs a hundred police cars, I -- as the Court, I am not going to review that decision under 904. My reading of your ruling is that's clearly what you were saying on that point. There is a second concept, though, which is whether or not he should borrow the money to buy the police cars or whether or not he has existing funds

with which to borrow the police cars, and this is a second concept, which is the need to borrow. Is that also within the rubric of a decision that you will not review, which is --

THE COURT: It is.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ HACKNEY: It is. That clarifies it, and I appreciate it.

THE COURT: But there's an "unless" there, which I asked the city about, unless they want me to find that they need to borrow the money, but the city said, no, they don't want me to find that even though it's apparently in -- someone said it's in the order that was proposed with the motion and they're going to collaborate with you on all of that, so --

MR. HACKNEY: Thank you.

THE COURT: -- if they open that issue up, go for it. If they don't want that finding, I don't think it's necessary or appropriate under 364 in a Chapter 9 case.

MR. HACKNEY: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. SHUMAKER: One issue, your Honor, which we'd appreciate some clarification on, and that is the time limits. And now that it appears that the city will have seven hours and that the objectors will have eight hours to present their case, does the time allotted to each side include the cross-examination of the --

THE COURT: Oh, no. That's lectern time. 1 2 MR. SHUMAKER: Okay. Okay. Yes. 3 THE COURT: Does that answer your question? 4 MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, that does. That does, yes. 5 Thank you. THE COURT: I keep a running clock by minutes of the 6 7 time each side is standing at the lectern --8 MR. SHUMAKER: Thank you, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: -- whether it's opening, cross, direct, 10 or closing. On the privilege log issue, one of the 11 consequences of my earlier statement of the issues is that as 12 an evidentiary matter, I don't think it's relevant what any 13 particular attorney concludes regarding the strengths or weaknesses of any of the claims or defenses are nor do I 14 15 think it's relevant what any particular attorney on either 16 side for this matter told a client were the strengths or 17 weaknesses of any particular claim or defense. So on the issue of the privilege log, I don't think that any attorney-18 19 client communications are particularly relevant in the first 20 instance, so in those circumstances, I cannot conclude that the disclosure of a privilege log is necessary, so I won't 21 22 require it. 23 All right. Anything further for today? 24 MR. HACKNEY: Can I be heard on that just briefly? 25 THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HACKNEY: The only desire for the log is to confirm that the documents that have been withheld are privileged. If they are privileged, I'm not disputing the idea that they can withhold them under the privilege. I'm not saying you'd put it at issue. I'm just saying I want to check.

THE COURT: Your concern is that they have withheld documents that weren't communications between attorneys and clients?

MR. HACKNEY: Well, yes, because the way privilege --

THE COURT: That would be pretty ugly.

MR. HACKNEY: Well, no. It's not necessarily uncommon when people are reviewing, especially a pace like this, which is you'll look at the to and from on an e-mail, and if you see an attorney, you'll just mark it, and then you -- when you do the log, then you do the hard calls and say, "Well, yeah, there was an attorney cc'd on this, but this is really Miller Buckfire to business guys talking business stuff."

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKNEY: Then you produce it. So I didn't want there to be confusion about why I want the log. I'm not trying to say, "Oh, look at what they withheld. This is relevant." I'm trying to check their privilege calls.

THE COURT: Any response to that?

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, my response would be that when we produce documents, when we gather the documents from the city and we review them and produce them, we do our darndest to give the responsive documents as we did in connection with the PPF motion, and --

THE COURT: What motion?

MR. SHUMAKER: I'm sorry. The post-petition financing, the DIP motion. I forget which one we're calling it. And so, you know, we've -- we do have to go through a review. We do have a number of people who look at those documents. They operate in good faith, do the best they can. It's, you know, a significant amount of work to undertake just under the possibility that a document was withheld that shouldn't have been. I can't represent to your Honor that that's not possible, but we do have an affirmative ongoing obligation that if we uncover something that is not privileged, we produce it.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I'll ask you to file an affidavit then by Tuesday which describes what process you used to determine which documents were privileged or to be claimed as privileged and not disclosed, therefore, what standards the staff used, and I want the representation of who's ever affidavit this is that it is that affiant's good faith belief that all of the documents withheld are subject

to a proper claim of attorney-client privilege.

MR. SHUMAKER: Certainly will do that, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess.

THE CLERK: All rise. Court is adjourned.

5 (Proceedings concluded at 12:13 p.m.)

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None

EXHIBITS:

None

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

/s/ Lois Garrett

December 15, 2013

Lois Garrett

ı						
1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN					
2	SOUTHERN DIVISION					
3	IN THE MATTER OF, Case No. 13-53846 Detroit, Michigan					
4	CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN December 18, 2013 / 9:01 a.m.					
5						
6	IN RE: MOTION OF THE DEBTOR FOR A FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO 11 USC SECTIONS 105, 362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(e), 364(f),					
J	503, 507(a)(2), 904, 921, AND 922(I) APPROVING POST-PETITION					
7	FINANCING, (II) GRANTING LIENS AND PROVIDING SUPERPRIORITY CLAIMS STATUS AND (III) MODIFYING AUTOMATIC STAY (DKT #1520)					
8	MOTION OF THE DEBTOR FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER (1) AUTHORIZING THE ASSUMPTION OF THAT CERTAIN FORBEARANCE AND OPTIONAL					
9	TERMINATION AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 365(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, (II) APPROVING SUCH AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO					
10	RULE 9019, AND (III) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF (DKT #17) CORRECTED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER (I) AUTHORIZING THE					
11	ASSUMPTION OF THAT CERTAIN FORBEARANCE AND OPTIONAL					
12	TERMINATION AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 365(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE (II) APPROVING SUCH AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE					
13	9019, and (III) GRANTING RELATED RELIEF (Dkt #157) BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEVEN W. RHODES					
14	TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: <u>STEPHEN GROW, ESQ.</u>					
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1 (Court in Session) THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please 2 be seated. Case number 13-53846, City of Detroit, Michigan. 3 4 THE COURT: Good morning. One moment, please. Sir. 5 MR. ERENS: Good morning, Your Honor. Again Brad Erens on behalf of the City of Detroit. 6 7 If it please the Court, we thought before we went on the 8 clock this morning we'd give the emergency loan board report 9 Your Honor asked for yesterday afternoon. 10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. ERENS: Mr. Steve Howell of Dickinson, Wright is 12 here on behalf of the state and I'm going to have him give the 13 report. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. ERENS: Thank you. 16 MR. HOWELL: Good morning, Your Honor. Steven G. 17 Howell, Dickinson, Wright appearing as Special Assistant 18 Attorney General on behalf of the state. 19 Your Honor, I understand there were questions that came 20 up yesterday and I'd like to address a couple of them that I 21 understand were raised. One is in terms of the members of the 22 board, emergency loan board, they are Kevin Clinton, State 23 Treasurer, John Nixon, Director of the Department of 24 Technology Management and Budget, and Steve Arwood, Director

PAGE 7 1 Your Honor, there is underway an effort to get a meeting 2 scheduled. There is 18 hours notice required under the Open Meetings Act. We hope to have that meeting scheduled by the 3 4 -- either on Friday afternoon, or Monday. And that is the 5 soonest we can have it set up, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: What is the nature of the loan board's 7 review? 8 MR. HOWELL: It's not real clear. The -- the 9 requirement -- the review is under the Home Rule Cities Act, 10 not under PA436. And it is simply a requirement that it comply with the procedures and requirements of -- of the --11 12 let me just read it for you if I could.

THE COURT: Okay, sure.

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MR. HOWELL: And it's the Home Rule City Act 279, Section 36(a)(2). Any financial recovery bonds issued under this section are subject to the terms and conditions approved by the local emergency financial assistant loan board created under the Emergency Municipal Loan Act.

And that is the extent of the guidance in the statute. It will be presented to them. They will ask whatever questions they have and make their decision at that time.

THE COURT: Why wasn't this done before this hearing?

MR. HOWELL: I think at the time I think their

1 that may come up in the course of this proceeding, in the 2 course of any negotiations, the Judge's ruling, that what we would present to the emergency loan board would be that which 3 4 was final and concluded. Whether that was a correct judgment with the benefit of hindsight, is another question. But that 5 was the thinking at the time that we would simply present what 6 7 was the final outcome as opposed to having to possibly go back 8 later if there were changes between what was approved earlier 9 and what ultimately --10 THE COURT: Someone actually made the decision to potentially risk wasting the Court's time and all of the 11 12 attorney fees in this case? MR. HOWELL: That was -- that was certainly not --13 THE COURT: Should the loan board decide not to 14 15 approve whatever loan this Court approves? 16 MR. HOWELL: That was not the intention, Your Honor. 17 The intention was not to show any disrespect to this Court. 18 THE COURT: Well, it's not -- of course it wasn't your intention, but that's the risk, right? 19 20 MR. HOWELL: That is -- that is the risk. We are 21 hopeful that will not happen, but that -- that is a risk that exists, Your Honor, I can't change that. 22 23 THE COURT: Well, let me just put it to you

directly. Is there any reasonable likelihood that the loan

MR. HOWELL: Well, the question will be presented and needs to be made. That decision needs to be made in -- in the meeting that is scheduled under the Open Meetings Act.

But I do not expect there -- we do not expect there to be an issue, but that is -- that -- that decision has to be made at that meeting at that time under the Open Meetings Act, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, but -- okay. So suppose one or more of the objecting parties here wish to address the loan board with the same or perhaps even different issues on why the loan board shouldn't accept it. Will -- will -- will that be permitted?

MR. HOWELL: I suppose they -- I don't know the procedure for presenting evidence at that hearing. I don't know that there is a procedure for presenting evidence. But if it is, I would -- I would expect that that board would be before this Court.

THE COURT: I wasn't asking about evidence, I was just -- that's another question. I was just asking about whether parties are permitted to be heard on the issue of whether the loan should be approved at that administrative level.

MR. HOWELL: It is an open -- it is an open meeting under the Open Meetings Act. So I suppose someone could come

1 board to disregard the Court's view of this when -- when the 2 ruling is completed. And we are confident it will be -- be approved, but we cannot say that or give any real guidance 3 4 prior to that meeting occurring. 5 THE COURT: Is it your recommendation that the Court proceed? 6 7 MR. HOWELL: It is, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 9 MR. HOWELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: One more moment, please. At the 11 beginning of this case, I resolved to myself that I would 12 never have an off the record conversation with counsel because 13 the case is too public for that. 14 A circumstance, however, has arisen that has forced me to 15 reconsider that and so I want to see Ms. Ball and Ms. (sic) 16 Hackney at the side of the bench here right now. 17 (At Side Bar Off the Record at 9:09 a.m.; Resume at 9:10 18 a.m.) THE COURT: All right. Let's proceed. 19 20 MR. HAMILTON: Good morning, Your Honor. Robert 21 Hamilton of Jones, Day on behalf of the City. We're going to continue with the direct examination of -- of James Doak. 22 23 THE COURT: Sir, you are still under oath. You may 24 be seated.

Doak - Direct (WITNESS JAMES DOAK WAS PREVIOUSLY SWORN) DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HAMILTON: Q Good morning, Mr. Doak.

A Good morning.

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Q When we broke yesterday afternoon, evening we were on City's Exhibit 88 which is the September 26th, 2013 financing discussion dec that you testified you provided to Mr. Orr, the City's CFO, and to then State Treasurer Andy Dillon. And we were on the second page of the dec which is up there on the screen.

And I wanted to ask you, the first two columns after all the names of the alternative lenders has a column that CA sent and CA signed. What does the CA refer to?

- A That refers to confidentiality agreement. So the first column is parties that received the confidentiality agreement and then parties that returned it executed.
- 18 Q And then the next column is 9-6 check in. What is that?
- 19 A For parties that received the introductory packet at the
- 20 -- at the commencement of the process. We had asked them to
- 21 get back to us on the 6^{th} of September to indicate whether they
- 22 were anticipating preparing a -- a term sheet or indication of
- 23 interest.
- Q Okay. And then the next column has the label data room.

1 We anticipated at the outset of the process that some of 2 the parties may ask for access to a data room and we -- this 3 column was intended to track those that -- that were admitted 4 into the data room.

And if you go down to the -- the very bottom on that column under the grand total which as I understand it combines both the lenders on this page and the previous page, the traditional lenders. It has a total of eight out of 50 with access to the data room, is that right?

10 That's correct.

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- 11 Why such a small number?
- 12 Of -- in the -- in the time frame of getting to the term sheets, a number of the parties did -- did not request access 14 to the data room. In -- they felt that they could produce the 15 term sheet without access to the data room and as a result only -- only eight subsequently entered the -- the data room.
- 17 Did they have discussions with you in -- in lieu of going to the data room on other topics?
- Yes, they did. Most of our discussions with the parties in advance of deliveries of the term sheet concerned structuring of the -- structuring of the loan and the provisions in the indicative term sheet. Parties were less 23 concerned with the financial and operational data that was in the data room that the City operated.

1 before the 26^{th} and after the 26^{th} , what was the most important 2 areas of concerns that were expressed by the lenders to you? 3 The most -- the areas that were most frequently addressed 4 by the lenders were the state of the Chapter 9 filing and the 5 protections including collateral that the lenders would receive in the -- in making the loan and how those protections 6 7 and collateral would be affected by various litigative 8 outcomes including the appeal of the Chapter 9 and a -- an overturning of the -- the -- the Chapter -- Chapter 9 as well 9 10 as other issues associated with 436. And when you say the appeal of Chapter 9, do you mean the 11 12 appeal of the eligibility ruling for Chapter 9? The lenders were concerned that the Court's 13 14 decision on the eligibility of the city would be overturned in 15 the appellate process and at that point they would have a -- a 16 loan agreement that would potentially have state -- state 17 components and federal components, but the federal components 18 could be viewed as being inactive or not part of their loan 19 any longer. 20 So how did the concern regarding loan structure and 21 collateral relate -- relate to the concern about the 22 possibility that the Chapter 9 eligibility ruling would be 23 reversed and this case would be dismissed? How did those two

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relate?

1 proceeding forward. None of them indicated to us that they 2 were -- were willing to proceed forward without -- and being provided collateral and collateral that could be provided to 3 4 them under state law as well as -- as federal law. 5 MR. ARNAULT: Objection, Your Honor. That's 6 hearsay. 7 THE COURT: Overruled. 8 The last column on Page 2 of this dec is title -- not the 9 last column, second to last one is -- is term sheet. What 10 does that refer to? That refers to potential lenders who got back to us with 11 12 written indications of interest to participate in the 13 financing. Now in the -- if you look at the very bottom on that 14 column, the grand total is 15 out of 50. Yet in the City's 15 16 motion and your declaration and -- and in some other testimony 17 we have indicated that we got a total of 16 term sheets, not 15. Why does that say 15 but elsewhere we say 16? 19 Subsequent to the date of this document, CSG Investments 20 which also goes by the name Beal Bank in our process submitted an indication of interest. 21 22 And they're the one that's close to the middle of the 23 page there on the alternative lender's side, right?

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That's correct.

- 1 this exhibit, what does this page represent?
- 2 A This page represents the comparative economics of solely
- 3 the -- the swap termination portion of the post-petition
- 4 financing amongst the various parties.
- 5 Q And then the next page of the exhibit shows what?
- 6 A The next page shows the same mathematics for the quality
- 7 of life component of the facility.
- 8 Q And then Page 5 of the next page shows what?
- 9 A Page 5 shows the comparative economics of the proposal --
- 10 proposals that we received for the entire financing and for
- 11 the total facility.
- 12 Q Okay. Now there's a -- there's a black bar down the
- 13 middle of this chart. There's three potential lenders on the
- 14 left side of that -- of that black bar and there's five on the
- 15 right side. What's the significance of that black bar?
- 16 A At the time these were the three potential lenders that
- 17 we were recommending that we proceed forward with to
- 18 definitive commitment letters.
- 19 Q The three to the left of the bar?
- 20 A That's correct.
- 21 Q And why -- why were you recommending proceeding with
- 22 those three and not with the other five?
- 23 A We were recommending those three because of the -- their
- 24 -- all in terms of their -- their indicative term sheet,

- 1 strength of the institutions.
- 2 Q And if you'll look on the -- the -- under the Barclays
- 3 column, the second lender there to the left of the bar. If
- 4 you go down to the -- the bottom totals on the difference from
- 5 lowest all in rate and difference from lowest all in expense,
- 6 dashes there for Barclays. Why is that?
- 7 A Because this -- this row showed sort of distance off the
- 8 lead. And at this point Barclays was the lead and that they
- 9 were the lowest all in rate provider of financing.
- 10 Q All right. Now does this all in cost analysis reflect
- 11 the market flex provision that ultimately ended up in the
- 12 Barclays facility?
- 13 A No. No, it does not.
- 14 Q Why not?
- 15 A Because at -- at this time the indicative term sheet that
- 16 they provided us did not have a market flex provision.
- 17 Q All right. After you recommended to the -- I assume you
- 18 made your recommendation to Mr. Orr, the emergency manager.
- 19 I'm assuming the three to the left of the bar, is that right?
- 20 A Yes, we did.
- 21 Q All right. After you made that recommendation, what did
- 22 you do?
- 23 A We -- we indicated to those three institutions that we
- 24 would like to see from them definitive executable commitment

- 1 Q And did you go after anybody else other than those three?
- 2 A Subsequently we incorporated the syndicate of lenders led
- 3 by Carval which is the next -- the next column over.
- 4 Q Why did you decide to do that?
- 5 A Because we were not confident we would get to acceptable
- 6 commitment letters from all three of the -- the lenders. We
- 7 had issues with -- individual issues with all of them, but --
- 8 but significant issues with Bank of America and with -- and
- 9 with Goldman.
- 10 Q And so what were you -- what was your concern then as to
- 11 why -- why you needed to get someone else in -- in -- in the
- 12 room?
- 13 A Our -- our concern was we were headed towards a one horse
- 14 race and that would give us very limited flexibility in case
- 15 for some reason we were not able to arrive at acceptable terms
- 16 with Barclays and recognizing that Carval was a close fourth.
- 17 We incorporated them back into the process.
- 18 Q Let me ask you now about City Exhibit 89.
- 19 MR. HAMILTON: And this too, Your Honor, is already
- 20 in evidence because it was not objected to.
- 21 Q What is this document, Mr. Doak?
- 22 A This was the briefing materials that we provided to the
- 23 emergency manager and -- and others providing the real time
- 24 status update on negotiating commitment letters and -- and the

- 1 from the four lead potential lenders.
- 2 Q Did you also give this to then State Treasurer Andy
- 3 Dillon?
- 4 A Yes. The -- the working group was -- was the same set of
- 5 individuals.
- 6 Q As the previous dec?
- 7 A As the previous dec. The Director of Michigan Finance
- 8 Authority, the Treasurer, CFO, other members of the EM staff.
- 9 Q All right. So if we go to the next page of this exhibit
- 10 which is Page 1 of the dec.
- 11 A This is a comparison of the principal economic terms of
- 12 Barclays and Carval which were at that time developing into
- 13 our two lead potential commitment letters.
- 14 Q And then on Pages 3 and 4 you got the same discussion
- 15 with respect of Bamil and Goldman Sachs, is that right?
- 16 A That's correct.
- 17 Q All right. Go back to Page 1. Under the Barclays
- 18 columns, halfway down there's a thing for market flex. We now
- 19 have information there on the market flex. Why is that?
- 20 A In their definitive commitment letters, Barclays
- 21 incorporated in market flex terms into what they -- into their
- 22 overall commitment.
- 23 Q Okay. If we load to Page 5 of this exhibit, the one
- 24 that's labeled 5, what is this?

PAGE 19

- of the state of the four proposals. And for Barclays and for
- 2 Goldman Sachs. Both of those institutions anticipated
- 3 syndicating a portion of the loan subsequently. So both of
- 4 them incorporated in market flex provisions to their -- their
- 5 commitment. So we ran those proposals both at their, you
- 6 know, starting no flex point and also at their max flex point.
- 7 Q All right. If you go down to the very bottom, there's a
- 8 total annual expense row. What's that?
- 9 A Total annual expense was our mathematics for taking the
- 10 | all in rate and incorporating in all of the fees associated
- 11 with the transaction as well as the interest rate and
- 12 calculating over a two year period what the raw dollar cost
- would be of each one of these commitment proposals.
- 14 Q All right. And so if you look for under the max -- max
- 15 flex column for Barclays you get a total annual expense
- 16 calculation of 26.3, I assume that's million, is that right?
- 17 A Yes.
- 18 Q All right. And that's lower than all the other figures
- 19 to the right, is that correct?
- 20 A That's correct.
- 21 Q So even if you get the max max max market flex for
- 22 Barclays it's still less expense to the City than the others?
- 23 A That's correct, yes. That was our conclusion.
- 24 Q All right. This is dated -- this -- this dec is dated

PAGE <u>20</u>

- 1 Is that Thursday?
- 2 A That was Thursday morning.
- 3 Q What happened on Friday and over the weekend?
- 4 A Friday and over the weekend, we negotiated with Barclays
- 5 and their representatives to come to a final form of
- 6 commitment letter. We also engaged in dialogue -- you know,
- 7 dialogue with Carval in regards to furthering on their --
- 8 their commitment as well.
- 9 Q All right. And did Barclays send you its commitment
- 10 letter, signed by the Barclays representative on Sunday the
- 11 6th?
- 12 A Yes. At each stage of the process we asked Barclays to
- 13 -- to bring down their commitment letter and provide us with a
- 14 executed copy. This is our way making sure in our process
- 15 that what we had from them was what they were willing to sign.
- 16 Q Now did Mr. Orr sign the document on Sunday evening the
- $17 \mid 6^{th}$ when you got the signed ones, the signed letter from
- 18 Barclays?
- 19 A No, he did not.
- 20 Q All right. What did you do on Monday the 7^{th} ?
- 21 A On Monday the 7th, I met -- I start -- I met with members
- 22 of city council on a one on one basis to brief them on the
- 23 post-petition financing process and the fact that we would be
- 24 coming to them shortly with a financing proposal.

- 1 of the city council on Monday and Tuesday of that week?
- 2 A Yes, I met with each member of city council on -- on
- 3 Monday and Tuesday, most on Monday.
- 4 Q Was that just one meeting or was it individual meetings
- 5 | with each one?
- 6 A It was individual meetings with each one of the city
- 7 council members, all six.
- 8 Q And in those individual meetings with each individual
- 9 member of the city council, did you provide them with any
- 10 written materials to explain the process in the terms of the
- 11 commitments that you had received?
- 12 A Yes, we did. Or yes, I did.
- 13 Q All right. I'd like to ask you about City Exhibit 90,
- 14 Mr. Doak. What is this document?
- 15 A The -- this is the presentation, the physical briefing
- 16 materials that I provided to each member of the city council
- 17 in the one on one meetings that I held with them on October 7^{th}
- 18 and October 8th.
- 19 (City's Exhibit 90 was identified)
- 20 Q And did you discuss the contents of this document with
- 21 each member of the city council?
- 22 A Yes, I did.
- 23 Q During those meetings?
- 24 A Yes, I did.

1 move Exhibit 90 into evidence. 2 THE COURT: Any objections? It is admitted. (City's Exhibit 90 was admitted) 3 4 If you'll look at what's numbered Page 4 on this dec, 5 which makes it the fifth page in, next page. There you go. If you look at the bullet that starts with this confidential 6 7 process. Do you see that, Mr. Doak? Α Yes. 9 Could you read that, please? 10 This confidential process resulted in a competitive financing commitment on the most favorable terms available in 11 12 the market. What were you referring to with the phrase, a competitive 13 financing commitment in this bullet? 15 I was referring to the -- the -- the deal that we -- we had in hand from Barclays. 17 If we turn to the next page of the exhibit, what does this page show? This page shows the savings, the opportunity to the City 19 20 from -- from moving forward with the -- with the termination of the swaps and putting in place the post-petition financing. 22 All right. And in the middle column it says annual cost of -- of swap termination load. And then in Italics it says, 23

indicative all in interest rates. Do you see that?

- 1 Q What -- what did you tell the city council members was 2 meant by indicative all in interest rates?
- A I -- we told them that indicative all in interest rates
 was meant to represent both the interest rate components which
 could be a base rate plus a -- plus a -- plus a lift. As well
 as the fees associated with the deal. So it's consistent with
- 8 Q So it includes both the potential interest rates and the 9 fees involved with the loans, is that correct?
- 10 A That's correct.

council?

the all in economics concept.

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- 11 Q All right. How did you -- why did you choose the ranges
 12 that are in here 5 to 9% to discuss with the members of city
- 14 A I chose the -- the ranges here because I knew that the
 15 financing proposal that we had was well within the bounds of
- financing proposal that we had was within this range without

this range and I could represent to council members that the

- 18 disclosing the specific economics.
- 19 Q All right. So earlier you said it was the interest rate
- 20 plus a lift is the term you used. Did you tell each
- 21 individual council member that there was a market flex
- 22 provision in the commitment?
- 23 A I -- I -- I don't recall whether I discussed market flex
- 24 with them at -- at this time.

- all in would be somewhere in the range of 5 to 9%, is that 2 right?
- 3 A Yes. I told -- I told them that this range was a -- was
- 4 an appropriate range and the financing was going to be well
- 5 within this -- the range that was presented to them.
- 6 Q All right. I'd like now to ask you, Mr. Doak, about City
- 7 Exhibit 96. Are you familiar with this document, Mr. Doak?
- 8 A Yes.
- 9 0 What is it?
- 10 A This is the letter from Kevyn Orr to then Treasurer Andy
- 11 Dillon requesting his approval as is required under 436 for
- 12 Kevyn to execute the commitment letter, the Barclays
- 13 commitment letter to proceed forward with the financing.
- (City's Exhibit 96 was identified)
- 15 Q And was this document actually sent to Treasurer Dillon?
- 16 A Yes, it was.
- MR. HAMILTON: Okay. Your Honor, the City would
- 18 move Exhibit 96 into evidence.
- 19 THE COURT: Any objections? It is admitted.
- 20 (City's Exhibit 96 was admitted)
- 21 Q Did you have -- and if we look -- if you'll look at the
- 22 third page of this exhibit. And this is an attachment to what
- 23 the letter that was sent to Mr. Dillon, is that right?
- 24 A Yes.

- 1 A This is the -- this is the fee letter which is one
- 2 component of the documentation that we were required to
- 3 execute at that time to proceed forward.
- 4 Q If you'd go to Page 5 of that fee letter. You'll see --
- 5 go back one, please. There -- this -- this fee letter is
- 6 signed by Barclays, is that right?
- 7 A Yes, it is.
- 8 Q By Gerbino?
- 9 A Yes.
- 10 Q And it's not signed yet by -- by Mr. Orr on behalf of the
- 11 City of Detroit, is that right?
- 12 A That's correct.
- 13 Q And then the next document that's attached is what is
- 14 that? The next -- there we go. What is that?
- 15 A This is the commitment letter for the financing.
- 16 Q And if you go to the last page of that document which is
- 17 Page 10, the signature page, you'll see that one is signed
- 18 also by Barclays?
- 19 A Yes.
- 20 Q But not yet signed by Mr. Orr, is that correct?
- 21 A That's correct.
- 22 Q And this is on Tuesday the 8^{th} when it was sent to Mr.
- 23 Dillon?
- 24 A That's -- yes.

1 about this document, this package on Thursday evening the -the 10^{th} ? 2 3 Yes, we did. 4 And I'd now ask you to look at City Exhibit 97. What is 5 this document, Mr. Doak? This is the response that we received from Treasurer 6 7 Dillon coming out of the prior night's conference call when we 8 asked for his approval for Kevyn Orr to execute the commitment 9 documentation for the Barclays loan and --(City's Exhibit 97 was identified) 10 Is this document Mr. Dillon's approval of the loan and 11 12 the -- and authorization for the City to enter into the commitment? 13 14 Yes. 15 MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, the city would move City Exhibit 97 into evidence. 16 THE COURT: Any objections? It is admitted. 17 (City's Exhibit 97 was admitted) 18 And again this exhibit is dated October 11th, that's 19 20 Friday, right? 21 Α Yes. All right. So let's look at City Exhibit 94 then. 22 is a copy of the commitment letter from Barclays, right? 23 24 Α Yes.

1 And if you look at the signature -- signature page which 2 is ten pages in, I believe, right there. We see that it's executed by Kevyn Orr on behalf of the City of Detroit, is 3 4 that right? 5 Yes. When did Mr. Orr sign this document? 6 7 He signed it on the 11th. 8 After you received the approval from Mr. Dillon? 9 Yes. MR. HAMILTON: And, Your Honor, Exhibit 94 is 10 already into evidence, it wasn't objected to. 11 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 13 Mr. Doak, could you explain to the Court why the City 14 agreed -- why it entered into the commitment letter and agreed 15 to pay the commitment fee to Barclays before it obtained 16 approval from the Bankruptcy Court of this transaction? We -- we moved forward with executing the commitment 17 18 letter because it was an integral part of the overall Barclays 19 financing. And it was -- which was the lowest overall cost to 20 the city. And we were -- would not have the ability to 21 proceed forward with negotiating definitive documentation with 22 Barclays unless we executed the commitment letter. Why did the city --23 24 MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, I -- I misspoke.

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 1
            The objection was that it's duplicative. We couldn't
 2
    find it elsewhere, so we don't think it's duplicative. But I
 3
    misrepresented it, it has not been entered into evidence yet.
 4
    So we would move it into evidence.
              THE COURT: Thank you. Any objections? Let's just
 5
    restate for the record what Exhibit 94 is.
 6
 7
              MR. HAMILTON: Is -- Exhibit 94, Your Honor, is the
 8
    commitment fee letter that is executed by both Barclays and by
   Mr. Orr on behalf of the City of Detroit.
 9
10
              THE COURT: Thank you. Any objections?
11
              MR. MARRIOTT: I want to just clarify the commitment
12
    fee letter, or the commitment letter?
              MR. HAMILTON: It's titled commitment letter.
13
14
    fee letter is a separate document.
              MR. MARRIOTT: Right. Okay, I just wanted to
15
16
    clarify. No objection.
17
              THE COURT: It is admitted.
18
         (City's Exhibit 94 was admitted)
19
        Mr. Doak, can you explain to the Court why the city
20
    ultimately decided to select Barclays over all the other
21
   potential lenders? What's -- what's advantageous about the
22
    Barclays financing facility?
         The -- the Barclays facility was advantageous over the
23
    others because it presented the city with the best overall
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commitment by a major financial institution that we felt confident would be able to complete the transaction.

In addition the other terms that Barclays negotiated for in our process were ones that we felt we were capable of performing -- performing on in the time allotted. That includes the collateral provisions that they -- that they requested.

Q What was particularly attractive about the collateral provisions in the Barclays financing proposal that you ultimately were able to negotiate?

A The -- the Barclays proposal worked with the indicative term sheet that we provided and was -- and they were willing to move forward with the -- the limited collateral interest that we suggested that the lenders would receive on gaming revenue and income tax revenue.

The other proposals that we received most -- all the other proposals were -- were much more complex in regards to what collateral interest parties were looking for.

Q And under the Barclays proposal that you were able to negotiate, what happens with respect to the collateral if the city is unable to get exit financing and the city ends up defaulting at the end of the term of this loan?

A The -- Barclays has limited rights under the documents to -- to utilize up to \$4,000,000 a month of gaming tax revenues

- 1 interest and amortize their position down. They -- they don't
- 2 have -- they don't have more expansive rights to the tax
- 3 streams of the city.
- 4 Q So they can't -- can Barclays if -- if the city defaults,
- 5 can Barclays demand immediate payment of the entire
- 6 outstanding balance in full and collect the collateral to do
- 7 that?
- 8 A No, that's -- that's not within their rights under the
- 9 documents.
- 10 Q All right. And is the city confident that in the event
- 11 it defaults, can't obtain exit financing, it will be able to
- 12 afford the amortized pay down of the loan in a default status
- 13 going forward?
- 14 A It will require some very difficult choices, but the --
- 15 but the city is -- is confident that it can -- it can still
- 16 operate and perform under those terms.
- 17 Q If I could ask you, sir, now to look at City Exhibit 98.
- MR. HAMILTON: And again, Your Honor, this is a
- 19 document that is -- that is already in evidence because it was
- 20 not objected to.
- 21 Q Mr. -- Mr. Doak, can you tell us what this document is?
- 22 A This is the submission of the post-petition financing to
- 23 -- to the city council.
- 24 | Q Was this document in fact -- and its attachments provided

- 1 A Yes, it was.
- 2 Q Okay. And then if I could ask you, sir, what happened
- 3 after you submitted the -- the package that included the --
- 4 the financing proposal and the related letters? What happened
- 5 with respect to the city council after you submitted them?
- 6 A The city council requested a -- a briefing on the -- on
- 7 the post-petition financing, so we -- and we provided them
- 8 with a closed meeting briefing in the subsequent week.
- 9 Q And did you attend that meeting?
- 10 A Yes, I did.
- 11 Q And did you physically provide them with the dec that
- 12 they requested?
- 13 A Yes. We -- we provided them with briefing materials in
- 14 the context of that meeting.
- 15 Q All right. If I can ask you, sir, to look at City
- 16 Exhibit 91. What is this document?
- 17 A These are the briefing materials that we provided to city
- 18 council in their closed session on the afternoon of October
- 19 17th.
- (City's Exhibit 91 was identified)
- 21 MR. HAMILTON: Okay. Your Honor, the -- the city
- 22 would move Exhibit 91 into evidence.
- THE COURT: Any objections?
- MR. MARRIOTT: Your Honor, no objection to admission

1 to city council. There are projections on the back that we 2 lodged objections to yesterday as to their relevance and whether they should be admitted for the truth of the material 3 4 information contained therein. But as to -- to the extent the 5 city, and I assume this is true, was using this exhibit for purposes of showing what was provided to city council, no 6 objection. 7 8 THE COURT: Is that the purpose of the exhibit, sir? 9 MR. HAMILTON: That is correct, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: All right. For that limited purpose, Exhibit 91 is admitted. 11 12 (City's Exhibit 91 was admitted) Mr. Doak, if you'll look at Page 6 of this dec. Under 13 the -- in the row that's got the heading of pricing, second 14 15 from the bottom. The second bullet refers to the market flex 16 provision, or market flex provisions. Do you see that? 17 Yes. 18 What was -- what was discussed with council in the closed session on the 17^{th} regarding this -- this provision? 19 20 We informed them that there was a -- there was a market 21 flex provision in the -- in the Barclays commitment that gave 22 Barclays the -- the flexibility within specific limits to 23 modify the -- the interest rate component of the -- the financing in order to syndicate out a -- a given portion of

- 1 Q During that closed session, did you expressly state what
- 2 the maximum cap was on the market flex?
- 3 A No, we did not.
- 4 Q Why not?
- 5 A Because that's the -- because it was important to not
- 6 convey the market flex including what the max is in a -- in a
- 7 forum that could eventually be public because that would
- 8 defeat the -- the purpose of having the -- the market
- 9 flex provision. Financing would likely move to the -- to the
- 10 all in rate.
- 11 Q Now had you already discussed with each of the individual
- 12 city council members what the interest -- potential interest
- 13 rate range would be as a result of the market flex?
- 14 A In -- in the one on one sessions with the council
- 15 members, for those who -- who asked about the pricing, we --
- 16 we had conveyed that the -- that the commitment was -- was
- 17 | well within the range that we had provided which was the 5% to
- 18 the -- to the 9%.
- 19 Q Okay. Did you also discuss at the closed session with
- 20 city council, the commitment fee that the city had agreed to
- 21 pay to -- to Barclays?
- 22 A Yes, we did.
- 23 Q Did you disclose the amount of that fee during your
- 24 discussions?

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- 1 Q What happened after the closed session with city council?
- 2 What did city council do?
- 3 A City council provided us with a -- the staff provided us
- 4 with a list of questions that we had to respond to over the
- 5 weekend.
- 6 Q And after you responded to those questions what did the
- 7 council do?
- 8 A The council subsequently did not approve the -- the
- 9 post-petition financing.
- 10 Q Is city council approving -- is city council approval of
- 11 the facility a condition, a closing condition to the facility?
- 12 A No.
- 13 Q Do you have an understanding as to why it's not a
- 14 condition to closing?
- 15 A The state public law 436 provides for how the City of
- 16 Detroit operates in the -- in the installation of emergency
- 17 manager. And subsequent to a disapproval by city council
- 18 there is an opportunity for them to provide an alternative and
- 19 then from there there is a -- there is an emergency loan board
- 20 decision that can be made to determine what goes forward.
- 21 Q Mr. Doak, do you have an opinion as to whether based on
- 22 the process that you -- you employed and directed, whether or
- 23 not the post-petition financing facility that the city has
- 24 agreed to with Barclays, has been substantially and adequately

- 1 A Yes, I do.
- 2 Q What is your opinion?
- 3 A My opinion is that the Barclays financing is the best
- 4 available to the city under present circumstances and it has
- 5 been adequately and appropriately tested by a robust
- 6 competitive and market based solicitation process.
- 7 Q And is it your opinion it's the best facility available
- 8 to the city even if the maximum market flex provision is --
- 9 THE COURT: Would you not ask a leading question on
- 10 this point?
- MR. HAMILTON: Sure.
- 12 Q Do you have an opinion as to whether or not this facility
- is the best available to the city even if the market flex
- 14 provision is fully implemented?
- 15 A Yes.
- 16 Q What is your opinion?
- 17 A My opinion is that even if the market flex provision is
- 18 fully executed, this is the -- this is the best available
- 19 financing to the city right now given the circumstances and we
- 20 have the benefit of knowing from a very competitive process of
- 21 | soliciting a -- from a wide range of financing providers what
- 22 other economics and associated terms was available. And I'm
- 23 confident that even with market flex, no party was -- was
- 24 willing to provide comparative overall and better terms.

1 unsecured financing is available to the city in this Chapter 9 2 case? 3 Α Yes, I do. 4 What's your opinion? 5 My opinion is that unsecured financing is not available to the City of Detroit at this time given its current 6 7 circumstances. 8 MR. HAMILTON: I have no further questions, Your 9 Honor. 10 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. ARNAULT: 11 12 Good morning, Mr. Doak. How are you? 13 Good morning. 14 Again, my name is Bill Arnault and I represent Syncora. 15 I'd like to begin by discussing the initial proposal that you 16 sent out to prospective lenders regarding the DIP financing. So the initial proposal that you sent out contemplated that 17 the DIP financing would be secured, correct? 19 Yes. 20 And the collateral that the city included in its initial proposal was income tax revenue, asset proceeds, and the 22 casino revenues, correct? 23 Yes. And you would agree with me -- agree with me that it

- 1 protections that went out with the city's initial proposal,
- 2 right?

- A I would agree.
- 4 Q And as part of this solicitation process, you did not
- 5 send out a solicitation document that asked parties to return
- 6 bids for unsecured financing, right?
- 7 A No, we did not.
- 8 Q And you did not personally ask any prospective lender if
- 9 it would make the DIP loan on an unsecured basis, right?
- 10 A I did not ask that particular question.
- 11 Q Now yesterday on direct you testified that you had some
- 12 discussions with potential lenders before you filed for
- 13 bankruptcy. Do you remember that testimony?
- 14 A Yes.
- 15 Q And you testified that you had conversations with
- 16 Deutsche Bank, Wells Fargo, Citibank, and JP Morgan, right?
- 17 A That's correct.
- 18 Q And as we learned yesterday as part of these discussions,
- 19 you identified four distinct revenue streams that could be
- 20 used as security to secure any potential lending facility,
- 21 right?
- 22 A Yes.
- 23 Q I'd now like to move to your discussions with the city
- 24 council regarding the Barclays DIP. As you testified earlier,

- 1 A Yes.
- 2 Q And as part of this market flex provision, the libor
- 3 floor can flex up from 1% to 2%, right?
- 4 A That's correct.
- 5 Q And the spread over libor can flex up from 2.5% to 4.5%,
- 6 right?
- 7 A Yes.
- 8 Q So the minimum interest rate on the DIP loan could go as
- 9 high as 6.5%, right?
- 10 A Yes.
- 11 Q And as part of the fee letter, Barclays has what is
- 12 defined as a successful syndication target, isn't that right?
- 13 A That's correct.
- 14 Q And the terms in the market flex provision allow them to
- 15 reset the interest rate on the entire loan within the market
- 16 flex parameters, right?
- 17 A Yes, under particular conditions.
- 18 Q So for example if Barclays discovers that the only
- 19 interested takers of the loan are willing to loan -- or
- 20 willing to take it at 5%, the portion of the loan that is also
- 21 retained by Barclays also resets to 5%, right?
- 22 A If they retained that portion of the loan, yes.
- 23 Q Okay. And the Barclays DIP also contains a commitment
- 24 fee, isn't that right?

- 1 Q And the commitment fee is due regardless of whether or
- 2 not this deal ever closes, right?
- 3 A Yes.
- 4 Q And you've already paid half of this commitment fee,
- 5 correct?
- 6 A No, we've paid all of it.
- 7 Q Okay. Okay. And the terms of the market flex provision
- 8 and the commitment fee are set forth in the fee letter,
- 9 correct?
- 10 A Yes.
- 11 Q And of course the market flex and the commitment fees
- 12 impact the ultimate cost of the Barclays DIP, right?
- 13 A Yes.
- 14 Q And when you were evaluating the various proposals, one
- 15 of the items that you evaluated was the interest rate, right?
- 16 A Yes.
- 17 Q So interest rate is a factor in evaluating the
- 18 attractiveness of a particular loan, correct?
- 19 A Yes.
- 20 Q And you would agree with me that pricing was an important
- 21 | factor when you were evaluating the various proposals, right?
- 22 A Yes, it was.
- 23 Q In fact you would not have been in a position to
- 24 recommend the transaction to Mr. Orr if you were not aware of

- 1 A I think that's correct, yes.
- 2 Q Now as you've testified, you said that you eventually
- 3 submitted the Barclays proposal to city council, right?
- 4 A Yes.
- 5 Q And under PA 436, if the city council disapproved the
- 6 Barclays DIP, it then had seven days to submit an alternative
- 7 proposal that would yield substantially the same financial
- 8 result or even a better one, right?
- 9 A I -- I don't think that's how 436 is written. They have
- 10 seven days to submit an alternative proposal.
- 11 Q That would yield substantially the same financial result?
- 12 A That's not how 436 is written. They have seven days to
- 13 submit an alternative proposal.
- 14 Q And after you submitted the proposal you had several
- 15 discussions with the city council members, correct?
- 16 A I have -- I'm a little lost on the chronology. Could --
- 17 could you provide some --
- 18 Q Sure, sure, sure. So after you submitted the proposal to
- 19 the city council, you had several discussions with city
- 20 council members, correct?
- 21 A No.
- 22 Q You didn't have any discussions with city council members
- 23 after you submitted the proposal to the city council?
- 24 A After we submitted the executed commitment letter to

- 1 full.
- 2 Q And this is a closed door session, correct?
- 3 A Yes.
- 4 Q So it was not subject to the Open Meetings Act, correct?
- 5 A Well, I -- I'm not familiar with every aspect of the Open
- 6 Meetings Act, but my understanding was that because this was
- 7 associated with litigation on a number of levels, the city
- 8 council and their legal advisors determined that a closed
- 9 meeting was appropriate.
- 10 Q Okay. And at this closed meeting, the substance of the
- 11 market flex provision was not provided to the city council,
- 12 right?
- 13 A No, it was not.
- 14 Q I'm sorry. It was not provided, correct?
- 15 A That's correct.
- 16 Q Okay. But isn't it true that after you had this closed
- 17 door meeting that the city council had additional questions
- 18 about the key terms of the Barclays DIP?
- 19 A The staff provided us with a list of questions that they
- 20 asked Jones, Day and Miller, Buckfire to answer.
- 21 Q Okay. And if we could turn to Syncora Exhibit 233.
- 22 MR. ARNAULT: I believe this has already been
- 23 admitted into evidence. Can we bring it up, please?
- 24 Q Now Syncora Exhibit 233 is an October 20th, 2013 email

- 1 correct?
- 2 A Yes.
- 3 Q And you are a recipient of this email, right?
- 4 A Yes.
- 5 Q And this document contains responses to the city
- 6 council's inquiries regarding the post-petition financing,
- 7 correct?
- 8 A Yes.
- 9 Q If we could turn to Page 7 of this document, please.
- 10 Sorry, next page, please. Yeah. And if we look at question
- 11 | 13, you'll see that the city council asked whether there are
- 12 any other key terms that the city council should be aware of.
- 13 Do you see that?
- 14 A Yes.
- 15 Q And in response the city notes that the primary terms of
- 16 the financing are in the term sheets, correct?
- 17 A Yes.
- 18 Q And the city notes the existence of market flex but does
- 19 not actually disclose the specific terms of the market flex,
- 20 correct?
- 21 A Yes.
- 22 Q Now, Mr. Doak, on redirect -- or on direct, you were
- 23 asked why you did not disclose the terms of the market flex to
- 24 the city council. And you stated that you did not want the

- 1 A That's correct.
- 2 Q But I think as we established, this was actually a closed
- 3 door meeting, correct?
- 4 A That's correct.
- 5 Q Can we bring up Exhibit 94, please? I believe this has
- 6 also been admitted into evidence. City Exhibit 94 please.
- 7 This is the commitment letter with Barclays, correct?
- 8 A Yes.
- 9 Q And this document actually sets forth the conditions
- 10 under which you may disclose the fee letter, right?
- 11 A Yes.
- 12 Q And if we could turn to Page 6, please. And if you'll
- 13 look at Section 8, that actually set forth the conditions
- 14 under which you may share the commitment letter and the fee
- 15 letter, correct?
- 16 A Yes.
- 17 Q And little (I) there, states that the commitment and fee
- 18 letters may be disclosed to the City of Detroit's agents,
- 19 representatives, officers, directors, and advisors on a need
- 20 to know basis to the extent you notify such persons of this
- 21 obligation to keep those documents confidential, correct?
- 22 A Yes.
- 23 Q And the section also states that the fee letter may be
- 24 disclosed to the extent required pursuant to applicable law,

- 1 council, correct?
- 2 A It doesn't say that. What --
- Q I think we go to the next page, please. Yeah, right at the top there.

respect to any disclosures regarding the commitment letter or the fee letter to the city council or any local emergency financial assistance loan board as may be required under Michigan PA 436, or Section 36(a) of the Michigan Home Rule Act, correct?

And we see notwithstanding any of the foregoing with

11 A Okay.

5

6

7

8

9

- 12 Q Okay. And you would agree with me that the city council
- are duly elected representatives of the City of Detroit,
- 14 correct?
- 15 A They are -- they are -- yes. They're -- well, I can't
- 16 tell you exactly how they fit into the architecture of
- governance under 436 at this point, but they're certainly
- 18 elected individuals into the city council provisions.
- 19 Q Sure. Okay. Moving along, have you ever used the -- the
- 20 forward libor curve to take the swaps all the way out to
- 21 completion?
- 22 A I think you're asking have I looked at the libor curve
- 23 and understand what the implications are and in regards to the
- 24 size of payments throughout the entire remaining life,

- 1 Q Yes.
- 2 A So I have an understanding of that.
- 3 Q Okay. And have you -- have you -- have you done that?
- 4 A I -- I -- I have not performed the -- the mathematics.
- 5 We have others on our team that have.
- 6 Q But you have an understanding of what that shows?
- 7 A Yes.
- 8 Q Similarly with respect to the -- the DIP financing, have
- 9 you done the same thing? Have you used the forward libor
- 10 curve to take -- to take that all the way out?
- 11 A Yes.
- 12 Q Okay. And have you compared the two results, the swaps
- 13 versus the DIP financing to see what that shows?
- 14 A No.
- 15 Q No. So you don't know whether the net present cost of
- 16 the swaps is actually lower than the net present cost of the
- 17 DIP financing?
- 18 A No, I'm -- I think there's a couple problems with your
- 19 question. Because as it stands the swaps are in default right
- 20 now. So I would -- I would challenge the assumption that you
- 21 should be looking at the swaps as if they will exist in their
- 22 current position in place over the next 20 to -- 20 to 30
- 23 years. And we -- but we do know that the mark to market
- 24 liability, the net present value of those -- that swap

1 \$290,000,000 in -- in recent times looking at the libor curve. 2 The economic cost of the swap termination portion of the loan is significantly lower because the principal balance of 3 4 the loan will be 25 to 18% less and in addition the -- the near term cost on a month to month basis is lower. 5 Okay. So it sounds like you haven't actually compared --6 7 I mean it sounds like you haven't actually compared whether the net present cost of the swaps is lower over time than the net present cost of the DIP financing, is that right? 9 10 Based on --11 Assuming that the swaps are not terminated. 12 Well, the swaps are in default so one would -- one would have to -- one would have to question how -- whether that 14 would be an appropriate analysis to perform. But it's not an analysis that you performed, correct? 15 16 We -- it's -- that is not a particular analysis that -that I had performed. We do know what the overall economic 17 18 cost is of the swaps to the end of the life. Effectively that's the mark to market liability. 19 20 MR. ARNAULT: Okay. No further questions, Your 21 Honor.

22 CROSS EXAMINATION

23 BY MR. MARRIOTT:

Good morning, Mr. Doak.

- 1 Q Vince Marriott of Ballard, Spahr representing EEPK and
- 2 affiliates. I have just a few questions for you. You
- 3 indicated in your response to previous questions that you did
- 4 not personally call any potential post-petition lender to ask
- 5 if they would provide to the city unsecured credit, correct?
- 6 A Yes.
- 7 Q Yes, that's correct?
- 8 A Yes, that -- that's correct. That would not --
- 9 Q I just want to make sure the answer doesn't come in
- 10 ambiguously.
- 11 A Okay.
- 12 Q My understanding is that you led the efforts of the city
- 13 to find post-petition financing, correct?
- 14 A Yes, I executed most of the activities and -- and led the
- 15 process.
- 16 Q Okay. Did you direct anybody else to contact a
- 17 prospective lender or lenders to ask if they would provide to
- 18 the city unsecured credit?
- 19 A No, I did not.
- 20 Q Did anybody do that anyway and report to you the answer?
- 21 A Not to my knowledge, no.
- 22 Q If we could bring up briefly City 90.
- THE COURT: I'm sorry, sir, what number?
- MR. MARRIOTT: I'm sorry, City 90.

- 1 including the cover page. Thank you. Now if I understood
- 2 your previous testimony, Mr. Doak, Exhibit 90 was a
- 3 presentation that you provided to the members of city council,
- 4 correct?
- 5 A Yes.
- 6 Q And these were the briefing materials from which you
- 7 spoke when you met with each of the city council members
- 8 individually?
- 9 A Yes.
- 10 Q And your testimony was that in the context of those
- 11 discussions, you did not indicate to members of city council
- 12 at least what the substance of any market flex provision would
- 13 be, but you did provide them with a range of interest rates
- 14 that could apply to the post-petition financing, is that
- 15 correct?
- 16 A That's correct.
- 17 Q And -- and that's what this page reflects, that range of
- 18 interest rates that you provided to them?
- 19 A Yes. This reflects a range of all end costs for the
- 20 facility.
- 21 Q Okay. And -- and it could run according to this chart
- 22 from a low of 5% up to 9%, correct?
- 23 A Yes.
- 24 Q So the range that you provided to them was one at the low

- 1 correct?
- 2 A Yes.
- 3 Q Now if we could turn to City Exhibit 89. And -- and
- 4 first let me just -- well, I understood your earlier
- 5 testimony, this presentation was provided to among others,
- 6 emergency manager Orr, correct?
- 7 A Yes.
- 8 Q And is it fair to say that this presentation was provided
- 9 to emergency manager Orr to assist him in evaluating the
- 10 relative merits of the four commitment letters that the city
- 11 received?
- 12 A Yes.
- 13 Q Okay. And if you would flip to the last page of this
- 14 exhibit. This is the all end cost analysis whereby the -- the
- 15 various potential costs of the facilities contemplated by
- 16 those four commitment letters, was provided to Mr. Orr,
- 17 | correct?
- 18 A Yes.
- 19 Q With the contemplation that he would use this information
- 20 to assist him in deciding which if any of these commitment
- 21 letters to -- or the -- which of any of these commitments to
- 22 proceed with, correct?
- 23 A Yes. We -- we were not asking him to make a definitive
- 24 decision at that particular meeting. But this was to advise

1 time.

- 2 Q Okay. Now in providing information to Mr. Orr, you
- 3 didn't provide a range of potential interest rates from 5 to
- 4 9%. You provided the actual potential interest rates, market
- 5 flex, and all under each of the commitments that the city had
- 6 in hand at that time, correct?
- 7 A Yes.
- 8 Q Would you have considered yourself adequately advising
- 9 him on the potential costs of these facilities if instead of
- 10 giving him the actual interest rates you just gave him a
- 11 range?
- 12 A No.
- 13 Q And I believe you also testified on direct that you gave
- 14 -- you gave two, unless I missed one, two principal reasons
- 15 for ultimately recommending the Barclays loan to Mr. Orr. The
- 16 first you gave was the best economics, correct?
- 17 A Yes.
- 18 Q Okay. And this last page of City 89, is a summary
- 19 depiction of the economics, correct?
- 20 A Yes, it is.
- 21 Q The second reason you gave if I heard you correctly was
- 22 that Barclays number one was undertaking to fully underwrite
- 23 the facility and they were an institution that could -- you
- 24 felt could close, correct?

- 1 Okay. And -- and there was a third and I have trouble 2 reading my own notes, you found the collateral provisions of the Barclays facility to be the most favorable of the 3 4 commitments you received? 5 We -- we did, yeah. We -- the Barclays facility was the best overall financing that the city had available given all 6 7 the elements of the commitment. The economics, the collateral 8 terms, the other lender protections, where they were willing, 9 where we resolved issues and associated with legal opinions, it -- it was the best overall proposal that the city had 10 available. 11 12 MR. MARRIOTT: Nothing further. 13 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. GREEN: 14 15 Good morning, Mr. Doak. I'm Jennifer Green on behalf of the Retirement Systems for the City of Detroit. 17 Good morning. 18 As you understand it the funds related to the quality of 19 life note will be deposited in one lump sum, correct? 20 Yes. 21 And those funds will be deposited into the city's general 22 fund account, not into a special re-investment account,
- 24 A My current understanding is that it will be deposited

correct?

- as a general fund account, however, it most likely will be deposited into a specific segregated bank account.
 - Q And the funds from the quality of life note are not earmarked for a particular purpose though, correct?
 - A They are not earmarked for a particular purpose.
- 6 Q And you can't answer why the city will not commit to 7 using those proceeds for a particular purpose, correct?
- 8 A I -- I don't -- sorry, can you ask that question again?
- 9 Q You cannot answer why the city will not commit to using
- 10 the proceeds for a particular purpose, correct?
- 11 A I -- I can provide you an answer.
- 12 Q What's that?

4

- 13 A I think the -- the -- the number of different projects
 14 and revitalization needs that the city has right now are --
- are extensive and I believe that there is some flexibility
- 16 that's desired by the -- by the leadership team to deploy the
- capital in the most efficacious purposes. And those
- determinations will most likely be made on a real time basis.
- 19 Q Mr. Doak, do you remember being -- being deposed on
- 20 December 5th of 2013?
- 21 A Yes.
- MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, I'm going to object to
 the relevance of this whole line of inquiry. I believe you
- 24 ruled on Friday this isn't relevant.

1 what I was looking for, that's why I'm bringing up his 2 deposition. He answered differently at his deposition. That's -- that's why. I'm not going into the --3 4 THE COURT: So you want to impeach him on an 5 irrelevant point? MS. GREEN: No. I -- I -- I didn't think he was 6 7 going to answer with the purpose. He said something different 8 about where the funds were going to be deposited in general. 9 I didn't expect him to say anything about the re-investment 10 structure. 11 THE COURT: Why do we care where the funds will be 12 deposited? 13 MS. GREEN: Pardon me? 14 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Where do we care about where 15 the funds will deposited? 16 MS. GREEN: He testified previously that they would 17 be deposited into the general fund and that they would not be 18 earmarked for any particular re-investment purpose. 19 THE COURT: Right. Why do we care about that? 20 MS. GREEN: It's not related to what I take his 21 objection to be. Under the city's proposed order, they are asking for certain findings of fact and conclusions of law 22 23 relating to the validity of the collateral with respect to the 24 quality of life note.

```
1
    several parties have objected to the legality of that
 2
    collateral. In order to find -- for this Court to find that
    that collateral is a valid pledge, I believe that the use of
 3
 4
    the proceeds for proceeds approved under the gaming act is
    still a relevant issue, setting aside what the objection is.
 5
    And I think I understand his is to be more limited than the
 6
 7
   purpose I'm seeking it for.
 8
              MR. HAMILTON: I withdraw the objection, Your Honor,
 9
    if that's the purpose.
              THE COURT: Well, but I -- I would suggest to you
10
    that you get to that rather than worry about what specific
11
12
    bank account it happens to land in.
              MS. GREEN: But I didn't expect the answer.
13
14
    expected something different, Your Honor.
15
              THE COURT: All right.
         Mr. Doak, do you remember being deposed on December 5th?
16
17
         Yes.
18
         Can you pull up Exhibit 236, please? Page 187. It
    actually starts on Page 186 at the bottom. At Line 22, Mr.
19
20
    Doak, if the post-petition financing is approved, is my
21
    understanding correct that the city will receive the proceeds
22
    as a part of one lump sum? Yes, that's correct. Do you
   recall that testimony?
23
24
         Yes.
```

1 is your understanding of what will happen to the remainder of 2 those funds? The aspect that is the quality of life note, 3 what will happen to that lump sum? That will be deposited in 4 the city's general fund. Do you recall that testimony? 5 Yes. And on Page 188. So as part of the general fund, is it 6 7 fair to say that those quality of life proceeds are not 8 earmarked for any particular purpose? Object to form. You stated they will -- the proceeds will not be placed to the 9 10 best of my knowledge in a segregated account and that the 11 spending will occur as I understand it, is not going to be 12 from a segregated account. Do you recall that testimony? 13 Α Yes. 14 Okay. And the concept of calling it a quality of life 15 note, was the idea --16 Would you like to know why the answer is changed? 17 Sure, why is your answer different today than it was a 18 week ago? We've -- we've had subsequent negotiations with one of 19 20 the objectors, NPFG and we've also had discussions with the 21 city in regards to how the city is going to be administrating 22 the quality of use funds. There is now in the latest version 23 of the order, some understanding as to how the city will be

attempting to track how the proceeds are used and report back

1 I'm also aware of dialogues between Conway, MacKenzie and 2 other city officials in regards to how they want to think 3 about using the funds and they have indicated it's 4 administratively easier for them to potentially track it in a 5 separate account. For clarification purposes, let's pull up the latest 6 7 order so you can clarify which portion of the order you are 8 referring to. 9 I -- I'm not -- sure. 10 Okay. Can I direct your attention to the first page. 11 you recognize this order as being the one that has recently 12 been amended? The date is at the bottom. So this -- this looks like it's the 16^{th} at 6:10. And I 13 don't know whether the negotiation with NPFG was completed by 15 that. In fact I'm -- I'm pretty sure it may not have entered into this particular version of the order. 17 So subsequent to this order, you have re-negotiated a term relating to the use of the proceeds? 19 Just how we are going to provide some information 20 and reporting on what we're -- on -- on how we're going to be 21 tracking the -- tracking the spending. 22 Can I direct your attention to Page 7? (ii), use of the

- 1 A Yes.
- 2 Q Okay. So this is the negotiation that you just
- 3 referenced with NPFG?
- 4 A No.
- 5 Q No. So I'm just trying to clarify. This order does or
- 6 does not contain the subsequent negotiations and the resulting
- 7 amendment that you are referencing?
- 8 A Given the -- given the time stamp on it, I -- I don't
- 9 know if it does. I don't believe it does. And once again
- 10 that is -- this is related to a -- a reporting or information
- 11 -- subsequent information providing requirement to the -- to
- 12 stakeholders.
- I -- I don't know if the order itself is going to include
- 14 a particular provision in regards to what bank accounts are
- 15 used. That's my -- my information there is based on dialogue
- 16 that I've had with city officials and advisors.
- 17 MS. GREEN: I'll move on, Your Honor, except that
- 18 we've all been tailoring our cross examinations based on the
- 19 details in the proposed order. This one was filed just two
- 20 days ago, so we've all been using that as our template.
- 21 And if there is a purpose of the quality of life note
- 22 that's been injected back into the case, we may have further
- 23 questions. I'm just not sure at this time.
- 24 THE COURT: Well, let's just inquire. Is there a

1 MR. HAMILTON: I believe -- I think this is the 2 current one, Your Honor. I think it's Paragraph 18 is what she meant to be looking at. 3 4 THE COURT: Eighteen? 5 MR. HAMILTON: Eighteen. MS. GREEN: So there, just to clarify, there is not 6 7 another order that will be filed after this. 8 MR. HAMILTON: There was a -- a typo that we found 9 that we need to correct, but substantively this is the current state of the -- of the order. 10 11 MS. GREEN: Thank you. 12 And back to the quality of life note. The concept for calling it a quality of life note was an idea by a -- an 13 attorney for the City of Detroit, correct? 14 That the name first appeared in a document -- in a 15 document that was drafted by Jones, Day. Okay. And this phrase, quality of life, originated in 17 mid to late August of this year, correct? 19 Α Yes. 20 And it was after the objections to the forbearance agreement and the assumption motion were filed in mid-August? 22 I -- I don't know the timing of the objections, but that 23 would --24 After August 16th?

- 1 Q Okay. And this terminology was used in response to
- 2 concerns related to the Michigan Gaming Revenue Control Act,
- 3 correct?
- 4 A This terminology was used because it appropriately
- 5 reflected the -- how the funds would be deployed.
- 6 Q Well, you had discussions about the Gaming Control Act
- 7 while you were developing the term sheet, correct?
- 8 A Yes.
- 9 Q And you incorporated ideas from those discussions when
- 10 you were formulating the purpose for which the quality of life
- 11 proceeds could be used, correct?
- 12 A Could you state that again?
- 13 Q You incorporated certain ideas from these discussions
- 14 when you were formulating the purpose for which the quality of
- 15 life proceeds would be used, correct?
- 16 A I -- I -- I believe that's accurate, but I -- I'm not
- 17 quite sure about the concept of formulating the purpose. But,
- 18 okay. I -- I didn't formulate a -- a purpose. I formulated a
- 19 construction of the -- the term sheet.
- 20 Q And you decided to call the loan that was not going to be
- 21 used to pay off the swaps, the quality of life loan in August
- 22 as we established. But your first awareness of the Michigan
- 23 | Gaming Act was actually back in June, correct, during
- 24 negotiations by the swap counter parties?

- 1 Q So you're generally familiar, or were familiar with the
- 2 notion that there are limitations on the use of casino revenue
- 3 under Michigan law?
- 4 A Yes.
- 5 Q And as you were drafting the term sheet you purposely
- 6 structured it so that different collateral would secure the
- 7 quality of life note versus the way that the swap note would
- 8 be collateralized, correct?
- 9 A Yes.
- 10 Q And you only offered the casino revenue for the quality
- 11 of life note collateral because you thought that it would be
- 12 less controversial given that the marketplace was aware of the
- 13 arguments that had been made in connection with the assumption
- 14 motion that had been filed, correct?
- 15 A Yes.
- 16 Q And in fact even with this collateral structure that you
- 17 came up with, some potential lenders still had concerns
- 18 regarding the casino revenue being used as collateral,
- 19 correct?
- 20 A Yes.
- 21 Q And I think that you just testified they were concerned
- 22 about the collateral with respect to both federal and state
- 23 law, correct?
- 24 A Lenders were concerned about how their collateral

- 1 context of state law and in the context of federal law.
- 2 Q Okay. And city council also had concerns with using the
- 3 casino revenue as collateral due to the gaming act, correct?
- 4 A I don't know whether I could affirm that statement. City
- 5 council, various city council members voiced their concern in
- 6 regards to the use of gaming tax revenues in the first place
- 7 in regards to some of the transactions in -- in 2009.
- 8 Q Do you remember meeting with someone named Irv Corley,
- 9 the executive policy manager of the city council's policy
- 10 division?
- 11 A Yes.
- 12 Q Do you remember this concern about the collateral and the
- 13 casino revenue being raised by Mr. Corley during that meeting?
- 14 A It most likely was.
- 15 Q Okay. Can you pull up Exhibit 233? And you recognize
- 16 these. You asked about these earlier. These are the
- 17 questions that were sent to you from city council? Well, this
- 18 is the cover email, but attached to this are the questions?
- 19 A Yes. This is the Q and A that was provided back to the
- 20 city council.
- 21 Q Okay. And this -- this casino revenue collateral issue
- 22 was also raised by the city council in their written questions
- 23 to you?
- 24 A It -- it most likely -- likely was.

- 1 A This was a set of questions prepared by city council 2 staff.
 - Q Okay.

- 4 A So I -- I can't tell you whether it was actually the city
- 5 council that raised this.
- 6 Q Fair enough. Can I direct your attention to Page 6,
- 7 Question 9? Question 9 states, under MCL 432.212, do you
- 8 understand that that's the Michigan Gaming Act, a reference to
- 9 that?
- 10 A Okay.
- 11 Q It lists the restrictions on the use of wagering taxes.
- 12 Which category allows the use of wagering taxes to secure the
- 13 swaps or the proposed financing? The response was, with
- 14 respect to the swaps, the swap counter parties have made
- 15 certain legal arguments in support of the pledge of wagering
- 16 taxes which speak for themselves.
- In connection with the proposed post-petition financing,
- 18 the city intends to rely on the Federal Bankruptcy Code to
- 19 authorize the pledge of collateral including the wagering
- 20 taxes. Did you -- did you work on this response to this
- 21 particular question?
- 22 A I did not work on this response.
- 23 Q But you understand that the city council's question was
- 24 what purpose under Michigan law and under which category of

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              MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, at this point I think
 2
    we're beyond the competence of the -- of the witness to
    answer. He didn't work on this portion of this unit.
 3
 4
              THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
 5
         Do you know who did prepare the responses to the
    questions raised by city council?
 6
 7
         Yes.
 8
         And who prepared these responses?
 9
         Two attorneys from Jones, Day.
10
         Okay. You would agree with me that based on the plain
11
    language of the answer since I will not be cross examining an
12
    attorney from Jones, Day, that there is no use listed in the
    response under Michigan law specifically referencing the
13
    gaming act?
14
              MR. HAMILTON: Object, Your Honor. It's calling
15
16
    for --
17
              THE COURT: The objection is sustained. You -- you
18
    can argue that, but --
19
              MS. GREEN: I'll move on.
20
         The city council, I believe we already established they
    were not given a copy of the fee letter?
         That's correct.
22
23
        And you admit that fees are important to you in analyzing
   the transaction, correct?
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- 1 Q I believe you were already asked this question about the
- 2 market flex provision, but I don't know that anyone asked this
- 3 with respect to the fees. If you didn't know the amount of
- 4 the fees associated with the loan, do you agree with me that
- 5 you would not be in a position to recommend the \$350,000,000
- 6 financing to the city?
- 7 A I -- I would agree with you.
- 8 Q Okay. Can we pull up Exhibit 1003? Mr. Doak, do you
- 9 recognize this email dated August 29th, 2013? Or it might be
- 10 August 30th, there's two.
- (Retirement Systems Exhibit 1003 was identified)
- 12 A I -- I --
- 13 Q Can you pull up the -- the paragraph below it? The body
- 14 of the email.
- 15 A It -- it looks that -- that looks like the letters that
- 16 -- email and correspondence we were sending to many of the
- 17 potential lenders.
- 18 Q Okay. And the to and from portion of the email states
- 19 that it's an email from you to Bruce Mendelson at Goldman
- 20 Sachs?
- 21 A Yes.
- 22 Q And Goldman Sachs was a potential lender with respect to
- 23 the post-petition financing, correct?
- 24 A Yes.

1 paragraph of the email. It says Jim, thank you for sending 2 the information over. We've begun our work and are far along in clearing our internal conflict system. Is there a data 3 4 room that you were planning on making available or should we 5 provide a list of diligent questions. Do you remember this 6 email? 7 Not -- not this particular email, but I -- that looks 8 completely consistent with what he might have written to me. 9 And with the work that you were doing to prepare the information that the lenders would need, correct? 11 Α Yes. 12 And your response to him, if we could go to the email 13 directly above that. Hold off on the due diligence, we have a 14 data room and there's a liquidity piece under development. You did not call the liquidity piece a quality of life 15 improvement piece to Mr. Mendelson, did you? That reference, a liquidity piece under development 17 18 is a reference to the -- the monthly cash flow liquidity 19 forecast that we subsequently provided to all of the potential 20 lenders that signed the NDA. 21 Okay. Can we also look at email Exhibit 1005? At the bottom portion dated August 29th, it's an email from you. Do 22 you recognize that email? 23

(Retirement Systems Exhibit 1005 was identified)

- 1 Q And is this another solicitation email to a prospective
- 2 lender?
- $3 \mid A$ Yes. In a -- yes, it is.
- 4 Q And Mr. Gavin is an investment banker at RW Baird,
- 5 correct?
- 6 A Yes, he is.
- 7 Q And you were reaching out to him as a potential source
- 8 for the post-petition financing?
- 9 A Yes. We -- we -- we were reaching out to RW Baird to see
- 10 whether they wanted to look at the financing opportunity.
- 11 Q And the email states exactly that, we're working on
- 12 sourcing 350,000,000 post-petition financing for the city, use
- of proceeds is to financing the swap termination and provide
- 14 general fund liquidity through the Chapter 9 case. Do you see
- 15 that portion?
- 16 A Yes.
- 17 Q And that's not relating to the liquidity forecast,
- 18 correct? That's the actual purpose of -- of the use of the
- 19 proceeds?
- 20 A Yes. This was sent to him to get a quick understanding
- 21 as to whether RW Baird wanted to be incorporated into the
- 22 process and receive the formal invitation.
- 23 Q And you also had a conversation with Mr. Gavin relating
- 24 to the potential post-petition financing shortly after this

A Yes.

Q And in this conversation he told you -- let's go to the
next portion of the email, please. The top of the email it
says when we spoke I said the counter parties didn't get a
bankruptcy opinion. Is he referring to the phone conversation

A Yes, he is.

that you had?

Q Okay. Further down in the second paragraph as I said on the phone, the counter parties' attorneys did not believe that the pledge survived, but they did what they could get from Oreck. And attached to this email was a legal opinion from Oreck, correct?

MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, at this point I think we're talking about double hearsay about what somebody who's not in Court said, somebody else who is not in Court said. I would object on that ground on this portion of the email.

THE COURT: Well, excuse me again. Is this exhibit in evidence?

MS. GREEN: Not yet. I was going to move for its admission after we established certain things relating --

THE COURT: Okay. Again, it's not proper to ask a witness about the content of a document until it is in evidence. So on that ground the objection is sustained.

MS. GREEN: Your Honor, I would move for the

1 MR. HAMILTON: And, Your Honor, we would object to 2 the portion of the exhibit that contains the double hearsay, the portion that's actually currently highlighted on the 3 4 screen. We don't object to the statements that this man made 5 to Mr. Doak in response to Mr. Doak's inquiries. But when this man is -- if they're introducing what this man is saying 6 7 about what somebody else said that is -- has no relation to 8 the financing that's being sought, that's double hearsay and 9 should not come in. 10 MS. GREEN: May I respond? I will be using this particular sentence for its affect on Mr. Doak and what he did 11 12 afterward, not to establish the truth of the email itself. 13 And so therefore I do not believe I'm using it for the truth 14 of the matter asserted and it's not hearsay. THE COURT: For that very limited purpose, the Court 15 will overrule the objection and admit into evidence Exhibit 17 1005. 18 (Retirement Systems Exhibit 1005 was admitted) 19 MS. GREEN: And, Your Honor, I believe that my 20 Exhibit 1003 is already in evidence, the one that I asked him 21 about previously. THE COURT: Would you like me to check for you? 22 23 MR. HAMILTON: No objection, Your Honor. We don't

object to it being admitted into evidence. It's not into

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1
              THE COURT:
                          1003 is --
                          Right, Your Honor.
 2
              MS. GREEN:
                          1003, all right. 1003 is admitted.
 3
              THE COURT:
 4
         (Retirement Systems Exhibit 1003 was admitted)
 5
         If we could pull the portion up that we had up a moment
    ago. And attached to this email was a legal opinion from
 6
 7
    Oreck, correct?
 8
         Most likely.
 9
         And I think we established when we -- when you testified
10
    at your deposition you didn't read the legal opinion, but you
    knew that it was attached?
11
12
         Yes.
    Α
         Okay. And that Oreck opinion, do you understand that
13
14
    that's the same opinion that was attached to the collateral
15
    agreement?
16
         I don't -- all I know is the Oreck opinion related to the
17
    2009 swap amendment.
18
         Fair enough. The portion that we read earlier, as I said
    on the phone the counter parties' attorneys did not believe
19
20
    that the pledge survived, but they did what they -- did get
21
    what they could from Oreck. And to your knowledge this
22
    information was gained through Mr. Gavin's role as a financial
    advisor to the city in 2009, correct?
23
24
              MR. HAMILTON: Again, I'm going to object now on
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the post-petition financing facility. It's not within the scope of his direct. I -- I don't see how this relates to the post-petition financing facility.

MS. GREEN: Your Honor, I believe that it does relate to the ability of the city to have potentially gotten a better deal. Yesterday we heard evidence relating to the city's poor bargaining position in relation to the forbearance agreement. We heard that they had no leverage. The cards were stacked against them.

I think that certain evidence tends to show that after they entered into the agreement they learned information that could have strengthened our case and I want to explore whether this information was used to reconsider their position, to investigate further, things of that nature.

THE COURT: This is arguable. I'll permit it. Go
ahead.

- 17 A Could you ask the question again, please?
- Q Sure. Your understanding was that this knowledge was gained by Mr. Gavin through his role as a financial advisor to the city in 2009, correct?
- A I have -- I have no knowledge and do not recall having
 knowledge at the time as to whether Tom Gavin was or RW Baird
 was an advisor to the city for the purposes of that

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- financial advisor or consultant for the City of Detroit,
 correct?
- A His -- yes. His engagement as I understand it has been a standing one related to the water fund and the sewer fund and the debt of DWSD. I don't know what RW Baird's role was or if
- 6 they had a role with regards to the 2009 deal.
- Q Okay. Rather than taking this down and pulling your deposition up, I will read it so that we don't have to switch.
- 9 You recall being deposed on December 5th, correct?
- 10 A Yes.
- 11 Q Do you recall being asked a question about Mr. Baird and
 12 your conversations and your knowledge of his involvement with
 13 the City of Detroit?
- MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, could we at least have a page reference so I can --
- 16 MS. GREEN: 215.
- 17 Q Do you recall testifying about that?
- 18 A I don't recall that particular -- I don't recall that
 19 particular question, but I'm sure you asked it.
- 20 Q Do you recall testifying, "he had a recollection, meaning
- 21 Mr. Gavin, or at least a narrative in regards to the
- 22 negotiations that occurred amongst the parties in 2009 and he
- 23 was informing me of a dialogue that he indicated had occurred
- 24 in the negotiations between the city and its advisors, and the

- 1 structuring the collateral agreement and the amendment to the 2 swaps"?
 - A Yes.

- 4 Q Does that change your answer as to whether or not you're
- 5 -- the context of your conversation was that he was a former
- 6 financial advisor during the 2009 negotiations?
- 7 A Absolutely not. I didn't know if that was firsthand,
- 8 secondhand, thirdhand, fourth hand, at the bar (Inaudible). I
- 9 -- I didn't know where he came up with this.
- 10 Q Okay. After you spoke to Mr. Gavin and you received this
- 11 email from him, you then forwarded this information to the
- 12 city's legal advisors, correct?
- 13 A Yes.
- 14 Q And why do you share it with -- why did you share it with
- 15 them?
- 16 A I shared it with them --
- MR. HAMILTON: At this point I think we're getting
- 18 into privilege, Your Honor.
- 19 MS. GREEN: Perhaps, then I -- with that caveat, if
- 20 there's a non-privileged answer, I'll take it.
- 21 THE COURT: I don't know that we can rely on the
- 22 | witness to know the difference.
- 23 Q Without disclosing any potentially attorney/client
- 24 privileged information, did you have a reason for forwarding

- 1 fine, sorry. Just --
- 2 A It seemed to be a pertinent conversation to make sure
- 3 that I was not the only person who was aware of this act that
- 4 my conversation had occurred.
- 5 Q Okay. And did you share it with the swap counter parties
- 6 as well?
- 7 A No.
- 8 Q Do you know if anyone from the city's team shared it with
- 9 the swap counter parties?
- 10 A No.
- 11 Q Did you do any further investigation as to whether Mr.
- 12 Gavin's statements were true?
- 13 A No.
- 14 Q Did you ask Mr. Gavin for the names of the individuals
- 15 that allegedly said these statements?
- 16 A No.
- 17 Q Did you look for any documents where the swap counter
- 18 parties may have made this admission -- admission in writing?
- 19 A No.
- 20 Q Did this information cause you in any way to reconsider
- 21 the deal that had previously been struck?
- 22 A In -- my focus at that particular point was on moving
- 23 forward with the post-petition financing and my area of focus
- 24 was not on the executed forbearance agreement and where it

- 1 Good point. Do you know if anyone else on the emergency 2 manager's team or perhaps your colleague Mr. Buckfire used 3 this information as leverage with the swap counter parties? 4 I -- I don't know. 5 Do you know after you forwarded this information on to others, do you know if anything was ever done with this 6 7 information in regards to due diligence that could be performed to look into the story that you were told? I don't know. 9 10 Is it fair to say that this information didn't cause you 11 to re-think the strategy of seeking post-petition financing 12 versus litigating the underlying swap transactions? I -- I -- could you ask the question again? Because 13 I'm --14 15 You just testified --16 Is it the whole city or -- or like we -- we had an 17 executed forbearance agreement that provided advantages to the 18 city and, you know, -- and -- and had, you know, various 19 obligations. And I was working on the -- the financing. 20 If there was to be a reverse of course on the direction 21 we were going on the forbearance optional termination 22 agreement, it would not have come from me. Okay. There were continued negotiations though related 23
- 25 | correct? Five amendments? 13-5-9846-5W Doc 2256-9 File 12/20/2/34 Effet 12/20/2/34 21:20/2/3 PRGG 7-5-20 15-74

to the forbearance agreement after its initial execution date,

- 1 A Yes. There has been subsequent amendments.
- 2 Q And there's a sixth one in the works, right?
- 3 A Yes.
- 4 Q And some of those are related to the fact that the city
- 5 missed the first discount milestone date?
- 6 A Sure, yes.
- 7 Q And the current size of the discount is a 25% discount
- 8 until January 1st, I believe?
- 9 A Well, the -- without an execution of the Sixth Amendment,
- 10 we -- we are in the 82 price zone.
- 11 Q Okay. And did you use any of this information as
- 12 leverage to negotiate yourself back into the 75% price zone?
- 13 A This is -- once again I'm focused on the post-petition
- 14 financing. And I have not taken a laboring or on the dialogue
- 15 with the swap counter parties.
- 16 MS. GREEN: Understood. Thank you. I have no
- 17 further questions, Your Honor.
- 18 THE COURT: All right. Stand by one second, please.
- 19 All right. We'll take our morning recess now and reconvene at
- 20 | 10 after 11:00, please.
- 21 (WITNESS JAMES DOAK WAS TEMPORARILY EXCUSED AT 10:46
- 22 A.M.)
- 23 THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess.
- 24 (Court in Recess at 10:46 a.m.; Resume at 11:13 a.m.)

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    be seated.
 2
         (WITNESS JAMES DOAK RESUMED THE STAND AT 11:13 A.M.)
              THE COURT: It appears everyone is present, let's
 3
 4
    proceed. Everyone except Ms. Green.
 5
              MR. HACKNEY: I think Mr. Doak probably would like
 6
    to confirm that we're done with him, sir.
 7
              THE COURT: Okay.
 8
              MR. HAMILTON: No redirect, Your Honor.
 9
              THE COURT: All right. You're all set, sir.
10
   Α
         Okay.
11
         (WITNESS JAMES DOAK WAS EXCUSED AT 11:14 A.M.)
12
              MR. SHUMAKER: Good morning, Your Honor. Greg
13
    Shumaker, Jones, Day for the City of Detroit. The city calls
    Kevyn Orr to the stand.
14
15
              THE COURT: While we have a moment, my latest count
    is 243 minutes left for the city and 319 minutes left for the
16
17
    objecting parties.
18
              MS. GREEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
19
              THE COURT: Please raise your right hand.
20
         (WITNESS KEVYN ORR WAS SWORN)
              THE COURT: Please sit down.
21
22
                          DIRECT EXAMINATION
23
   BY MR. SHUMAKER:
24
         Good morning.
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PAGE 77

- 1 Q Would you please state your name for the record?
- 2 A Kevyn D. Orr.
- 3 Q What's your current position, Mr. Orr?
- 4 A Emergency manager, City of Detroit.
- 5 Q Mr. Orr, are you aware of a document or agreement known
- 6 as the forbearance and optional termination agreement?
- 7 A Yes.
- 8 Q I'm going to refer to it as the forbearance agreement
- 9 this morning, is that okay with you?
- 10 A Yes.
- 11 Q Okay. What was your role in the negotiation of the
- 12 forbearance agreement?
- 13 A I participated in the negotiations towards the end to
- 14 final we get to definitive terms.
- 15 Q Who led the business and legal negotiations for the city?
- 16 A On the business side, it would be Ken Buckfire, the
- 17 city's investment banker. And on the legal side attorneys at
- 18 Jones, Day.
- 19 Q Anyone in particular at Jones, Day?
- 20 A I believe Corinne Ball and Bruce Bennett.
- 21 Q Okay. Why did you have Mr. Buckfire take the lead on the
- 22 business negotiations?
- 23 A Mr. Buckfire is the city's investment banker of the
- 24 restructuring effort and had participated in these types of

- 1 Q And when did the -- the swap -- I'm sorry, when did the
- 2 negotiations relating to the forbearance agreement begin?
- 3 A I believe they began in late May throughout June. I
- 4 became involved in early June.
- 5 Q Okay. And why did you believe pursuing such an agreement
- 6 in the May, June time period was important?
- 7 A The city was flowing cash flow negative quite severely,
- 8 almost to the point that we would not have sufficient cash to
- 9 make -- meet obligations as they became due.
- 10 Q Were there any other concerns that you had with regard to
- 11 the city's position at that time?
- 12 A Sure. In addition to cash flow concerns, I was concerned
- 13 that we wouldn't be able to provide services to the city. And
- 14 that we also were at risk of being in default and might lose
- 15 access to the casino revenue.
- 16 Q Was there any concern about a termination payment under
- 17 the swaps?
- 18 A Yes. We have been in default and there was quite a large
- 19 termination payment that could be due as well.
- 20 Q Did you have a sense as to how much that termination
- 21 payment might be?
- 22 A At that time I had heard figures somewhere between
- 23 | 300,000,000 to 400,000,000.
- 24 Q What was your understanding of why the city was facing a

A The -- the city had been in default for a number of issues including the declaration of the emergency and the appointment of an emergency manager. Obviously in the event of default. And the swap counter parties had been forbearing for some period of time, so the city was at risk at any given time of being declared in default and those parties exercising their remedies.

- Q As you started out with these negotiations, what were your objectives?
- 10 A Our objectives really were to get the best discount we
 11 could over the termination fee that was due to relieve any
 12 threat, to losing the casino revenue and to also to the extent
 13 we could, reduce the risk of litigation so we could stabilize
 14 the city's finances and go cash flow positive.
- Q You talk about the cash. Any particular portion of the city's cash that you were referring to, the casino revenues has come up?
- 18 A Yes. Casino developer revenue, yes.

8

- 19 Q Okay. Why is access to the casino revenue so important 20 to the city?
- A Casino revenue is the single most stable source of
 revenue available to the city. And without it the city cannot
 operate.
- Q Could you summarize for the Court how the negotiations

1 They progressed at a pace in June and in approximately the June 10th to June 14th time frame. 2 became more critical. There were a number of different 3 4 sessions that I personally was involved with where negotiations broke down and the parties would try again 5 ultimately reaching an agreement on June 12th or 13th, I 6 7 believe. 8 So you've mentioned that you got involved towards the end. What -- what do you mean by that? You -- what did you 9 10 personally do? Well, the -- the negotiations were going forward 11 12 principally on the business side from Mr. Buckfire and on the 13 legal side with the attorneys at Jones, Day for some weeks 14 before I got involved. But personally I began to negotiate 15 what I hoped to be the best possible discount percentage that 16 we could get. I want to talk a little bit -- ask you a few questions 17 18 about the -- the discount that you referred to. But focusing 19 right now on negotiations, and you said that Mr. Buckfire at 20 Miller, Buckfire, and Ms. Ball, and Mr. Bennett at Jones, Day, 21 how often did you communicate with them about negotiations 22 during this time frame? I -- I communicated either directly or indirectly 23 regularly throughout the June time frame with Mr. Buckfire for

- 1 phone calls off and on several times a day.
- 2 Q Do you recall what the opening positions of the city and
- 3 the swap counter parties were?
- 4 A Yeah. Generally speaking the -- the city wanted to get
- 5 the maximum discount available, relieve itself of the threat
- 6 to the casino revenue, release any liens that might -- that
- 7 the parties have on that revenue. The swap counter parties
- 8 wanted to take the position that they were 100% secured and
- 9 wanted to recover their total amount due.
- 10 | Q Do you recall what the city's opening position was?
- 11 A I recall that by the time I got involved the negotiations
- 12 were in the 80% range. And we -- we wanted to push to see if
- 13 we could get better.
- 14 Q Before you got to that position, how would you describe
- 15 the negotiations between the city and the swap counter
- 16 parties?
- 17 A My understanding that negotiations were arm's length.
- 18 They were robust. And they were quite contentious from time
- 19 to time.
- 20 Q Were you coming to an agreement easily?
- 21 A No, not at all.
- 22 Q Why did you think that was the case?
- 23 A Well, I -- I think the parties held very strong positions
- 24 on both sides.

that you were an event of default yourself. How did those
events of -- of default affect the negotiations?

A Well, I -- I think the swap counter parties wanted to press and -- and suggested that they knew we were in default, so they wanted us to acknowledge that they were forbearing and there was a value to that. We wanted to press that the city's condition was quite dire. And while there were defaults, we had been paying the obligations as they had become due, but the risk to the city remained.

- 10 Q What did the -- an event of default allow the swap
 11 counter parties to do?
- 12 A Well, it could have allowed them to trap the casino 13 revenue.
- 14 Q And you mentioned the termination payment as well?
- 15 A Yes.

3

4

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9

- 16 Q Had the -- the swap counter parties attempted to trap the casino revenues before this time?
- 18 A I don't believe so.
- 19 | Q Did you --

THE COURT: Excuse me one second. I have to
interrupt. We just blew through what is probably the most
significant question in this trial which is what were the
arguments that the city was using to -- in support of its
request to get a discount on the termination fee.

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1
    I promise.
 2
              THE COURT: You're going to what?
              MR. SHUMAKER: I am going to get there.
 3
 4
              THE COURT: Okay.
 5
              MR. SHUMAKER: I was -- I was leading up to that.
              THE COURT: Okay. So this was like a preview.
 6
 7
         If -- if that's your plan, I will let you pursue it.
 8
    Otherwise, I was going to.
 9
              MR. SHUMAKER: Okay. Hopefully, I'll cover
10
    everything that Your Honor is -- is interested in. And I do
    recognize what Your Honor is interested in.
11
12
         I believe my question was, Mr. Orr, was why did you think
13
    at this time when the negotiations were going on, in the May,
14
    June time frame, that the -- the swap counter parties might
    trap the casino revenues when they hadn't previously?
15
16
         Well, there have been multiple events of default as I
    have mentioned with me as well. And also to the extent there
17
    were other litigation risks, it appeared that -- at least to
18
19
    us, it appeared that the parties had come to sort of a head in
20
    their respective positions.
21
         We also could not operate on the basis that hope was a
22
    strategy for stabilizing the city's finances given the
   precarious nature that they were going into that we were
23
    having a very significant financial crisis at the time.
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1 reasonable.
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- 2 Q And during this time were you -- fair to say that the --
- 3 the city was -- you started considering thinking about a
- 4 filing of bankruptcy for the city, correct?
- 5 A Yes, I think that's fair.
- 6 Q If you were -- if the -- if the possibility of a
- 7 bankruptcy filing was out there for you, why were you
- 8 concerned about the banks and the casino revenues?
- 9 A Well, I -- I believe in consultation with our attorneys,
- 10 there was a possibility that the swap counter parties wouldn't
- 11 be bound for several -- by several provisions of the
- 12 Bankruptcy Code by the automatic stay and would still be able
- 13 to exercise their security interest.
- |14| Q And do you -- do you recall the -- the provisions that --
- 15 that were coming into play?
- 16 A I don't have the Code in front of me, but I think
- |17| 362(a)(17) and don't quote me on this, there are a lot of
- 18 attorneys, 546.
- 19 Q I'm not trying to quiz you. I -- is the --
- 20 A I just don't remember.
- 21 Q Is the term a safe harbor --
- 22 A Safe harbor provision, sure. There's the safe -- I'm
- 23 just -- I don't remember the specific Code provision.
- 24 Q Okay. And I'm sorry. What would the -- what would the

1 A The safe harbor provision allows banks with -- with
2 interest of -- of this kind to execute on their security
3 interests.

Q Around this time of -- of negotiation, was there any interruption in the negotiation process?

A Oh, sure, yeah.

Q And -- and who in your mind interrupted?

MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, I'd like to interpose an objection if I could. I think he's about to go down a pathway that I construed the Court to have determined to be collateral by excluding Ms. Schwartzman's testimony. This is about Syncora and whether it impacted the negotiations that were ongoing and I do think that this is a sufficiently collateral matter that is just not relevant to the proceeding. But to the extent we're going to delve into it, then it gets into the sort of who said what to whom and why didn't various things happen.

MR. SHUMAKER: Well, Your Honor, the importance of the casino revenues and what Mr. Orr's testifying to is -- and its critical importance was what Syncora was -- was up to and that's why the witness' account of what the city -- how the city approached that issue and what it might do and what it did in order to protect those casino revenues is -- is important.

Buckfire testified yesterday why he was also heavily involved,
to the extent they want to introduce testimony that Syncora
sought to trap the revenue and that impacted the desire to
conclude the negotiations, I don't have a problem with limited
testimony to that effect.

As you get into the temporary restraining order that was

As you get into the temporary restraining order that was obtained on an ex parte basis and whether that was appropriately obtained, or whether we were sitting around waiting for them to turn a confidentiality agreement to us, all of the things that were in the testimony that we wanted to introduce, I think you cross over to a point where it -- it becomes prejudicial for us to have them tell their side of the story and I do believe it's also -- I think it's collateral.

MR. SHUMAKER: And, Your Honor, I -- I don't plan on going into this in any significant detail.

THE COURT: Well, I'll let you proceed with the understanding that you are potentially opening up doors you don't want to open. And I'll leave you to decide whether to take that risk.

Q Let me switch to this, Mr. Orr. Let -- let me ask you, when did you reach a final agreement with -- with the swap counter parties?

A We reached an agreement in principal on June, I believe it was June 13th and actually signed a document, I believe July

- 1 Q So how long did it take from -- from start to finish?
- 2 A Almost a month and a half approximately.
- 3 Q Now, in your view as the emergency manager, what benefits
- 4 does the forbearance agreement provide to the city?
- 5 A Well, it gives us access, unfettered access to the cash.
- 6 It gives us a significant discount over and above the par rate
- 7 of the termination fee. It helps us avoid costly and
- 8 expensive litigation which is a cost drain on the city.
- 9 Equally important is it helps stabilizes the city's finances
- 10 and also allows us an opportunity to get at some well needed
- 11 services to the citizens of the city.
- 12 Q Now, so is it fair to say that -- that in your view you
- 13 achieved your objectives that you started out with in
- 14 negotiating the forbearance agreement?
- 15 A Yes.
- 16 Q Now you talked a little bit about a discount on the
- 17 termination payment, correct? Do you recall what the original
- 18 discount percentages were that were negotiated under the
- 19 forbearance agreement?
- 20 A Yes.
- 21 Q And -- and what were they?
- 22 A The original percentages were -- I believe there was 82,
- 23 77, and 75.
- 24 Q And when you say 82, 77, and 75, what -- what do you

- 1 A There -- there was a -- a sliding scale related to how
- 2 quickly you could pay the discount and as you went by certain
- 3 time frames, the discount began to get reduced. So initially
- 4 if you paid it quickly it was 75%, if you paid it less quickly
- 5 it became 77%. And if you took out the entire term of the
- 6 agreement it went to 82%.
- 7 Q Okay. Now, there have been subsequent amendments to the
- 8 forbearance agreement, correct?
- 9 A Yes.
- 10 Q And the discount numbers have changed and the -- and the
- 11 date thresholds have changed, is that correct?
- 12 A Yes.
- 13 Q And what is your understanding of what the current
- 14 discount percentages are on the termination payment?
- 15 A I want to be clear when I say discount. It's the amount
- 16 that you have to pay. So the discount is actually 25%. And
- 17 when I say 82, it's actually 18%.
- 18 Q Right. What -- what are they right now? As we sit here
- 19 today December 18th, 2013?
- 20 A Twenty-five and 18%.
- 21 Q Okay. And do you know when the city must exercise its
- 22 | rights under the agreement in order to get the 75%, by what
- 23 date?
- 24 A I think we need to exercise them by December $31^{\rm st}$.

1 percentages?

- 2 A Yes.
- 3 Q How did you arrive at these percentages?
- 4 A It was subject to negotiation. We kept pressing and
- 5 testing how far we could go and they kept resisting and they
- 6 would hang up and we'd come back and press and test and
- 7 finally we got to the point where they said those are the
- 8 percentages that we're willing to accept.
- 9 If we don't accept those percentages we would not have a
- 10 deal. We pushed back and said, you know, we have to have 25%
- 11 because we felt that was a fair discount for a secured
- 12 interest.
- 13 Q Okay. Do you believe the city got a good deal with the
- 14 discount percentages that you approved?
- 15 A I believe we got the best deal available, yes.
- 16 Q Why?
- 17 A Well, as I said during the negotiations, they had broken
- 18 down several times, literally broken down. Phone calls were
- 19 hung up and the parties did not speak for several days. And
- 20 went up -- as I understand it went up to the highest levels of
- 21 the counter parties organization as far as what they were
- 22 | willing to accept. And in fact we were prepared to
- 23 potentially pursue litigation if we had to.
- 24 Q I want to -- I want to focus on that in just a bit, but

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- 1 question which is in connection with your negotiations, did
- 2 the swap counter parties ask you on behalf of the city to
- 3 reaffirm their swaps deal with the city?
- 4 A Yes.
- 5 Q Did they ask you to reaffirm their collateral rights with
- 6 regard to the casino revenues?
- 7 A Yes.
- 8 Q Did you agree to do so?
- 9 A No.
- 10 Q Why not?
- 11 A Well, we -- we felt there were issues with regard to
- 12 their rights and we don't want to affirm because we're in the
- 13 midst of negotiations and wanted to preserve our options if
- 14 those negotiations fell through.
- 15 Q During this time of the negotiations, were you looking at
- 16 the possibility of suing the swap counter parties?
- 17 A Yes.
- 18 Q Did you receive legal advice regarding the potential
- 19 claims the city might have against the swap counter parties?
- 20 A Yes.
- 21 Q From whom?
- 22 A From our attorneys.
- 23 Q Who were your attorneys? The law firms, how about that?
- 24 Okay.

- 1 Hamilton.
- 2 Q And that's Mr. Hertzberg at Pepper, Hamilton?
- 3 A Yes.
- 4 Q Why was Pepper, Hamilton involved?
- 5 A We had retained Pepper, Hamilton -- Pepper, Hamilton
- 6 because issues had been raised regarding a potential conflict
- 7 | with Jones, Day and we didn't want to have any issues
- 8 regarding whether or not we were pursuing potentially any
- 9 claims against the swap counter parties zealously.
- 10 Q Now were -- were the Jones, Day lawyers and -- and the
- 11 Pepper, Hamilton lawyers involved in the meetings and
- 12 communications with the swap counter parties while you were
- 13 negotiating the agreement?
- 14 A Yes.
- 15 Q Why did you have -- was -- was Ms. Ball one of the
- 16 lawyers who participated in those calls?
- 17 A Yes.
- 18 Q Why did you have both Ms. Ball and Mr. Hertzberg
- 19 participate in those calls?
- 20 A Well, we wanted to make sure that they were fully
- 21 informed and prepared if those calls broke down from the legal
- 22 perspective to take appropriate relief. There may have been
- 23 other attorneys involved in those discussions as well. I'm
- 24 just identifying Ms. Ball, Ms. Bennett, Mr. Hertzberg as the

1 Did those law firms, did Jones, Day and Pepper, Hamilton 2 prepare any legal analyses of the claims that the city might 3 have against the COPS and the swaps? 4 Yes. 5 And those memos were conveyed to you, is that correct? Yes, I believe so. 6 7 Were any legal analyses prepared by Jones, Day or Pepper, Hamilton regarding the pledge of the casino revenues that was a part of the 2009 collateral agreement? 9 10 Yes. Without divulging the substance of the communications, 11 12 the privileged discussions that you might have had with Jones, 13 Day lawyers and Pepper, Hamilton, what kinds of claims were addressed in the memoranda that you saw and/or heard about? 14 MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, I'll just interpose an 15 objection on two fronts here. The first one is that during 16 17 the discovery on the forbearance agreement, we were -- we were not actually granted the opportunity to obtain document 18 discovery and they did not provide us a privilege log. 19 20 But after the testimony of Mr. Orr in which he asserted, 21 I took advice on all these subjects, don't worry, I considered 22 everything and -- and took it into account, I asked counsel to provide a privilege log so the extent to which we could see 23

were memoranda transmitted to Mr. Orr for his consideration.

1 things that you can just process by having a five minute conversation with someone. And I think -- and -- and counsel 2 for the city refused to do that. 3 4 I think that they are now inquiring of testimony of the witness that I don't have a fair opportunity to cross examine 5 the witness about. Even if it's not the substance of the 6 7 communication, if they were going to elicit testimony from Mr. Orr about all the different memoranda and email that he concluded that he considered as part of his decision, I think 9 10 it was incumbent upon them to produce such a privilege log so that we could see that it maps up with the decision time frame 11 12 that's laid out around the negotiation. MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor --13 14 THE COURT: You received memoranda from your lawyers 15 outlining claims that the city might have in regard to the 16 COPS and the swaps. 17 Yes, claims and defenses, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: And you're claiming the privilege as to 19 those memoranda? 20 Yes, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: And you're claiming the privilege as to those memoranda even though you want to take \$270,000,000 from 22 the taxpayers of this city to pay to terminate those swaps? 23

I am claiming the privilege, Your Honor.

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             MR. SHUMAKER: Well, Your Honor, responding to --
 2
              THE COURT: Just because the -- you have the
 3
   privilege doesn't mean you have to claim it.
 4
             MR. SHUMAKER: Well, Your Honor, that's true. But
 5
    the -- the city has asserted the privilege and --
 6
              THE COURT: I don't get it. How can I decide
 7
   whether this was a fair settlement without understanding what
 8
   the city's assessment of the strength of its claims against
   the COPS and the swaps were? How can I do that?
 9
10
             MR. SHUMAKER: Well, Your Honor, you can do that as
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    I think we set forth in the -- our response to the motion in
12
    limine on this point that the objectors filed, it's really an
13
    objective standard. And you have the theories laid out by the
14
    objectors. This -- this -- the city has, you know, asserted
15
    the privilege, but obviously the consideration of those
16
    claims --
17
              THE COURT: Why has the city asserted the privilege?
18
             MR. SHUMAKER: Well, Your Honor, it's not my
19
   privilege, but --
20
              THE COURT: I'm asking you. You're their lawyer.
21
   Why have you asserted it?
22
             MR. SHUMAKER: Well, Your Honor, you know, this is a
   -- it is a well known effort to protect the city with regard
23
   to its communications between, you know, its client and its
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system.

And we were negotiating with large banks who would love to have the Jones, Day, or the Pepper, Hamilton memoranda revealed for all the world so it would inform their negotiating position.

MR. CULLEN: If I may add one thing, Your Honor.

Thomas Cullen for the city. I think, Your Honor, that one of the reasons we haven't disclosed those memoranda, and we didn't want to disclose those memoranda, is that we may still sue the banks. If we are in a position of --

THE COURT: All right. Let's walk down -- let's walk down that road for a second. Assume the Court denies its approval of this forbearance agreement and you wind up in litigation, right.

They're going to file a complaint, or you're going to file a complaint, or the other -- and -- and regardless the other side is going to file a counter claim and sooner or later you're going to file your motions for summary judgment and answers to motions for summary judgment, or trial briefs and answers to trial briefs, it's all going to come out.

MR. CULLEN: Your Honor, perhaps not -- not suggesting to split the baby here, but we did have --

THE COURT: Let's pause. Let's just take a pause here. It's a little early for lunch, but we're going to take

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1
    issue over lunch.
 2
             MR. CULLEN: May I suggest one thing, Your Honor?
 3
             THE COURT:
                          Yes.
 4
             MR. CULLEN: There was a draft complaint and perhaps
 5
   the Court could -- we could certainly waive with respect to
   that if we weren't on the subject matter waiver provision.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Let -- let -- let's reconvene at, it
 8
   will be 1:15, 90 minutes from now and -- and -- and you think
 9
   about what position to take that's in the best interest of the
10
    city.
             MR. CULLEN: I understand, Your Honor.
11
12
              THE COURT: All right. We're going to be in recess.
         (WITNESS KEVYN ORR WAS EXCUSED AT 11:43 A.M.)
1.3
              THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess.
14
15
         (Court in Recess at 11:43 a.m.; Resume at 1:18 p.m.)
16
              THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please
17
   be seated. Recalling case number 13-53846, City of Detroit,
18
   Michigan.
19
              THE COURT: It appears that everyone is here. Mr.
20
    Shumaker.
21
             MR. SHUMAKER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Over
22
   lunch I have to confess that I was thinking about what Your
23
   Honor had told us at the pre-trial conference on Friday about
   the proponent of a settlement being in a -- an awkward
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at the same time -- at the same time asking for settlement of the claims, it does not reveal the strengths and the weaknesses in case the -- the Court decides that it can't approve the settlement. And I've -- and I've kind of -- think we find ourselves in that awkward zone.

We interpreted what you were saying, Your Honor, that you did not want to know what Jones, Day or Kevyn Orr, or any of the employees thought about the strengths and weaknesses of the -- the case. You thought we were asking what did he consider and were memoranda prepared. Did you receive advice from counsel, were there -- was all of that considered. So again I stand here awkwardly, or hopefully less so after -- after a busy lunch.

With regard to what your -- Your Honor has requested, I guess my -- my answer is -- is twofold in nature. One, we have -- I'm going to admit that there was a bit of scurrying in the lunch and we have pulled together a -- a packet of what I think Your Honor would find under normal circumstances clearly privileged attorney/client communications and attorney/client work product. And including draft complaints that were prepared.

And in trying to figure out what to propose to Your

Honor, Rule 502(d) comes to mind of -- of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. I'm not sure -- oh, I'm sorry, the Federal

controlling effect of a Court order. A Federal Court may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the Court in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.

If Your Honor would like us to, we can make a motion or Your Honor could, I imagine issue an order pursuant to 502(d) right now in which we — the city would provide those to Your Honor and if Your Honor believes that we need to publish those to the world, we will publish those to the world. If — if you're able to — if the Court is —

I don't want you to misunderstand what my request was. I was not requesting you to disclose privileged information. My request was that you consider whether maintaining the privilege is in the best interest of the city. That was my request.

If you come to the conclusion it is, and you think you can prove what you need to prove to get this settlement approved, go for it. I think your challenge is more difficult if you maintain the privilege. It's not impossible. That was — and I apologize to you if I wasn't clear enough on that point.

MR. SHUMAKER: No, no. Yeah, I was just --

say in hindsight now that I understand what the issue was regarding the privilege log that Mr. Hackney had raised, that if I had understood when that motion was addressed briefly as it was the other day, that these memos were the subject of that request for a privilege log, I certainly would have ordered it. And in fact I do order it now, I'm going to change my order on that and order a privilege log.

MR. HACKNEY: So I have to clarify for the record,

Your Honor, to be very precise, there is actually a -- a

meaningful distinction about what you and I were talking about

on Friday and this issue. And if I could clarify it.

THE COURT: Oh, all right. Go ahead.

MR. HACKNEY: On the original forbearance agreement, we were not entitled to any discovery period at the end of our colloquy. And then after Mr. Shumaker indicated that this would be an evidentiary hearing, the Court then said, okay.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HACKNEY: I'll let you take depositions. But we weren't allowed to engage in written discovery. And when you engage in written discovery, that's what triggers the privilege log coming back because that's what they withhold.

The privilege log you and I were talking about on Friday was with respect to DIP discovery where we were entitled to issues in written discovery and then they did not give us a

THE COURT: Okay. That was -- so that -- that was my disconnect, okay.

MR. HACKNEY: Yes, sir. And I -- I wanted to clarify that, but on the forbearance agreement after we went through the depositions and there was the repetitive assertion of the privilege, which I understood. I understand the position that's being taken.

What I then said to the city was, I know I haven't been given the right to take written discovery, but given the widespread assertion of the privilege, and the complexity of the issues, won't you please agree to produce to me a privilege log so that what we could do is we can see --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKNEY: -- the deliberative process. Because you'll see the memoranda and the email going to Mr. Orr on the relevant issues.

You do have to disclose the subject matter of a communication, even if you don't disclose the communication itself. Then we'd be able to test the proposition that don't worry, I considered the gambit of the issues. That's the privilege log, it was a voluntary request.

My objection today was simply that having rejected that request, I do think that they have now put the objectors in a position where it's difficult to meaningfully cross examine

you don't have access to seeing the -- the communications go to him.

1.3

MR. SHUMAKER: And if I could address that, Your Honor. At Mr. Orr's deposition, objectors count on the assumption motion back when it was Your Honor's order was that the city just proffered whoever was going to testify in support of the assumption motion.

The -- the objectors' counsel did ask a number of questions about what sort of topics, what sort of claims did you consider Mr. Orr. And he was allowed to answer those questions. That is similar to what you would find on a privilege log.

But when they went deeper and they started asking what about -- what were the likelihood of success on the merits there, that's when I said that is invading the privilege.

That's how I drew the line.

And so in effect I think the objectors have the kind of information that they would have received in connection with the privilege log had we -- had there been written discovery in connection with the assumption motion. And frankly, Your Honor, that was what I was going to be asking Mr. Orr about.

THE COURT: So I -- I take it that it is -- it is still the city's judgment that it is in the best interest to maintain the claim of privilege as to whatever legal memoranda

1 the swaps? 2 MR. SHUMAKER: I have consulted with -- obviously, Your Honor, it's the client, the city's decision. 3 4 THE COURT: Right. 5 MR. SHUMAKER: Mr. Cullen and I were given -- were -- had very little time to speak with Mr. Orr prior to him 6 7 walking into the courtroom after lunch. And we simply posited 8 to him what we were going to propose the -- the twofold 9 proposal that I was going to make to Your Honor. We did not 10 ask do you want to fully waive the privilege which -- which we could do if Your Honor would like us to do that. 11 12 THE COURT: Well -- sir? 13 MR. CULLEN: To -- to be hopefully slightly more 14 clear. What we said to Mr. Orr, or what we're saying to the Court, is that we're willing to make A, these documents 15 16 available. We would like to have a 502(d) order with respect 17 to those documents which would restrict the waiver -- it would 18 make the documents available, but the privilege would not be waived, the documents would be made available --19 20 THE COURT: Available to the Court and to the 21 objecting parties? MR. CULLEN: And to the objecting parties. As long 22 23 as they weren't waived. 24 Now, the other thing because we've changed direction on

interest of fully informing the Court of the other questions that the Court pressed, one of them being what exactly was conveyed in terms of the -- how are these theories used in the negotiations in -- in detail.

What we would propose is the following. And this would save the -- this would address both the Court's issue with respect to the underlying memoranda and with respect to the subject matter of those meetings.

We would propose to make Ms. Ball as a percipient witness at those meetings who is charged with Mr. -- charged by Mr.

Orr with both formulating those theories and conveying them in negotiations with the other side about potential litigation.

I don't know whether we'd call her a rebuttal witness or not, profess to make her available for a deposition on those topics and to authenticate those documents, many of which Mr.

Orr would not be in a position to authenticate even if he had

-- if he had seen them or not.

So what she would do -- what we would do, and propose to the Court, is that we'd make Ms. Ball available for deposition tonight and we'd put her on tomorrow with respect to those issues. And they -- that we would make available for that deposition -- for that deposition, the documents that we have gathered which fit Your Honor's discussion here which are the memos relating to the claims against the banks which were the

1 We have -- we may find some more, but we -- as of right 2 now, we have a -- a group of oh, maybe 25 documents that fit that description including two draft complaints. 3 4 THE COURT: Including what? 5 MR. CULLEN: Including two draft complaints. 6 THE COURT: Mr. Hackney. 7 MR. HACKNEY: So this is sufficiently material that I -- I do at some -- you know, I don't speak for the objectors 8 and I guess I have one suggestion. 9 10 Which is, I know the evidence and I question the relevance of Ms. Ball's proffered testimony. And perhaps I 11 12 can make a suggestion to the Court. 1.3 Perhaps the Court might reserve its decision about this until the end of Mr. Orr's cross examination. And also 14 perhaps until after I've been able to caucus with the 16 objectors. Because I, based on my knowledge of the record, I 17 do not understand how Ms. Ball's testimony would materially 18 change what we are talking about right now. 19 MS. ENGLISH: Your Honor, may I speak? 20 THE COURT: Yes. 21 MS. ENGLISH: I would just like to make two points 22 here and again I -- I would also echo Mr. Hackney's comments that the objectors would like to caucus on these new 23 developments first.

think the assertion of privilege in the depositions of Mr. Orr and Mr. Buckfire were much broader in fact than Mr. Shumaker has represented to the Court.

In fact in Mr. Orr's testimony, I just want to read a couple of lines to you, please. Mr. Hackney asked Mr. Orr about what claims were being settled by the forbearance agreement that the city had against the swap counter parties. He said, and if I ask you to tell me what claims you have, will you tell me or will you assert the privilege? Mr. Shumaker responded, I would instruct the witness that that may implicate attorney/client communications. And Mr. Orr then responded, I would have no independent knowledge of what claims the city may have other than discussions I've had with my counsel so I would not answer. So I think the claim of privilege was much broader.

The second point I would like to make is because the assertion of privilege was made so much throughout the city witnesses depositions, the city must be precluded from now admitting privileged as evidence, waiving the privilege and admitting that in trial. And opening up — allowing us to take a deposition of Ms. Ball would not be sufficient.

We would need to re-depose Mr. Orr and Mr. Buckfire and possibly examine what other witnesses need to be deposed as well as a result of this new development. Thank you, Your

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, just to respond quickly on the assertion of privilege. Let me read another quote, this one from Ms. English at the -- the deposition of Mr. Orr which was question from Ms. English. "Can you just list for me what the topics were ..."

THE COURT: What page are you on?

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MR. SHUMAKER: Page 16, Your Honor, of the objector -- I mean the city's opposition to the objectors motion in It's Footnote 5. Ms. English asks, "can you just list for me what the topics were on which you got advice or would you claim the privilege as to just the topics as well? Mr. Orr, maybe I can do it this way. I think I've said before that in this case for instance your client Ambac, I filled that in, has filed an objection. Ms. English, yes, it has. Mr. Orr's response, and in this case many objections have been filed and many of the topics listed in those objections, whether it was subordination, prioritization, equitable estoppel, tort, invalidation of liens ab initio, whatever they were, none of those analyses or claims came as a surprise to me and that in some fashion without divulging what I had spoken with to my counsel, in some fashion issues such as those have been discussed and analyzed with my counsel, attorneys, and advisors".

I don't think Ms. English is -- is giving you an accurate

of privilege because of the awkwardness that Your Honor had noted.

And so we were trying to draw the line in a way that was permissible and allowed the objectors to get at the kind -- we talked a little bit about this, Your Honor, in the opposition too which is really it's for Your Honor, it's not for Mr. Orr to decide -- he obviously has to make a decision as to whether -- whether to enter into the agreement, but you have all of the claims spelled out for you.

And -- and it's your -- you know, your decision, your objective decision as to whether it was reasonable to compromise those claims. And we also quoted in that --

THE COURT: Here's the -- here's the difference.

You know, I -- I think back to the hundreds or thousands of motions to settle that I have been called upon to determine in the last 28 1/2 years. And in virtually every one of those cases, everyone knew what the claims were, what the defenses were, what the factual -- the alleged factual bases were for those claims, the alleged factual bases for the defenses, and where the strengths and weaknesses were on either side.

I don't have that here. Not -- not from your brief and not yet at least from Mr. Orr. I certainly didn't get it from Mr. Buckfire. So I'm at a loss as to how to evaluate the fairness of the settlement without that data.

1 THE COURT: And so I -- and I think the burden is on 2 the city to -- to -- to show the fairness of the settlement, 3 right? 4 MR. SHUMAKER: Correct, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: So you know, this is -- in the end it's your call. I mean you have to decide how you want to persuade 6 7 me regarding the fairness of this settlement if you -- and if 8 you fail, the motion is denied. You don't want that. 9 MR. SHUMAKER: Understood. 10 THE COURT: At least I don't think you do. 11 MR. SHUMAKER: That's correct, Your Honor. And I 12 quess the -- the -- for the Court's consideration is this. 13 Although this is not your normal 9019 situation. 14 You do -- the Court does know what the -- the subject of the -- of the potential legal attacks are, the -- the swaps 16 and the -- the pledge of the collateral. And at -- at this 17 stage, given all the different considerations that were going 18 on and that have been described to you with regard to the city's financial condition at the time of May to June and the 19 20 May numbers came in and they were much worse than anyone 21 thought. And the -- the city had very limited time. 22 I would suggest that Your Honor you -- there is no full factual record here for you to review because the settlement 23

decision had to be made very quickly under the dire

And so you do have the theories. You do have the subjects. You do have Mr. Orr who will say that I was given plenty of legal memoranda and -- and emails and -- and counsel. And then if Your Honor believes that that's not sufficient, I mean I agree that there is a decision that -- that -- that we need to make. And that's why we're trying to find a compromise.

THE COURT: Since you've raised the question, I'm going to say this to you. Every transaction, including this one, that the city has entered into in connection with these swaps and COPS has been with a gun to its head.

That has to stop. It has to stop. And -- and I think it's part of a Bankruptcy Judge's role to carefully scrutinize a debtor's request to approve a settlement when that settlement was made with the debtor's -- with a -- with a gun to the debtor's head. I mean --

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SHUMAKER: We dare not agree -- we could not agree to --

THE COURT: Just one more thought.

MR. SHUMAKER: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: And the reason is obvious. Because, you know, it's not just the debtor who is impacted by this, right.

I got a whole courtroom full of people who are impacted by this.

know, if you want me to do that, I'm happy to. If you -- if you want to take your chances, that's your call.

MR. SHUMAKER: Two responses to that, Your Honor. First, we couldn't be in more complete agreement. Under the circumstances they were not perhaps ideal given the financial emergency that was in place.

Mr. Orr came in in April. The numbers that Mr. Malhotra and Ernst and Young provided in May showed holy cow, we're running out of time. And so no one likes to make a decision with a gun to their head, but a big big reason why we believe that this — this forbearance agreement is necessary and the post-petition financing is needed to finance it, is to stabilize the city. That is exactly what we're trying to do. We don't — we know it's not ideal, but this is how we come to — that's how Mr. Orr came to the — came to the problem.

THE COURT: You know, stabilizing the city is exactly what motivated the original swaps and COPS. And it's exactly what motivated the 2009 transaction and look where we are.

MR. SHUMAKER: It's not a great spot, I agree with Your Honor. But that's why Mr. -- a financial emergency was declared and Mr. Orr was put in to take the steps necessary to right the ship. And I don't know how he can right the ship without keeping these casino revenues available to the city so

1 you know, serve as collateral that can be tied up by a couple of banks for as long as they want. Which is the -- the 2 difficult decision Mr. Orr faced. 3 4 THE COURT: Of course, but the question is whether 5 you're overpaying for that, right? MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, Your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: Or one -- one of the questions. MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: And that depends -- I don't know why the 9 10 considerations for that determination in this case should be 11 any different than in any of the other hundreds or thousands 12 that I've dealt with. MR. SHUMAKER: Understood, Your Honor. And I guess 13 14 that's why we -- we tried to come up with a compromise over 15 lunch which was if Your Honor's willing to enter the 502(d) 16 order so that there's no some broad expansive waiver, and if 17 Ms. Ball can get on the stand and explain what -- what the 18 advice that you will see is and how that was communicated to 19 the other side, you clearly are going to be in a much much 20 much better position to be able to determine whether the city 21 is overpaying. 22 THE COURT: Well, let me ask the -- well, the 23 objecting attorneys have -- or the attorneys for the objecting

parties have requested an opportunity to -- to caucus

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How much time would you like?
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             MR. HACKNEY: Can we have 20 minutes?
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             THE COURT: Absolutely.
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             MR. HACKNEY: Can we reconvene at 2:00, Your Honor?
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             THE COURT: Yes. We will reconvene at --
             MR. HACKNEY: Yeah.
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             THE COURT: I'm sorry?
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             MR. HACKNEY: Whatever works for you. I'm sorry.
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             THE COURT: I'm here regardless. So let's say 2:00.
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   If you find you need a few more minutes, you know, we'll work
   that out. In the meantime, I urge -- I urge you all to
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    consult among yourselves on both sides to see what the best
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   way to resolve this is.
             MR. SHUMAKER: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess.
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         (Court in Recess at 1:42 p.m.; Resume at 2:00 p.m.)
              THE CLERK: Court is in session. Please be seated.
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             MR. HACKNEY: Your Honor, can I approach the podium?
              THE COURT: Yes. Which reminds me, I've been asked
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   to remind everyone again that -- that when you address the
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   Court to speak near a microphone, not only so that it's on the
   record, but so that the people in the overflow courtrooms can
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   hear as well.
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             MR. HACKNEY: Will do, Your Honor. Thank you for
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Your Honor, the objectors have caucused together and what we did was we basically articulated kind of broad principals and order and then determined that there was no objection to my relaying this to the Court on behalf of all of the objectors.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HACKNEY: That's the easiest way to operate when you have a lot of people.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HACKNEY: So, Your Honor, with respect to the idea that they might produce these memoranda that they're referring to, and then produce Ms. Ball for a deposition in the nighttime tonight that we would -- and then she would then testify tomorrow.

The objectors do not believe that that proffered testimony would be relevant. Because, Your Honor, the record shows, and I can relay additional record evidence that's not yet in the record, but is about to be, moments from now. But the record for Mr. Buckfire's testimony shows that he was the lead negotiator on the deal. That he had not evaluated any of the claims of the city and that he was unaware as to whether anyone else had done so either at the time he was negotiating the deal.

That he never argued the city's case to the swap counter

either. That testimony, I think, is — is compelling testimony and what they now want to do is they effectively want to rebut their own case by calling in Ms. Ball to back and fill and say no, I was — I was heavily involved in arguing and threatening the swap counter parties and fully apprised of all the various issues.

We don't think that Ms. Ball's testimony is sufficient to contradict the record evidence of Mr. Buckfire's testimony that he was the lead negotiator on this deal and that he never saw anyone else do this and is unaware of it. We think that -- that -- that the city --

THE COURT: Well, assuming what you say is true, I don't know that it is, but assuming it is for this -- for this purpose, that doesn't make the testimony inadmissible, does it?

MR. HACKNEY: Well, it would --

THE COURT: It may go to its weight, but does it go to its admissibility?

MR. HACKNEY: I -- well, I think what you would say is that it doesn't make it inadmissible because the two witnesses can contradict each other. And she can come in and say, oh, here's all the stuff that Mr. Buckfire somehow forgot happened on the deal that he was the lead negotiator on.

Okay. Fine, it's a theoretical matter. But the idea

the list where the city insisted that only those witnesses testify, and that the only other people that could be identified by a date certain were rebuttal witnesses.

That they're now going to add a witness as a rebuttal to their own case before their case in chief is done. That's out of the order and prejudicial to us and now we have to take the rush deposition.

But in addition, I think what the Court can do, is the Court can say, I saw Mr. Buckfire testify and I'm not going to allow you to back and fill your way out of that. And I'm not going to go through extraordinary steps to do it. And that's our second point.

Which is if you decide that given the -- the significance of this settlement and all that goes into it, consistent with the comments that you've made, that you want to hear the testimony and you want to see the documents. You think that's appropriate to your decision.

Then we -- we will understand that. But then we will say, we have got to do this in an orderly way. That --

THE COURT: I'm just going to stop you there.

21 Because I -- I view what I want as irrelevant. It's not my 22 motion.

MR. HACKNEY: Let me rephrase if I could. If the city decides no, you know, we have to do this. We -- we are

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    case in response to the Court's comments. We have to have Ms.
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   Ball testify. Then our point is that this must be done in an
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    orderly way.
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              THE COURT: Uh-huh.
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             MR. HACKNEY: And that means not just a rush
   deposition of Ms. Ball tonight with the five documents that
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   they picked out and said look at these. It's let's get order
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   to the discovery. Let's get order to the -- where the
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   privilege being asserted, where not.
        Let's take the depositions in an orderly way and Mr. Orr
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   is going to, you know, hate me for saying this, but we will
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   have to re-depose certain witnesses. I mean when you roll out
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   with these -- these documents --
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              THE COURT: He won't -- he won't hate you.
             MR. HACKNEY: Well --
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              THE COURT: He may dislike you, but he won't hate
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   you.
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             MR. HACKNEY: These are --
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              THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honor.
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             MR. HACKNEY: We teach our -- at work we teach our
   daughters that you're not supposed to say hate, but I think
   that --
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              THE COURT: Right.
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             MR. HACKNEY: -- people actually do hate
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THE COURT: All right. I'll accept that.

MR. HACKNEY: So that -- that was our second point which -- and the only thing we wanted to say though was in support of this idea that if the city changes and says, here you go, here's all the stuff that we relied upon and here's Ms. Ball who was the legal eagle on the deal.

You know, we articulated in the motion in limine that we filed a long time ago in anticipation of the first hearing, this was a big issue for us. Because we had lived through the depositions and had raised the questions and seen the assertion of the privilege.

And, you know, I think that the city waiting all the way until the last week, I think on the 9th, even to respond to that in limine motion. And I think that should factor in somewhat to the Court's consideration of whether if the city decides to go in this fashion, whether it will allow the types of rush depositions that are sometimes appropriate in different contexts where it's like sufficiently not material that you're like oh, we're just going to get it done and you'll have to stay up late and do a cross tomorrow, but you can do it.

This is core. So given that we put this issue out there to try to join issue on the city with it and the city, you know, didn't respond until recently and has now sort of

limine, now we're thinking about saying we kind of agree with it. That's a sufficiently material change. I think it should factor in to your consideration of the time line. If I can make one last comment.

The gun that's to our head in this case from the standpoint of schedule, you know, at first it was the discount posts in the forbearance agreement. You know, so it's like we got it -- you know, this was the way there was a -- you talked about a gun to the head of the city. There was a little bit of a gun to all of our heads under the schedule. Because it's like we have to do this by this time to get this by this time.

But then the original hearing was just adjourned for several months and it turned out the discount post extended out by four months when they -- after the hard fought negotiations had only been able to get like six weeks.

Now there's -- that's a bit of a gun at our head, is now it really expires on December 31 and so we have to get it done. And then also is the Barclays commitment expires on January $7^{\rm th}$.

That's another gun to our head from a scheduling time frame. And given -- I will say given the holidays, this -- these all don't go together very well if we adopt this second course.

And what I wanted to say is that if we go this way, I've

potential DIP lenders and ask them about certain provisions in their agreements and ask them, is that -- that January 7th, you know, as firm as it says there in black and white. And -- and in some instances, Your Honor, and we often heard debtor's counsel as well, but it turns out that -- that it was flexible.

And I think that if we -- I know that we don't know which way we're going. But if we're going to go this second way, can't we have a practical conversation about this? Because this scheduling gun to our head, and this is isn't a harangue, it's an observation.

It's -- it's infected everything. It's infected how much discovery we did, the scope, the pace of discovery, and it's had an impact on our ability to present the case to you -- to you. Bless you, Mr. Orr.

And I think that you've made observations today about the magnitude of this transaction and its significance that if we could get a little bit of the gun stopped to be pointing at our head as we're considering this idea of what's the schedule going to be, what is the process going to be from the standpoint of discovery. If we go that second way, I think that will be important to the objectors. That's all I have to say, Your Honor. I don't know if other objectors would also like to be heard, but that — that's the consensus. Thank

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Shumaker.

MR. SHUMAKER: Your Honor, a couple of points.

First of all, Mr. Hackney has talked about how important this issue of the assertion of the city's privilege has been to the objectors for a long time.

Your Honor should not think that this was anything other than calculated from the beginning. Back when Mr. Orr was deposed, the first question that Mr. Hackney asked was, Mr. Orr, in the course of negotiating and executing the forbearance agreement, did you receive legal advice? Answer, yes.

And then five questions later, after some predicate, who did you get the legal advice from. Five questions later, from Mr. Hackney. Are you waiving the attorney/client privilege in connection with the motion to assume the forbearance agreement? When that answer was no, that led to about 50 questions intended to invade the city's privilege.

In that motion in limine, opposition that Mr. Hackney referred to, that the city has put forth, it's been very clear in the — in the <u>Washington Mutual</u> case, which I believe is in the Bankruptcy Court in one of the districts in New York, the agreement was very clear that with regard to this kind of motion you do not need to waive.

So that's one thing. I think that this -- the notion

was a tactic from the get go. The second thing, is that this 2 gun is not going away. THE COURT: Look, everyone uses tactics. The 3 4 question when you talk about tactics is, is it -- is it a legitimate tactic, right? 5 MR. SHUMAKER: Well --6 7 THE COURT: You can't say it was illegitimate. 8 MR. SHUMAKER: No, and I --THE COURT: I asked the same questions just before 9 10 lunch that Mr. Hackney asked in -- in this deposition that you quoted from. 11 12 MR. SHUMAKER: I was not suggesting you were undertaking a tactic, Your Honor, not in the least. 13 14 THE COURT: Okay. MR. SHUMAKER: But I -- but I -- but I was -- I was 15 16 commenting on it because -- because of the awkward position 17 that the city finds itself in. And it does not believe it 18 needs to waive but --19 THE COURT: Well --20 MR. SHUMAKER: Appreciate your honest concern. 21 THE COURT: But as far -- you know, as I've said 22 before, the burden is on -- if you want to -- to put these memos in with this 502(d) order we can talk about that. If 23 you want to call Ms. Ball, we can talk about how to -- how to

1 But as I said before, this -- this approval will get the 2 closest scrutiny from me and it's your burden. So, you know, you have to decide what you want to do to -- to meet that 3 4 burden. MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, Your Honor. Perhaps --5 THE COURT: And I can tell you, that I agree with 6 7 Mr. Hackney. That if -- if we're going to open it up in the 8 -- in the ways that you and Mr. Cullen have -- have suggested, 9 it's not going to be done today and tomorrow. And I'm not available between December 22nd and January 1st. 10 MR. SHUMAKER: May I consult with my colleagues, 11 12 Your Honor, for a minute? 13 THE COURT: How much time would you like? MR. SHUMAKER: Ten minutes, Your Honor. 14 15 THE COURT: Mr. Hertzberg says you want ten minutes. 16 MR. SHUMAKER: Yes, please, Your Honor. THE COURT: We'll be in recess for ten minutes. 17 18 MR. SHUMAKER: Thank you, Your Honor. THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in recess. 19 20 (Court in Recess at 2:13 p.m.; Resume at 2:41 p.m.) THE CLERK: All rise. Court is in session. Please 21 22 be seated. 23 MR. CULLEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Sir.

25 | MR. CULLEN: The city would like to -- to propose 1318383646wit Doc 2216-9 File 10202029314 Entented 1202029312122009923 Page 2216-9 File 10202029314 Entented 12020293124122009923 Page 2216-9 File 10202029314 Entented 12020293124 Ent

the following. If that -- if it makes sense to the -- to the Court.

Given the Court's guidance, given the procedural posture we're in now, given the concerns of the objectors about the ripeness of the various issues in front of us, and given our need to reach out to other parties to talk about how we can accommodate all of those things, what we would propose is that we and the other parties take tomorrow to try and work out a procedural schedule for your -- Your Honor.

We will in that -- in the course of that time, to be frank with all concerned, we'll have to -- we will be reaching out to the -- the counter parties, the Barclays about what we can do with them.

In our discussions with the objectors, we will be talking about various things, including the -- the options I've laid forth before the Court and see if we can get the -- we can cabin those in such a way so that we can get the right discovery and the right things in front of the Court. And -- and get to the Court -- do something within the Court's schedule and in a way that will allow us to stop the city paying money on a notional \$800,000,000 rather than the amount of 270,000,000, the settlement amount.

So that's all the things we're going to try and accomplish tomorrow to make this easier. I can also tell the

questions about the various underlying deals and the history and the issue of -- of -- of gun to the head.

The banks who are in the room here and the counter parties in the post-petition financing are also in the -- in the room here. They have been educated as well.

We have asked to the objectors to discuss with us tomorrow among the other things that they would discuss, if — if in their view there is a — a number, a sweetening of the deal that would make it go away. It is my suspicion that there is no number that makes all of them disappear, but it's an issue.

And we would propose then to report back to the Court on Friday if that would be amenable to the Court's schedule about what we have achieved with respect to all of those procedural and financial constraints to lay at the front of the Court because I think otherwise we're going to have a series of running hand battles while the -- while witnesses sit here that won't be productive for -- for anyone.

And I'm sensible to the fact that it's taken a long time for us all to schedule this. We have a lot of money invested in this -- in this proceeding to date. We're going to see what we can preserve of that. That will also be part of what we are -- what we are talking about.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hackney.

THE COURT: Sure. Sir.

MR. HACKNEY: So, Your Honor, I'm going to state what I think the sense of the senate is and perhaps then we can just poll the room and see if any -- if I got it wrong.

But I think I -- I think I can say that it is the sense of the objectors that what the city is -- is asking the Court to do is to continue the hearing on its motion until a later date.

And I think that the objectors would -- this -- I think the objectors would agree to that continuance. I will note that there has been a lot of money spent getting ready for this hearing to get it done, but whatever things change and we acknowledge that.

So -- but I just offer that, you know, agreeing to a continue it I think is -- is a sign of good faith. And I also say the objectors I think are willing to meet with the city and hear the city's ideas about how to handle evidence and discovery and so on and so forth. So we are amenable to that idea.

I wanted to offer two -- two points for the Court's consideration. One of them is that I hope the city will think about the fact that it's not clear the extent to which you can change this evidential record with new evidence. So I think that should be a consideration for the city.

And I also don't want to -- I'm not backing off what I

respect to this deal and $\--$ and I just wanted to reiterate that point.

The second one is that having lived under the gun of these deadlines before, I would like the city to make sure that it's expressing our views about process to the folks that are setting these deadlines, whether it's the discount or the expiration of a commitment.

I -- you know, it will -- it will be a problem for us if they come back and say Barclays was very accommodating, they've extended it from January 7th to January 9th and so we're going to do all this over the Christmas week. And then we're going to come back on January 2nd and do it again.

That's going to be a problem for the objectors, I think.

And I want to say that now just so it's not a surprise later.

Long way around, if the city is asking for a continuance we would not object to it.

We did want to confirm that Friday's hearing would be a
-- in the way of a status conference to report to you on
progress we've made in sorting this puzzle out. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Mr. Cullen, to -- to the extent I heard you say that you are willing to use the time of any continuance in an attempt to re-negotiate the deal that you are asking me to approve, I would encourage that as strongly as I can.

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as long as we all have, or in litigation even for that matter
   knows, that even if -- even if a winning party gets a
 2
 3
    judgment, they'll take 75%. Do you hear what I'm saying?
 4
             MR. CULLEN: I understand you, Your Honor.
 5
             THE COURT: All right. What time on Friday?
             MR. CULLEN: What time is good for the Court?
 6
 7
             THE COURT: Well, I'm here, so --
 8
             MR. CULLEN: 10:00.
             THE COURT: 10:00, is that all right with everybody?
 9
   All right. I'll see you then.
10
11
             THE CLERK: All rise.
12
              THE COURT: If it's not this room, ladies and
13
    gentlemen, one second. If it's not this room, we'll post a
   notice on ECF, otherwise assume it's this room.
14
15
             MR. SHUMAKER: Thank you, Your Honor.
16
             MS. GREEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
17
             THE COURT: Court is adjourned.
18
        (Court Adjourned at 2:50 p.m.)
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   We certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
 7
8
   electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the
9
   above-entitled matter.
10
   /s/Deborah L. Kremlick, CER-4872 Dated: 11-20-13
11
   Letrice Calloway
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